SAPP vs G2 SECURE STAFF, LLC., A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, et al.

In applying to work for G2, Plaintiff was required to (a) register for his own individualspecific account using his email address, and (b) enter a unique password in order to log into the system and submit his employment application. (Decl. of Christopher Elliott ISO Mot. (“Elliott Decl.”) ¶ 5.) In the online application system, Plaintiff was first presented with an Electronic Signature Notice and Consent disclosure form that informed him, among other things, that when he types his name into a textbox in the online application system it constitutes his electronic signature. (Elliott Decl. ¶ 6.) After agreeing to electronic signatures, Plaintiff was asked to enter his personal contact information, work history, and educational background. (Id. at ¶ 7.)

G2’s “Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Agreement” (“Arbitration Agreement”) was presented to Plaintiff next. (Elliott Decl. ¶ 8.) It provides in pertinent part:

DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND ARBITRATION AGREEMENT

G2 Secure Staff, LLC (the “Company”) attempts to avoid disputes with applicants and employees and to resolve issues that arise in a fair, reasonable, and expeditious manner. As part of that commitment to resolving disputes with applicants and employees, the Company has instituted a mandatory, binding arbitration program.

1. Mutual Arbitration and Covered Claims Except as provided below, both the Company and the undersigned individual (“Individual”) agree that all legal disputes and claims between them shall be determined exclusively by final and binding arbitration before a single, neutral arbitrator as described in this agreement (“Agreement”). The claims subject to this Agreement include all claims arising from or relating to Individual’s application

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 25CV023124: SAPP vs G2 SECURE STAFF, LLC., A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, et al. 06/04/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Action in Department 16C

for employment, employment (if hired), employment benefits, and termination of employment, except as provided below. Claims covered by this Agreement include the following types of claims: tort (negligence, defamation) or contract (express or implied); discrimination, harassment, retaliation, or termination; violation of public policy; overtime, wages, wage penalties, or other unpaid compensation; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended; the Americans with Disabilities Act; the Age Discrimination in Employment Act; the Fair Labor Standards Act; the Family and Medical Leave Act; the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (“WARN”); the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”); applicable state statutes, such as for California employees the California Labor Code including individual claims under the California Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”) for Labor Code violations that Individual claims to have personally suffered; and/or any other claim under any federal, state, or local statute, constitution, regulation, rule, ordinance, or common law (hereinafter, “Covered Claims”).

Covered Claims also include any dispute about the formation, scope, interpretation, applicability, validity, existence, enforcement, or extent of arbitrability of or under this Agreement, except as set forth in Section 4 below. Covered Claims shall be submitted to and determined exclusively by binding arbitration except as otherwise set forth in this Agreement. Company and Individual agree and stipulate that the parties are subject to, and that because the Company’s business, Individual’s prospective employment or employment, and this Agreement affect interstate commerce, this Agreement shall be interpreted and enforced in accordance with the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), and, to the extent not inconsistent with or preempted by the FAA, by the laws of the state in which Individual last worked for the Company.

In the event the FAA is found not to be applicable, the applicable law shall be the law of the state where Individual last worked for the Company. This mutual

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 25CV023124: SAPP vs G2 SECURE STAFF, LLC., A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, et al. 06/04/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Action in Department 16C

obligation to arbitrate Covered Claims binds the Company as well as applicants and employees. Both the Company and Individual agree that, by agreeing to binding arbitration, both are giving up the right to trial by jury or to file a lawsuit in court. Claims against the Company subject to this Agreement include claims against the Company’s parents, owners, officers, investors, subsidiaries, affiliates, divisions, brands, alleged agents, and alleged joint or co-employers, and their respective directors, officers, employees, and alleged agents, whether current, former, or future as well as claims against any person or entity that Individual alleges was acting in the course and scope of their employment with the Company. ….

5. Arbitration Procedures Individual and the Company agree to the administration of the arbitration proceeding by Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services (“JAMS”), subject to the then-current JAMS Employment Arbitration Rules & Procedures available at www.jamsadr.com, or by American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) pursuant to its Rules for the Resolution of Employment Disputes available at www.adr.org, unless those rules and/or procedures conflict with any express term of this Agreement, in which case this Agreement is controlling. No arbitration under this Agreement shall be subject to the JAMS Class Action Procedures or the AAA Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations.

If the parties cannot agree to the agency at the time of the dispute, Individual will make the final decision as to JAMS or AAA. A copy of the JAMS rules or the AAA rules can be made available to Individual upon request. …

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The arbitration will be heard by a single arbitrator at the agency office closest to Individual’s last place of employment, unless the Company and Individual both agree otherwise. Any party shall have the right to file a motion to dismiss and/or a motion for summary judgment in accordance with applicable federal law governing such motions. The responsibilities, procedures, and sanctions of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) Rule 11 are also incorporated into this Agreement. Either party can make an Offer of Judgment pursuant to FRCP Rule 68 or applicable state law, such as California Code of Civil Procedure Section 998. The arbitrator shall have the authority to issue subpoenas to compel the production of documents during discovery and the attendance of witnesses at the arbitration hearing and shall do so upon the reasonable request of either party.

Subject only to the express language in the above section entitled “Waiver of Class, Collective, and Certain Representative Actions,” the arbitrator shall have the sole and exclusive authority to resolve any Covered Claims. The arbitrator shall issue a final and binding written award pursuant to the JAMS rules, which will be subject to review only on the grounds set forth in the Federal Arbitration Act. Any Covered Claims arbitrated hereunder are subject to the same affirmative rights to individual damages and other relief and the same limitations regarding damages and ability to obtain other relief as would have applied in a judicial forum.

Among other things, the arbitrator has no authority or power to award penalties pursuant to PAGA other than for proven Labor Code violations Individual personally suffered. Any party may be represented throughout the arbitration proceedings by legal counsel of its/his/her own choosing.

6. Arbitration Fees and Costs

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In the event Individual files a claim in arbitration under this Agreement, the Company will pay all JAMS or AAA filing, administration, and arbitrator fees, except for JAMS’s or AAA’s employeedesignated [sic] filing fee or the normal filing fee in the state or federal court in which the dispute arose, whichever is less, which shall be Individual’s responsibility. The Company will pay any other JAMS or AAA administrative fees, the arbitrator’s fees, forum fees, and other administrative fees and costs of the arbitration forum. … Each party shall pay its own costs and attorneys’ fees, filing fees, deposition costs, service of process costs, witness fees, and transcript costs, unless the arbitrator awards such fees or costs in accordance with controlling law.

(Elliott Decl. ¶ 11, Ex. A.)

Plaintiff was required to scroll through the Arbitration Agreement in order to continue the online application process and submit his application. (Elliott Decl. ¶ 8.) In other words, Plaintiff could not complete and submit an application for employment with G2 without scrolling through the Arbitration Agreement. (Ibid.)

At the end of the Arbitration Agreement, Plaintiff was asked to electronically sign it by typing his name into a textbox, which constituted his electronic signature. (Elliott Decl. ¶ 8.) Plaintiff was then required to select one of two radio buttons marked “Accept” or “Decline.” (Ibid.) The way the Arbitration Agreement is displayed during the online application process differs and uses larger text than when it is in paper format. (Ibid.) The online application system allowed Plaintiff to pause the application process and return to the system later to complete his application. (Id. at ¶ 9.)

G2’s records reflect that Plaintiff electronically signed the Arbitration Agreement on August 5, 2025. (Elliott Decl. ¶ 11.) The text “Vincent Sapp” appears next to the signature line at the end of the Arbitration Agreement, which represents the full name that Plaintiff typed into the textbox mentioned above. (Ibid.) Below Plaintiff’s name, the word “Accepted” appears, which signifies that Plaintiff selected the radio button marked “Accept” as to the Arbitration Agreement. (Ibid.) Under these indicators, the date that

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 25CV023124: SAPP vs G2 SECURE STAFF, LLC., A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, et al. 06/04/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Action in Department 16C

Plaintiff signed the Arbitration Agreement appears: “Date Signed: August 5, 2024.” (Ibid.)

After Plaintiff electronically signed the Arbitration Agreement, a link was available to download a copy of the employment application, including the Arbitration Agreement. (Elliott Decl., ¶ 10.)

On September 26, 2025, G2’s counsel sent Plaintiff’s counsel a copy of Plaintiff’s signed Arbitration Agreement and asked whether Plaintiff would stipulate to arbitration. (Decl. of K. Gao ISO Mot. (Decl. of K. Gao ISO Mot. (“Gao Decl.”) ¶ 3.)

On September 29, 2025, Plaintiff filed the Complaint in this action.

On October 9, 2025, G2’s counsel followed up with Plaintiff’s counsel concerning whether Plaintiff would agree to arbitration. (Gao Decl. ¶ 3.)

G2 was served with the Summons and Complaint on October 10, 2025.

On November 7, 2025, G2, Menzies, and Delta filed an Answer to the Complaint. No other Defendant has appeared in the action. The Answer includes as its first affirmative defense a claim that the lawsuit is barred by an arbitration agreement. (Answer 2:14- 22.)

On November 10, 2025, G2 filed a Notice of Removal in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California (“Federal Court”). While the action was pending in Federal Court, G2’s counsel followed up with Plaintiff’s counsel on December 15, 2025, to ask if Plaintiff would stipulate to arbitration. (Gao Decl. ¶ 3.) Plaintiff’s counsel would not stipulate. (Ibid.)

The Federal Court remanded the action back to the Sacramento County Superior Court based on the stipulation of the parties on December 26, 2025. On March 24, 2026, G2’s counsel again asked Plaintiff’s counsel if Plaintiff would stipulate to arbitration. (Gao Decl. ¶ 3.) Plaintiff’s counsel declined. (Ibid.)

G2 filed the instant Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Action on April 17, 2026.

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Legal Standard The Arbitration Agreement states, and Plaintiff does not dispute, that the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) governs this motion. (See Elliott Decl., Ex. A [“Company and Individual agree and stipulate that the parties are subject to, and that because the Company’s business, Individual’s prospective employment or employment, and this Agreement affect interstate commerce, this Agreement shall be interpreted and enforced in accordance with the [FAA], and, to the extent not inconsistent with or preempted by the FAA, by the laws of the state in which Individual last worked for the Company.”].)

Under both the FAA and state law, the threshold questions presented by a petition to compel arbitration are: (1) whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists and, if so, (2) whether the agreement encompasses the dispute at issue. (See United States ex rel. Welch v. My Left Foot Children’s Therapy, LLC (2017) 871 F.3d 791, 796; Maxwell v. Atria Management Co., LLC (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 230, 241.)

“When determining whether parties have agreed to submit to arbitration, courts apply state-law principles of contract formation and interpretation.” (Suski v. Coinbase, Inc. (2022) 55 F.4th 1227, 1230; see also Metters v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 696, 701 [stating the FAA’s “public policy of favoring arbitration does not come into play … until a court has found the parties entered into a valid contract under state law”].)

Further, even under the FAA, “general contract defenses such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, grounded in state contract law, may operate to invalidate arbitration agreements.” (Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams (2002) 279 F.3d 889, 892.) In contrast, the defense of waiver is not viewed as a question of substantive contract law; therefore, “‘it is federal law, not state law, that governs the inquiry into whether a party has waived its right to arbitration.’ [Citation.]” (Aviation Data, Inc. v. American Express Travel Related Services Co., Inc. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1535.)

“A party seeking to compel arbitration of a dispute ‘bears the burden of proving the existence of an arbitration agreement, and the party opposing arbitration bears the burden of proving any defense, such as unconscionability.’ [Citation.]” (Jenks v. DLA Piper Rudnick Gray Cary US LLP (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 1, 8; see also Pinnacle

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Museum Tower Ass’n v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236 [deciding application of an arbitration clause under the FAA].)

Both the state and federal arbitration statutes reflect a recognized public policy favoring arbitration. (Knight, et al., Cal. Prac. Guide: Alternative Dispute Resolution (The Rutter Group 2025 Update) ¶ 5:76.)

Discussion

G2 moves to compel arbitration pursuant to the Arbitration Agreement under the FAA, arguing that Plaintiff entered into a valid and enforceable agreement to arbitrate all disputes and claims related to his employment with G2. (Mot. to Arbitrate (“Mot.”) 2:3- 10.) G2 also seeks an order to stay the action pending arbitration. (Id. at 2:24-26.) G2 contends:

Plaintiff signed the Arbitration Agreement, the causes of action asserted in the Complaint are covered by the Arbitration Agreement, and the Arbitration Agreement is neither procedurally nor substantively unconscionable. G2, therefore, respectfully requests that the Court grant the instant Motion to Compel Arbitration (“Motion”) and stay this action pending arbitration.

(Mot. 8:11-17.) Although the motion is brought by G2, Menzies, and Delta consent to and join G2’s motion. (Mot. 3:4-6.) The Court refers to G2, Menzies, and Delta collectively as “Defendants.”

Plaintiff opposes the motion, rejoining that no enforceable agreement to arbitrate exists, G2 waived its right to arbitration by removing the action to federal court without moving for arbitration in that forum, and the proffered Arbitration Agreement is procedurally and substantively unconscionable. (Opp’n 2:3-18.)

The Court addresses these issues in turn. ///

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A. Existence of an Arbitration Agreement

Plaintiff contends that Defendants have failed “to establish that Plaintiff knowingly assented to the [Arbitration] Agreement or that the alleged electronic signature is attributable to [him].” (Opp’n 5:1-2.) Plaintiff argues:

Here, Defendants have failed to meet their burden of authenticating the alleged electronic signature. Defendants merely point to the fact that Plaintiff’s typed name appears at the end of the purported arbitration agreement. However, a typed name alone is insufficient to establish that Plaintiff actually reviewed, assented to, or electronically signed the Agreement. Defendants provide no audit trail, metadata, IP address logs, time-stamped authentication records, or evidence from any independent electronic signature platform such as DocuSign or Adobe Sign. Nor do Defendants provide evidence demonstrating that only Plaintiff could have accessed the system or entered the alleged signature.

(Opp’n 5:13-19.)

The Court disagrees.

Under Civil Code section 1633.7, enacted in 1999 as part of the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act …, an electronic signature has the same legal effect as a handwritten signature [Citations.] Still, any writing must be authenticated before the writing, or secondary evidence of its content, may be received in evidence. [Citations.] “Authentication of a writing means (a) the introduction of evidence sufficient to sustain a finding that it is the writing that the proponent of the evidence claims it is or (b) the establishment of such facts by any other means provided by law.” [Citations.] Civil Code section 1633.9 addresses how a proponent of an electronic signature may authenticate the signature—that is, show the signature is, in fact, the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 25CV023124: SAPP vs G2 SECURE STAFF, LLC., A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, et al. 06/04/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Action in Department 16C

signature of the person the proponent claims it is. The statute states: “(a) An electronic record or electronic signature is attributable to a person if it was the act of the person. The act of the person may be shown in any manner, including a showing of the efficacy of any security procedure applied to determine the person to which the electronic record or electronic signature was attributable.” (Civ. Code, § 1633.9, subd. (a).)

(Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Group, Inc. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836, 843.) “[T]he burden of authenticating an electronic signature is not great.” (Id. at p. 844.)

For example, in Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Grp., Inc. (“Ruiz”) the Court of Appeal concluded that the defendant had not authenticated the electronic signature on the subject arbitration agreement as the act of the plaintiff. The court reasoned that the declaration submitted by the defendant did not show that the plaintiff’s signature “could only have been placed on the [subject] agreement … by a person using [the plaintiff]’s ‘unique login ID and Password’; that the date and time printed next to the electronic signature indicated the date and time the electronic signature was made; that all [of the defendant’s] employees were required to use their unique login ID and password when they logged into the HR system and signed electronic forms and agreements; and the electronic signature on the [arbitration] agreement was, therefore, apparently made by [the plaintiff] on September 21, 2011, at 11:47 a.m.” (Ruiz, supra, at p. 844.)

By contrast, in Espejo v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group (“Espejo”) (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1047, the Court of Appeal found the defendant properly authenticated the electronic signature by filling the evidentiary gap left by the defendant in Ruiz. The Espejo court noted that the defendant supported its conclusion that the signature could only have been placed by someone using the plaintiff’s username and password by “detail[ing] [its] security precautions regarding transmission and use of an applicant’s unique username and password, as well as the steps an applicant would have to take to place his or her name on the signature line of the employment agreement and the [arbitration agreement].” (Espejo at p. 1062.)

Here, like in Espejo, the Court finds that Defendants have sufficiently authenticated Plaintiff’s electronic signature on the Arbitration Agreement dated August 5, 2024,

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despite Plaintiff’s declaration that he does not “recall separately reviewing or knowingly signing any arbitration agreement.” (Sapp Decl. ISO Opp’n ¶ 8; see Elliott Decl. ¶¶ 5- 11.) As detailed above, the Declaration of Christopher Elliottt, G2’s Regional Director of Labor Relations, provides the necessary factual details to properly authenticate the Arbitration Agreement and Plaintiff’s electronic signature thereon.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendants have satisfactorily shown that a valid agreement to arbitrate exists.

The Court also finds, and Plaintiff does not dispute, that the terms of the Arbitration Agreement encompass the claims at issue in this action.

B. Waiver

Plaintiff argues that Defendants waived their right to arbitration by G2’s removal of this action to federal court, citing Hoover v. American Income Life Insurance Co. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1204 (“Hoover”).[1]

As stated above, “where the FAA applies, whether a party has waived a right to arbitrate is a matter of federal, not state, law.” (Davis v. Shiekh Shoes, LLC (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 956, 963.)

“[T]he burden for establishing waiver of an arbitration agreement is the same as the burden for establishing waiver in any other context.” (Armstrong v. Michaels Stores, Inc. (2023) 59 F.4th 1011, 1015.) “[T]he party asserting waiver must demonstrate: (1) knowledge of an existing right to compel arbitration and (2) intentional acts inconsistent with that existing right.” (Ibid.)[2]

“[T]here is no ‘concrete test,’ for assessing wither [a party takes] acts inconsistent with its right to arbitration[;]” therefore, the Court “consider[s] the totality of the parties’ actions.” (Armstrong, supra, 59 F.4th at p. 1015; accord Davis, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 964.) The Court “asks whether those actions holistically ‘indicate a conscious decision ... to seek judicial judgment on the merits of the arbitrable claims, which would be inconsistent with a right to arbitrate.’ [Citation.]” (Armstrong, supra, at p. 1015.) “[A] party generally ‘acts inconsistently with exercising the right to arbitrate when it (1) makes an intentional decision not to move to compel arbitration and (2) actively litigates

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the merits of a case for a prolonged period of time in order to take advantage of being in court.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)

“A defendant’s removal of a case filed in state court to federal court does not by itself constitute an implicit waiver of the right to compel arbitration.” (Hoover v. American Income Life Ins. Co. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1204 [citing Halim v. Great Gatsby’s Auction Gallery, Inc. (7th Cir. 2008) 516 F.3d 557, 562.) “But, a defendant’s removal of a case to federal court, coupled with participation in several months of litigation, waives the right to arbitrate because electing to proceed in federal court on an arbitrable dispute is presumptive waiver of the right to arbitrate.” (Id. [citing Cabinetree of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Kraftmaid Cabinetry, Inc. (7th Cir. 1995) 50 F.3d 388, 390-391].)

Applying the foregoing standards to this case, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not shown Defendants waived the right to arbitration by G2’s act of removing the case to federal court.

G2 quickly and clearly indicated its intention to arbitrate, providing copies of the Arbitration Agreement to Plaintiff’s counsel shortly after Plaintiff filed his Complaint. G2’s counsel met and conferred with Plaintiff’s counsel multiple times in an effort to avoid unnecessary motion practice, and at no point did G2 actively litigate the merits of the case or seek discovery. Defendants’ Answer asserts the existence of the Arbitration Agreement, and G2 filed the instant motion less than four months after the federal court remanded the action back to the state court.

This case is easily distinguishable from Hoover, the case relied upon by Plaintiff. In Hoover, the defendant seeking to compel arbitration filed two demurrers, attempted to schedule discovery, accepted and contested discovery requests, and failed to assert a right to arbitration in the case management statement. (Hoover, supra, at p. 1205.) Additionally, the defendant did not produce the arbitration agreement until after the second demurrer hearing, approximately three months before the scheduled trial date. (Ibid.) None of these facts exists in this case.

C. Unconscionability

Plaintiff argues that even if a valid arbitration agreement exists in this case, it is “wholly unconscionable.” (Opp’n 7:13-14.)

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“The general principles of unconscionability are well established. A contract is unconscionable if one of the parties lacked a meaningful choice in deciding whether to agree and the contract contains terms that are unreasonably favorable to the other party.” [Citation.] We have referred to these two aspects of unconscionability as its “procedural and substantive elements.” [Citation.] The procedural element concerns “the circumstances of contract negotiation and formation,” particularly “oppression or surprise due to unequal bargaining power.” [Citation.] The substantive element, by contrast, concerns “the fairness of an agreement’s actual terms,” i.e., whether those terms “are overly harsh or one-sided.” [Citation.]

“Both procedural and substantive elements must be present to conclude a term is unconscionable, but these required elements need not be present to the same degree.” [Citation.] Courts “apply a sliding scale analysis under which ‘the more substantively oppressive [a] term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa.’” [Citation.]

When there is substantial procedural unconscionability, “even a relatively low degree of substantive unconscionability may suffice to render the agreement unenforceable.” [Citation.] “Substantive terms that, in the abstract, might not support an unconscionability finding take on greater weight when imposed by a procedure that is demonstrably oppressive. Although procedural unconscionability alone does not invalidate a contract, its existence requires courts to closely scrutinize the substantive terms ‘to ensure they are not manifestly unfair or one-sided.’” [Citation.] “The ultimate issue in every case is whether the terms of the contract are sufficiently unfair, in

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 25CV023124: SAPP vs G2 SECURE STAFF, LLC., A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, et al. 06/04/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Action in Department 16C

view of all relevant circumstances, that a court should withhold enforcement.” [Citation.]

(Fuentes v. Empire Nissan, Inc. (2026) 19 Cal.5th 93, 102-103.)

Procedural Unconscionability

Plaintiff argues that the Arbitration Agreement is procedurally unconscionable because it is a contract of adhesion, was inconspicuous, and failed to provide the applicable rules of arbitration. (Id. at 7:28-9:12.)

“Some procedural unconscionability is present whenever an agreement ‘is a contract of adhesion, i.e., a “standardized contract which, imposed and drafted by the party of superior bargaining strength, relegates to the subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it.”’ [Citation.]” (Fuentes, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 103.)

Here, the Court agrees that the Arbitration Agreement is a contract of adhesion as it was provided on a take it or leave it basis. “The question then becomes one of the degree of procedural unconscionability, and by extension, the degree of scrutiny with which [the Court] search[es] the substance of the agreement’s terms for unfairness and one-sidedness.” (Fuentes, supra, at p. 104.) “A greater degree of procedural unconscionability is present when the circumstances of a contract’s formation evince ‘oppression’ or ‘surprise’ beyond that usually present in a contract of adhesion. [Citation.]” (Ibid.)

“Oppression occurs where a contract involves lack of negotiation and meaningful choice.” (Fuentes, supra, at p. 104 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted].) “Courts must be particularly attuned to this danger in the employment setting, where economic pressure exerted by employers on all but the most sought-after employees may be particularly acute.” (Ibid. [internal quotation marks and citation omitted].)

“‘[S]urprise’ is present when an agreement’s meaning is difficult to ascertain, such as when the allegedly unconscionable provision is hidden within a prolix printed form. Small font size and illegibility can also support a finding of surprise.” (Fuentes, supra, at p. 104 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted].)

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Here, where a prospective employer asks an applicant to “sign an arbitration agreement as part of the employment application process, the economic pressure on the applicant to sign the agreement is particularly high.” (Fuentes, supra, at p. 104.) However, Plaintiff had the opportunity to pause the online application and return to the system later, meaning Plaintiff could take his time to review the Arbitration Agreement at his own pace. Also, after signing the Arbitration Agreement, Plaintiff was provided the opportunity to download a copy of his employment application, including the Arbitration Provision. (Elliott Decl. ¶¶ 9-10.)

Further, the Arbitration Agreement was shown to Plaintiff as a separate section of his online employment application process, in which it was displayed in larger text than if displayed or printed in paper form. (Elliott Decl. ¶ 8.)

Finally, the Court finds that the degree of procedural unconscionability in this case is not increased by the fact that the arbitration rules referenced in the Arbitration Agreement (JAMS Employment Arbitration Rules & Procedures or the AAA’s Rules for Resolution of Employment Disputes) were not provided to Plaintiff. The applicable rules are clearly identified in the Arbitration Agreement and were easily accessible to Plaintiff – the Arbitration Agreement provided the internet addresses where both sets of rules could be located.

Under such circumstances, the failure to attach a copy of the rules does not render the Arbitration Agreement procedurally unconscionable. (See Lane v. Francis Capital Management, LLC (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 676, 691 [“There could be no surprise, as the arbitration rules referenced in the agreement were easily accessible to the parties – the AAA rules are available on the internet.”]; Peng v. First Republic Bank (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1470-1472 [concluding the failure to attach governing AAA rules, alone, is insufficient to support a finding of procedural unconscionability]; Bigler v.

Harker School (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 727, 737 [“We agree that the absence of the AAA rules is of minor significance to our analysis.”].)

Under the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds only a low degree of procedural unconscionability. (See Fuentes, supra, at pp. 103-105 [finding a “high degree” of procedural unconscionability when: the subject arbitration agreement was required to be signed as part of the employment application process; the plaintiff was told to “hurry” and given only five minutes to complete the entire employment application packet, which contained the arbitration provision; the plaintiff was not provided a copy of the form after she signed it; and the arbitration agreement was in tiny, blurry font].)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 25CV023124: SAPP vs G2 SECURE STAFF, LLC., A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, et al. 06/04/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Action in Department 16C

Substantive Unconscionability

The substantive unconscionability analysis examines the fairness of a contract’s terms. This analysis ensures that contracts, particularly contracts of adhesion, do not impose terms that have been variously described as overly harsh, unduly oppressive, so one-sided as to shock the conscience, or unfairly one-sided. All of these formulations point to the central idea that the unconscionability doctrine is concerned not with a simple old-fashioned bad bargain, but with terms that are unreasonably favorable to the more powerful party. [W]here, as here, the written agreement has been prepared entirely by the employer, it is a well established rule of construction that any ambiguities must be construed against the drafting employer and in favor of the nondrafting employee.

Ultimately, the question is whether [the nondrafting employee], through oppression and surprise, was coerced or misled into making an unfair bargain.

(Fuentes, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 106 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted.) In assessing substantive unconscionability, the “paramount consideration” is mutuality of the agreement to arbitrate. (Pinela v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 227, 241.)

Plaintiff contends that the Arbitration Agreement is substantively unconscionable, arguing:

The Agreement raises significant mutuality concerns [under Cook v. University of Southern California (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 312] because it broadly requires Plaintiff to arbitrate claims not only against Defendants, but also against a sweeping category of affiliated third parties, including Defendants’ parents, owners, officers, investors, subsidiaries, affiliates, divisions, brands, alleged agents, and alleged joint or co-employers, as well as their respective

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 25CV023124: SAPP vs G2 SECURE STAFF, LLC., A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, et al. 06/04/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Action in Department 16C

employees and agents. However, the Agreement does not clearly impose corresponding obligations requiring those same third parties to arbitrate claims they may assert against Plaintiff. In practical effect, the Agreement substantially expands the categories of entities and individuals protected by arbitration while providing limited reciprocal benefit to Plaintiff.

(Opp’n 9:18-27.)

Plaintiff further argues that the Arbitration Agreement is substantively unconscionable because “the Agreement does not provide for adequate discovery,” and “severely limits judicial review of the arbitrator’s decision.” (Opp’n 10:1-4.)

1) Mutuality In Cook v. University of Southern California (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 312 (“Cook ”), relied upon by Plaintiff, the Court of Appeal found that the subject arbitration agreement was substantively unconscionable for, inter alia, lack of mutuality. In that case,

the plaintiff (Cook) filed a lawsuit against her former employer, the University of Southern California (USC), and two coworkers alleging discrimination and harassment. Cook and USC had an arbitration agreement wherein they “agree[d] to the resolution by arbitration of all claims, whether or not arising out of Employee’s University employment, remuneration or termination, that Employee may have against the University or any of its related entities, including but not limited to faculty practice plans, or its or their officers, trustees, administrators, employees or agents, in their capacity as such or otherwise; and all claims that the University may have against Employee.” . . . The agreement was . . . deemed unconscionable[, inter alia,] because it . . . lacked mutuality as it did not require USC’s “related entities” to arbitrate their claims against Cook.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 25CV023124: SAPP vs G2 SECURE STAFF, LLC., A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, et al. 06/04/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Action in Department 16C

(Ayala-Ventura v. Super. Ct. (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 241, 257.) “The employee in Cook was obliged to arbitrate her claims against USC, its related entities, as well as its ‘officers, trustees, administrators, employees or agents,’ but only USC was bound to arbitrate its claims against the plaintiff. The agreement lacked mutuality because USC’s “related entities” were not bound to it.” (Id. at p. 258 [quoting Cook at p. 319].)

Here too, the Arbitration Agreement requires Plaintiff to arbitrate her claims against G2 and its “parents, owners, officers, investors, subsidiaries, affiliates, divisions, brands, alleged agents, and alleged joint or co-employers, and their respective directors, officers, employees, and alleged agents, whether current, former, or future,” whereas the related entities are not required to arbitrate their claims against Plaintiff.

Like in Cook, the “plain language” of the Arbitration Agreement provides a “significant benefit” to G2’s related entities “without any reciprocal benefit” to Plaintiff. (Cook, at p. 328.) And G2 offers no justification for this one-sided treatment. (Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 117-118 [“As has been recognized ‘“unconscionability turns not only on a ‘one-sided’ result, but also on an absence of ‘justification’ for it.”’ (Citation.)”].)

The Court is not persuaded by G2’s attempts to distinguish this case from Cook.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the Arbitration Agreement is somewhat substantively unconscionable. 2) Discovery Plaintiff argues the Arbitration Agreement is also substantively unconscionable because it “merely references JAMS and AAA employment arbitration rules without setting forth any guaranteed discovery procedures within the Agreement itself.” (Opp’n 10:8-10.) Plaintiff continues: “Although the Agreement references JAMS and AAA employment arbitration procedures generally, it does not guarantee Plaintiff any minimum level of discovery sufficient to vindicate his statutory employment claims [as required under Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83]. Instead, the scope of discovery is left largely to the discretion of the arbitrator.” (Id. at 10:10-13.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 25CV023124: SAPP vs G2 SECURE STAFF, LLC., A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, et al. 06/04/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Action in Department 16C

Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th 83 provided a standard that many cases have used to evaluate the validity of discovery limits. A brief review will provide context. The Armendariz plaintiffs sued their employer for FEHA violations, and the employer moved to compel arbitration. (Armendariz, at p. 92.) In opposition, the plaintiffs first argued that a mandatory agreement to arbitrate claims arising under a state antidiscrimination statute, like FEHA, is prohibited. [The California Supreme Court] rejected that broad argument, but held that arbitration of a claim based on nonwaivable statutory civil workplace rights could only be compelled if the agreement satisfied five minimum requirements.

Such an agreement “is lawful if it ‘(1) provides for neutral arbitrators, (2) provides for more than minimal discovery, (3) requires a written award, (4) provides for all of the types of relief that would otherwise be available in court, and (5) does not require employees to pay either unreasonable costs or any arbitrators’ fees or expenses as a condition of access to the arbitration forum.‘”

(Ramirez v. Charter Communications, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 478, 504.) “As to discovery,” the California Supreme Court “state[s] that parties to an arbitration clause can agree ‘to something less than the full panoply of discovery provided’ in the Code of Civil Procedure [citation], but that ‘adequate discovery is indispensable for the vindication of FEHA claims.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) “Armendariz stands for the principle that an arbitration agreement required as a condition of employment must generally permit employees sufficient discovery to adequately arbitrate any statutory claims. The scope of what discovery is sufficient is determined by the arbitrator.” (Id. at p. 505.)

Although the Arbitration Agreement does not contain an express provision for discovery, it incorporates JAMS’ Employment Arbitration Rules & Procedures or the AAA’s Rules for the Resolution of Employment Disputes.[3] Cases have rejected contentions that the AAA rules do not comply with Armendariz’s minimum discovery requirements. (Lane v. Francis Capital Management, LLC (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 676, 693-694.) “There appears to be no meaningful difference between the scope of discovery approved in Armendariz and that authorized by the AAA employment dispute rules, certainly

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 25CV023124: SAPP vs G2 SECURE STAFF, LLC., A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, et al. 06/04/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Action in Department 16C

not the role of the arbitrator in controlling the extent of actual discovery permitted.” (Roman v. Superior Court (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1476.) “In short, the lack of an express provision for discovery [does] not render the arbitration agreement substantively unconscionable.” (Lane, supra, 224 Cal. App.4th at 693.)

Thus, the lack of an express provision addressing discovery does not render the Agreement unconscionable, as the AAA rules are expressly incorporated into the Agreement.

The Court notes that Plaintiff cites to two cases – Baxter v. Genworth North American Corp. (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 713 and De Leon v. Pinnacle Property Management Services, LLC (2021) 72 Cal.5th 476 – in support of his argument that the Arbitration Agreement does not provide for adequate discovery under Armendariz. The line of reasoning used in those decisions has been disapproved of by the California Supreme Court in Ramirez v. Charter Communications, Inc., supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 505-506.

For the stated reasons, the Court finds that the Arbitration Agreement’s discovery provisions are not substantively unconscionable.

3) Judicial Review Plaintiff next argues that the Arbitration Agreement is substantively unconscionable because it “fails to permit adequate judicial review,” as required by Armendariz. (Opp’n 11:16.) Plaintiff contends:

Here, the Agreement expressly limits judicial review to the narrow grounds available under the Federal Arbitration Act. While Defendant cites the provision requiring the arbitrator to issue a written award, there is no provision permitting meaningful judicial review beyond the limited grounds available under the FAA. Plaintiff’s ability to challenge legal error or otherwise protect his statutory rights is therefore significantly restricted, in contravention of Armendariz.

(Opp’n 11:28-12:4.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 25CV023124: SAPP vs G2 SECURE STAFF, LLC., A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, et al. 06/04/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Action in Department 16C

The Court disagrees.

Armendariz requires an arbitrator to “issue a written arbitration decision that will reveal, however briefly, the essential findings and conclusions on which the award is based.” (Armendariz, supra, at p. 107.) The purpose of a written decision is to permit a limited form of judicial review.

Here, the Arbitration Agreement provides that the arbitrator ’shall issue a final and binding written award pursuant to the JAMS rules, which will be subject to review only on the grounds set forth in the Federal Arbitration Act.” (Elliott Decl., Ex. A.)

“JAMS employment rules require a ‘concise written statement of (the arbitrator’s) reasons for the Award, stating the essential findings and conclusions on which the award is based. The parties may agree to any other form of award, unless the arbitration is based on an arbitration agreement that is required as a condition of employment.’ [Citation.]” (Chin, et al., Cal. Prac. Guide: Employment Litigation (The Rutter Group 2026 Update) ¶ 18:837 [citing JAMS Employment Arbitration Rules and Procedures, Rule 24(h)].)

Moreover, the FAA, which governs the Arbitration Agreement, provides for judicial review of the arbitrator’s award. (See 9 U.S.C. §§ 9-11.)

Accordingly, the Court finds that the Arbitration Agreement satisfies Armendariz’s requirement.

Severance

As discussed above, the Court has concluded that Plaintiff has demonstrated a modicum of procedural unconscionability and that some degree of substantive unconscionability exists for the Arbitration Agreement’s lack of mutuality under Cook.

Accordingly, the Court must decide whether it may sever the provision of the Arbitration Agreement that it finds to be substantively unconscionable.

Pursuant to Civil Code section 1670.5, when a court finds a contractual clause to be unconscionable, the court has discretion to refuse to enforce the contract, sever any

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 25CV023124: SAPP vs G2 SECURE STAFF, LLC., A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, et al. 06/04/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Action in Department 16C

unconscionable clause, or limit application of the unconscionable clause. (Ramirez, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. Cal. 5th at 513; see also Ronderos v. USF Reddaway, Inc. (9th Cir. 2024) 114 F.4th 1080, 1099.)

“No bright-line rule requires a court to refuse enforcement if a contract has more than one unconscionable term. Likewise, a court is not required to sever or restrict an unconscionable term if an agreement has only a single such term.” (Ramirez, supra, at p. 516.) Instead, the appropriate inquiry is “qualitative and accounts for each factor” the California Supreme Court identified in Armendariz. (Ibid.)

At the outset, a court should ask whether “the central purpose of the contract is tainted with illegality.” (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 124.) If so, the contract cannot be cured, and the court should refuse to enforce it. If that is not the case, the court should go on to ask first, whether the contract’s unconscionability can be cured purely through severance or restriction of its terms, or whether reformation by augmentation is necessary. (See Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 124-125.)

If no “reformation is required,” the offending provision can be severed or limited, and “the rest of the arbitration agreement left intact,” then severance or restriction is the preferred course for provisions that are collateral to the agreement’s main purpose. [Citations.] If the unconscionability cannot be cured by extirpating or limiting the offending provisions, but instead requires augmentation to cure the unconscionability, then the court should refuse to enforce the contract. [Citations.]

Courts cannot “rewrite agreements and impose terms to which neither party has agreed.” [Citation.]

Even if a contract can be cured, the court should also ask whether the unconscionability should be cured through severance or restriction because the interests of justice would be furthered by such actions. (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 124.) This part of the inquiry focuses on whether mere severance of the unconscionable terms would

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 25CV023124: SAPP vs G2 SECURE STAFF, LLC., A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, et al. 06/04/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Action in Department 16C

function to condone an illegal scheme and whether the defects in the agreement indicate that the stronger party engaged in a systematic effort to impose arbitration on the weaker party not simply as an alternative to litigation, but to secure a forum that works to the stronger party’s advantage. (Ibid.) If the answer to either question is yes, the court should refuse to enforce the agreement.

In conducting this analysis, the court may also consider the deterrent effect of each option. As Mills v. Facility Solutions Group, Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 1035 explained, severing multiple unconscionable provisions from an agreement and enforcing the remainder could “create an incentive for an employer to draft a one-sided arbitration agreement in the hope employees would not challenge the unlawful provisions, but if they do, the court would simply modify the agreement to include the bilateral terms the employer should have included in the first place.” (Id. at p. 1045.) Although there are no bright-line numerical rules regarding severance, it is fair to say that the greater the number of unconscionable provisions a contract contains the less likely it is that severance will be the appropriate remedy.

Finally, if the contract contains a severance clause, the court should take it into account as an expression of the parties’ intent that an agreement curable by removing defective terms should otherwise be enforced. [Citations.] That said, we note that the parties to an agreement cannot divest a trial court of its discretion under Civil Code section 1670.5 by including such a severance clause. [Citation.]

Accordingly, courts may liberally sever any unconscionable portion of a contract and enforce the rest when: the illegality is collateral to the contract’s main purpose; it is possible to cure the illegality by means of severance; and enforcing the balance of the contract would

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 25CV023124: SAPP vs G2 SECURE STAFF, LLC., A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, et al. 06/04/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Action in Department 16C

be in the interests of justice. [Citations.]

(Ramirez, at p. 516-517.)

Applying the forgoing standard to this case, the Court finds it is permitted and appropriate to sever the following offending clause from paragraph 1 of the Arbitration Agreement:

Claims against the Company subject to this Agreement include claims against the Company’s parents, owners, officers, investors, subsidiaries, affiliates, divisions, brands, alleged agents, and alleged joint or co-employers, and their respective directors, officers, employees, and alleged agents, whether current, former, or future as well as claims against any person or entity that Individual alleges was acting in the course and scope of their employment with the Company.

(Elliott Decl., Ex. A, at ¶ 1.) This clause is the only unconscionable term in the Arbitration Agreement, and its illegality is collateral to the its main purpose. Further, the clause can be severed and the remainder of the Arbitration Agreement enforced without adding terms. Additionally, severance would not conflict with the interests of justice, as there is no indication of a systemic effort by G2 to engage in an illegal scheme at the disadvantage of its employees. Finally, the Arbitration Agreement includes a severability provision, which the Court takes into account even though it is not binding. (See Elliott Decl., Ex. A at ¶ 8.)

Because the Court has severed the clause which expands the phrase “Claims against the Company” as used in the Arbitration Agreement to include claims against G2’s “alleged agents[] and alleged joint or co-employers, and their respective directors, officers, employees, and alleged agents,” etc., the Court considers Defendants’ argument made in the moving papers that non-signatories Menzies and Delta are entitled to enforce the Arbitration Agreement under the doctrine of equitable estoppel/ (Mot. 16:3-5.)

///

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 25CV023124: SAPP vs G2 SECURE STAFF, LLC., A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, et al. 06/04/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Action in Department 16C

D. Equitable Estoppel

“[T] general rule is ‘one must be a party to an arbitration agreement to be bound by it or invoke it.’ [Citation.]” (Garcia v. Pexco, LLC (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 782, 785.) “Courts recognize exceptions to the general rule which allow nonsignatories to compel arbitration of a dispute arising out of the scope of the agreement. [Citation.] One of the exceptions is equitable estoppel.” (Id. at pp. 785-786.)

Under the equitable estoppel doctrine, “‘a nonsignatory defendant may invoke an arbitration clause to compel a signatory plaintiff to arbitrate its claims when the causes of action against the nonsignatory are “intimately founded in and intertwined” with the underlying contract obligations.’ [Citation.]” (Garcia, supra, at p. 786.) “The doctrine applies where the claims are based on the same facts and are inherently inseparable from the arbitrable claims against signatory defendants.” (Ibid. [internal quotation marks and citation omitted].)

Defendants argue in support of their equitable estoppel argument as follows:

Plaintiff’s Complaint confirms that the claims against Menzies and Delta are based on the same facts as those asserted against G2 and are inherently inseparable from those claims. Indeed, Plaintiff lumps Menzies and Delta together with G2 when he defines “DEFENDANTS” in the Complaint and alleges that they are joint employers with, and agents of, G2. (Compl., ¶¶ 14-17, 22-23, 26.) Again, while G2, Menzies, and Delta dispute this characterization, it is clear that the Complaint alleges that the three entity defendants employed Plaintiff and participated in equal measure in the events underlying Plaintiff’s claims. It is, therefore, manifest that the equitable estoppel doctrine applies, and Plaintiff cannot claim that non-signatories Menzies and Delta are precluded from joining in seeking enforcement of the Arbitration Agreement against Plaintiff.

(Mot. 18:1-9.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 25CV023124: SAPP vs G2 SECURE STAFF, LLC., A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, et al. 06/04/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Action in Department 16C

Plaintiff’s opposition does not respond to Defendants’ equitable estoppel argument, and the Court construes Plaintiff’s lack of opposition thereto as a concession on its merits. (See D.I. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Super. Ct. (1964) 60 Cal.2d 723, 728 fn. 4 [where nonmoving party fails to oppose a ground for a motion “it is assumed that [nonmoving party] concedes” that ground].)

Even if Plaintiff did not concede the merits of Defendants’ equitable estoppel argument, the Court finds that Defendants have shown its application to this case since Plaintiff’s claims against Menzies and Delta are “based on the same facts and are inherently inseparable from the arbitrable claims against [G2].” (Garcia, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 786.)

Like the facts presented in Garcia v. Pexco, LLC, Plaintiff’s claims against Menzies and Delta are “rooted in his employment relationship with [a staffing company], and the governing arbitration agreement expressly includes [FEHA and] statutory wage and hour claims.” (Id. at p. 787.) Plaintiff’s claims against Menzies and Delta are based on the same facts as those alleged against G2. (See Compl. ¶¶ 19-20.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that G2 contracted with Delta and Menzies to supply personnel/staff and that “[a]t all relevant times, G2 assigned Plaintiff to perform ramp agent duties in support of Delta’s operations, under the supervision and direction of Menzies and/or Delta personnel.” (Compl. ¶ 20.)

Plaintiff further alleges that Menzies and Delta “exercised control over the manner and means of Plaintiff’s work, shared supervisory authority with G2, and jointly employed Plaintiff for purposes of California employment law.” (Ibid.)

Plaintiff cannot attempt to link Menzies and Delta to G2 to hold them liable for alleged employment law claims and argue the Arbitration Agreement only applies to G2. Plaintiff agreed to arbitrate his claims against G2, and Plaintiff alleges Menzies and Delta were his joint employers.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the Arbitration Agreement applies to Plaintiff’s claims against G2, Menzies, and Delta.

Conclusion

For the stated reasons, the motion to compel arbitration is granted.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 25CV023124: SAPP vs G2 SECURE STAFF, LLC., A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, et al. 06/04/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Action in Department 16C

Further, this action is stayed pending the completion of the arbitration. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.4.) This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1019.5; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.) [1] Hoover was overruled in part by Quach v. California Com. Club, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 562.

[2] In Morgan v. Sundance (2022) 596 U.S. 411, the United States Supreme Court resolved a Circuit split and held that “under the FAA, courts may not condition a determination of waiver on prejudice.” (Davis v. Shiekh Shoes, LLC, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 962.) [3] As stated above, if the parties cannot agree on which rules to use, the Arbitration Provision provides that Plaintiff makes the final decision. NOTICE: Consistent with Local Rule 1.06(B), any party requesting oral argument on any matter on this calendar must comply with the following procedure: To request limited oral argument, on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Law and Motion Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-2615 by 4:00 p.m. the Court day before the hearing and advise opposing counsel.

At the time of requesting oral argument, the requesting party shall leave a voice mail message: a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and that opposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below. If no request for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court.

Unless ordered to appear in person by the Court, parties may appear remotely either telephonically or by video conference via the Zoom video/audio conference platform with notice to the Court and all other parties in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure §367.75. Although remote participation is not required, the Court will presume all parties are appearing remotely for non-evidentiary civil hearings. The Department 16C Zoom Link is https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/j/16030877014 and the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 25CV023124: SAPP vs G2 SECURE STAFF, LLC., A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, et al. 06/04/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Action in Department 16C

Zoom Meeting ID is 160 3087 7014. To appear on Zoom telephonically, call (833) 568-8864 and enter the Zoom Meeting ID referenced above. NO COURTCALL APPEARANCES WILL BE ACCEPTED. Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporter services at their own expense, pursuant to Government code §68086 and California Rules of Court, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed in the Policy for Official Reporter Pro Tempore available on the Sacramento Superior Court website at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-6a.pdf.

Parties may contact Court- Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore available at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp- 13.pdf. A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list. Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk.

If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.