Motion to Strike
1 Kwak vs. Progeny Motion to Strike Psychiatric Clinic Defendant Progeny Psychiatric Clinic’s Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Claim for Punitive Damages is GRANTED with 15 30-2025-01482453 days leave to amend.
Pending Motion
Defendant Progeny Psychiatric Clinic moves to strike the request for punitive damages in Paragraph 14(a)(2) of Page 3 of the Complaint – Personal Injury, Property Damage, Wrong Death (Complaint) filed by Plaintiff Deborah Kwak.
Standard for Motion to Strike
A party may move to strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading or strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.)
“Irrelevant” matters include: allegations not essential to the claim, allegations neither pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise sufficient claim, or a demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.10, subd. (b).)
A party may also request to strike legal conclusions. (Weil & Brown, Cal. Prac. Guide, Civil Proc. before Trial, ¶ 7:179 (2010).) Specifically, conclusory allegations that are not supported by factual allegations in the complaint may be stricken. (Perkins v. Superior Court (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 1, 6.)
For example, prayers for relief that lack factual foundation may be stricken from a complaint. (See Turman v. Turning Point of Central Calif., Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63 [trial court properly struck prayer for punitive damages where complaint failed to allege sufficient facts to show that defendant acted with malice, oppression, or fraud].)
The grounds for a motion to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or from matters which the court may judicially notice. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437.)
However, pleadings are to be construed liberally with a view to substantial justice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 452; Weil & Brown, Cal. Prac. Guide, Civil Proc. before Trial, ¶ 7:197 (2010).)
“In passing on the correctness of a ruling on a motion to strike, judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth. In ruling on a motion to strike, courts do not read allegations in isolation.” (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255, citations omitted.)
Striking Punitive Damages
To obtain punitive damages, a plaintiff must plead and prove one of the following: malice, oppression, or fraud. (See Civil Code, § 3294, subd. (a).)
“Malice” is defined as “conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Civil Code, § 3294, subd. (a)(1).)
“Oppression” means “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.” (Civil Code, § 3294, subd. (a)(2).)
“Fraud” is defined as “an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” (Civil Code, § 3294, subd. (a)(3).)
In order to survive a motion to strike, a complaint must not only allege in general terms oppression, fraud, or malice, but also plead ultimate facts in support. (See Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166 [“The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages. Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim.”], citations omitted.)
Conduct carried on with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others, but that is not “despicable,” will not support an award of punitive damages. (College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725.)
“Despicable conduct” refers to circumstances that are so vile, base, or contemptible that it would be looked down on and despised by reasonable people. (Ibid.; Scott v. Phoenix Schools, Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 702, 715.) Such conduct has been described as “having the character of outrage frequently associated with crime.” (Scott v. Phoenix Schools, Inc., supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 715.)
“Consequently, to establish malice, ‘it is not sufficient to show only that the defendant's conduct was negligent, grossly negligent or even reckless.’” (Bell v. Sharp Cabrillo Hospital (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1034, 1044, quoting Flyer's Body Shop Profit Sharing Plan v. Ticor Title Ins. Co. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1149, 1155.)
“The mere carelessness or ignorance of the defendant does not justify the imposition of punitive damages. . . . Punitive damages are proper only when the tortious conduct rises to levels of extreme indifference to the plaintiff's rights, a level which decent citizens should not have to tolerate.” (Lackner v. North (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1210, citations and quotation marks omitted.)
In addition, to recover punitive damages against a corporate defendant based on the acts of its employee, the plaintiff must plead facts showing that the employer “had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud or malice. With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or [wrongful] act must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.” (Civil Code, § 3294, subd. (b).)
In this case, Plaintiff has filed a form Complaint that states “each complaint must have one or more causes of action attached” above the statement of Plaintiff’s causes of action. (See Compl., ¶ 10, italics original.)
Although Plaintiff checked the box indicating that she was asserting one cause of action for general negligence, Plaintiff failed to include the attachment for a general negligence cause of action.
Thus, Plaintiff has failed to make out any causes of action for which punitive damages can be awarded.
Further, Plaintiff failed to allege any facts to show that Defendant’s conduct was malicious, oppressive, or fraudulent, or that an officer, director, or managing agent of the Defendant was directly involved in any wrongful conduct, or employed, authorized, or ratified any wrongful conduct.
Therefore, the court will grant the motion to strike.
Leave to Amend
In ruling on a motion to strike, the court employs the same liberality to amend as used for demurrers. As long as there is a reasonable possibility that plaintiffs can cure the defects, leave to amend is appropriate. (See Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 168; Price v. Dames & Moore (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 355, 360.)
However, it is the plaintiff's “burden to establish how the complaint can be amended to state a valid cause of action.” (Sanowicz v. Bacal (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1044.) In order to meet this burden, a plaintiff may submit a proposed amended complaint or enumerate facts and demonstrate how those facts establish a cause of action. (See Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 857, 890.)
Nonetheless, “for an original complaint, regardless whether the plaintiff has requested leave to amend, it has long been the rule that a trial court's denial of leave to amend constitutes an abuse of discretion unless the complaint ‘shows on its face that it is incapable of amendment.’” (Eghtesad v. State Farm General Insurance. Co. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 406, 411, quoting King v. Mortimer (1948) 83 Cal.App.2d 153, 158; see Cabral v. Soares (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1240 [“Only rarely should a demurrer to an initial complaint be sustained without leave to amend.”].)
As the Court of Appeal has explained: “Liberality in permitting amendment is the rule, if a fair opportunity to correct any defect has not been given.” (Angie M. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1227.)
Here, although Plaintiff has not requested leave to amend and has not explained how the Complaint could be amended, the motion to strike is asserted against an original complaint and Plaintiff has not had a prior opportunity to amend the Complaint.
Further, the deficiencies in the Complaint arise from the failure to plead sufficient allegations rather than deficiencies in the underlying facts that cannot be changed. The Complaint, for example, could be amended by including a form attachment for a general negligence cause of action and pleading facts to support a request for punitive damages.
Therefore, the court will exercise its discretion and grant leave to amend.
However, the parties are reminded that when leave to amend is granted upon the sustaining of a demurrer or motion to strike, amendments are limited to the issues addressed in the court’s ruling and generally may not include amendments to causes of action not addressed in the ruling or the addition of new causes of action. (See Community Water Coalition v. Santa Cruz County Local Agency Formation Com. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1317, 1329 [“It is the rule that when a trial court sustains a demurrer with leave to amend, the scope of the grant of leave is ordinarily a limited one. It gives the pleader an opportunity to cure the defects in the particular causes of action to which the demurrer was sustained, but that is all.”].)
Defendant shall give notice of this ruling.
2 Selski vs. Providence Motion to Compel Arbitration Mission Hospital Mission Viejo Defendant THC – Orange County, LLC’s (erroneously sued as Kindred Hospital Brea) Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay the Proceedings is taken OFF CALENDAR pursuant to 30-2025-01513378 the Stipulation to Arbitration Following Mediation and the Order thereon issued May 22, 2026 (ROA #64).
3 Hatter vs. Knott's Demurrer Berry Farm, LLC Defendants Knott’s Berry Farm, LLC’s and Cedar Fair, L.P. dba Cedar Fair Entertainment Company’s (erroneously sued 30-2025-01513936 as Cedar Fair Entertainment Company) Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint is SUSTAINED with 15 days leave to amend as to the 2nd and 3rd Causes of Action.
If Plaintiff Markeita Lemetrea Hatter does not amend the Complaint for Damages within the period of time stated above, Defendants Knott’s Berry Farm, LLC and Cedar Fair, L.P. dba Cedar Fair Entertainment Company shall file an answer or other pleading in response to the remaining cause of action of the Complaint for Damages within 10 days of the expiration of the period of time to amend. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1320(j).)
Pending Motion
Defendants Knott’s Berry Farm, LLC and Cedar Fair, L.P. dba Cedar Fair Entertainment Company (erroneously sued as Cedar Fair Entertainment Company) demur to the 2nd
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