Locke Management Association vs. Martha Esch

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will be forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

TENTATIVE RULING

***NOTICE: EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G. ST. SACRAMENTO, CA. ALL MOTIONS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 28 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 8C OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. ALL PAPERS FOR THIS DEPARTMENT MUST BE FILED AT THIS NEW LOCATION AND WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED AT THE HALL OF JUSTICE. ALL HEARINGS WILL TAKE PLACE AT THIS NEW LOCATION****

Defendant Martha Esch’s (“Defendant”) motion to vacate all judgments entered in this action is ruled upon as follows.

The notice of motion does not provide notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system, as required by Local Rule 1.06. Moving counsel is directed to attempt to contact opposing counsel and advise them of Local Rule 1.06 and the Court’s tentative ruling procedure and the manner to request a hearing. If moving counsel

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2011-00103789-CU-OR-GDS: Locke Management Association vs. Martha Esch 06/03/2026 Hearing on Motion to Vacate All Judgments Entered in Department 8C

is unable to contact opposing counsel prior to hearing, moving counsel is ordered to appear at the hearing in person or remotely.

The parties’ requests for judicial notice are GRANTED.

Defendant’s objections are overruled.

Factual Background

The Complaint in this action was filed on May 20, 2011 and alleges that Plaintiff Locke Management Association is a California Nonprofit Mutual Benefit Corporation established in part to enforce the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) which apply to all parcels of real estate in the National Historic Preservation community known as the Town of Locke in Sacramento County. (Complaint, ¶ 1).

When the Plaintiff entity was created and the Articles of Incorporation were filed with the Secretary of State on November 10, 2003, it was assigned corporation number 2564207. The Articles of Incorporation uses the name “Locke Management Corporation”. (Decl. of Prassa, ¶ 4). A Statement filed October 1, 2007 with the Secretary of State states that the plaintiff entity is a “Common Interest Development Association”, formed to manage a common interest development under the Davis- Stirling Common Interest Development Act. (Decl. of Prassa, ¶ 5).

The Plaintiff entity has never been dissolved or converted. (Decl. of Prassa, ¶ 6). When the County of Sacramento created the plaintiff entity and the bylaws were written, the first sentence of the bylaws says, “The name of this corporation is and shall be Locke Management Association.” (Decl. of Prassa, ¶ 7). The Plaintiff entity’s CC&Rs refer to the town’s management as the “Locke Management Association”. (Decl. of Prassa, ¶8).

On or around November 20, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (“MSJ”). (Decl. of Gray, ¶ 6).

On or around January 21, 2016, Defendant filed her Motion to Dismiss Complaint. Within this motion, Defendant argued that “ ‘Locke Management Association’ is not a corporation registered with the State of California. No fictitious business name filing has been made to authorize any other entity to transact business in the name of ‘Locke Management Association.’ ‘Locke Management Association’ has no standing to maintain this action and its complaint must be dismissed.” (Decl. of Gray, ¶ 7).

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2011-00103789-CU-OR-GDS: Locke Management Association vs. Martha Esch 06/03/2026 Hearing on Motion to Vacate All Judgments Entered in Department 8C

On or around March 7, 2016, the Court signed an Order Granting Plaintiff’s MSJ. Within the order, the Court addressed the arguments made by Defendant within her Motion to Dismiss Complaint. (Decl. of Gray, ¶ 8).

On or around May 6, 2016, Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal. The Notice of Appeal states that Defendant is appealing the order granting Plaintiff’s MSJ on March 7, 2016 and previous orders. (Decl. of Gray, ¶ 9).

The Court entered Judgment on May 9, 2016. (Decl. of Gray, ¶ 10).

On or around July 18, 2017, the Third District Court of Appeal entered an order dismissing Defendant’s May 6, 2016 appeal. (Decl. of Gray, ¶ 11).

Plaintiff now moves to vacate the judgements in this action pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473(d) “on the grounds that all of the judgments entered in this case are, upon inspection of the judgment roll, void because Plaintiff Locke Management Association is a nonexistent entity that has no standing to sue as it is not a ‘real’ party in interest, and because all of the judgments entered in this case were obtained by fraud upon the Court.” (Notice, 1:6-9.)

Plaintiff opposes the motion on multiple grounds.

The Court first addresses Plaintiff’s argument that Defendant’s motion fails due to issue preclusion, as the Court finds this issue dispositive.

Issue preclusion “prevents relitigation of previously decided issues.” (DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813, 825.) “[I]ssue preclusion applies (1) after final adjudication (2) of an identical issue (3) actually litigated and necessarily decided in the first suit and (4) asserted against one who was a party in the first suit or one in privity with that party.” (Id.)

In the present matter, Plaintiff argues that it can establish each of the elements required for the applicability of issue preclusion as follows:

As for element (1), final adjudication was reached after Plaintiff received its March 7, 2016 order and May 9, 2016 judgment and

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2011-00103789-CU-OR-GDS: Locke Management Association vs. Martha Esch 06/03/2026 Hearing on Motion to Vacate All Judgments Entered in Department 8C

Defendant’s appeal was dismissed. Thus, Plaintiff can establish element one. As for element (2), within her Motion to Dismiss, Defendant argued that “ ‘Locke Management Association’ is not a corporation registered with the State of California. No fictitious business name filing has been made to authorize any other entity to transact business in the name of ‘Locke Management Association.’ ‘Locke Management Association’ has no standing to maintain this action and its complaint must be dismissed.” Now, Defendant brings this exact argument to claim that Plaintiff’s judgments should be vacated.

Thus, Plaintiff can establish element two, an identical issue. As for element (3), the Court already made a decision on these arguments within the “Standing” section of its March 7, 2016 Order. In that order, the Court found Defendant’s arguments unpersuasive and granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Thus, Plaintiff can establish element three, that the issue was actually litigated and necessarily decided. As for element (4), Defendant is bringing this argument against Plaintiff, a party to the original action.

Thus, Plaintiff can establish element four, that the identical issue was already asserted against Plaintiff.

(Opposition, 8:2-17.)

As explained in Ayala v. Dawson, 13 Cal. App. 5th 1319:

It is often said that collateral estoppel “is not an easy rule to apply, for the term ‘issue’ as used in this connection is difficult to define, and the pleadings and proof in each case must be carefully scrutinized to determine whether a particular issue was raised even though some legal theory, argument or ‘matter’ relating to the issue was not expressly mentioned or asserted.” (Clark v. Lesher (1956) 46 Cal.2d 874, 880–881 [299 P.2d 865] (Clark).) The identical issue requirement “addresses whether ‘identical factual allegations’ are at stake in the two proceedings.” (Lucido, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 342.) “[I]n determining whether the identity [of issues] requirement is satisfied, courts must be mindful of the need to distinguish ‘issues’ from ‘legal theories.’” (Wimsatt v.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2011-00103789-CU-OR-GDS: Locke Management Association vs. Martha Esch 06/03/2026 Hearing on Motion to Vacate All Judgments Entered in Department 8C

Beverly Hills Weight etc. Internat., Inc. (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1511, 1517 [38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 612]; Evans v. Celotex Corp. (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 741, 746 [238 Cal. Rptr. 259] [“Collateral estoppel bars relitigation of the same issues; it does not require identity of legal theories or causes of action.”].)

(Id. at 1326-1327.)

Here, Defendant expressly raised the issue of Locke Management Association’s standing to sue in her Motion to Dismiss filed in January 2016. In so doing, Defendant acknowledged the existence of the corporate entity known as Locke Management Corporation and argued that Locke Management Association lacked standing to sue because it had not filed a fictitious business name certificate (presumably, to allow it to litigate on behalf of Locke Management Corporation). While Defendant’s legal theory is framed somewhat differently here, the key issue remains the same – i.e., whether Locke Management Association has standing.

That issue was squarely ruled upon by the Court in proceedings in the litigation that occurred more than a decade ago. The Court finds that Plaintiff has established each required element of issue preclusion, which prevents Defendant from relitigating this issue post judgment.

Defendant contends that the doctrine of issue preclusion does not apply where, as here, the court that made the ruling on summary judgment lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, Defendant contends, the judgment obtained from the summary judgment ruling must be vacated. (Reply, 4:12-15.)

Defendant argues that People v. American Surety (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 71 is on point and controlling. American Surety found, “The requirements for issue preclusion are present here. But the doctrine does not apply where the court that made the earlier ruling lacked subject matter jurisdiction...” (Id. at 76-77; internal citations omitted.) American Surety found that the prior ruling was void because it was beyond the fundamental jurisdiction of the court, and as a result, issue preclusion did not apply. (Id. at 77.)

Here, Defendant urges that the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because only real parties in interest are allowed to file and maintain a lawsuit in California, and Plaintiff Locke Management Association is not a real party in interest because articles of incorporation were filed for Locke Management Corporation, not Locke Management

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2011-00103789-CU-OR-GDS: Locke Management Association vs. Martha Esch 06/03/2026 Hearing on Motion to Vacate All Judgments Entered in Department 8C

Association.

Code of Civil Procedure section 367 states, “Every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest, except as otherwise provided by statute.”

However, neither section 367 nor the concept of standing prohibits an entity from pursuing its case under a fictitious name. (The Rossdale Group, LLC v. Walton (2017) 12 Cal. App. 5th 936, 945.) “[A] person may adopt any name in which to prosecute business, and may sue or be sued in such a name.” (Emery v. Kipp (1908) 154 Cal. 83, 86.)

As explained in Doe v. Lincoln Unified School Dist. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 758, and adopted in The Rossdale Group, LLC:

“The question for purposes of standing is not the name used by the party suing but whether the party suing is the party possessing the right sued upon. In this matter, there is no question plaintiff is the party injured by virtue of defendants' actions and, therefore, she is the party possessing the right sued upon. Thus, the question is not whether plaintiff has standing to sue but whether she may do so using a fictitious name.” (Ibid.) The Lincoln Unified court then examined a long line of cases allowing the plaintiff to proceed under a fictitious name. (Id. at pp. 766–767.)

The Lincoln Unified court also rejected the assertion that section 367 “requires that a party sue in his or her own name. It does not. Notwithstanding its wording, this provision requires that an action be brought by the real party in interest. [Citation.] ‘“A real party in interest ordinarily is defined as the person possessing the right sued upon by reason of the substantive law.” [Citation.] A complaint filed by someone other than the real party in interest is subject to general demurrer on the ground that it fails to state a cause of action. [Citation.]’” (Lincoln Unified, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 765.)

The Rossdale Group, LLC, supra, 12 Cal. App. 5th at 945-946.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2011-00103789-CU-OR-GDS: Locke Management Association vs. Martha Esch 06/03/2026 Hearing on Motion to Vacate All Judgments Entered in Department 8C

Here, while Plaintiff may have sued under an erroneous name based on the articles of incorporation filings, Plaintiff is the real party in interest, and had standing to sue. The Court did not lack subject matter jurisdiction.

As a result, Defendant’s motion must be denied.

Disposition

Defendant’s motion to vacate the judgments in this action is DENIED.

The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1312 or further notice is required.