CRUZ, VANESSA vs COVENANT CARE CALIFORNIA LLC

I note here that this case has used substantial resources of the court and counsel. I would caution the legislature not to impose a cure worse than the problem; this case has doubtless been vexing to Renner (and surely to Reeves, who appears to still believe the actor stole her money). Lawsuits against people who did nothing wrong are expensive and taxing; California's efforts to reduce them - as by anti-SLAPP rules - have been laudable. The Court will sign the proposed order. Defendant is to prepare a judgment consistent with this ruling.

CV-25-007268 - CRUZ, VANESSA vs COVENANT CARE CALIFORNIA LLC - Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration - DENIED.

Governing Law Under both federal and state law, it is the Court's responsibility to determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate the dispute. (See 9 U.S.C. Sec. 4 ["If the making of the arbitration agreement ... be in issue, the court shall proceed summarily to the trial thereof"]; Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 1281.2 [If the court "determines that [a written] agreement to arbitrate a controversy exists ... [it may order enforcement]."]; Brockman v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 569, 585, reh'g denied (Oct. 16, 2025), review denied (Dec. 17, 2025) ["[A] court, before granting a petition to compel arbitration, ' " must determine the factual issue of 'the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement.' " ' [Citations.]"] [emphasis in original].)

State law applicable to contracts generally governs whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists. (See Perry v. Thomas (1987) 482 U.S. 483, 492; Stutler v. T.K. Constructors Inc. (6th Cir. 2006) 448 F.3d 343, 347; Metters v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 696, 701 ["Federal policy in favor of arbitration does not come into play ... until a court has found the parties entered into a valid contract under state law."].)

Once the existence of the agreement is established, the burden of establishing grounds that prevent its enforcement is on Plaintiffs as the challengers. (See Mission Viejo Emergency Medical Associates’v. Beta Healthcare Group (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1153-1154.)

While the Court recognizes that the purported arbitration agreement contains a delegation clause, this dispute raises foundational issues, including whether Ms. Lopez possessed ostensible authority to agree to the arbitration provisions on behalf of her father. The law dictates that, regardless of the inclusion of a delegation clause in the subject agreement, these types of foundational issues ought to be determined by the Court. (Bruni v. Didion (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1272, 1285.)

Discussion

In contending that a valid agreement to arbitrate exists, Defendants mainly rely on the declaration of Jennifer Warkentin, a former Executive Director at the facility. Ms. Warkentin asserts that she was present when Valerie Lopez signed the arbitration agreement on behalf of the decedent, Juan Cruz. Ms. Warkentin states that, before Ms. Lopez signed the paperwork, Ms. Warkentin spoke with Mr. Cruz to ask him if Ms. Lopez was authorized to sign on his behalf, and he stated that she was so authorized. Ms. Warkentin further asserts that she explained to both Mr. Cruz and Ms. Lopez that the arbitration agreement was not a condition of residency. The Warkentin declaration does not contain a description of in what manner she asked Mr. Cruz about the arbitration agreement.

Ms. Warkentin's declaration appears contradicted by the declaration of Valerie Lopez. Ms. Lopez asserts that, at the time she signed the admission paperwork, she had no legal authority to act on behalf of her father. While Mr. Cruz did ultimately execute a power of attorney agreement naming Ms. Lopez as his attorney-in-fact, that did not occur until several months after the admission paperwork was completed. Ms. Lopez also states that her father was not present with her when she completed the paperwork (as he was still in the hospital that day), she does not recall anyone explaining the arbitration agreement to her, she does not recall Ms. Warkentin asking her if she was authorized to sign the arbitration agreement and the residency papers on her father's behalf, and her father never spoke with Ms. Warkentin or any other staff at the facility until after his admission.

Lack of recollection is typically insufficient to overcome a direct assertion, but here the failure to describe the means by which Mr. Cruz was contacted leaves a substantial gap in the testimony presented. Defendant appears to concede that ratification was likely required. The evidence before the Court that

Further, supporting documentation appears to adhere more closely to Ms. Lopez's version of events. The record contains evidence establishing that decedent was not admitted to the facility until September 21, 2023, the day after the arbitration agreement was signed. Facility admission records reflect an admission date of September 21, 2023, and Plaintiffs' evidence further shows that Valerie Lopez signed the admission and arbitration documents on September 20, 2023, while decedent was still hospitalized and not present at the facility. (See 6/11/26 Fish Decl., Exhs. 1-5.)

In addition, there is a "required" section that should have been completed explaining Ms. Lopez's authority to sign on her father's behalf, but that section of the paperwork was left blank. (See 11/14/25 Warkentin Decl., Exh. A [pdf p. 9].) Finally, the only power of attorney agreement presented to the Court is dated January 5, 2024. (See 11/14/25 Morris Decl., Exh. C.) It was not in effect at the time that the admission paperwork was executed.

Conclusion

Because it appears to the Court that Ms. Lopez lacked actual or ostensible authority to sign on behalf of the decedent on admission to the facility, it further appears that no valid agreement was formed.

CV-25-012584 - PAIGE, DONALD vs DINAPOLI, MARY ELISBETH - Plaintiff's Motion to be Relieved as Counsel - DENIED without prejudice. It does not appear sufficient notice was given.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Stacy P. Speiller in Department 22:

CV-26-002034 - ALFARO FARM LABOR CONTRACTOR INC vs ATHWAL INVESTMENTS LP - a) Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant's Writ of Attachment - HEARING REQUIRED; b) Cross-Defendant Alfaro Farm Labor Contractor Inc.'s Demurrer to Cross Complaint - HEARING REQUIRED; c) Cross Defendant Alfaro Farm Labor Contractor Inc.'s Motion to Strike Cross Complaint - HEARING REQUIRED.

PR-23-000109 - IN THE MATTER OF LEO LANDUCCI AND PATRICIA LANDUCCI REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST OF 2007 - Respondent Kathleen Landucci's Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs - HEARING REQUIRED.

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Clifford Tong in Department 23:

CV-24-001883 - BARCLAYS BANK DELAWARE vs BROWN, GIA - Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside Dismissal with Prejudice (C.C.P. Sections 1008(A), 473) - DENIED. The Court finds that Plaintiff's request for reconsideration was not timely filed pursuant to CCP Sec. 1008(a). In addition, Plaintiff's request for relief based on counsel's affidavit of fault has not been presented in the proper form, as no proposed pleading has been submitted. (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 473(b).)

CV-24-002604 - CANO, MARIA vs DOCTORS MEDICAL CENTER OF MODESTO INC - Plaintiff's Motion to Tax Costs of Defendant Silvia Diego, M.D. [C.C.P. 1033.5] - DENIED. Defendant Diego is the prevailing party following summary judgment and is entitled to recover allowable costs as a matter of right under Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, subject to plaintiffs' burden to show that particular items are not authorized, not reasonably necessary, or unreasonable in amount. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 1033.5; Ladas v. California State Auto. Assn. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 774.) Plaintiffs have not met that burden on this record.

The Court further finds that Dr. Diego's Code of Civil Procedure section 998 offers served 1-17-25 were made in good faith based on the information available at the time, and plaintiffs did not obtain a more favorable judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 998, subd. (c)(1); Elrod v. Oregon Cummins Diesel, Inc. (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 692, 698-699.) Accordingly, in the Court's discretion, Dr. Diego's post-offer expert witness fees are recoverable. Records subpoena/medical records costs are allowed as reasonably necessary costs of taking depositions/obtaining records in this medical negligence action. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 1033.5, subd. (a)(3); Evers v. Cornelson (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 310, 317.) Defendant Silvia Diego, M.D. is awarded costs in the amount stated in her Memorandum of Costs: $29,740.46.

CV-24-007017 - LOCKWOOD, VEOLA vs CARPENTER, KEVID MD - Defendant American Medical Response West's Motion for Summary Judgment - GRANTED, and unopposed.