Motion for reconsideration
changes to Plaintiff’s Arbitration Agreement at any point in time by anyone after Plaintiff executed the Arbitration Agreement on December 12, 2023.” (Bhangoo Decl. ¶ 17.)
The statements in the Bhangoo declaration detailing the steps the potential employee would have to take to electronically review and sign the Arbitration Agreement, as well as the security precautions concerning creation and use of the employee’s username and password, are sufficient to establish that the electronic signature on the Arbitration Agreement is an act of Plaintiff. (See Civ. Code § 1633.9; Ruiz, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at 843-844; Espejo v. S. California Permanente Med. Grp. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1062.)
Based on the foregoing, the motion is GRANTED as to Universal only.
The Court notes Universal contends the Arbitration Agreement applies to defendant Adriana Ramirez as well, as an employee of Universal, and Ms. Ramirez is entitled to compel arbitration of Plaintiff’s claims against her. However, Ms. Ramirez did not join in this motion, has not appeared in this matter, and appears to have not yet been served with the complaint. In addition, no evidence is offered showing Ms. Ramirez has made any demand for arbitration to Plaintiff.
This matter is STAYED as to Universal only.
Plaintiff’s evidentiary objections are OVERRULED.
Counsel for Universal is to give notice of this ruling.
8. Wong v. SBS Trust Deed Network 23-1343409
Before the court is a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s March 19, 2026 order filed by defendant Mitchell Willet (Defendant or Willet). As set forth below, the motion is DENIED.
A motion for reconsideration must be “based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law” than those before the court at the time of the original ruling. (Code of Civ. Proc. § 1008, subd. (a).) In addition, a party seeking reconsideration of a prior order based on “new or different facts, circumstances or law” must provide a satisfactory explanation for failing to present the information at the first hearing, i.e., a showing of reasonable diligence. (
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Here, Defendant fails to identify any new or different facts, circumstances or law than those before the Court at the time of the 03/19/26 order denying Willet’s motion to set aside the default judgment. (ROA 126.) While Willet cites to the supplemental declaration, it was filed prior to the hearing. (ROA 125.) In fact, at the hearing, the Court specifically addressed the late-filed declaration and declined to consider it. (ROA 126.) The Court also finds Willet failed to adequately explain why the supplemental declaration and supporting evidence were not submitted with the original motion.
But even if the Court were to reconsider its prior ruling, the evidence provided does not warrant reversal. The passport entries do not show Willet was out of the country on the day the proof of service shows he was personally served. (ROA 26; Suppl. Willet Decl., Ex. A.) And the credit card transactions are not proof of physical presence, as they do not show who made the purchases or that the card was physically in Willet’s possession. (Id., Ex. B.) Moreover, the Court also denied the motion based on untimeliness, and the new evidence does not overcome this finding. (ROA 126.)
The motion is therefore DENIED.
Counsel for Plaintiff shall give notice of this ruling.
9. Gibson Holdings, LLC v. Pure Rapscallion, Inc 24-1382993 Plaintiff Gibson Holdings, LLC’s (“Plaintiff”) unopposed Motion for Issue Sanctions (“Motion”) is DENIED.
Plaintiff requests issue sanctions against pro per defendant Daniel Adam Hewko aka Adam Hewko (“Adam”). Adam was previously represented by counsel, but that counsel substituted out. The pleadings Plaintiff served on Adam following Adam’s former counsel stopping representation have all been e-served on Adam at adam@bottlecoatings.com and/or adam@glugwater.com. To electronically serve a pro per party, the pro per party must file consent to receive electronic service. (CA Rules of Court Rule 2.251.) There is nothing in the court’s records which indicates Adam filed such consent. Adam’s former counsel noted Adam’s email address was adam@dynamicbrandsllc.com, which is neither of the two email addresses above. (ROA 184.) It is unclear where Plaintiff obtained the above addresses where electronic service has been sent.
In addition to electronically serving Adam the present Motion, Plaintiff electronically served Adam the underlying court order which is the basis of this Motion. (ROA 270.) As that service was improper, Adam has not technically received notice of the court’s order and therefore cannot have violated it.
For the above reasons the Motion is DENIED. Plaintiff will need to properly serve the underlying order and then, if Adam does not comply, Plaintiff will need to file a new motion for sanctions should it so choose.
The court also notes corporate defendant Pure Rapscallion, Inc. (“PRI”) has been unrepresented since 10/02/25. (ROA 268.) The court hereby sets an OSC Re: Why Unrepresented Corporation Pure Rapscallion, Inc.’s Answer Should Not Be Struck for July 9, 2026, at 1:30 p.m. in Dept. C-20.
Plaintiff to give notice to all parties, including Pure Rapscallion, Inc.
10. Farkas v. Smith 23-1324888 (Off calendar) 11. Millen v. General Motors LLV (Continued)