JOHN MMB DOE, AN INDIVIDUAL vs MOORPARK UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, A CALIFORNIA LOCAL PUBLIC ENTITY, et al.

Discussion: A. Demurrer- Legal Standard Grounds for demurrer must appear on the face of the pleading or from judicially noticeable matters. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a); Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) Concerning the legal sufficiency of a pleading, the sole issue on demurrer is whether the facts pleaded, if true, state a valid cause of action – i.e., if the complaint pleads facts that would entitle the plaintiff to relief. (LiMandri v. Judkins (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 326, 339.)

It is an abuse of discretion to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is a reasonable probability that the defect can be cured by amendment. (Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074, 1081.) A demurrer on grounds of uncertainty lies when the pleading is uncertain, ambiguous, or unintelligible. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f).) Demurrers on grounds of uncertainty are

2025CUPP054442: JOHN MMB DOE, AN INDIVIDUAL vs MOORPARK UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, A CALIFORNIA LOCAL PUBLIC ENTITY, et al.

disfavored. They are strictly construed. Even if a complaint is in some respects uncertain, it should be overruled because ambiguities can be clarified through discovery. (Chen v. Berenjian (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 811, 822.) “A demurrer for uncertainty should be overruled when the facts as to which the complaint is uncertain are presumptively within the defendant's knowledge.” (Ibid.) B. Application The Demurrer on grounds of uncertainty is overruled. This is not one of the rare cases where the pleading is so poor that Defendant cannot reasonably be expected to respond.

All of the required elements of the negligence claim have been alleged - duty, breach, causation, damages – with sufficient clarity regarding Macias’ own actions. The basis for Defendant Macias’s duty is her alleged “special relationship” with students as school personnel. (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal. 4th 861, 869-70; ¶58.) Macias was a “teachers’ aide at MHS” (¶9), and also described as a “mentor, and advisor to minor high school students at MHS.” (¶14). As alleged in ¶¶19-29, 34-38. 52-56, Defendant Macias breached that duty by committing sexual abuse, harassment, and molestation of Plaintiff.

The allegation at ¶67 re-alleges and incorporates by reference all of the allegations specific to the Negligence cause of action. Although the allegations under the heading on negligence are drafted with a focus on the actions/inactions of the District Defendants, the allegations specific to Macias are clear enough within the complaint to state a cause of action against her. Additionally, the argument raised for the first time on Reply that the claim is barred by the statute of limitations was not properly identified as a basis for the demurrer and will not be considered.

Regarding the IIED claim, a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress exists when there is “‘“‘(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.’”’” [citations omitted] (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050.)

Sexual abuse of a minor student while acting as teacher’s aide is sufficient to plead outrageous conduct beyond all bounds tolerable in civilized society, and Plaintiff has adequately alleged severe emotional distress due to Macias’ actions. The four-year age gap, the fact that Plaintiff is male, and the level of potential criminal liability, does not change the analysis. The allegation at ¶143 re-alleges and incorporates every other allegation in the FAC. Therefore, all of the required elements of this cause of action are adequately pled in the FAC. ¶¶143-152.

Defendant demurs to the FAC’s eighth cause of action for Gender Violence in violation of Civil Code § 52.4, on grounds that the express statute of limitation period is three-years from the act, or within eight-years of when Plaintiff attains age of majority. (Civil Code §52.4, subd. (b).) Plaintiff responds that CCP §340.1, subd. (a)(1) applies to extend the period because the gender violence claim is predicated on acts of childhood sexual abuse. Claims related to childhood sexual assault occurring before January 1, 2024 must be commenced within the later of (a) 22 years after plaintiff reaches the age of majority (age 18) or (b) five years after plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that “psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual assault”. [CCP § 340.11(a)(1) (emphasis added)] Rutter, Cal.

Prac. Guide Pers. Inj. Ch. 5-B. While typically the more-specific statute of limitations period governs, here the FAC alleges application of CCP §340.1 and Defendant fails

2025CUPP054442: JOHN MMB DOE, AN INDIVIDUAL vs MOORPARK UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, A CALIFORNIA LOCAL PUBLIC ENTITY, et al.

to affirmatively demonstrate that the claim is affirmatively barred as pled in the FAC or meaningfully argue that CCP §340.1(a)(1) does not apply. For a bar based on the statute of limitations to be raised by demurrer, the defect must clearly and affirmatively appear on the face of the complaint; “it is not enough that the complaint shows merely that the action may be barred.” (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Services (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315-1316, emphasis added, citations omitted.) When the relevant facts are not clear such that the cause of action might be, but is not necessarily, time-barred, the demurrer will be overruled. [Citation.]” (Coalition for Clean Air v.

City of Visalia (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 408, 420.) As there is no other basis for the demurrer to this claim except the statute of limitations, the Court overrules the demurrer. The demurer to the ninth cause of action for Sexual Abuse and Harassment in the Educational Environment in violation of Education Code § 220 is based on Macias’ argument that the cause of action does not apply to individuals, and there are no allegations of discrimination in any event. Plaintiff argues that it would be absurd and unjust to hold an administrator liable for indifference to harassment, but not the actual harasser.

Education Code section 220 states that “No person shall be subjected to discrimination on the basis of disability, gender, gender identity, gender expression, nationality, race or ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, or any other characteristic that is contained in the definition of hate crimes set forth in Section 422.55 of the Penal Code, including immigration status, in any program or activity conducted by an educational institution that receives, or benefits from, state financial assistance, or enrolls pupils who receive state student financial aid.” (emphasis added).

There does not appear to be support for individual liability under this statute. (Donovan v. Poway Unified School Dist. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 567.) The demurrer to this claim is sustained without leave. Finally, Defendant’s argument that the claim for punitive damages lacks support is not properly ruled on in the context of a demurrer.

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