DEVORE MASON, et al. vs HUYNH, et al.

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be

25CV010570: DEVORE MASON, et al. vs HUYNH, et al. 06/02/2026 Hearing on Motion to Strike First Amended Complaint in Department 16D

signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

****NOTICE: EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G. ST. SACRAMENTO, CA. MOTIONS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 53 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 16D OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. PARTIES MAY CONTINUE TO APPEAR REMOTELY IN DEPARTMENT 16D UNLESS SPECIFICALLY ORDERED OTHERWISE.*****

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendants Diane and My Huynh’s motion to strike self-represented Plaintiffs Daniel Bernal Corea’s and Allison Lynn Devore Mason’s first amended complaint is granted in part and denied in part as set forth below.

Plaintiffs are admonished that the opposition violates California Rule of Court rule 3.1113(d) which limits a responding memorandum to 15 pages. Plaintiffs’ opposition is 18 pages, and Plaintiffs did not make an application for permission to file a longer memorandum as required by subdivision (e). Thus, the memorandum is considered in the same manner as a late-filed paper. (Id. at subd. (g).) Plaintiffs are further admonished that any memorandum exceeding 10 pages must include a table of contents and a table of authorities. (Id. at subd. (f).)

In this action, Plaintiffs filed a judicial council form complaint alleging causes of action for motor vehicle and intentional tort. The Court previously granted in part Defendants’ motion to strike, with leave to amend, the punitive damages allegations in the initial complaint. On December 3, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint, with four pages of factual allegations and attaching 63 pages of exhibits.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV010570: DEVORE MASON, et al. vs HUYNH, et al. 06/02/2026 Hearing on Motion to Strike First Amended Complaint in Department 16D

Defendants move to strike ¶ 14a(2) of the form complaint (the box for punitive damages), pages 1-4 of Attachments to the first amended complaint as to Plaintiffs’ references to Defendant My Huynh’s “alleged conduct entitling Plaintiffs to punitive damages, the first paragraph of Attachment 1D as to Plaintiffs’ allegation that Defendant My Huynh had an unlawful insurance policy “due to its falsity”, and portions of all exhibits (1-12).

A motion to strike is appropriate to strike out any irrelevant, false or improper matter asserted in any pleading and the Court may strike out all or any party of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the law. (See Code Civ. Pro. § 436 (a)-(c).) A motion to strike challenges portions of a cause of action that are substantively defective on the face of the complaint. (PH II, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1680, 1682-83; see also Code of Civ. Proc. § 437.) More specifically, a motion to strike should be granted to remove 'any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading,' or where the pleadings are drawn in violation of a law, rule or court order. (Code of Civ. Proc. § 436.) Examples of 'improper' matters include allegations which are 'at variance with the contract.' (California Sugar & White Pine Agency v. Penoyar (1914) 167 Cal. 274, 279.

“The court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading, (b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” (Code Civ. Proc, § 436.) A motion to strike is limited to the face of the challenged pleading or any matter of which the Court may take judicial notice. (CCP § 437(a).) The use of the motion to strike should be cautious and sparing. It should not be a procedural 'line item veto'. (PH II, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal. App. 4th 1680, 1683.)

At the outset, the Court must note that Plaintiffs opposition does cite to specific portions of the first amended complaint, and repeatedly refers to allegations not made in the first amended complaint. A demurrer or motion to strike “tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) Extrinsic evidence may not properly be considered on a pleading motion, such as a demurrer or motion to strike. (Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal. App. 3d 868, 881.)

Punitive Damages

In order to plead an entitlement to punitive damages a plaintiff must allege that the defendant is

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV010570: DEVORE MASON, et al. vs HUYNH, et al. 06/02/2026 Hearing on Motion to Strike First Amended Complaint in Department 16D

guilty of “oppression, fraud, or malice.” (Civil Code §3294(a).) “Malice” under Civil Code §3294(c)(1) means conduct intended to injure the plaintiff or despicable conduct by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of others. Malice “based on a conscious disregard of the plaintiff’s rights, requires proof that the defendant’s conduct is ‘despicable’ and ‘willful.’” (Lackner v. North (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1211.) “‘[D]espicable’ connotes conduct that is ‘ so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people.’” (Id. [citations omitted].)

Despicable conduct includes “that which is in blatant violation of law or policy.” (American Airlines, Inc. v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter, & Hampton (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1017, 1050.) Indeed, “[e]ven ‘nonintentional torts’ may form the basis for punitive damages when the conduct constitutes conscious disregard of the rights or safety of other. [citation omitted] ‘Nonintentional conduct comes within the definition of malicious acts punishable by the assessment of punitive damages when a party intentionally performs an act from which he knows, or should know, it is highly probable harm will result.’ [citation omitted].” (Skf Farms v.

Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 907.) Nonetheless, the cases have uniformly recognized that proof of negligence, even gross negligence, or recklessness is insufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages. (E.g., G. D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 22, 31; see Taylor v. Superior Court, (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 895, 900 [conc. opn. of Bird, C.J.], 907 [dis. opn. of Clark, J.]; Nolin v. National Convenience Stores, Inc. (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 279, 285-286.)

It is true that punitive damages may be available in personal injury actions against one who drives while intoxicated. (Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890.) “There is a very commonly understood risk which attends every motor vehicle driver who is intoxicated. [citation omitted] One who willfully consumes alcoholic beverage to the point of intoxication, knowing that he thereafter must operate a motor vehicle, thereby combining sharply impaired physical and mental facilities with a vehicle capable of great force and speed, reasonably may be held to exhibit a conscious disregard of the safety of others.

The effect may be lethal whether or not the driver has a history of drunk driving incidents.” (Id. at pp. 897-898.) A claim for punitive damages can be premised on despicable conduct involving consumption of alcoholic beverages. (Id at p. 899.) In the first amended complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant My Huynh was drinking alcohol at a local bar for “most of his day.” (FAC, Attach. 1A.) Plaintiffs further allege Defendant My Huynh “intentionally, recklessly, and maliciously” drove while “heavily intoxicated” into Plaintiff Correa’s vehicle, with Plaintiff Correa inside the vehicle.

Plaintiffs allege Plaintiff Correa was at a red light, and saw Defendant My Huynh approaching behind him, at an extremely high rate of speed. (Ibid.) Without any application of his brakes, Plaintiffs allege Defendant My Huynh slammed his vehicle into the back of Plaintiff Correa’s vehicle. (Ibid.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV010570: DEVORE MASON, et al. vs HUYNH, et al. 06/02/2026 Hearing on Motion to Strike First Amended Complaint in Department 16D

Plaintiffs allege Defendant My Huynh attempted to flee the scene, and Plaintiff Correa followed Defendant My Huynh and parked behind his vehicle in a parking lot to prevent him from leaving. (Ibid.) Plaintiffs allege that, upon exiting his vehicle, Defendant My Huynh was swaying from side to side, had a heavy odor of alcohol on his breath” and stated “I am drunk. I am drunk. Please don’t call the police.” (Ibid.) Plaintiffs allege Defendant My Huynh’s blood test results revealed that his blood alcohol content was well over 0.8. (FAC, Attach. 1B.) Plaintiffs allege that Defendant My Huynh was “well aware of his condition of being overwhelmingly intoxicated before still choosing to operate his vehicle.” (FAC, Attach 1C.)

Plaintiffs argue in opposition that Taylor supports their request for punitive damages. The Court finds that the allegations sufficiently allege that Defendant My Huynh willingly became intoxicated, and knowingly operated a vehicle despite his inability to do so safely. In Taylor the essence of the punitive damages claim was that “Defendant became intoxicated and thereafter drove a car while in that condition, despite his knowledge of the safety hazard he created thereby. This is the essential gravamen of the complaint, and while a history of prior arrests, convictions and mishaps may heighten the probability and foreseeability of an accident, we do not deem these aggravating factors essential prerequisites to the assessment of punitive damages in drunk driving cases.” (Taylor, supra, 24 Cal.3d at 896-897.)

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ allegations are speculative, and that Plaintiffs have failed to “support a claim” that Defendant My Huynh was “aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his conduct.” (MPA, p. 6.) Defendants essentially argue that Plaintiffs will not be able to provide evidence to establish that Defendant My Huynh drove while intoxicated, despite his knowledge of the safety hazard created thereby. These arguments are not relevant at the pleading stage, as the Court’s consideration for purposes of this motion is whether Plaintiffs have pleaded sufficient facts to state a claim for punitive damages. The Court is not evaluating Plaintiffs’ ability to introduce sufficient admissible evidence at trial to establish entitlement to punitive damages.

The motion to strike punitive damages is denied.

Exhibits to the FAC

The motion to strike the Exhibits (in whole or in part) is denied.

Defendants argue that the exhibits contain “conclusory characterizations of Defendant My Huynh’s conduct” or are irrelevant to Plaintiffs’ punitive damages claim. The Court finds the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV010570: DEVORE MASON, et al. vs HUYNH, et al. 06/02/2026 Hearing on Motion to Strike First Amended Complaint in Department 16D

exhibits are all relevant to the FAC as a whole, and the admissibility of the exhibits is, again, not an issue for resolution as part of a motion to strike.

Attachment 1B – reference to exhibit 9

Defendants move to strike the reference in Attachment 1B to “As shown through Exhibit 9 attached to this complaint, Mr. Huynh’s blood test results revealed that his blood alcohol content was well over 0.8 or higher.” Defendants argue that Exhibit 9 is a vehicle repair estimate, and thus does not support the factual assertion.

The Court agrees, and thus strikes “As shown through Exhibit 9 attached to this complaint” from paragraph 3 of Attachment 1B.

Attachment 1D – first paragraph

Defendants move to strike the first paragraph of Attachment 1D on the basis that it falsely alleges that Defendant My Huynh’s auto policy coverage violated Insurance Code section 11580.1b. Defendants argue that Defendant My Huynh’s insurance policy in effect at the time of the alleged accident was in compliance with California law at the time.

The Court notes that Exhibit 12 purports to be a copy of Defendant My Huynh’s vehicle insurance policy at the time of the accident. The Court cannot determine that this document establishes that Defendant My Huynh had vehicle insurance at the stated “limits and/or deductibles” include an asterisk that “Coverage applies where a premium or [redacted] is shown for a vehicle.” (FAC, Exh. 12.) The column beneath “Vehicle 1” stating the subject premiums is redacted on Exhibit 12, and thus the Court cannot determine that at the time of the subject accident Defendant My Huynh maintained property damage liability insurance in the amount of $5,000.

In sum, the motion is granted as to the quoted portion of paragraph 3 of Attachment 1B and denied as to all remaining aspects.

The Court notes that Plaintiffs have already filed a Motion to File Second Amended Complaint, which motion is set to be heard on August 6, 2026. The Court does not address this motion as part of its ruling on the present motion to strike.

The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1312 or

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV010570: DEVORE MASON, et al. vs HUYNH, et al. 06/02/2026 Hearing on Motion to Strike First Amended Complaint in Department 16D

further notice is required.