Hernandez vs. Evergreen Royalle

Plaintiff to give notice. 109 Hernandez vs. Evergreen Royalle, 24-01417052

Defendants Evergreen Royalle, Ltd., and Jose Toro seek an order sustaining their demurrer to the 1st, 8th, 9th, 11th, and 13th causes of action of Plaintiff’s Complaint based on failure to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action.

Initially, a Request for Dismissal was filed on 5/18/2026 as to the 8th and 9th causes of action. As such, the demurrers to those causes of action are moot and will not be addressed.

MEET AND CONFER

Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41, subdivision (a) requires that prior to filing a demurrer, “the demurring party . . . . meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer . . . .” Similarly, prior to filing a motion to strike, “the moving party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the motion to strike . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc. § 435.5(a).)

Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41, subdivision (a)(3) requires that the demurring party file and serve with the demurrer a declaration stating either “[t]he means by which the demurring party met and conferred with the party who filed the pleading subject to demurrer, and that the parties did not reach an agreement resolving the objections raised in the demurrer,” or that “the party who filed the pleading subject to demurrer failed to respond to the meet and confer request of the demurring party or otherwise failed to meet and confer in good faith.”

“If, upon review of a declaration under section 430.41, subdivision (a)(3), a court learns no meet and confer has taken place, or concludes further conferences between counsel would likely be productive, it retains discretion to order counsel to meaningfully discuss the pleadings with an eye toward

reducing the number of issues or eliminating the need for a demurrer, and to continue the hearing date to facilitate that effort.” (Dumas v. Los Angeles County Bd. of Supervisors (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 348, 356.)

Here, the declaration of Attorney Ross A. Spector, indicates that on October 21, 2025, he sent an email to Plaintiff’s attorney fully explaining the grounds for his clients’ position. (Decl. of Spector¶2.) Plaintiff’s counsel never responded to the email. (Id.¶3.)

The above establishes no meet and confer as required by Code of Civil Procedure sections 430.41 or 435.5 effectively took place. Based on the foregoing, the Court CONTINUES the hearing on the demurrer and motion to strike to June 25, 2026 at 1:30 p.m. in Department W15.

The Court ORDERS the parties to meet and confer in person, by zoom or video remote technology, concerning the issues raised in the demurrer and motion to strike.

Defendant to file and serve a supplemental declaration setting forth the meet and confer efforts by counsel for the parties as to the issues raised by the demurrer and motion to strike, the outcome of the meet and confer, and what issues, if any, remain for the Court. The supplemental declaration to be filed no later than nine (9) court days before the new hearing date.

The Case Management Conference is continued to June 25, 2026 at 1:30 p.m.

Defendant to give notice. 110 Lee vs. Kingsbury, 25-01472404

Demurrer Defendant, Michael Kingsbury (“Kingsbury”), demurs to all seven causes of action asserted in the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) of Plaintiff, Jessica V. Lee (“Plaintiff”).

Uncertainty Kingsbury contends that the FAC contains multiple factual contradictions which render the pleading uncertain under Code of Civil Procedure §430.10(f) because Defendant

cannot reasonably ascertain what factual theory is being asserted.

Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10(f) provides that a defendant may demur on the ground that the pleading is uncertain. “As used in this subdivision, ‘uncertain’ includes ambiguous and unintelligible.” “A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal App.4th 612, 616.) Demurrers for uncertainty “are granted only if the pleading is so incomprehensible that a defendant cannot reasonably respond.” (Lickiss v. Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth. (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1135.)

The allegations that services were not provided but a certificate was issued, and that a refund was refused and then a refund was completed are not contradictory. In particular, the FAC alleges that on Kingsbury refused to refund the money, i.e., $17,000, and that the $17,000 “was eventually repaid on May 1 after suit was filed . . . .” (Complaint, Summary of Facts.)

Lastly, it is alleged that Kingsbury stated in court that he was not the owner and that Plaintiff alleges that “Kevin Young is the owner and principal responsible for the misconduct.” (Complaint, Summary of Facts.) To the extent that this allegation is uncertain, it may be clarified in discovery.

Failure to State Facts Sufficient to Constitute a Cause of Action First and Second Causes of Action for Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation Kingsbury contends that Plaintiff affirmatively alleges in her own FAC that the entirety of the disputed $17,000 was refunded to her on May 1, 2025, and that this fact is fatal to her claims for fraud, and negligent misrepresentation.

Kingsbury also contends that the first cause of action for fraud fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and is uncertain because the FAC contains only