YOUNG, et al. vs AALGAARD, et al.

If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 23CV004130: YOUNG, et al. vs AALGAARD, et al. 06/03/2026 Hearing on Motion for Order Setting Aside and Vacating Dismissal in Department 8D

and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided. ***NOTICE: EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G. ST. SACRAMENTO, CA. ALL MOTIONS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 25 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 8D OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. ALL PAPERS FOR THIS DEPARTMENT MUST BE FILED AT THIS NEW LOCATION AND WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED AT THE HALL OF JUSTICE. ALL HEARINGS WILL TAKE PLACE AT THIS NEW LOCATION**** TENTATIVE RULING:

Plaintiff in pro per Colleen Young’s (“Young”) motion “for order setting aside and vacating dismissal” is ruled upon as follows.

The notice of motion does not provide notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system as required by Local Rule 1.06(D). Young is ordered to notify opposing parties immediately of the tentative ruling system and to be available at the hearing in the event opposing parties appear without following the procedures set forth in Local Rule 1.06(B).

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a wrongful death case arising from a motor vehicle accident. Plaintiffs Young and Felecia Mathews (“Mathews”) filed their Complaint against Defendants Erica Roxanne Aalgaard and Garrett Aalgaard (“Defendants”) on July 5, 2023. Plaintiffs allege that Decedent, Nicholas Wayne Mathews was riding his Harley Davidson on Don Julio Boulevard as Ms. Aalgaard was making a left turn and struck, and fatally injured, Decedent. (See Complaint at p. 5.) The Complaint alleges causes of action for motor vehicle, general negligence and wrongful death. (Id., at p. 3.)

Defendants filed an answer to the Complaint on August 29, 2023. On December 12,

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 23CV004130: YOUNG, et al. vs AALGAARD, et al. 06/03/2026 Hearing on Motion for Order Setting Aside and Vacating Dismissal in Department 8D

2023, Plaintiffs filed a request for dismissal to dismiss the Complaint, with prejudice, as to Young only. The dismissal was entered on the same date as requested. On February 21, 2024, a Request for Dismissal dismissing the entire action with prejudice was filed. The dismissal was again entered as requested.

Young now moves:

…for an order to vacate and set aside the dismissal of Plaintiff, Colleen Young, 12-12-2023 from my Case #23CV 004130, and the dismissal of Plaintiff, Colleen Young’s Case #23CV004130 on 02-21-2024 entered against Plaintiff Colleen Young.

(Notice of Motion at 1:23-25.)

Plaintiff states in her notice of motion that the motion is made:

…on the ground(s) that the dismissals are void and were taken against Plaintiff Colleen Young through the extrinsic fraud of Robert Bentley Gibson, Esq., Gibson & Hughes Law Firm, Thomas Andrew Lamore, The Ledger Law Firm, James Olson, and Law Offices of Carmin K. Shaffer, individually and collectively preventing Plaintiff Colleen Young from presenting my case to the court, thereby denying Plaintiff, Colleen Young of presenting my case in a court of law, a fair trial, and Plaintiff Colleen Young has meritorious cases against all the defendants in [her] case.

(Id., at 1:26-2:4.)

In support of her motion, Young provides her declaration in which she makes the following declarations:

 That after her son’s passing Young secured the legal services of Thomas Andrew Lamore of the Ledger Law Firm on August 2, 2022. (Young Decl., ¶ 12.)  Mr. Lamore informed Young that she “needed a trial lawyer” and thus connected Young with Robert Bentley Gibson, of Gibson & Hughes. (Id., at ¶¶ 14-15.)  Young met with Mr. Gibson in April 2023 “for the first and only time” to discuss

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 23CV004130: YOUNG, et al. vs AALGAARD, et al. 06/03/2026 Hearing on Motion for Order Setting Aside and Vacating Dismissal in Department 8D

her case. (Id., at ¶ 16.)  In early July 2023, Mr. Gibson’s staff called Young and requested she invite Mathews to make a claim and be Mr. Gibson’s client. (Id., ¶ 25.)  While Young declares Mathews was hesitant to make a claim, she eventually acquiesced. (Id., at ¶ 29.)  Young and Mathews then “worked as a team” to provide “everything requested by USAA insurance, and according to Mr. Gibson’s staff during the discovery process.” (Id., at 30.)  Young received a communication from Mr. Gibson on September 28, 2023 notifying her that that progress has been made on the case and that they should discuss. (Id., at ¶ 32.)  On October 13, 2023, Mr.

Gibson notified Young that “he has negotiated a settlement for Mrs. Mathews and that she is the only rightful Plaintiff ‘under the law.’” (Id., at ¶ 35.)  Young “theorized that Mr. Gibson neglected to file [her] case by the deadline, while taking on Mrs. Matthews [sic] case, and was now trying to use Mrs. Mathews and her case to cover up his mistakes…” (Id., at 39.)  “After consulting the State Bar and other sources, [Young] determined the only way to protect [her] case and [her] rights was to terminate Mr.

Gibson and Mr. Lamore; therefore, on December 3, 2023 [Young] terminated the legal services of Mr. Gibson and Mr. Lamore, (Exhibit F), and filed complaints against them with the CA State Bar.” (Id., at 40.)

Attached to Young’s declaration as Exhibit F is an email from Young to Messrs. Gibson and Lamore in which Young writes, in relevant part: “I have decided to terminate our current legal relationships immediately and have accepted legal counsel elsewhere” and further instructed Messrs. Gibson and Lamore “not to take any further action on my behalf.” (Young Decl., Exhibit F.) The time stamp on the email indicates it was sent on December 3, 2023 at 7:02 am. (Ibid.)

Plaintiff also declares that:

On December 3, 2023, the same day Plaintiff terminated Mr. Gibson and Mr. Lamore, (Exhibit F), Mr. Gibson writes Mr. Olson, “James, tomorrow we are filing a request for dismissal on behalf of Colleen Young. She does not have a claim under CCP 377.60. So the remaining, and only Plaintiff is

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 23CV004130: YOUNG, et al. vs AALGAARD, et al. 06/03/2026 Hearing on Motion for Order Setting Aside and Vacating Dismissal in Department 8D

Ms. Matthews. Kindly send over the release on her behalf. We will get that signed, send you a separate dismissal for her and get this wrapped up. Sound Good?”

(Id., at ¶ 51, Exhibit J4)

Indeed, Young attaches a copy of an email from Mr. Gibson to Mr. Olson (counsel for Defendants) as Exhibit J4. Consistent with her averment described above. The email is time stamped December 3, 2023 at 4:19 pm.

Young further avers that in December of 2024, the California State Bar concluded its investigation and found no wrong doing by Mr. Gibson or Mr. Lamore. (Id., ¶¶ at 59, 60.)

Finally, Young declares that, due to a number of difficulties, including homelessness, she “wasn’t able to access the Sacramento County Courthouse until February 7, 2025.” (Id., at ¶ 64.) It was on February 7, 2025, that Young accessed a self-help computer and “discovered” her case “and the fraudulent dismissals.” (Id. at ¶ 64.)

Young argues she has “meritorious claims against all defendants in [her] case, and has done everything in [her] power ability and knowledge to bring this matter to the courts in a timely manner.” (Moving MPA at 20:17-19.) In addition requesting a “new trial” Young further makes “related requests for ancillary relief…to remediate damages caused by the fraud and to prepare for a new trial.” (Id., at 20:21-26.) In this regard, Young requests an order for Mr. Gibson and Mr. Lamore to turn over her “case files,” a “request for a temporary restraining order or injunctive relief” or an “order for a 3rd party, non-government authority to assist [Young] with safely accessing [her] home to collect her belongings or to assist with safely learning what my government/public housing has done with them” as well as an order for monetary sanctions to pay Young’s fees and costs incurred in filing this Motion as well as costs for relitigating Young’s case and finally, for “Robert Bentley Gibson, Esq., of Gibson & Hughes, of Thomas Andrew Lamore, of The Ledger Law Firm, of James Olson, and of Law Offices of Carmin K.

Shaffer as it relates to the extrinsic fraud and the motivations for the fraud of all the defendants reported herein.” (Id., at 20:26-21:23.)

Defendants oppose this motion arguing that the motion is untimely, there is no extrinsic fraud to support Young’s request, and that Young has no statutory qualification as a

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 23CV004130: YOUNG, et al. vs AALGAARD, et al. 06/03/2026 Hearing on Motion for Order Setting Aside and Vacating Dismissal in Department 8D

wrongful death claimant under this Complaint. (See Opposition at 1:24-28.)

Mathews, through her attorneys Jeffrey S. Hughes and Robert B. Gibson, filed a “response” to this motion. Mathews argues that Young’s motion should denied because Young had no financial dependence on Decedent and that Young was “fully aware of the circumstances surrounding this for 2 years and 4 months.” (Response at 2:24-28.) In her response, Mathews also explains that at the time of filing the Complaint, suit was filed in the name of Decedent’s wife (Mathews) and his mother (Young) but that “it was determined through the course of discovery and investigation that the only viable plaintiff/claim was that of Felicia Mathews.” (Id., at 1:25-28.)

Mathews further states that “[g]iven the circumstance of the case, a settlement of $85,000 was reached. The settlement was approved by Ms. Mathews and the matter was concluded.” (Id., at 2:7- 8.) Finally, Mathews notes for the Court that Young made a complaint to the California State Bar about these actions, but that the “State Bar concluded there was no merit to the claim.” (Id., at 2:12-14.)

Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 473(b) states in pertinent part: “The court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or the party’s legal representative from a... dismissal ... taken against the party through the party’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Application for this relief shall be accompanied by a copy of the answer or other pleading proposed to be filed therein, otherwise the application shall not be granted, and shall be made within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months, after the judgment, dismissal, order, or proceeding was taken.”

While section 473(b) requires a motion be made within six months after entry in dismissal, there is no such time limit when an unauthorized dismissal is involved. “Quite simply, the controlling question is whether [the attorney] had any authority to dismiss plaintiffs’ action without their knowledge and consent. If he wholly lacked power to dismiss the cause and acted beyond the scope of his authority in dismissing his clients’ complaint, his action remained voidable for an indeterminate period, and his clients could vacate the unauthorized dismissal within a reasonable time after learning of it, regardless of the time limitations in section 473 and regardless of rules governing extrinsic fraud or extrinsic mistake. Because the facts are undisputed that [the attorney’s] dismissal was wholly unauthorized and entered without any knowledge and

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 23CV004130: YOUNG, et al. vs AALGAARD, et al. 06/03/2026 Hearing on Motion for Order Setting Aside and Vacating Dismissal in Department 8D

consent of plaintiffs, the dismissal may be vacated by the court at any time.” (Whittier Union High School Dist. v. Superior Court (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 504, 508.)

“Dismissal of a cause of action by an attorney acting without any authority from his client is an act beyond the scope of his authority, which, on proper proof, may be vacated at any time. Obviously, such actions require strong and convincing proof, and the longer the delay in the application for relief, the stronger and more convincing the factual proof must be.” (Romadka v. Hoge (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1231, 1236 quoting Whittier, supra, 66 Cal.App.3d 504, 509.) An attorney’s unauthorized disposition of a client’s substantive rights is invalid. (See Blanton v. Womancare, Inc. (1985) 38 Cal.3d 396, 404.)

Here, Young presents evidence that she never authorized her attorney, Mr. Gibson, to dismiss her from the action, or to later dismiss the entire action. Indeed, Young presents evidence that she sent an email to Mr. Gibson terminating his legal representation on December 3, 2023 hours before Mr. Gibson represented to opposing counsel that Young would be dismissed and more than a week before Mr. Gibson filed the request for dismissal with the Court. Moreover, Mathews’ response to the present motion provides no evidence that Young consented to being dismissed from the case, or to later dismiss the entire action. Rather, Mathews declares that she “consented to the settlement of the matter and gave [her] lawyer permission to do so.” Such evidence does not refute the evidence put forth by Young that Mr. Gibson lacked any authority to dismiss Young from the case.

As discussed above, an action to vacate a dismissal requires strong and convincing proof, especially when, as here, there was a delay in the action seeking relief. The Court concludes however that Young has provided strong and convincing proof as it is undisputed that Young terminated her relationship with Mr. Gibson prior to the dismissal being filed and that Young instructed Mr. Gibson to not take any additional actions on her behalf. Indeed, Mathews does not contest these facts in her “response.”

Moreover, given the evidence presented by Young, the Court concludes that the dismissals with prejudice were void and are properly set aside regardless of any time limitations in Code of Civil Procedure section 473.

Finally, the Court acknowledges that both Mathews and Defendants argue in their

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 23CV004130: YOUNG, et al. vs AALGAARD, et al. 06/03/2026 Hearing on Motion for Order Setting Aside and Vacating Dismissal in Department 8D

respective briefing that, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 377.60, Young does not have a viable claim. However, the question presented by this motion is much narrower: is the judgment void given the argument that Mr. Gibson lacked authority to dismiss Young? As discussed above, Young has presented evidence demonstrating that the judgment is void and thus the Court need not, and does not reach, the question of the viability of Young’s case against Defendants.

Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED in part. The dismissal with prejudice as to Young entered on December 12, 2023 and the dismissal with prejudice as to the entire Complaint entered on February 21, 2024 is set aside.

Young’s request for a “new trial” and “related requests for ancillary relief” are DENIED as such requests are outside the scope of this motion.

The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to California Rules of Court Rule 3.1312 or further notice is required.