"A.P." VS. JEFFERSON ELEMENTARY SCHOOL DISTRICT, ET AL

A court reviewing a demurrer accepts as true the facts alleged in the complaint as well as those of which it may take judicial notice (John’s Grill, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1008, citing Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318), but does not “assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law.” (Aubry v. Tri-City Hosp. Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967 (Aubry).)

June 3, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar Judge Nicole S. Healy Department 28 ________________________________________________________________________ B. Discussion

1. Second Cause of Action: Intentional and/or Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

Setting aside any cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress, which is addressed in the ruling on the accompanying motion to strike, the District, Mizel, and Hopkins contend that the FAC fails to plead a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) against them.

The District contends that, as a public entity, it is immune from liability for IIED by operation of Government Code, section 815, which provides: “A public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person.” (Gov. Code, § 815, subd. (a).) Notwithstanding this immunity, however, “[a] public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee or his personal representative.” (Id., at § 815.2, subd. (a).)

As Prielo’s opposition makes clear, the FAC attempts to hold the District liable based on the purported IIED inflicted by Mizel and Hopkins on AP pursuant to subdivision (a) of Government Code, section 815.2, and not merely pursuant to common law. (See May 19, 2026, Memo. of Points & Auths., at pp. 4–8.)

The District nonetheless contends that it is immune due to its employees’ own immunity. Indeed, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, a public entity is not liable for an injury resulting from an act or omission of an employee of the public entity where the employee is immune from liability.” (Gov. Code, § 815.2, subd. (b).) The District as well as Mizel and Hopkins argue the individuals are immunized by sections 820.2 and 822.2 of the Government Code. Section 820.2 provides that: “Except as otherwise provided by statute, a public employee is not liable for an injury resulting from his act or omission where the act or omission was the result of the exercise of the discretion vested in him, whether or not such discretion be abused.” (Id., § 820.2.)

Section 822.2 immunizes public employees for liability due to their misrepresentations unless they are “guilty of actual fraud, corruption or actual malice.” (Id., § 822.2.) Plaintiff correctly notes that the FAC does not plead misrepresentation.

The question of whether the individual defendants are immune and whether such immunity is or is not apparent on the face of the FAC is intertwined with Mizel’s and Hopkins’s argument that the FAC fails to allege facts showing extreme and outrageous conduct, an element of an IIED cause of action. (See Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050– 1051.) That is, whether Mizel or Hopkins are immune depends on what they, individually, are alleged to have done or failed to do.

The FAC alleges three categories of acts and omissions that together constitute the necessary outrageous conduct: (1) the failure to respond to AP’s multiple requests to be

June 3, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar Judge Nicole S. Healy Department 28 ________________________________________________________________________ separated from SN, leading to the physical altercation; (2) the failure to impose proper consequences and protective measures afterward; and (3) blaming AP for his injuries. (See FAC, ¶ 73.) The FAC does not allege sufficient facts under the second count to determine who did or failed to do what, requiring reference to the preceding allegations. (See id., ¶ 70 [incorporating preceding allegations by reference].)

According to those preceding allegations, both Mizel and Hopkins knew SN’s “history of violence,” which included violence ranging from physical altercations to “bringing a toy gun to school.” (FAC, ¶¶ 19–20.) While some physical altercations may be severe — like the incident that is the subject of this case — others are far less indicative of non-trivial injury. The FAC’s allegations do not show that Hopkins knew of an appreciable threat to AP’s well-being when he failed to respond to an email requesting a schedule change due to ‘problems’ with SN some four months before the incident (see id., ¶¶ 29–30); nor that such an appreciable threat was known to Mizel when she ignored and apparently failed to take action after AP sent two emails about SN “bothering” him. (See id., ¶¶ 30–33.)

Though the FAC alleges SN had violently thrown AP to the ground once before the incident but after AP’s requests, it does not allege that Mizel or Hopkins were made aware of this fact. (See id., ¶ 27.) Based on the facts actually alleged, Mizel’s and Hopkins’s responsibility for the first category of conduct are based on their failure to respond promptly to correspondence and to shift AP’s schedule to protect against the “problems” and “bothering” between AP and a student known to have physically and forcefully touched another student on at least one occasion.

Even assuming that Mizel and Hopkins owed AP a duty to keep him safe on school grounds, the FAC’s allegations fail to show they were on sufficient notice that they might fail in this duty by their inaction. The FAC therefore does not plead the level of extremity and outrageousness necessary to constitute the tort of IIED.

As for the second category of conduct, none of it is alleged to have been the responsibility of either Mizel or Hopkins. Indeed, Mizel is alleged to have recommended SN’s expulsion from the school to the superintendent, which in the absence of any contrary indication suggests neither she nor Hopkins has the ability to remove SN themselves. (FAC, ¶ 36.) Nor is there an indication that Mizel or Hopkins had any independent ability to implement AP’s parents’ requests for information or further safety measures, especially given that the requests were allegedly directed to “the school and district administration” and the most egregious conduct was allegedly committed by the District and not Mizel or Hopkins individually. (Id., ¶¶ 39–41.)

The third category, “a pattern of victim blaming” — to the extent it is intended to constitute something apart from the District’s failure to implement all changes and provide all information requested by AP’s parents — is alleged only once in a conclusory fashion and not supported by facts showing outrageous or extreme conduct on the part of Mizel or Hopkins individually. (FAC, ¶ 40.)

Accordingly, based on the FAC’s allegations, the court need determine whether any discretionary or misrepresentation immunity applies to Mizel and Hopkins, and thus immunizes the District as well, because the FAC fails to allege facts showing that either Mizel or Hopkins

June 3, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar Judge Nicole S. Healy Department 28 ________________________________________________________________________ committed the tort of IIED against AP. Therefore, the demurrer is sustained as to the second cause of action. Leave to amend is granted. (See City of Stockton v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 730, 747.)

2. Fourth Cause of Action: Violation of Ralph Civil Rights Act of 1976

The District contends that a public school district cannot be held liable for a violation of the Ralph Civil Rights Act. However, its argument is not well taken — there is no limitation on who may violate the statue akin to that in the Unruh Civil Rights Act which provides the right to equal accommodation “in all business establishments” but not schools. (Civ. Code, § 51, subd. (b); Brennon B. v. Superior Court (2022) 13 Cal.5th 662, 668-669.) However, like the second cause of action, there is a more fundamental flaw with the fourth cause of action.

The fourth cause of action is premised upon Civil Code, section 52, which provides for a private right of action against “[w]hoever denies the right provided by [the Ralph Civil Rights Act] ... or aids, incites, or conspires in that denial ....” (Civ. Code, § 52, subd. (b).) Importantly, the right implicated here that is provided is “the right to be free from any violence ... committed against their persons or property ... on account of any characteristic listed or defined in [the Unruh Civil Rights Act] ... or because another person perceives them to have one or more of those characteristics.” (Id., § 51.7, subd. (b).) That is, the prohibited violence must be motivated by discriminatory animus.

The FAC does not allege that SN had any discriminatory motive in committing the alleged violence, with respect to age, sex, disability or other purportedly protected characteristic. Accordingly, it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for violation of the Ralph Civil Rights Act, and the demurrer is sustained as to the fourth cause of action. Leave to amend is granted. (See City of Stockton, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 747.)

If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the court. Thereafter, counsel for defendants Jefferson Elementary School District, Melissa Mizel, and Jon Hopkins shall prepare a written order consistent with the court’s ruling for the court’s signature, pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312 and Local Rule 3.403(b)(iv), and provide written notice of the ruling to all parties who have appeared in this action. The order should be e-filed only, do not email or mail a hard copy to the court.

June 3, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar Judge Nicole S. Healy Department 28 ________________________________________________________________________

02:00 PM LINE 10 25-CIV-06487 "A.P." VS. JEFFERSON ELEMENTARY SCHOOL DISTRICT, ET AL

"A.P." COREY M. POLLAK JEFFERSON ELEMENTARY SCHOOL DISTRICT MARK E. DAVIS

Motion to Strike Portions of First Amended Complaint

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendants Jefferson Elementary School District’s, Melissa Mizel’s, and Jon Hopkins’s Motion to Strike Portions of plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (FAC) is GRANTED with leave to amend.

Guardian ad litem Michael Prielo may file a Second Amended Complaint within ten (10) days of service of written notice of entry of the formal order. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1320(g); Code Civ. Proc. § 472b.)

Defendants Jefferson Elementary School District, Melissa Mizel, and Jon Hopkins move to strike (1) the references to a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) and (2) the references to and prayers for punitive and exemplary damages.

The District, Mizel, and Hopkins seek to strike the references to NIED, contending that NIED is not a standalone tort but a species of negligence, which is already pled. (See Nov. 18, 2025 FAC, ¶¶ 55–69.) Prielo concedes as much in opposition but contends the allegations in the second count support recovery of emotional distress damages for negligence. The motion does not request that all the factual allegations be stricken, only those words in the caption, heading, and a single paragraph that suggest a standalone cause of action for NIED is being asserted. Given that it is not and the references are unnecessary, the motion is granted as to those references in the caption, the heading of the second cause of action, and paragraph 74.

As to the references and prayers for punitive and exemplary damages, the court strikes them for the same reasons set forth in the ruling on the accompanying demurrer: the allegations of mere negligence alone do not show fraud, malice, or oppression on the part of the District, Mizel, or Hopkins, nor a basis for heightened remedies pursuant to Civil Code, section 52 from these defendants. Leave to amend is granted to cure these defects.

If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the court. Thereafter, counsel for defendants Jefferson Elementary School District, Melissa Mizel, and Jon Hopkins shall prepare a written order consistent with the court’s ruling for the court’s signature, pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312 and Local Rule 3.403(b)(iv), and provide written notice of the ruling to all parties who have appeared in this action. The order should be e-filed only, do not email or mail a hard copy to the court.