WIGHT, et al. vs CEDARWOOD POST ACUTE, LLC, et al.

24CV025504: WIGHT, et al. vs CEDARWOOD POST ACUTE, LLC, et al. 06/02/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 16C

Tentative Ruling

NOTICE:

Please take notice, Department 54 has moved to Department 16C at the Tani G. Cantil- Sakauye Courthouse. The new courthouse is located at 500 G Street, Sacramento, CA 95814.

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendant Cedarwood Post Acute, LLC’s (“Defendant”) motion to compel arbitration is GRANTED.

Plaintiffs Steve Wight, Kathleen Monks, Doug Wight, and Thomas Wight (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed this action against Defendant, Gregory Smith, M.D., Sutter Health, Sutter Independent Physicians, and Sutter Medical Group on December 16, 2024. Plaintiffs filed the operative First Amended Complaint on March 6, 2025, alleging causes of action for medical negligence/wrongful death, survival, and elder abuse. Plaintiffs allege that decedent Joanne Wight (“Mrs. Wight”) suffered injuries and death due to the negligence and neglect of Defendant’s facility, a licensed skilled nursing facility, where Mrs. Wight was admitted as a resident from on or about November 27, 2023, to December 18, 2023. Plaintiffs are the husband and children of Mrs. Wight.

Defendant filed its Answer on March 28, 205.

Plaintiffs dismissed Sutter Health, Sutter Independent Physicians, and Sutter Medical Group from this action without prejudice on November 14, 2025. Plaintiffs dismissed Gregory Smith, M.D. from this action with prejudice on April 28, 2026. Thus, Defendant is the only remaining defendant..

Trial is set for April 12, 2027.

Defendant moves to compel arbitration via the Arbitration Agreement Mrs. Wight signed via electronic signature on November 28, 2023, which contains the following language:

“Article 1. It is understood that any dispute as to medical malpractice, that is as to whether any medical services rendered under this contract were unnecessary or unauthorized or were improperly, negligently, or incompetently rendered, will be determined by submission to arbitration as provided by California law, and not by a lawsuit or resort to court process except as California law provides for judicial

24CV025504: WIGHT, et al. vs CEDARWOOD POST ACUTE, LLC, et al. 06/02/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 16C

review of arbitration proceedings. Both parties to this contract, by entering into it, are giving up their constitutional right to have any such dispute decided in a court of law before a jury, and instead are accepting the use of arbitration.

Article 2. It is further understood that any dispute between Resident and Cedarwood Post Acute LLC, its owners, operators, officers, directors, administrators, staff, employees, agents, and any management and administrative services company and consulting vendors, and all related entities and individuals, their staff, personnel, employees, owners, officers, directors, members, and agents that provide services to the Facility that relates to the provision of care, treatment and services the Facility provides to the Resident, (collectively referred to herein as “Facility), including any action for injury or death arising from negligence, intentional tort and/or statutory causes of action (including all California Welfare and Institutions Code sections and Health and Safety Code section 1430), will be determined by submission to binding arbitration and not by lawsuit or resort to court process except as California law provides for judicial review of arbitration proceedings.

The parties to this agreement are giving up their Constitutional right to have all disputes decided in a court of law before a jury, and instead are accepting the use of binding arbitration. By signing this agreement, the parties waive their right to commence and/or be a party to any class or collective action in any court against the other party relating in any manner to the Resident’s residency at the Facility. Further, the parties waive their right to commence or be a party to any group, class, or collective action claim in arbitration or any other forum.”

(Declaration of Brandon P. Singleton (“Singleton Decl.”), ¶ 3, Ex. A.)

Article 4 of the Arbitration Agreement states, “This Agreement is binding on all parties, including the Resident’s representatives, executors, family members, and heirs who bring any claims individually or in a representative capacity. This Agreement may be rescinded by written notice within thirty (30) days of signature.” (Singleton Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. A.)

Admissions Director Karen Saechao (“Ms. Saechao”) also signed the Arbitration Agreement on November 28, 2023.

Defendant asserts that its nurses assessed Mrs. Wight’s mental status upon her admission and found that she was alert, oriented, and able to make decisions. In support of the foregoing, Defendant proffers the Declaration of Robert Schulz, Defendant’s Administrator. Mr. Schulz declares:

“I am familiar with the admissions policies and procedures of Cedarwood Post

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV025504: WIGHT, et al. vs CEDARWOOD POST ACUTE, LLC, et al. 06/02/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 16C

Acute. In my capacity as Administrator, I supervise the activities of the Admissions Director during the conduct of her job duties.

I have observed that, in preparation for carrying out the aforementioned steps described in Paragraph 10, it is the Admissions Director’s custom and practice to review the resident’s medical charting, Advanced Healthcare Directive (AHCD) and/or Power of Attorney, speak with the facility’s nursing staff, and/or speak with the resident, in order to determine whether the resident possessed legal mental capacity to make decisions and to be responsible for their acts or decisions. The Admissions Director determines whether the resident possessed legal mental capacity prior to offering an Admission Agreement for signature.

I have observed that, during my time supervising her job duties, the Admissions Director carries out the steps described in the foregoing Paragraphs 10 – 11 regularly and consistently.

On or about November 28, 2023, the Admissions Director was Karen Saechao.

I have seen no evidence or reason to believe that Ms. Saechao deviated from her normal custom and practice, on or about November 28, 2023. Therefore, I am informed and believe that the facility resident, Mrs. Wight, possessed legal mental capacity at the time when she signed the Arbitration Agreement.”

(Declaration of Robert Schulz (“Schulz Decl.”), ¶¶ 9, 11-14.)

Legal Standard

California has a public policy that encourages arbitrations, and courts have repeatedly approved and upheld arbitration clauses. (See, e.g., Moncharsh v. Heily & Blasé (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 9 [California has a “strong public policy in favor of arbitration as a speedy and relatively inexpensive means of dispute resolution”]; Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1976) 17 Cal.3d 699, 707 [California’s statutory scheme “evidence[s] a strong public policy in favor of arbitrations [as a] favored method of resolving disputes”]; Gross v. Recabaren (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 771, 775; Berman v. Dean Witter Co. (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 999, 1003; Greenfield v. Mosley (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 735, 744.)

“Under both federal and state law, the threshold question presented by a petition to compel arbitration is whether there is an agreement to arbitrate.” (Sparks v. Del Mar Child and Family Svcs. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1511, 1517.) “Absent a clear agreement

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV025504: WIGHT, et al. vs CEDARWOOD POST ACUTE, LLC, et al. 06/02/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 16C

to submit disputes to arbitration, courts will not infer that the right to a jury trial has been waived.” (Id. at 1518.)

“In a petition to compel arbitration, the party seeking to compel arbitration bears the burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by a preponderance of the evidence. [Citation.] The party opposing the petition bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence any fact necessary to its defense, including that an arbitration provision is invalid or otherwise not enforceable.” (Brinkley v. Monterey Financial Servs., Inc. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 314, 325.)

Existence of a Valid Agreement to Arbitrate

Defendant asserts Plaintiffs’ claims are subject to binding arbitration pursuant to the foregoing, as are Plaintiffs’ heirs in both their representative and individual capacity, where the claim arises from Mrs. Wight’s residency, even though they are not signatories. Defendant cites to Ruiz v. Podolsky (2010) 50 Cal.4th 838 as support that Code of Civil Procedure section 1295, when construed in light of its purpose, is designed to permit patients who sign arbitration agreements to bind their heirs in wrongful death actions. (Ruiz, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 849.)

Plaintiffs have opposed. Plaintiff’s arguments are not well-organized, nor are they always clearly or fully explained. The opposition skips around, first raising general arguments that the Plaintiffs cannot be bound as nonsignatories and then moving on to arguments that the Arbitration Agreement is unconscionable. These arguments are followed by an argument that the Arbitration Agreement should be rescinded. The opposition ends with an argument that Defendant has failed to present sufficient evidence of the existence of an agreement to arbitrate.

In places, Plaintiffs also make certain factual statements that seem to infer an argument will be made based upon the statement, but no well-reasoned argument follows. For example, Plaintiffs state Defendants have brought this motion 16 months after the action was filed, but Plaintiffs do not raise waiver as a legal argument. In this ruling, the Court will address arguments gleaned from the opposition that the Court believes more appropriately fit within the analysis the Court is required to conduct.

The first hurdle in evaluating a motion to compel arbitration is determining whether the moving party has established the existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate. Plaintiffs argue at the very end of their opposition that Defendant has not met this burden because the declarations submitted in support of the motion “should be stricken as hearsay.” (Opposition at 10:8-14.) Although Plaintiffs raise arguments based upon purported deficiencies in the evidence within their opposition, they have not filed any separate evidentiary objections. Plaintiffs argue that Mr. Singleton, Defendant’s counsel, has not properly authenticated the Arbitration Agreement because he does not have

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV025504: WIGHT, et al. vs CEDARWOOD POST ACUTE, LLC, et al. 06/02/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 16C

“personal knowledge of the process of getting the agreement signed” or that Mrs. Wight possessed mental capacity at the time she signed. (Opposition at 10:20.) Plaintiffs assert that Mr. Shultz merely attests to what he supposedly thinks Ms. Saechao did in the admissions process with Mrs. Wight, but offers no evidence that Mrs. Wight signed the Arbitration Agreement, nor is there any declaration from Ms. Saechao herself.

On a motion to compel arbitration, the moving party may meet its initial burden of producing prima facie evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate the controversy by attaching a copy of the agreement purporting to bear the opposing party’s signature to the motion. (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 165.) “For this step, ‘it is not necessary to follow the normal procedures of document authentication.’” (Ibid.) A party moving to compel arbitration “is not required to authenticate an opposing party’s signature on an arbitration agreement as a preliminary matter in moving for arbitration or in the event the authenticity of the signature is not challenged.” (Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Group, Inc. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836, 946, italics in original.)

“If the moving party meets its initial prima facie burden and the opposing party disputes the agreement, then in the second step, the opposing party bears the burden of producing evidence to challenge the authentication of the agreement. [Citation.] The opposing party can do this in several ways. For example, the opposing party may testify under oath or declare under penalty of perjury that the party never saw or does not remember seeing the agreement, or that the party never signed or does not remember signing the agreement. [Citations.] If the opposing party meets its initial burden of producing evidence, then in the third step, the moving party must establish with admissible evidence a valid arbitration agreement between the parties.'

(Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.)

Here, Mr. Singleton declares he reviewed the business file obtained from Defendant regarding Mrs. Wight and that the business file included an Arbitration Agreement executed by Mrs. Wight on November 29, 2023, which he attaches as Exhibit A. (Singleton Decl., ¶¶ 2-3, Ex. A.) The Court concludes this satisfies Defendant’s low initial burden to establish the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate.

Thus, the burden shifts to the Plaintiffs to challenge its authenticity. Plaintiffs do not present any evidence that Mrs. Wight never saw the Arbitration Agreement or that she did not sign the Arbitration Agreement that is attached to Mr. Singleton’s declaration. The only evidence presented in opposition is Thomas Wight’s declaration. However, nothing in Mr. Wight’s declaration challenges the authenticity of Mrs. Wight’s signature on the Arbitration Agreement. The Court recognizes that Mrs. Wight has passed away, but that does not alter the legal standard that evidence must still be presented that

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV025504: WIGHT, et al. vs CEDARWOOD POST ACUTE, LLC, et al. 06/02/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 16C

sufficiently presents a challenge to the signature’s authenticity.

Plaintiffs also argue that it was impossible for Mrs. Wight to have reviewed and understood the Arbitration Agreement in the 41 seconds that passed between the time it was presented to her on the portable tablet and the time she signed. They insist that Defendant’s electronic audit log of how the Arbitration Agreement and other admissions documents were signed shows that they were viewed by Mrs. Wight at 1:11 and 3 seconds p.m. and signed 41 seconds later. (Singleton Decl., Ex. B; ¶; Schulz Decl., ¶ 17.) The fact that Mrs. Wight may not have read or understood the Arbitration Agreement that she signed is not a defense to enforcement. (Desert Outdoor Advertising v Superior Court (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 866, 872 [party's failure to read a contract before signing is no defense to enforcement].)

The Arbitration Agreement Mrs. Wight signed also states:

“The Resident and/or the person executing this Agreement certifies that he/she has read this Agreement, it has been explained in a manner he/she understands, has been given a copy of this Agreement, understands this Agreement, and affirmatively represents that he/she is duly authorized, by virtue of the Resident’s consent, instruction and/or durable power of attorney, to execute this Agreement and accept its terms on behalf of the Resident and individually and acknowledges that the Facility is relying on the aforementioned certification.”

Directly above the signature lines, in bold red capital letters, the Arbitration Agreement includes the following language: “NOTICE: BY SIGNING THIS CONTRACT YOU ARE AGREEING TO HAVE ANY ISSUE OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE DECIDED BY NEUTRAL ARBITRATION AND YOU ARE GIVING UP YOUR RIGHT TO A JURY OR COURT TRIAL. SEE ARTICLE 1 OF THIS CONTRACT.”

Plaintiffs also present no legal authority that Defendant was required to explain the terms of the agreement to Mrs. Wight.

Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes Defendant has established the existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate.

Plaintiffs as Nonsignatories

Plaintiffs also challenge the motion on the ground that, pursuant to Wright v. WellQuest Elk Grove (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 267 (“WellQuest”), they cannot be compelled to arbitration because they are not signatories to the Arbitration Agreement. Plaintiffs argue that, although the agreement that was signed by decedent Wright in WellQuest did not contain a clause about heirs like the clause that is present in the instant

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV025504: WIGHT, et al. vs CEDARWOOD POST ACUTE, LLC, et al. 06/02/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 16C

Arbitration Agreement, that distinction is not binding. Plaintiffs insist that they cannot be bound by the terms because the Arbitration Agreement then clearly limits its purported binding affect to only “ those who execute this Agreement below on the signature line.”

The Court is not persuaded by Plaintiffs’ argument. As noted by Plaintiffs, the Arbitration Agreement at issue here is factually distinguishable from the agreement at issue in WellQuest. The Arbitration Agreement signed by Ms. Wight contains an express clause that provides the agreement “is binding on all parties, including the Resident’s representatives, executors, family members, and heirs who bring any claims individually or in a representative capacity.” (Singleton Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. A.) No similar provision was included in the Wellquest agreement and, therefore, the effect of such a provision was never evaluated by the Wellquest court. Indeed, the Wellquest court stated:

“In this case, the trial court found that the arbitration agreement did not apply to claims brought by Raymond, Erika, and Thomas as they were not parties to the agreement. WellQuest does not challenge that ruling and we agree with the trial court. “‘“[T]he right to compel arbitration depends upon the contract between the parties, [citations], and a party can be compelled to submit a dispute to arbitration only where he has agreed in writing to do so.”’” (Benaroya v. Willis (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 462, 469 [232 Cal.Rptr.3d 808].) Although there are circumstances in which nonsignatories to an agreement containing an arbitration clause can be compelled to arbitrate under that agreement, none of them are present here. (See ibid.) Accordingly, as Raymond, Erika, and Thomas were not parties to the arbitration agreement, it does not bind them or their independent claims.”

(Wellquest, supra, 119 Cal.App.5th at p. 275.)

Further, the Arbitration Agreement does not state that it binds only those who execute the agreement on the signature line. Plaintiffs have picked out a snippet of the language found in Article 4 as support, but the complete provision states the following:

“Article 4. This Agreement shall be binding for any and all disputes arising out of the Resident’s residency at the Facility, except for disputes pertaining to collections or evictions. This Agreement is binding on all parties, including the Resident’s representatives, executors, family members, and heirs who bring any claims individually or in a representative capacity. The Resident’s representatives, agents, executors, family members, successors in interest and heirs who execute this Agreement below on the signature line are doing so not only in their representative capacity for the Resident, but also in their individual capacity and thus agree that any claims brought individually by any such representatives, agents, executors, family members, representatives, successors

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV025504: WIGHT, et al. vs CEDARWOOD POST ACUTE, LLC, et al. 06/02/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 16C

in interest and heirs are subject to binding arbitration. This Agreement may be rescinded by written notice within thirty (30) days of signature.”

(Singleton Decl., Ex. B.)

The Court disagrees with Plaintiffs’ interpretation of Article 4 and concludes that it expressly states that the agreement is binding on the Resident’s representatives, executors, family members, and heirs who bring any claims individually or in a representative capacity, regardless of whether they are signatories. The next sentence clarifies that if an individual is signing on behalf of a resident, then they are also doing so in their individual capacity and agreeing that any claims also brought in their individual capacity are subject to binding arbitration. The second sentence does not negate or limit the first; rather, it addresses a more specific circumstance where a family member or heir serves as a signatory.

To the extent Plaintiffs’ opposition purports to argue that there is “no longer a viable ‘medical malpractice’ cause of action pending against” Defendant and, thus, section 1295 and Ruiz are not applicable, that is not supported by the operative pleading, which still contains a first cause of action for “medical negligence, wrongful death, and survival,” which includes allegations against Defendant.

In Ruiz, the California Supreme Court determined that “[Code of Civil Procedure] section 1295, construed in light of its purpose, is designed to permit patients who sign arbitration agreements to bind their heirs in wrongful death actions.” (Ruiz, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 849.) The Second District Court of Appeal in Enmark v. KF Community Care, LLC (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 463 explained, “In Ruiz v. Podolsky, supra, 50 Cal.4th 838 (Ruiz), the Supreme Court held all heirs in wrongful death actions are bound by arbitration agreements under Code of Civil Procedure section 1295, when the language of the agreement manifests an intent to bind the heirs.” (Enmark v. KF Community Care, LLC (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 463, 475.)

Here, there is no dispute that Mrs. Wight signed the Arbitration Agreement which contains language that manifests and intent to bind her heirs. Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiffs are bound by the Arbitration Agreement.

Plaintiffs then assert that the Arbitration Agreement is unenforceable because it is unconscionable.

Unconscionability

Both procedural and substantive unconscionability must be present in order for a contract provision to be unenforceable under the unconscionability doctrine. (Parada v.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV025504: WIGHT, et al. vs CEDARWOOD POST ACUTE, LLC, et al. 06/02/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 16C

Superior Court (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1554, 1570.) “But they need not be present in the same degree. ‘Essentially a sliding scale is invoked which disregards the regularity of the procedural process of contract formation, that creates the terms, in proportion to the greater harshness or unreasonableness of the substantive terms themselves.’ In other words, the more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa.” (Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychare Service, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 114.)

Procedural Unconscionability

The procedural aspect of unconscionability “concerns the manner in which the contract was negotiated and the circumstances of the parties at that time. [citations omitted] It focuses on factors of oppression and surprise. [citations omitted] The oppression component arises from an inequality of bargaining power of the parties to the contract and an absence of real negotiation or a meaningful choice on the part of the weaker party.’ [citations omitted]” (Morris v Redwood Empire Bancorp (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th at 1305, 1319; Gatton v. T-Mobil USA, Inc. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 571, 595.)

Plaintiffs assert the Arbitration Agreement, which is only two pages long, is procedurally unconscionable because Mrs. Wight apparently took only 41 seconds to view, review, and purportedly execute the agreement, and she was 79 years old and had just had hip surgery. That is the only argument Plaintiffs raise under the legal heading of procedural unconscionability. To the extent Plaintiffs assert under their legal heading of substantive unconscionability that Mrs. Wight was the weaker party with unequal bargaining power, the Court disagrees.

The first sentence of the Arbitration Agreement, which stands alone and is in bold, states: “Residents shall not be required to sign this arbitration agreement as a condition of admission to this facility.” (Singleton Decl., Ex. A.) It further states, “The execution of this Arbitration Agreement is not a precondition to receiving medical treatment, care, services and/or for admission to the Facility and is not a requirement to continue to receive medical treatment, care and services at the Facility.” (Ibid.)

Finally, the agreement provides that it may be rescinded by written notice within 30 days. Thus, the Arbitration Agreement itself clearly states Mrs. Wight was not required to sign the agreement to be admitted or to receive medical treatment, and Plaintiffs present no evidence to the contrary.

The Court concludes Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate the Arbitration Agreement is procedurally unconscionable. Plaintiffs present no argument that there was any oppression or surprise present.

Although the Court need not evaluate substantive unconscionability because both procedural and substantive unconscionability must be present, the Court also finds the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV025504: WIGHT, et al. vs CEDARWOOD POST ACUTE, LLC, et al. 06/02/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 16C

Arbitration Agreement is not substantively unconscionable for the reasons discussed below.

Substantive Unconscionability

“A provision is substantively unconscionable if it ‘involves contract terms that are so one-sided as to ‘shock the conscience,’ or that impose harsh or oppressive terms.” (Parada, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at 1573.)

Plaintiff argues the Arbitration Agreement is substantively unconscionable because the agreement “refers to both state laws and federal laws, none of which could have been understood by Ms. Wight at the time of signing.” (Opposition at 6:19-20.) Plaintiffs also contend the optional nature of the agreement should have been “specifically pointed out” and she should have been given a “lengthy amount of time to review.” (Opposition at 7:1-3.)

Plaintiffs cite no legal authority that Defendant was required to explain the agreement to Mrs. Wight, and, moreover, the very first sentence of the Arbitration Agreement is set apart, in bold, and states: “Residents shall not be required to sign this arbitration agreement as a condition of admission to this facility.” The agreement itself clearly states, in very clear terms, that it is optional. Plaintiffs also present no evidence that Mrs. Wight was not given sufficient time to review the agreement, and no legal authority is cited supporting that substantive unconscionability exists because an agreement may refer to “both state and federal laws.”

The Court concludes the Arbitration Agreement is not substantively unconscionable.

Rescission

Plaintiffs assert that the Arbitration Agreement should be rescinded due to lack of consent because the agreement was presented to Mrs. Wight the day after she was admitted, it was presented after she had just had hip surgery and without her husband present, and she was presented with 118 pages of documents to sign approximately 30 times. Plaintiffs assert this suggests undue influence, which is grounds for rescission. This argument is based purely on speculation without any supporting evidence.

Plaintiffs also do not dispute that Mrs. Wight was competent at the time she executed the agreement and they expressly state, “Plaintiffs are not asserting that decedent Wight was completely incompetent or incapable of entering into a general contract,” which cuts against the very argument raised that the agreement should be rescinded due to lack of consent. (Opposition at 8:22-23.) Although Mr. Wight also declares that he does not believe his wife was capable of fully understanding the 100+ pages of

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV025504: WIGHT, et al. vs CEDARWOOD POST ACUTE, LLC, et al. 06/02/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 16C

documents that were presented to her, that she may not have fully understood the documents is not a defense to enforcement as noted above.

Accordingly, this argument is rejected.

Conclusion

Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration is GRANTED. This matter is STAYED pending completion of binding arbitration.

The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312, or further notice is required.

NOTICE:

Consistent with Local Rule 1.06(B), any party requesting oral argument on any matter on this calendar must comply with the following procedure:

To request limited oral argument, on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Law and Motion Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-2615 by 4:00 p.m. the Court day before the hearing and advise opposing counsel. At the time of requesting oral argument, the requesting party shall leave a voice mail message: a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and that opposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below. If no request for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court.

Unless ordered to appear in person by the Court, parties may appear remotely either telephonically or by video conference via the Zoom video/audio conference platform with notice to the Court and all other parties in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure §367.75. Although remote participation is not required, the Court will presume all parties are appearing remotely for non-evidentiary civil hearings.

The Department 16C Zoom Link is https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/j/16030877014 To appear on Zoom telephonically, call (833) 568-8864 and enter the Zoom Meeting ID 16030877014. NO COURTCALL APPEARANCES WILL BE ACCEPTED.

Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporter services at their own expense, pursuant to Government code §68086 and California Rules of Court, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed in the Policy for Official Reporter Pro Tempore available on the Sacramento Superior Court website at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/courtreporters/docs/crtrp-6a.pdf.

Parties may contact Court-Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore available at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-13.pdf.

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV025504: WIGHT, et al. vs CEDARWOOD POST ACUTE, LLC, et al. 06/02/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 16C

each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.