Denise Anderson et al v. United Rental Realty, LLC

In The Matter of George J Manyik 26PR000065 and Antoinette J Manyik Family Trust

PETITION TO MODIFY TRUST RE: SUCCESSOR TRUSTEES

TENTATIVE RULING: Good cause appearing, and no objection having been made, the Petition is GRANTED. The Court will sign the Proposed Order unless an interested party appears at the hearing to object. (See Prob. Code § 1043.)

CIVIL LAW & MOTION CALENDAR – Hon. Joseph J. Solga, Dept. B (Historic Courthouse) at 8:30 a.m.

Denise Anderson et al v. United Rental Realty, LLC 25CV001597

[1] PLAINTIFFS AND CROSS-DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO WRITTEN DISCOVERY [Filed 4/3/26]

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion to compel responses to the RFPs, FROGS, and SPROGS (defined below) is MOOT. The motion as to the RFAs (defined below) is DENIED. The request for sanctions is GRANTED IN PART. Within 10 calendar days of notice of entry of order, Defendant shall pay to Plaintiffs, care of their attorney of record, sanctions in the amount of $3,660. Plaintiffs are directed to provide notice of entry of order.

A. PROCEDURAL MATTER

Plaintiffs and Cross-Defendants Denise Anderson, Trustee of The Denise E. Anderson Trust, and Scott R. Cowan, Trustee of The Scott R. Cowan Trust (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) move, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 2019.010 et. seq., 2030.210 et. seq., 2031.210 et seq., 2025.210 et seq., and 2033.280, subdivision (c),1 for an order compelling Defendant and Cross-Complainant United Rental Realty, LLC (“Defendant”) to serve verified responses to: Plaintiffs’ Second Set of (1) Requests for Production (“RFPs”); (2) Form Interrogatories—General (“FROGS”); (3) Special Interrogatories (“SPROGS”); and (4) Requests for Admission (“RFAS”) (collectively, “Subject Discovery”). Plaintiffs further move for monetary sanctions against Defendant in the amount of $3,960.

The matter originally came on for hearing on May 5, 2026 and was continued to coincide with the hearing noticed by Defendant’s filing on April 30, 2026 of a motion for relief for the failure to serve timely discovery responses to the Subject Discovery.

B. RFPS, SPROGS, AND FROGS

If a party to whom interrogatories or requests for production of documents were directed fails to serve a timely response, the responding party waives all objections and the propounding party may move for an order compelling responses and for a monetary sanction. (§§ 2030.290, 1 All subsequent statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise specified.

subds. (a)-(c), 2031.300, subds. (a)-(c).) All that need be shown in the moving papers is that a set of interrogatories or requests for production was properly served on the opposing party, that the time to respond has expired, and that no response of any kind has been served. (Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide, Civ. Proc. Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2022), Ch. 8F, § 8:1140, p. 8F- 59, citing Leach v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 902, 905-06.) The moving party is not required to show a “reasonable and good faith attempt” to resolve the matter informally with opposing counsel before filing the motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.290; Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants, (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 411.)

Plaintiffs submit evidence demonstrating that the discovery was properly propounded and timely responses were not served. (Declaration of John N. Heffner (“Heffner Decl.”) at ¶¶ 2-4, 6, Exhs. A-C.)

Defendant does not dispute that in Opposition. Rather, Defendant argues that it served code-compliant, full, and complete responses to the Subject Discovery and a production of responsive documents on April 22, 2026, the same day its Opposition to this motion was due and filed. (Declaration of J. Brian Urtnowski, ¶ 2 (“Urtnowski Decl.”).) Defendant contends its delay to respond was due to inadvertence and excusable neglect; the deadline was not calendared because, at the time they were received, they were believed to be a duplicate copy of the first set of discovery. (Id., ¶ 3.)

Defendant further explains that its counsel did not respond to Plaintiffs’ counsel’s meet and confer email from March 13, 2026 due to intensive trial preparation and trial in a separate matter; however, upon completion of the trial, Defendant’s counsel promptly commenced preparation of responses on April 9, 2026. (Id., ¶¶ 4-5.)

Plaintiffs acknowledge in Reply that, subsequent to their filing of the instant motion, Defendant served responses to the Subject Discovery. Plaintiffs contend that Defendant’s responses are objection-laden and substantively deficient. As to the first point, the Court’s concurrent ruling grants Defendant relief from its waiver of objections. While the Court acknowledges Plaintiffs’ assertion that Defendant’s responses are noncompliant for reasons in addition to the objections imposed (see Reply, pp. 3-5), the sufficiency of the responses is not properly before the Court on this motion. (See Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc., supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at 405-06 [whether to proceed with a motion to compel responses when there has been a response – albeit untimely – is within the sound discretion of the court].)

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs’ motion as to the RFPS, SPROGS, AND FROGS is MOOT. This ruling is made without prejudice to Plaintiffs’ rights to renew their arguments that the discovery responses are substantively deficient. Unless extended by agreement of the parties, the deadline for any subsequent motion to compel is 45 days from April 22, 2026 (the date Defendant served its responses). (§§ 2030.300, subd. (c), 2031.310, subd. (c).)

C. RFAS

“If a party to whom requests for admission are directed fails to serve a timely response, ... [t]he party to whom the requests for admission are directed waives any objection to the requests [and] [t]he requesting party may move for an order that the genuineness of any documents and the truth of any matters specified in the requests be deemed admitted.”

(§ 2033.280, subds. (a)-(b).) “The court shall make this order, unless it finds that the party to whom the requests for admission have been directed has served, before the hearing on the motion, a proposed response to the requests for admission that is in substantial compliance with Section 2033.220.” (§ 2033.280, subd. (c).)

Here, Plaintiffs acknowledge in Reply that, subsequent to their filing of the instant motion, Defendant served responses to the RFAS. Plaintiffs do not raise specific challenges to the responses, other than a general statement that Defendant’s responses to all the Subject Discovery contain objections. The Court has reviewed Defendant’s responses to the RFAs and does not find that they assert any objections. (Urtnowski Decl., Exh. D.) Regardless, the Court’s concurrent ruling grants Defendant relief from its waiver of objections. Furthermore, Defendant’s responses appear to be in substantial compliance with section 2033.220. (Ibid.) Thus, the Court is not compelled to order that the truth of the matters specified in the RFAs are deemed admitted. (See § 2033.280, subd. (c).)

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs’ motion to deem admitted the matters specified in the RFAs is DENIED. To the extent Plaintiffs take issue with the content of the responses, the sufficiency of the responses is not properly before the Court on this motion. Unless extended by agreement of the parties, the deadline for any subsequent motion to compel is 45 days from April 22, 2026 (the date Defendant served its responses). (§ 2033.290, subd. (c).)

D. SANCTIONS

“The court shall impose a monetary sanction ... against any party ... who unsuccessfully ... opposes a motion to compel a response to [interrogatories or requests for production of documents], unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (§§ 2030.290, subd. (c), 2031.300, subd. (c).) Moreover, “[t]he court may award sanctions under the Discovery Act in favor of a party who files a motion to compel discovery, even though . . . the requested discovery was provided to the moving party after the motion was filed.” (Rules of Court, rule 3.1348, subd. (a).)

Here, the Court finds neither that Defendant acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. Plaintiffs’ counsel took steps to avoid motion practice and, when met with silence, incurred fees in having to file the instant motion. Defendant’s counsel’s contention that he would have prepared discovery responses without the need for a motion had Plaintiffs’ counsel sent an email stating that a motion to compel was contemplated (see Urtnowski Decl., ¶ 6) is undermined by the record wherein Plaintiffs’ counsel’s March 13, 2026 email expressly informed Defendant’s counsel that a motion to compel was contemplated if responses were not received before March 27, 2026. (Heffner Decl., Exh. F.)

The Court finds that the $650 hourly rate charged by Plaintiffs’ counsel is out of the reasonable range of customary fees charged in the area. (Heffner Decl., at ¶ 7; Reply Heffner Decl., at ¶ 3.) Plaintiffs’ counsel provides no factual basis in support of the hourly rate (i.e., experience and qualifications) such that the Court might find the rate reasonable for the

circumstances. As such, the Court reduces counsel’s rate to $600. The Court finds that 6 hours is a reasonable number of billable hours for preparation of the motion and reply. (Heffner Decl., ¶ 7; Reply Heffner Decl., ¶ 3.)

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs’ request for sanctions is GRANTED IN PART. Defendant is ordered to pay to Plaintiffs, care of their attorney of record, within 10 calendar days of notice of entry of order, sanctions in the amount of $3,660 [= $600 / hr x 6 hrs + $60 filing fee].

[2] DEFENDANT AND CROSS-COMPLAINANT’S MOTION FOR RELIEF FOR THE FAILURE TO SERVE TIMELY DISCOVERY RESPONSES

TENTATIVE RULING: The Motion is GRANTED. Defendant is relieved from its waiver of objections as to the Subject Discovery (defined below). Unless extended by agreement of the parties, the deadline for any motion to compel a further response to the Subject Discovery is 45 days from April 22, 2026 (the date Defendant served its responses). Plaintiffs’ request for sanctions is DENIED.

Defendant and Cross-Complainants United Rentals Realty, LLC (“Defendant”) moves, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 2030.290, 2031.300, and 2033.280,2 for an order of relief from waiver of objections with respect to Defendant’s responses to Plaintiffs’ Second Set of Form Interrogatories, Special Interrogatories, Requests for Admission, and Requests for Production (collectively, “Subject Discovery”), due to the inadvertence and excusable neglect of Defendant’s counsel.

A party who fails to timely respond to interrogatories, requests for production, or requests for admission waives all objections, including objections based on privilege and work product. (§§ 2030.290, subd. (a), 2031.300, subd. (a), 2033.280, subd. (a).) The Court, on motion, may relieve that party from this waiver on its determination that both of the following conditions are satisfied: (1) the party has subsequently served a response that is in substantial compliance with the Discovery Act; and (2) the party’s failure to serve a timely response was the result of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect. (§§ 2030.290, subd. (a)(1)-(2), 2031.300, subd. (a)(1)-(2), 2033.280, subd. (a)(1)-(2).)

“The Legislature apparently intended to employ the same standard for relief from defaults as used in section 473 for failure to serve a timely response to a discovery demand. ... Counsel’s mistake of law on a relatively simple and undebatable matter was not a valid ground for relief. (City of Ontario v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 335, 347.) Further, the press of an attorney’s practice would not warrant relief. (Lyons v. Swope (1957) 154 Cal.App.2d 598, 600.)” (City of Fresno v. Sup. Ct. (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1459, 1467.)

Here, Defendant argues that it has established inadvertence and excusable neglect on the part of its counsel. Specifically, Defendant argues that its failure to timely respond was due to the response deadline not being calendared because its counsel inadvertently believed that Plaintiffs’ 2 All subsequent statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise specified.

second set of discovery was a duplicate copy of Plaintiffs’ first set of discovery. (Declaration of J. Brian Urtnowski (“Urtnowski Decl.”) ¶ 3.) “Had [counsel] been aware of the service of Plaintiffs’ Second Set of discovery, United Rentals would have either timely responded or would have requested an extension of time to respond. United Rentals did neither because [counsel] was unaware of the outstanding discovery.” (Ibid.) Defendant further argues that the reason its counsel did not respond to Plaintiffs’ meet and confer email or provide responses prior to Plaintiffs filing a motion to compel was because its counsel (a solo practitioner) was heavily engaged in trial preparation and a jury trial which was meant to commence on March 30, 2026, but which started on April 6, 2026 and concluded on April 9, 2026.

In Opposition, Plaintiffs argue that Defendant cannot show inadvertence or excusable neglect based on trial preparation obligations and Defendant’s mistaken belief about which set of discovery was being served is not credible. Plaintiffs further argue that Defendant’s responses are not in substantial compliance because they assert objections.

In light of City of Fresno, supra, 205 Cal.App.3d at 1467, the Court does not find that Defendant’s counsel being heavily engaged in another trial constitutes inadvertence or excusable neglect. However, that explanation was offered in support of Defendant’s failure to respond to meet and confer communications—not the Subject Discovery itself. Rather, Defendant’s failure to timely respond to the Subject Discovery on February 20, 2026 is at issue on this motion. While the failure to calendar a deadline for discovery responses is not a model practice, the Court understands it occurs from time to time. Here, Defendant has shown that it occurred as a result of inadvertence. Thus, Defendant has sufficiently shown that its failure to serve a timely response was the result of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect.

The Court has reviewed Defendant’s responses to the Subject Discovery and finds that the responses are in substantial compliance with the Discovery Act, notwithstanding Plaintiffs’ right to move to compel a further response pursuant to sections 2030.300, 2031.310, and 2033.290. (Urtnowski Decl., Exhs. B-E.) Plaintiffs’ issue with the responses asserting objections is not well taken as objections can be a code-compliant response. (See, e.g., §§ 2030.210, subd. (a)(3), 2031.210, subd. (a)(3), 2033.210, subd. (b); see also Weil & Brown, et al., Cal. Practice Guide, Civ. Proc. Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2025), Ch. 8F-5, § 8:1035 [“Any form of response under § 2030.210 is permissible—i.e., answer, objection or election to allow inspection of records ....”].)

Plaintiffs request sanctions, pursuant to sections 2023.010, 2023.030, 2030.290, and 2031.300, in the amount of $2,470 for opposing the instant motion. Plaintiffs provide insufficient discussion of the foregoing code sections to show how they authorize sanctions here. Sections 2030.290 and 2031.300 provide no such authority related to a motion for relief from waiver. Section 2023.030 allows sanctions for a variety of discovery misconduct listed under section 2023.010; however, Plaintiffs fail to advance any argument as to the applicable misconduct here. Moreover, given that Defendant’s instant motion was successful, the Court finds the imposition of sanctions against Defendant would be unjust. Thus, Plaintiffs’ request for sanctions is DENIED.

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