Jesus Milanes v. Patrick Doe, et al.

Jesus Milanes v. Patrick Doe, et al., 25CVP-0393

Hearing: Motion to Compel Arbitration

Date: June 2, 2026 ________________________________________________________________________

Jesus Milanes (Plaintiff) filed this action against his former employer for discrimination, retaliation, Labor Code violations, wrongful termination, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and unfair business practices. Defendants are S.E. Combined Services of California, Inc., dba Chapel of Roses Mortuary, SCI Shared Services, LLC, Los Osos Valley Memorial Park, Inc. (Defendants) and Patrick Doe.

Defendants seek to compel arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement and to stay the action pending resolution of the arbitration. Plaintiff opposes the motion claiming that Defendants have failed to establish that he signed the arbitration agreement.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

Both the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and California law favor arbitration. (AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 563 U.S. 333, 339; OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho (2019) 8 Cal.5th 111, 125.) The Court considers two factors in determining a motion to compel arbitration: (1) whether the parties agreed to arbitrate; and (2) if so, whether the agreement encompasses the asserted claims. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2; Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Systems, Inc. (9th Cir. 2000) 207 F.3d 1126, 1130; Bruni v. Didion (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1272, 1283.)

The standard for determining a motion to compel arbitration is as follows:

On a petition to compel arbitration, the trial court must first determine whether an “agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2.) “Because the existence of the agreement is a statutory prerequisite to granting the petition, the petitioner bears the burden of proving its existence by a preponderance of the evidence.” (Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 875, 926 P.2d 1061.) The party seeking arbitration can meet its initial burden by attaching to the petition a copy of the arbitration agreement purporting to bear the respondent’s signature. (Espejo v.

Southern California Permanente Medical Group (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1060, 201 Cal.Rptr.3d 318 (Espejo).) Where, as here, the respondent challenges the validity of the signature, however, the petitioner must “establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the signature was authentic.” (Ibid.) In such proceedings, “the trial court sits as a trier of fact, weighing all the

affidavits, declarations, and other documentary evidence, as well as oral testimony received at the court’s discretion, to reach a final determination.” (Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 972, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 938 P.2d 903.)

(Bannister v. Marinidence Opco, LLC (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 541, 543-544.)

II. DISCUSSION

a. Electronic Signature as Evidence Establishing Existence of Agreement

Defendants assert that Plaintiff electronically signed a Mutual Resolution Process Agreement (MRPA) that requires arbitration of “covered disputes”, which is attached as Exhibit A to the Declaration of Jessica Crawford. (Crawford Dec., ¶ 9, Ex. A.) First, the Court finds that Defendants have met their initial burden of producing prima facie evidence sufficient to prove the existence of an arbitration agreement between Plaintiff and Defendants, at the first step.

“If the moving party meets its initial prima facie burden and the opposing party disputes the agreement, then in the second step, the opposing party bears the burden of producing evidence to challenge the authenticity of the agreement. [Citation.]” (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 165.) Plaintiff contends that Defendants have not met their burden of establishing a valid agreement to arbitrate exists and have provided insufficient evidence for the Court to determine that the signature of the arbitration agreement allegedly signed by Plaintiff on May 25, 2023 was in fact signed by Plaintiff.

Plaintiff declares that he does not recall seeing or electronically signing the alleged arbitration agreement. (Milanes Dec., ¶¶ 4, 5.) If Plaintiff had been made aware of the arbitration agreement to waive his right to proceed with claims in court, Plaintiff would not have waived this right. (Id., ¶ 4.) The Court finds that Plaintiff has met his burden of producing sufficient evidence to challenge the authenticity of the Arbitration Agreement at the second step. (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 168 [the opposing party can challenge the authenticity of the agreement by testifying “under oath or [declaring] under penalty of perjury that the party never saw or does not remember seeing the agreement, or that the party never signed or does not remember signing the agreement”].)

“If the opposing party meets its burden of producing evidence, then in the third step, the moving party must establish with admissible evidence a valid arbitration agreement between the parties. The burden of proving the agreement by a preponderance of the evidence remains with the moving party. [Citation.]” (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at pp. 165–66.)

The provisions of the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA), which are codified in Civil Code sections 1633.1 through 1633.17, govern electronic records and electronic

signatures relating to a transaction. (Civil Code § 1633.3; 1 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (11th ed. 2026) Contracts, § 11.)

“Civil Code section 1633.9, subdivision (a) governs the authentication of electronic signatures.” (Bannister v. Marinidence Opco, LLC, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at 545.) It provides that a party can prove that an electronic signature was the act of the person “in any manner, including a showing of the efficacy of any security procedure applied to determine the person to which the electronic record or electronic signature was attributable.” (Ibid.) “For example, a party may establish that the electronic signature was ‘the act of the person’ by presenting evidence that a unique login and password known only to that person was required to affix the electronic signature, along with evidence detailing the procedures the person had to follow to electronically sign the document and the accompanying security precautions. [Citation.]” (Ibid.)

Defendants submit the declaration of Jessica Crawford, the Human Resources Compliance Manager, who has served in that capacity since June 2021. (Crawford Dec., ¶ 1.) Prior to obtaining that position, Crawford served as Human Resources Business Systems Project Manager. (Ibid.) Crawford declares that she oversees “the online onboarding system of SCI Shared Resources and SE Combined known as Workday.” (Id., ¶ 4.) Workday is the system by which SE Combined’s employees electronically sign documents during their onboarding process and during their employment. (Ibid.) Crawford is the legal custodian of records and has personal knowledge about the mode and preparation of data within the Workday system, as well as how SCI Shared Resources and SE Combined’s application tracking and onboarding systems operate and how the data in these systems are electronically stored. (Id., ¶ 5.)

Based on Crawford’s review of Plaintiff’s personnel records, Plaintiff was employed with SE Combined from May 25, 2023 to November 2, 2023. (Crawford Dec., ¶ 7.) Crawford details the process by which employees electronically sign documents, as well as the way the records are stored. (Id., ¶¶ 8-15.) Crawford explains that “[u]pon an employee’s first login to the Workday system, the system requires them to create their private password.” (Id., ¶ 8.) Additionally, “only individuals with Plaintiff’s unique username and password could access and make changes to data in his account on Workday.” (Ibid.) Crawford declares that on May 25, 2023, at 1:19 p.m., Plaintiff accessed Workday and electronically signed the MRPA. (Id., ¶¶ 9, 10; Ex. B.) Crawford declares:

The MRPA and other onboarding documents were presented to Plaintiff as individual documents for Plaintiff to sign electronically in Workday. To electronically sign each document, including the MRPA, Plaintiff would have had to check a box stating “I Agree,” indicating that he had reviewed, agreed to, and acknowledged the MRPA. Furthermore, before Plaintiff could acknowledger and electronically sign the MRPA, a screen appeared informing Plaintiff of the effect of accepting and agreeing to the MRPA; that screen read: “By selecting the ‘I Agree’ button, you acknowledge and agree to the Mutual Resolution Process Agreement. You agree your electronic signature is the legal equivalent of your manual

signature.”

(Crawford Dec., ¶ 12.)

Defendants also submit the declaration of Brian Pellegrin, SCI Shared Resource’s Assistant VP of Information Technology for Cloud Applications Support. (Pellegrin Dec., ¶ 1.) Pellegrin explains how Defendant’s employees are provided with and use unique work email addresses and identification credentials, as well as the logging process when an employee electronically signs a document. (Id., ¶¶ 1-8.) Pellegrin also reviewed the files, databases and user activity reports and determined that Plaintiff logged into Workday using his unique work email address and username, and electronically signed documents on May 25, 2023, during a ninety-one minute session. (Id., ¶¶ 10-14; Exs. A- C.) Pellegrin declares that Plaintiff electronically signed the MRPA at 1:19 p.m. on May 25, 2023, along with other documents, and logged off at 2:13 p.m. (Id., ¶ 14.)

Relying on Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Group, Inc. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836 and Fabian v. Renovate America, Inc. (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1062, Plaintiff argues that there is a “critical evidentiary gap” in this case because Defendants do not explain how Plaintiff’s electronic signature was the act of Plaintiff. Plaintiff contends that Defendants present only conclusory evidence regarding the alleged electronic signing of an agreement but fail to provide circumstantial proof demonstrating the electronic execution.

Plaintiff asks this Court to take judicial notice of a federal court order denying defendants’ motion to compel arbitration in Gonzales v. Rose Hills Company, et al., United States District Court for the Central District of California, Case Number: 2:24-cv- 04632-MEMF-AS, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal’s affirmance of the order, involving the same defendants but a different plaintiff. The Court grants the request for judicial notice as to the existence of judicial opinions and court documents but declines to take judicial notice of the truth of the hearsay statements contained therein. (Evid.

Code, § 452, subd. (d); see Jefferson, Cal. Evidence Benchbook (Cont.Ed.Bar 4th ed. 2025) Judicial Notice, § 49.10 [“[A]lthough a court may take judicial notice of the existence of judicial opinions, court documents, and verdicts reached, it may not take judicial notice of the truth of hearsay statements in other decisions or court files, or of the truth of factual findings made in another action”].)

In Espejo v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1062, the employer’s declaration detailing use of the employee’s unique username and password and the steps the employee would take to place his or her name on the signature line of the employment agreement were sufficient to establish that the electronic signature on the agreement was the act of the employee. The Court similarly finds here that Defendants’ declarations and attachments demonstrate that the electronic signature on the agreement was the act of Plaintiff.

Specifically, Defendants provide details of how, when, and where the Agreement was presented to Plaintiff, including Plaintiff’s use of a unique email address, username and password, and the date, time, and IP address at which the MRPA was executed.

(Crawford Dec., ¶¶ 8-15, Exs. A-C; Pellegrin Dec., ¶¶ 3-15, Exs. A-C.) Accordingly, the Court therefore finds that Defendants have met their burden of producing evidence sufficient to establish the existence of an arbitration agreement between the parties at step three by a preponderance of evidence.

Finally, the Court also finds that the causes of action alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint — consisting of claims under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, Labor Code, Business and Professions Code, for wrongful termination, and for intentional infliction of emotional distress —are covered by the terms of the Arbitration Agreement. (Cmp., pp. 5-14; Crawford Dec., at pp. 9-10, Ex. A, Arbitration Agreement, Section IV., [defining covered disputes].)

III. EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

Plaintiff objects to the Crawford and Pellegrin Declarations primarily based on lack of personal knowledge. (See Opp., p. 7, ll. 19-25.)

Crawford declares that she has been the Human Resources Compliance Manager for SCI Shared Resources since 2021, and is “familiar with, and [has] firsthand knowledge of, the employment policies, employment practices, hiring procedures, personnel records, and employee onboarding process of SCI Shared Resources and SE Combined.” (Crawford Dec., ¶¶ 1, 3.) Pellegrin declares that he has been the Assistant VP of Information Technology for Cloud applications Support by SCI Shared Resources, LLC since 2019. (Pellegrin Dec., ¶ 1.) Pellegrin supports the human resources department at SCI Shared Resources and works on and within the systems implemented for associates to electronically review and sign employment related documents. (Id., ¶ 2.)

The Court finds that the Crawford and Pellegrin Declarations provide sufficient background to establish declarants’ qualifications to testify about Defendants’ electronic document and signature system, as well as sufficient foundational facts regarding how Plaintiff’s onboarding and personnel records were maintained and retrieved. Plaintiff’s objections are overruled.

IV. RULING

The Court finds that Defendants have met their burden of establishing the existence of an agreement to arbitrate between Plaintiff and Defendants by a preponderance of evidence. Plaintiffs have not presented any arguments raising any defenses as to enforceability of the arbitration agreement. (Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc., supra, 15 Cal.4th 951, 972 [“a party opposing the petition bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence any fact necessary to its defense”].) The Court also finds that the causes of action alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint are covered by the terms of the Arbitration Agreement.

The Motion to Compel Arbitration is granted. This action shall be stayed pending resolution of the arbitration.

ORDER (PROPOSED)

The Motion to Compel Arbitration is granted. This action shall be stayed pending resolution of the arbitration. Defendants are directed to serve the notice of ruling. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1019.5.)

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