FORD vs ADVANCED CARRIER SERVICES LLC

Defendant moves to compel arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement (“Agreement”)

26CV003705: FORD vs ADVANCED CARRIER SERVICES LLC, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPPANY 06/09/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Dismiss or Stay Proceedings in Department 16C

during the onboarding process. The Agreement states, in pertinent part:

MANDATORY ARBITRATION. THE EMPLOYEE AND COMPANY AGREE THAT ANY COVERED CLAIM (DEFINED BELOW), WHETHER BASED IN CONTRACT, TORT, STATUTE, COMMON LAW, FRAUD, MISREPRESENTATION OR ANY OTHER LEGAL OR EQUITABLE THEORY, SHALL BE SUBMITTED TO INDIVIDUAL BINDING ARBITRATION.

Covered Claims. Except as explained in the section “Claims Not Covered” below, this Mutual Agreement to Individually Arbitrate Disputes (this “Agreement”) covers all past, current, and future grievances, disputes, claims, issues, or causes of action (collectively, “claims”) under applicable federal, state or local laws, arising out of or relating to (a) Employee’s application, hiring, hours worked, services provided, and/or employment with the Company or the termination thereof, and/or (b) a Company policy or practice, or the Company’s relationship with or to a customer, vendor, or third party, including without limitation claims Employee may have against the Company and/or any Covered Parties (defined below), or that the Company may have against Employee.

[¶]

The Employee and the Company each specifically acknowledges and agrees that any claims brought by the Employee against any of the Covered Parties, whether brought jointly or severally with claims against the Company, shall be subject to arbitration under this Agreement. “Covered Parties” means the Company, any entity formerly or currently owned, affiliated, controlled or operated by the Company (a “company entity”), clients of the Company or a company entity, and the former and current officers, directors, managers, employees, owners, attorneys, agents, and vendors of the Company and/or a company entity and/or clients of the Company.

(Abad Hernandez Decl., Exs. 1-3.)

The Agreement also states “Interpretation and Enforcement of the Agreement: The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) and federal common law applicable to arbitration shall govern the interpretation and enforcement of this Agreement. If, for any reason, the FAA or federal common law is found not to apply to this Agreement (or its agreement to arbitrate), then applicable state law shall govern.” (Ibid.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV003705: FORD vs ADVANCED CARRIER SERVICES LLC, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPPANY 06/09/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Dismiss or Stay Proceedings in Department 16C

II. LEGAL STANDARD

On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the matter if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that: (a) the right to compel arbitration was waived by the petitioner; (b) grounds exist for the revocation of the agreement; or, (c) a party to the arbitration agreement is also a party to a pending court action or special proceeding with a third party, arising out of the same transaction or series of related transactions and there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact. (Code Civ. Proc. §1281.2; Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413.)

Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) is essentially the same:

A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. . . .

“Under both federal and state law, the threshold question presented by a petition to compel arbitration is whether there is an agreement to arbitrate.” (Sparks v. Del Mar Child and Family Svcs. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1511, 1517.) “Absent a clear agreement to submit disputes to arbitration, courts will not infer that the right to a jury trial has been waived.” (Id. at 1518.)

“A party seeking to compel arbitration of a dispute ‘bears the burden of proving the existence of an arbitration agreement, and the party opposing arbitration bears the burden of proving any defense, such as unconscionability. [Citation.]” (Jenks v. DLA Piper Rudnick Gray Cary US LLP (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 1, 8.) Normal principles of contract interpretation apply to the interpretation of contractual arbitration provisions. Included among these is the long-accepted rule that ambiguities in an arbitration agreement, as in any other type of contract, must be interpreted against the drafting party. Interpretation of ambiguous provisions requires application of the canons of construction - such as resolving ambiguities against the drafter. (Victoria v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 734, 739, 745-747.)

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff does not dispute that she has an arbitration agreement with Defendant. Nonetheless, she

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV003705: FORD vs ADVANCED CARRIER SERVICES LLC, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPPANY 06/09/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Dismiss or Stay Proceedings in Department 16C

argues that the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) does not govern because Plaintiff is a transportation worker exempt under 9 U.S.C. section 1, and that the Agreement is both procedurally and substantively unconscionable.

a. The FAA and the Interstate Commerce Exception

According to Defendant, the FAA governs the Agreement because the parties agreed that it would.

Relying Rittmann v. Amazon.com, Inc. (“Rittman”) (9th Cir. 2020) 971 F.3d 904, 907, Plaintiff insists that the FAA does not govern the dispute because she is a “last-leg delivery driver” for Amazon, and is therefore, “a ‘worker[] engaged in . . . interstate commerce’ within the meaning of the FAA’s transportation worker exemption, 9 U.S.C. § 1.” (Opposition, 1:6-7.)

Under Title 9, United States Code, section 1, the FAA does not apply “to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” (Circuit City Stores v. Adams (2001) 532 U.S. 105, 109.) This is commonly referred to as the “transportation worker” exemption. Whether a particular employee falls within the FAA exemption “require[s] a case-by-case factual determination, with the party opposing the motion to compel arbitration bearing the burden to demonstrate that the exemption applies.” (Betancourt v. Transportation Brokerage Specialists, Inc. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 552, 559.)

On reply, Defendant argues that Plaintiff failed to meet her evidentiary burden to establish the transportation worker exemption applies here. Defendant correctly notes that “Plaintiff fails to provide any evidence she falls within the exemption at all. Plaintiff avers absolutely nothing to support that she was actively engaged in transportation of goods in interstate commerce.” (Reply, 3:19-21.)

The Court agrees that Plaintiff has failed to meet her evidentiary burden to establish that the transportation worker exemption applies. Plaintiff makes no argument and submits no evidence that the packages she delivered came from other states.[1] She merely assumes that because she is a “last-leg delivery” driver, she must be a worker engaged in interstate commerce. Rittman highlights the evidence shortfall present here. In Rittman, the evidence indicated that the workers picked up packages that were distributed across state lines. (Rittman, supra, 971 F.3d at 915.) No such evidence appears in this record. As a result, the Court cannot find from the record that Plaintiff delivered packages originating outside California. This is fatal to Plaintiff’s exemption argument. Accordingly, the Court finds that the exception to the FAA does not apply.

b. Unconscionability

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV003705: FORD vs ADVANCED CARRIER SERVICES LLC, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPPANY 06/09/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Dismiss or Stay Proceedings in Department 16C

Both procedural and substantive unconscionability must be present in order for a contract provision to be unenforceable under the unconscionability doctrine. (Parada v. Superior Court (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1554, 1570.) “But they need not be present in the same degree. ‘Essentially a sliding scale is invoked which disregards the regularity of the procedural process of contract formation, that creates the terms, in proportion to the greater harshness or unreasonableness of the substantive terms themselves.’ In other words, the more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa.” (Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychare Service, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 114.)

a. Procedural Unconscionability

The procedural aspect of unconscionability “concerns the manner in which the contract was negotiated and the circumstances of the parties at that time. [citations omitted] It focuses on factors of oppression and surprise. [citations omitted] The oppression component arises from an inequality of bargaining power of the parties to the contract and an absence of real negotiation or a meaningful choice on the part of the weaker party.’ [citations omitted]” (Morris v Redwood Empire Bancorp (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th at 1305, 1319; Gatton v. T-Mobil USA, Inc. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 571, 595.)

“‘The circumstances relevant to establishing oppression include, but are not limited to (1) the amount of time the party is given to consider the proposed contract; (2) the amount and type of pressure exerted on the party to sign the proposed contract; (3) the length of the proposed contract and the length and complexity of the challenged provision; (4) the education and experience of the party; and (5) whether the party’s review of the proposed contract was aided by an attorney.’” (OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho (2019) 8 Cal.5th 111, 126-127.)

According to Plaintiff, procedural unconscionability exists because the Agreement was drafted by Defendant, presented to Plaintiff in a standardized form, and presented to Plaintiff as a requirement of employment. As noted above, Plaintiff has not provided her own declaration or any evidence regarding the procedural unconscionability of the Agreement. Plaintiff points only to Mr. Abad Hernandez’s declaration regarding the on-boarding process and the Agreement itself. Nonetheless, the Court finds that the lack of any opt-out provision in the Agreement suggests it was mandatory, or that it was at least presented to Plaintiff with the implication that it was mandatory, particularly since Defendants do not argue that Plaintiff could opt out of the Agreement.

The adhesive aspect of an agreement, however, is not dispositive. The Court must also look to whether there is any other indication of oppression or surprise. (Peng v. First Republic Bank (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1470.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV003705: FORD vs ADVANCED CARRIER SERVICES LLC, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPPANY 06/09/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Dismiss or Stay Proceedings in Department 16C

Having reviewed the evidence, the Court finds that there is a minimal amount of procedural unconscionability. Having found a minimal amount of procedural unconscionability, Plaintiff must demonstrate a high degree of substantive unconscionability.

b. Substantive Unconscionability

“A provision is substantively unconscionable if it ‘involves contract terms that are so one-sided as to ‘shock the conscience,’ or that impose harsh or oppressive terms.” (Parada, 176 Cal.App.4th at 1573.)

Plaintiff argues that the Agreement is substantively unconscionable because: (1) the “Covered Claims” and “Covered Parties” definitions are improperly overbroad, (2) the Agreement lacks mutuality, (3) the Agreement includes an unenforceable pre-dispute jury trial waiver, and (4) the PAGA and Representative Action Waiver is unenforceable.

i. “Covered Claims” and “Covered Parties”

Relying on Stoker v. Blue Origin, LLC (“Stoker”) (2026) 343 Cal.Rptr.3d 756, Plaintiff contends that the definition of “Covered Claims” is overbroad because it includes not only employment claims, but also any claims arising out of “a Company policy or practice, or the Company’s relationship with or to a customer, vendor, or third party. . . .” (Abad Hernandez Decl., Exs. 1-3.) According to Plaintiff, “[t]his language would require Plaintiff to arbitrate any dispute Plaintiff might have relating to any of Defendant’s policies, vendor relationships, or third-party dealings—regardless of any connection to Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant.” (Opposition, 6:3-5.)

Plaintiff argues that the definition of “Covered Parties” is also overbroad because it requires Plaintiff to arbitrate claims against “any entity formerly or currently owned, affiliated, controlled or operated by the Company (a “company entity”), clients of the Company or a company entity, and the former and current officers, directors, managers, employees, owners, attorneys, agents, and vendors of the Company and/or a company entity and/or clients of the Company.” (Abad Hernandez Decl., Exs. 1-3.) As result, Plaintiff maintains that she is required to arbitrate claims against any of Defendant’s vendors or clients “even for claims entirely unrelated to Plaintiff’s employment.” (Opposition, 6:16.)

In Stoker, the plaintiff sued for a number of employment-related claims, including sexual harassment. The arbitration agreement included a provision that it “applies to any and all claims, disputes, or controversies between the Company and me, including, without limitation, claims arising out of or relating to my employment application and/or hiring process, employment with the Company, and/or any termination of my employment. . . .” (Stoker, supra, 343 Cal.Rptr.3d at

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV003705: FORD vs ADVANCED CARRIER SERVICES LLC, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPPANY 06/09/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Dismiss or Stay Proceedings in Department 16C

760 (underline added).) It also defined the “Company” to include “Blue Origin, its parent, subsidiaries, affiliates, successors or assigns, as well as their current and former officers, directors, employees and agents.”

The court found the agreement to be overly broad because “by its terms, the arbitration agreement applies (with some exceptions discussed below) ‘to any and all claims, disputes, or controversies between the Company and me, including, without limitation, claims arising out of or relating to my employment application and/or hiring process, employment with the Company, and/or any termination of my employment ...,” (Id., at 766.) The court explained:

the arbitration agreement here is not limited to claims arising out of the employment relationship. Instead, it applies to any claim that might arise at any time between Stoker and Blue Origin or its parent, subsidiaries, affiliates, successors or assigns, or employees of any of these entities. Thus, for example, the arbitration agreement would apply if Stoker were to be injured in an automobile accident with another Blue Origin employee years after his employment ended, or if his house were damaged by debris from a Blue Origin rocket. The arbitration provision's broad scope, thus, renders it substantively unconscionable.

(Id., at 767 (italics in original).)

The Court finds the agreement in Stoker distinguishable from the Agreement here. The agreement in Stoker required arbitration of “any and all claims, disputes, or controversies between the Company and me, including, without limitation, claims arising out of or relating to my employment application . . .” The “Covered Claims” in the Agreement here are not as overbroad since the “Covered Claims” are those “arising out of or relating to (a) Employee’s application, hiring, hours worked, services provided, and/or employment with the Company or the termination thereof, and/or (b) a Company policy or practice, or the Company’s relationship with or to a customer, vendor, or third party, including without limitation claims Employee may have against the Company and/or any Covered Parties (defined below), or that the Company may have against Employee.”

The Court disagrees with Plaintiff that these terms are substantively unconscionable.

ii. Lack of Mutuality

Plaintiff advances that the Agreement lacks mutuality because it compels her to arbitrate claims against a “vast category” of “Covered Parties” that are not parties to the Agreement, and are not obligated to arbitrate their claims against Plaintiff.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV003705: FORD vs ADVANCED CARRIER SERVICES LLC, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPPANY 06/09/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Dismiss or Stay Proceedings in Department 16C

The Agreement provides that “[t]he Employee and the Company each specifically acknowledges and agrees that any claims brought by the Employee against any of the Covered Parties, whether brought jointly or severally with claims against the Company, shall be subject to arbitration under this Agreement.” (Abad Hernandez Decl., Exs. 1-3.) This requires only Plaintiff to bring her claims against the Covered Parties to arbitration.

Defendant responds in reply that mutuality exists because the “Covered Parties” are third-party beneficiaries. Defendant explains that the “Covered Parties” are third-party beneficiaries, and thus, “have secured the benefit of the Agreement.” (Reply, 10:1, citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 302 (1981).) As a result, Defendant contends that “in the same manner that Plaintiff could invoke the Agreement against ADCS, so could she against the ‘Covered Parties.’” (Reply, 10:2-3.) Defendant adds that:

Plaintiff appears to argue in unsupported hypotheticals regarding the Covered Parties’ obligations to compel Plaintiff to arbitration. In her argument, Plaintiff wholly ignores that the Agreement covers only claims “arising out of or relating to” Plaintiff’s employment with ADCS, thus, in the event of an action filed by a covered third-party beneficiary related to Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant, Plaintiff would be at liberty to enforce the Agreement against the third-party beneficiary and compel that hypothetical party to arbitration.

(Reply, 10:2-9.)

The Court is not persuaded by Defendant’s argument. Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 302 (1981) states:

(1) Unless otherwise agreed between promisor and promisee, a beneficiary of a promise is an intended beneficiary if recognition of a right to performance in the beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties and either (a) the performance of the promise will satisfy an obligation of the promisee to pay money to the beneficiary; or (b) the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance. (2) An incidental beneficiary is a beneficiary who is not an intended beneficiary.

(Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 302 (1981).)

The Restatement does not allow a party to the contract to enforce it against an intended thirdparty beneficiary. Further, the third-party beneficiary cases upon which Defendant relies concern

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV003705: FORD vs ADVANCED CARRIER SERVICES LLC, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPPANY 06/09/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Dismiss or Stay Proceedings in Department 16C

the non-signatory third-party beneficiary enforcing the arbitration agreement against a signatory, not the signatory enforcing the arbitration agreement against a non-signatory.

The Court agrees with Plaintiff that this term is substantively unconscionable.

iii. Pre-Dispute Jury Trial Waiver

Plaintiff also suggest that the Agreement includes an unenforceable “Waiver of Trial by Jury.” That section provides:

Waiver of Trial by Jury. Each of the Employee and the Company understands and fully agrees that by entering into this Agreement to arbitrate, each agrees to resolve all claims through arbitration and is giving up the right to have a trial by jury and the right of appeal following the rendering of a decision except on the grounds for reviewing an arbitration award under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) or applicable state law.

(Abad Hernandez Decl., Exs. 1-3 (bold in original).)

The cases upon which Plaintiff relies are inapposite because those cases concerned a waiver of jury trial for claims that are not subject to arbitration. (See Stoker, supra, 343 Cal.Rptr.3d at 769; Lange v. Monster Energy Co. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 436, 452; Dougherty v. Roseville Heritage Partners (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 93, 107.)

The Court disagrees with Plaintiff that this term is substantively unconscionable.

iv. PAGA and Representative Action Waiver

As to PAGA and Representative Actions, the Agreement states, in relevant part:

Each of the Employee and the Company expressly intends and agrees, to the absolute maximum extent permitted by law, that: (a) class action, collective action, or consolidated action procedures are hereby waived and shall not be asserted in arbitration or in court, nor will they apply in any arbitration pursuant to this Agreement; (b) representative action procedures are hereby waived and shall not be asserted in arbitration or in court, nor will they apply in any arbitration pursuant to this Agreement; (c) each will not assert class action, collective action, consolidated action or representative action claims against the other in arbitration or court or otherwise; and (d) the Employee and the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV003705: FORD vs ADVANCED CARRIER SERVICES LLC, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPPANY 06/09/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Dismiss or Stay Proceedings in Department 16C

Company shall only submit their own, individual claims in arbitration and will not seek to represent the interests of any other person. . . .

(Abad Hernandez Decl., Exs. 1-3 (underline added).)

Plaintiff claims that pursuant to Stoker, this provision is impermissible. The Court finds the agreement in Stoker distinguishable from the Agreement here. The agreement in Stoker stated, in part, “[t]he Company and I will resolve Claims only on an individual basis. This means that no Claims, including arbitration of Covered Claims or cause of action in court for Excluded Claims, will be initiated or maintained as a class action, collective action, consolidated action, representative action, or multi-party action (together ‘Collective Actions’). The Company and I waive the right to participate in, or receive money or other relief from, a Collective Action.” (Stoker, supra, 343 Cal.Rprtr.3d at 769.) In contrast, the waiver here is prefaced by the phrase, “to the absolute maximum extent permitted by law.”

The Court disagrees with Plaintiff that this term is substantively unconscionable.

In sum, the Court finds that the “Covered Parties” term is slightly substantively unconscionable. However, Plaintiff has not demonstrated a high degree of substantive unconscionability to render the entire Agreement unconscionable.

The Court would also sever the “Covered Parties” provision. Pursuant to Civil Code section 1670.5, when a court finds a contractual clause to be unconscionable, the court has discretion to refuse to enforce the contract, sever any unconscionable clause, or limit application of the unconscionable clause. (Ramirez v. Charter Communications, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 478, 513; see also Ronderos v. USF Reddaway, Inc. (9th Cir. 2024) 114 F.4th 1080, 1099.)

“No bright-line rule requires a court to refuse enforcement if a contract has more than one unconscionable term. Likewise, a court is not required to sever or restrict an unconscionable term if an agreement has only a single such term.” (Ramirez, supra, at p. 516.) Instead, the appropriate inquiry is “qualitative and accounts for each factor” the California Supreme Court identified in Armendariz. (Ibid.)

At the outset, a court should ask whether “the central purpose of the contract is tainted with illegality.” (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 124.) If so, the contract cannot be cured, and the court should refuse to enforce it. If that is not the case, the court should go on to ask first, whether the contract's unconscionability can be cured purely through severance or restriction of its terms, or whether reformation by augmentation is necessary. (See

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV003705: FORD vs ADVANCED CARRIER SERVICES LLC, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPPANY 06/09/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Dismiss or Stay Proceedings in Department 16C

Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 124-125.) If no “reformation is required,” the offending provision can be severed or limited, and “the rest of the arbitration agreement left intact,” then severance or restriction is the preferred course for provisions that are collateral to the agreement’s main purpose. [Citations.] If the unconscionability cannot be cured by extirpating or limiting the offending provisions, but instead requires augmentation to cure the unconscionability, then the court should refuse to enforce the contract. [Citations.] Courts cannot “rewrite agreements and impose terms to which neither party has agreed.” [Citation.]

Even if a contract can be cured, the court should also ask whether the unconscionability should be cured through severance or restriction because the interests of justice would be furthered by such actions. (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 124.) This part of the inquiry focuses on whether mere severance of the unconscionable terms would function to condone an illegal scheme and whether the defects in the agreement indicate that the stronger party engaged in a systematic effort to impose arbitration on the weaker party not simply as an alternative to litigation, but to secure a forum that works to the stronger party’s advantage. (Ibid.) If the answer to either question is yes, the court should refuse to enforce the agreement.

In conducting this analysis, the court may also consider the deterrent effect of each option. As Mills v. Facility Solutions Group, Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 1035 explained, severing multiple unconscionable provisions from an agreement and enforcing the remainder could “create an incentive for an employer to draft a one-sided arbitration agreement in the hope employees would not challenge the unlawful provisions, but if they do, the court would simply modify the agreement to include the bilateral terms the employer should have included in the first place.” (Id. at p. 1045.) Although there are no bright-line numerical rules regarding severance, it is fair to say that the greater the number of unconscionable provisions a contract contains the less likely it is that severance will be the appropriate remedy.

Finally, if the contract contains a severance clause, the court should take it into account as an expression of the parties’

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV003705: FORD vs ADVANCED CARRIER SERVICES LLC, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPPANY 06/09/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Dismiss or Stay Proceedings in Department 16C

intent that an agreement curable by removing defective terms should otherwise be enforced. [Citations.] That said, we note that the parties to an agreement cannot divest a trial court of its discretion under Civil Code section 1670.5 by including such a severance clause. [Citation.]

Accordingly, courts may liberally sever any unconscionable portion of a contract and enforce the rest when: the illegality is collateral to the contract’s main purpose; it is possible to cure the illegality by means of severance; and enforcing the balance of the contract would be in the interests of justice. [Citations.]

(Ramirez, at p. 516-517.)

Applying the forgoing standard to this case, the Court finds it is permitted and appropriate to sever the following language:

any entity formerly or currently owned, affiliated, controlled or operated by the Company (a “company entity”), clients of the Company or a company entity, and the former and current officers, directors, managers, employees, owners, attorneys, agents, and vendors of the Company and/or a company entity and/or clients of the Company.

This clause is the only unconscionable term in the Agreement, and its illegality is collateral to the its main purpose. Further, the clause can be severed and the remainder of the Agreement enforced without adding terms. Additionally, severance would not conflict with the interests of justice, as there is no indication of a systemic effort by Defendant to engage in an illegal scheme at the disadvantage of its employees. Finally, the Agreement includes a severability provision, which the Court takes into account even though it is not binding. (See Abad Hernandez Decl., Exs. 1-3.)

Accordingly, the motion to compel arbitration is GRANTED. Defendant’s motion to stay the action pending arbitration is GRANTED.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc. §1019.5; CRC Rule 3.1312.)

Moving counsel’s notice of motion does not provide notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system, as required by Local Rule 1.06. Moving counsel is directed to contact Defendant’s

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV003705: FORD vs ADVANCED CARRIER SERVICES LLC, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPPANY 06/09/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Dismiss or Stay Proceedings in Department 16C

counsel and advise counsel of Local Rule 1.06 and the Court’s tentative ruling procedure and the manner to request a hearing. If moving counsel is unable to contact Defendant’s counsel prior to hearing, moving counsel is ordered to appear at the hearing.

[1] Notably, Plaintiff failed to submit her own declaration in opposition to the motion. Moreover,

Mr. Abad Hernandez’s declaration in support of the instant motion provides no evidence regarding the origin of the packages that Plaintiff delivered.

NOTICE:

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To request limited oral argument, on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Law and Motion Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-2615 by 4:00 p.m. the Court day before the hearing and advise opposing counsel. At the time of requesting oral argument, the requesting party shall leave a voice mail message: a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and that opposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below. If no request for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court.

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SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV003705: FORD vs ADVANCED CARRIER SERVICES LLC, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPPANY 06/09/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Dismiss or Stay Proceedings in Department 16C

Parties may contact Court-Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore available at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/courtreporters/docs/crtrp-13.pdf.

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