KUSTOM US, INC. vs BEHROOJ, et al.

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will be forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided. TENTATIVE RULING

***NOTICE: EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G STREET SACRAMENTO, CA. ALL MOTIONS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 28 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 8C OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. ALL PAPERS FOR THIS DEPARTMENT MUST BE FILED AT THIS NEW LOCATION AND WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED AT THE HALL OF JUSTICE. ALL HEARINGS WILL TAKE PLACE AT THIS NEW LOCATION***

Defendant in pro per Mohammad Behrooj’s (“Defendant”) motion to quash service of summons is ruled upon as follows.

The notice of motion does not provide notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system, as required by Local Rule 1.06. Defendant is directed to contact opposing counsel and advise of Local Rule 1.06 and the Court’s tentative ruling procedure and the manner to request a hearing. If Defendant is unable to contact opposing counsel prior to the hearing, Defendant is ordered to appear at the hearing by Zoom or in person.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 25CV019302: KUSTOM US, INC. vs BEHROOJ, et al. 06/03/2026 Hearing on Motion to Quash Service of Summons in Department 8C

Background

Plaintiff Kustom US, Inc. (“Plaintiff”) filed this action on August 13, 2025. On September 8, 2025, Plaintiff filed a proof of service of summons stating that Defendant was served via substituted service on September 5, 2025 at 8:55 a.m. at 1776 Summer Cloud Court, Folsom, CA 95630-6249. The proof of service states that the documents were left with Jane Doe, who is identified as a co-occupant of the residence and a competent member of the household. The documents were mailed to Defendant at that address the same day.

The proof of service is signed by Teresa Samuelson, a registered process server. Ms. Samuelson attached a declaration of diligence that describes three previous attempts at service: (1) on August 26, 2025 at 8:08 p.m., a woman matching the physical description of Jane Doe answered the door and stated that Defendant was not home but that tomorrow at the same time would be better; (2) on August 29, 2025 at 2:50 p.m., no answer at the door and no noise or movement detected; and (3) on September 2, 2025 at 7:59 a.m., the same woman answered the door and stated that Defendant was not home, and thereafter the woman and an adolescent female wearing a school uniform got into a white Mercedes and left.

The declaration also describes the service itself on September 5, 2025. Ms. Samuelson declares that the same Mercedes was in the driveway when she arrived. She waited at the door for a long time after knocking and ringing the doorbell, and although there was no response from the house, she could hear a faint male voice inside. As Ms. Samuelson was preparing to leave the property, a black Tesla driven by the same woman seen at earlier service attempts parked in the driveway. Ms. Samuelson eventually approached the vehicle and stated, “Mrs.

Behrooj.” The woman then rolled down the front passenger’s side window, and Ms. Samuelson showed her the documents and stated she could give them to the woman for Defendant. The woman stated, “I do not accept,” and Ms. Samuelson proceeded to drop the papers on the passenger’s seat through the open window and state that she was serving the woman with court papers. The woman repeated that she did not accept the papers and stated that Defendant did not live at the property and that he had sold her the house.

The woman approached Ms. Samuelson’s car holding the papers and stood in front of the vehicle to block Ms. Samuelson from leaving, but Ms. Samuelson drove around the woman and left.

In his motion, Defendant asserts that he was out of the country at the time of purported service and did not return until September 30, 2025. Defendant also asserts that he sold the property in August of 2025 and that the property “is no longer connected to the defendant in any way … .” (Motion, p. 2:14-15.) Defendant further asserts that he has no relationship or legal connection to the Jane Doe referred to in the proof of service. Defendant’s memorandum in support of his motion states that “[p]roof the property was sold in August of 2025 to another party other than this defendant is attached as Exhibit 1 to this motion” (Motion, p. 2:19-21), but Defendant’s

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 25CV019302: KUSTOM US, INC. vs BEHROOJ, et al. 06/03/2026 Hearing on Motion to Quash Service of Summons in Department 8C

declaration does not refer to any exhibits, and no exhibits are attached to the moving papers.

Discussion

A defendant may, at any time before the expiration of his time to plead or within any further time that the court may for good cause allow, move to quash service of summons on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction. (Code Civ. Proc. § 418.10(a)(1); Ruttenberg v. Ruttenberg (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 801, 808-809 [personal jurisdiction only conferred where service of process is statutorily compliant]; American Express Centurion Bank v. Zara (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 383, 392 [actual notice of action is no substitute for proper service of process and does not confer jurisdiction].)

Pursuant to direction from the Supreme Court, the statutes governing service of process are “to be liberally construed to effectuate service and uphold jurisdiction if actual notice has been received by the defendant, … .” (Bein v. Brechtel-Jochim Group, Inc. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1392; see Pasadena Medi-Center Associates v. Superior Court (1973) 9 Cal.3d 773, 778.) This “admonition to construe the process statutes liberally extends to substituted service as well as personal service.” (Bein, supra, at p. 1392.)

“[A]n individual may be served by substitute service only after a good faith effort at personal service has first been made: the burden is on the plaintiff to show that the summons and complaint ‘cannot with reasonable diligence be personally delivered’ to the individual. [Citations.] Two or three attempts to personally serve a defendant at a proper place ordinarily qualifies as ‘“reasonable diligence.”’ [Citation.]” (American Express Centurion Bank v. Zara (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 383, 389.) “No single formula nor mode of search can be said to constitute due diligence in every case.” (Donel, Inc. v. Badalian (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 327, 333.)

“[W]here a defendant properly moves to quash service of summons the burden is on the plaintiff to prove facts requisite to the effective service.” (Sheard v. Superior Court (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 207, 211.)

Here, Plaintiff’s opposition sufficiently establishes that service was effective in this case. The evidence and arguments submitted by Plaintiff cast considerable doubt on Defendant’s suggestion[1] that he no longer resides at the property where service was made. As noted by Plaintiff, Defendant’s motion papers do not include a physical address for Defendant in the caption. However, in his request to waive court fees filed on the same date as his motion, Defendant listed his address as 1776 Summer Cloud Court, Folsom, CA 94630.

The factual assertions contained in Defendant’s fee waiver request are made under penalty of perjury. Similarly, Plaintiff’s proof of service for this motion, as well as the proof of service for his opposition to Defendant’s ex parte application filed on April 23, 2026, both state that Plaintiff’s “residence or business address is 1776 Summer Cloud Ct, Folsom, CA 95630.” These statements are also made under penalty of perjury. Additionally, Plaintiff submits evidence that on October

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 25CV019302: KUSTOM US, INC. vs BEHROOJ, et al. 06/03/2026 Hearing on Motion to Quash Service of Summons in Department 8C

13 and November 9, 2025, an attorney acting on behalf of Defendant sent correspondence to Plaintiff’s counsel asking for extensions to respond to the Complaint. (Gibbs Decl., ¶¶ 8-9, Exh. B.) This indicates that Defendant believed he was properly served. Only after Plaintiff requested entry of default following Defendant’s failure to respond to the Complaint did Defendant file this motion. Finally, Plaintiff satisfied the reasonable diligence requirement before resorting to substituted service, as Plaintiff’s process server made four attempts to serve Defendant at his residence before leaving the papers with Jane Doe, a competent member of the household as evidenced by Ms. Samuelson’s declaration of diligence. The papers were then mailed to Defendant at the 1776 Summer Cloud Court address.

Disposition

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to quash is DENIED.

The Court has not considered the new evidence submitted with Defendant’s reply papers. (See Jay v. Mahaffey (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1537.)

Defendant is admonished for failing to include his residence or mailing address in the caption of his filings with this Court as required by rule 2.111(1) of the California Rules of Court.

Plaintiff’s request for sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5 is denied for failure to comply with the safe-harbor provision under section 128.5(f)(1)(B).

Plaintiff shall serve notice of entry of this order on Defendant. Service may be made in any manner, including via email. The Court deems Defendant’s service of the motion and his opposition to Plaintiff’s ex parte application via electronic service as Defendant’s consent to accept electronic service under Code of Civil Procedure section 1010.6. Defendant’s time to plead in response to the Complaint shall be 15 days from the date notice of entry of this order is served on him if service is made via personal service, 17 days if service is made via electronic service, and 20 days if service is made via mail. (Code Civ. Proc. § 418.10(b).) [1] The Court uses the word “suggestion” because Defendant does not directly deny that he still resides at the property, but instead only declares that he is no longer the owner of the property. (See Behrooj Decl.)