ANGUIANO vs GLOBAL MACHINERY INTERNATIONAL WEST, LLC., et al.

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

26CV002836: ANGUIANO vs GLOBAL MACHINERY INTERNATIONAL WEST, LLC., et al. 05/27/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration Stay or Dismiss the Proceedings in Department 8D

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

***NOTICE: EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G. ST. SACRAMENTO, CA. ALL MOTIONS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 25 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 8D OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. ALL PAPERS FOR THIS DEPARTMENT MUST BE FILED AT THIS NEW LOCATION AND WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED AT THE HALL OF JUSTICE OR GORDON D. SCHABER COURTHOUSE. ALL HEARINGS WILL TAKE PLACE AT THIS NEW LOCATION.***

The notice of motion does not provide notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system, as required by Local Rule 1.06(D). Moving counsel is directed to contact opposing counsel forthwith to advise of Local Rule 1.06, the Court’s tentative ruling procedure, and the manner to request a hearing. If moving counsel is unable to contact opposing counsel prior to the hearing, moving counsel shall be available at the hearing, in person or remotely, in the event opposing counsel appears without following the procedures set forth in Local Rule 1.06(B).

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendants Global Machinery International West, LLC and Rick Harriman’s (“Defendants”) motion to compel arbitration is ruled upon as follows.

Background

This is an employment-related action brought by Plaintiff Oscar Anguiano (“Plaintiff”) alleging disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, failure to engage in the interactive process, and disability retaliation in violation of California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act; failure to comply with wage and labor laws and retaliation in violation of Labor Code statutes; and intentional infliction of emotional distress. (See Complaint.) Plaintiff alleges that he began working for Defendant Global Machinery in February 2016. (Id. ¶ 14; Anguiano Decl., ¶ 4.) Plaintiff alleges that he was unlawfully terminated on or about March 23, 2023. (Compl., ¶ 27.) Plaintiff filed his action on February 5, 2026.

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Defendants move to compel Plaintiff’s claims to arbitration and to stay or dismiss this matter. (Defs’ Notice of Motion.) Defendants assert that Plaintiff entered an arbitration agreement with nonparty Oasis Outsourcing, Inc. (“Oasis”) in June 2020 by electronically reviewing and executing a document titled “Employee Acknowledgements.” (Torres Decl., ¶ 15.) Defendants argue that the Employee Acknowledgements contains a valid, binding arbitration provision that covers the claims at issue. (Defs’ Memo. of Points & Authorities [“MPA”], at p. 1:26–27.)

Plaintiff opposes the motion, arguing that Defendants have not met their burden to prove formation of a contract in the first place or that, if a contract was formed, it is unconscionable and unenforceable. (Plf’s Opp., at p. 1:3–14.)

Evidentiary Objections

Both parties submitted evidentiary objections to some or all of the other party’s declarations. (See Plf’s Evidentiary Objections in Opposition; Defs’ Evidentiary Objections to Decl. of Demirtchian; Defs’ Evidentiary Objections to Decl. of Anguiano.) The Court SUSTAINS Defendants’ objections Numbers 1, 2, and 4 to the Declaration of Demirtchian. The Court OVERRULES the remaining objections.

Legal Standard

On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy, the court shall order the parties to arbitrate the matter if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that: (a) the right to compel arbitration was waived by the petitioner; (b) grounds exist for the revocation of the agreement; or (c) a party to the arbitration agreement is also a party to a pending court action or special proceeding with a third party, arising out of the same transaction or series of related transactions and there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2; Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413.)

Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) is essentially the same:

A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.

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(9 U.S.C. § 2.)

“Under both federal and state law, the threshold question presented by a petition to compel arbitration is whether there is an agreement to arbitrate.” (Sparks v. Vista Del Mar Child and Family Services (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1511, 1517.) “Absent a clear agreement to submit disputes to arbitration, courts will not infer that the right to a jury trial has been waived.” (Id. at p. 1518.)

“A party seeking to compel arbitration of a dispute ‘bears the burden of proving the existence of an arbitration agreement, and the party opposing arbitration bears the burden of proving any defense, such as unconscionability.’” (Jenks v. DLA Piper Rudnick Gray Cary US LLP (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 1, 8.) Normal principles of contract interpretation apply to the interpretation of contractual arbitration provisions. (Aanderud v. Super. Ct. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 880, 890.) Included among these is the longaccepted rule that ambiguities in an arbitration agreement, as in any other type of contract, must be interpreted against the drafting party. (Victoria v. Super. Ct. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 734, 739, 745–747.)

Analysis

Formation of the Agreement

A party moving to compel arbitration bears the ultimate burden of persuasion to prove the existence of an arbitration agreement between the parties, but the burden of production shifts in three steps. (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 165.) First, the moving party can meet its initial burden by attaching a copy of the arbitration agreement or setting forth the provisions verbatim in the motion. (Ibid.) The moving party need not authenticate the document at this step. (Ibid.)

If the opposing party disputes the existence of the agreement, then as the second step the opposing party must produce evidence to challenge the agreement’s authenticity. (Ibid.) This is typically done by the party’s declaration under penalty of perjury. (Ibid.) If the opposing party produces sufficient evidence, then the moving party must finally prove the agreement by a preponderance of the evidence. (Id. at 165–166.) The Court acts as the trier of fact in weighing the documentary evidence. (Garcia v.

Stoneledge Furniture LLC (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 41, 51.)

Defendants submit a Declaration from Luis Torres that Defendants argue shows Plaintiff agreed to arbitrate claims related to his employment when he signed Oasis’s Employee Acknowledgements. The relevant provision within the Employee Acknowledgements

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states:

I and Oasis agree that any legal dispute with my Worksite Employer, Oasis, or any other party that may have an employment relationship with me arising out of or in connection with my employment, application for employment, or separation from employment for which I am, was, or would be paid through Oasis will be resolved exclusively through binding arbitration by a neutral arbitrator as provided in this agreement and, to the extent not inconsistent with this agreement, under the rules of a neutral arbitration service.

The arbitrator will have the authority to grant the same remedies as a federal court (but no more), will apply the Federal Rules of Evidence and any applicable statutes of limitation, will render a reasoned, written decision based only on the evidence adduced and the law, and can grant attorney fees and costs to the prevailing party subject to applicable law. If for any reason a matter is not arbitrated, I AGREE THAT THE MATTER WILL BE HEARD BY A JUDGE AND WAIVE TRIAL BY JURY, and Oasis also agrees to waive trial by jury.

No matter how a case is heard, I agree that I will participate only in my individual capacity and not as a member or representative of a class. I understand that nothing herein prevents me from complaining to or cooperating with a government agency or restricts my right to act collectively with other employees under Section 7 of the National Relations Act. My agreement to these terms controls any conflicting dispute resolution agreement, including one entered into after I sign this document, if the conflicting agreement would prevent a matter in which Oasis or an insurance policy issued to Oasis is involved from being arbitrated, does not provide a jury waiver (if the matter is not arbitrated), or does not include a class action waiver (if the matter is a class action or potential class action).

(Torres Decl., Exh. A, ¶ 3 [“Arbitration Agreement”] (emphasis added).)

The Court finds that Defendants meet their initial burden by providing a copy of the Arbitration Agreement with Plaintiff’s purported electronic signature dated June 16, 2020. (Torres Decl., Exh. A.)

Plaintiff disputes the signature by declaring

 “I do not recall ever signing, digitally, electronically, or otherwise, any agreement to arbitrate disputes related to my employment.” (Anguiano Decl., ¶ 3.)

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 “I do not recall seeing any document entitled Binding Arbitration Agreement, Employee Acknowledgment and Agreement, or any other arbitration agreement.” (Id., ¶ 6.)

This is sufficient evidence to shift the burden back to Defendants to authenticate the Arbitration Agreement by a preponderance of the evidence. (Garcia v. Stoneledge Furniture LLC, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 52.)

A proponent seeking to authenticate an electronic signature must show the electronic signature “‘was the act of the person,’” which could be shown “‘in any manner, including a showing of the efficacy of any security procedure applied to determine the person to which the electronic record or electronic signature was attributable.’” [Citations.] For example, a party may present evidence that the signatory was required to use a unique, private login and password to affix the electronic signature, along with evidence detailing the procedures the person had to follow to electronically sign the document and the accompanying security precautions.

(Garcia v. Stoneledge Furniture LLC, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 53.) “[T]he burden of authenticating an electronic signature is not great.” (Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Group, Inc. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836, 844–845.)

Defendant submits the declaration of Luis Torres, a “PEO Systems & Project Analyst” for Oasis for over 15 years. (Torres Decl., ¶ 1.) Oasis provides its clients, including Defendant Global Machinery, with administrative services such as payroll processing. (Id., ¶¶ 3, 6.) Oasis’s clients are referred to as “worksite employers.” (Id., ¶ 1.) Oasis maintains a secure online process that contains paperwork that worksite employers’ employees are required to review, acknowledge, complete, and execute. (Id., ¶ 4.) Torres generally describes this process:

 Oasis maintains a secure, encrypted online site for onboarding. Employees access the site by an electronic link provided by Oasis and must enter an ID number and PIN number related to the employer and personal identifying information, including first and last name and Social Security Number, to begin the onboarding. (Id., ¶ 7.) Website traffic is encrypted to ensure that no one can alter the onboarding forms other than the worksite employee (Ibid.)

 Once logged into the onboarding system, the employee again inputs personal identifying information, including first and last name, birth date, social security

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number, address, telephone number, and email address, to complete federal employment forms, including Form I-9 and Form W-4. The employee cannot proceed without entering the personal identifying information. (Id., ¶¶ 8, 9, 14.)

 The employee is then asked to review and sign a series of documents, including the Employee Acknowledgements that contains the Arbitration Agreement. The employee must click a button marked “Sign and Continue” after reviewing the Employee Acknowledgements to continue the process. Each time an employee signs a document, the document is date stamped and Oasis’s computer system logs the precise time of signing. (Id., ¶¶ 11, 13.)

 After the employee finishes the onboarding process, the employer verifies the employee’s I-9. When that is complete, signed documents are converted to pdfs that neither Oasis nor the employer can edit or overwrite. Oasis’s data is stored on electronic servers compliant with industry standards for security. (Id., ¶¶ 12, 16.)

Particular to Plaintiff, Torres declares:

 “Plaintiff completed the first onboarding form (Federal W-4) on June 16th 2020, at 4:16 p.m. Central Standard Time and submitted his final document (Oasis CA Victims of Domestic Violence Leave Notice) on June 16th, 2020, at 4:29 p.m. Central Standard Time.” (Id., ¶ 14.)

 “I have also reviewed Plaintiff’s Oasis Electronic Onboarding record regarding his review and acceptance of the Arbitration Agreement. Plaintiff reviewed and signed the Employee Acknowledgments containing the Arbitration Agreement attached hereto as Exhibit A, which Plaintiff signed on June 16, 2020, at 4:22 p.m. Central Standard Time.” (Id., ¶ 15.)

In sum, Defendants present evidence of a secure online process that could be accessed only through a link provided by Oasis and after entering information identifying the employer and the individual employee. An employee must agree to the Arbitration Agreement and fill in other forms to complete the process. The employer verifies the employee’s personally identifying information before the onboarding documents are filed. In contrast, Plaintiff presents evidence that he does not recall seeing or signing the Employee Acknowledgements.

The Court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence presented, that Plaintiff signed the Employee Acknowledgements document on June 16, 2020. The Court finds that

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Defendants have submitted evidence sufficient to demonstrate that the electronic signature was “the act of” the Plaintiff based upon evidence of the security precautions taken with respect to use of the online process, the date and time associated with not only the arbitration agreement but other documents, such as a W-4 form, and the process for how documents are created, verified, and stored in the system. (See Espejo v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1062 [holding that the declaration “offered the critical factual connection that the declarations in Ruiz lacked” where the declaration detailed security precautions regarding user name and password, steps an applicant would have to take in the process, and date, time, and IP address was listed on the documents]; cf.

Garcia, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 53–54; Ruiz, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 844.)[1]

Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendants have met their burden in showing an agreement to arbitrate between the Parties.

Unconscionability

Plaintiff argues that the Arbitration Agreement is unconscionable and unenforceable.

Unconscionability refers to the absence of a meaningful choice for one party together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party. (Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC (2015) 61 Cal.4th 899, 910.) Thus, unconscionability contains both a procedural component, focusing on oppression and surprise based on unequal bargaining power, and a substantive component, focusing on overly harsh or one-sided results. (Ibid.) Both procedural and substantive components of unconscionability must be present for a court to refuse to enforce a contract or contract provision. (Ibid.)

A court considers the two components on a “sliding scale,” so that “the more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa.” (Ibid.) But unconscionability is more than “an old-fashioned bad bargain;” the substantive terms must be unduly oppressive or shock the conscience. (Id. at pp. 910–911.)

1) Procedural Unconscionability

Plaintiff argues that the Arbitration Agreement is procedurally unconscionable as a contract of adhesion and because Plaintiff was not provided a copy of the Arbitration Agreement or any procedural rules that may apply. (Opp., at pp. 13:4–14:22.)

'[T]he initial question regarding procedural unconscionability is whether the contract was

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one of adhesion, namely, a ‘standardized contract, which, imposed and drafted by the party of superior bargaining strength, relegates to the subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it.’” (Dougherty v. Roseville Heritage Partners (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 93, 103.) “A finding of a contract of adhesion is essentially a finding of procedural unconscionability.” (Flores v. Transamerica HomeFirst, Inc. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 846, 853.) However, just because an arbitration provision is found in a standard form contract does not per se establish procedural unconscionability. (Crippen v. Central Valley RV Outlet, Inc. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1165–1166.)

“‘The circumstances relevant to establishing oppression include, but are not limited to (1) the amount of time the party is given to consider the proposed contract; (2) the amount and type of pressure exerted on the party to sign the proposed contract; (3) the length of the proposed contract and the length and complexity of the challenged provision; (4) the education and experience of the party; and (5) whether the party's review of the proposed contract was aided by an attorney.’” (OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho (2019) 8 Cal.5th 111, 126-127.) Surprise occurs when the allegedly unconscionable provision is hidden within a lengthy, complex, or difficult to read document. (Id. at 126.)

Here, Defendants essentially admit the Arbitration Agreement is adhesive because signing the contract was required as part of Oasis’s onboarding process. (Torres Decl., ¶¶ 10, 11.) However, Oasis does not set a time limit for an employee to review and accept the Arbitration Agreement. (Id., ¶ 10.) Regarding not receiving a copy of the Arbitration Agreement, the Court has found above that it is more likely than not Plaintiff was given the opportunity to review the Arbitration Agreement during the onboarding process.

Based on the above, the Court finds that there is a degree of procedural unconscionability because the arbitration agreement was in a form contract, presented on a “take-it-or leave-it” basis and as a condition of employment.

The Arbitration Agreement does not prescribe any particular arbitral forum but only requires arbitration before a neutral party and “under the rules of a neutral arbitration service.” (See Arbitration Agreement, supra.) Plaintiff cites Harper v. Ultimo, (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1402, for the proposition that failing to provide a copy of the selected arbitration forum’s procedural rules is unconscionable. More recent caselaw from the California Supreme Court has made it clear that failing to provide arbitration rules may be considered as it relates to procedurally unconscionable when the rules themselves are substantively unfair in some regard. (Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1237, 1246) There is nothing substantively unfair, on its face, about requiring the parties

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to arbitrate according to the rules of a neutral arbitration service, and Plaintiff has not argued about any specific rules of the neutral arbitration service. Accordingly, the failure to attach the rules does not affect consideration of Plaintiff’s claims of substantive unconscionability in terms of the sliding scale analysis. (See ibid.)

Accordingly, the Court finds some degree of procedural unconscionability.

2) Substantive Unconscionability

Plaintiff argues that the Arbitration Agreement is substantively unconscionable because: (1) it does not allow for adequate discovery, if any at all; (2) the arbitration policy is silent as to costs; (3) it contains an illusory term; and (4) it unlawfully limits Plaintiff’s legal recovery. (Opp, at pp. 11:21–17:3.)

The central concern of substantive unconscionability is terms that are “unreasonably favorable to the more powerful party.” (OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 129.) “Unconscionable terms impair the integrity of the bargaining process or otherwise contravene the public interest or public policy’ or attempt to impermissibly alter fundamental legal duties. [Citation.] They may include fine-print terms, unreasonably or unexpectedly harsh terms regarding price or other central aspects of the transaction, and terms that undermine the nondrafting party's reasonable expectations.” (Id. at p. 130 [quotation marks omitted].) When procedural unconscionability is present, courts closely scrutinize the substantive terms for manifest unfairness or one-sidedness. (Ibid.)

Inadequate Discovery

Plaintiff notes that the Arbitration Agreement is silent regarding discovery and argues this means the Arbitration Agreement does not allow for adequate discovery. “[A]dequate discovery is indispensable for the vindication of [employment discrimination] claims.” (Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 104.) In Armendariz, the Court examined an arbitration agreement that did not expressly address or guarantee discovery. (Id. at pp. 104–106.) The Court noted that “when parties agree to arbitrate statutory claims, they also implicitly agree, absent express language to the contrary, to such procedures as are necessary to vindicate that claim.” (Id. at p. 106.)

The Court held that an employer, by agreeing to arbitrate a FEHA claim, has already impliedly consented to such discovery and thus, lack of stated rules for discovery is not ground for holding a claim inarbitrable. (Ibid.)

Here, as in Armendariz, the arbitration agreement has no express limitations on discovery. As such, the Court similarly holds that the employer has impliedly consented

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to discovery procedures necessary to vindicate that claim. Accordingly, this is not a basis for substantive unconscionability.

Arbitration Fees and Costs

Plaintiff argues that the Arbitration Agreement is unconscionable because it is silent as to the fees and costs unique to arbitration. In Armendariz, the Court held that “[t]he absence of specific provisions on arbitration costs would . . . not be grounds for denying the enforcement of an arbitration agreement. (Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc., supra, 24 Cal.4th 83 at p. 113.) In so holding, the Court reasoned that “a mandatory employment arbitration agreement that contains within its scope the arbitration of FEHA claims impliedly obliges the employer to pay all types of costs that are unique to arbitration.” (Ibid.) Since there were no express terms regarding the allocation of costs, the Armendariz Court interpreted the arbitration case consistent with these principles and held that the employer must bear the arbitration forum costs.

Here, as in Armendariz, the arbitration agreement has no express provisions regarding allocation of arbitration costs and fees. As such, the court similarly holds that the employer has impliedly agreed to bear the arbitration forum costs. Indeed, Defendants present evidence that Global Machinery explicitly confirms such agreement to pay costs unique to arbitration. (Weldon Decl., ¶ 5.) Accordingly, this is not a basis for substantive unconscionability.

IIllusory or Ambiguous Terms

Plaintiff argues that a sentence within the Arbitration Agreement is illusory or fatally ambiguous: “If for any reason a matter is not arbitrated, I AGREE THAT THE MATTER WILL BE HEARD BY A JUDGE AND WAIVE TRIAL BY JURY, and Oasis also agrees to waive trial by jury.” Plaintiff contends that it is not possible to determine the meaning or scope of this statement.

The Court agrees with Plaintiff that ambiguous terms in an arbitration agreement must be read against the drafting party. But confusing or ambiguous terms contribute to surprise, a part of procedural unconscionability. (OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 128–129.) A potential ambiguity does not by itself make an agreement substantively unconscionable, unless it unfairly favors the other party. Plaintiff makes no such showing.

Further the Court does not find the terms to be either illusory or ambiguous to support a finding of substantive unconscionability. (See also Holley-Gallegly v. TA Operating, LLC

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(9th Cir. 2023) 74 F.4th 997, 1002–1003.)

Lack of Remedies

Finally, Plaintiff argues that the Arbitration Agreement unconscionably limits his remedies, which may include attorneys fees and costs under California Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. The Arbitration Agreement states

The arbitrator will have the authority to grant the same remedies as a federal court (but no more), will apply the Federal Rules of Evidence and any applicable statutes of limitation, will render a reasoned, written decision based only on the evidence adduced and the law, and can grant attorney fees and costs to the prevailing party subject to applicable law.

(See Arbitration Agreement, supra [emphasis added].) Federal courts can hear and resolve state law claims, including applying state substantive law, and the Arbitration Agreement explicitly allows attorney fees and costs subject to applicable law.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds no substantive unconscionability in the Arbitration Agreement. Lacking substantive unconscionability, the Court finds the contract as a whole is not unconscionable.[2]

Disposition

Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration is GRANTED.

The Court notes that, in Opposition, Plaintiff requests that, if the Court denies the motion to compel, the Court grant leave to conduct discovery as to the arbitration issues. Plaintiff has not presented a sufficient basis for the need for any of the requested relief. Plaintiff has provided no area where additional discovery would change the language of or applicability of the agreement, and Plaintiff has presented no factual assertions or evidence in support of the opposition that shows a conflicting factual account for which additional discovery is supported. (Cf.

Bouton v. USAA Casualty Ins. Co. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 412, 428.) Moreover, Plaintiff does not assert that he had insufficient time to conduct discovery before hearing on the motion to compel or that he sought and was refused discovery of any matter pertinent to the enforceability of the arbitration clause. (See Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp., supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 412–13.) Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request is DENIED.

This case is STAYED in its entirety pending completion of arbitration. (9 U.S.C. § 3;

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Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.4.)

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1019.5; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.)

[1] The Court notes that Plaintiff does not declare that he did not complete Oasis’s

onboarding process, only that he does not recall seeing or signing this document. Failing to read an agreement before signing does not prevent formation of a contract. (Iyere v. Wise Auto Group 87 Cal.App.5th 747, 759.) [2] Moreover, to the extent that any of the terms raised by Plaintiff are considered

substantively unconscionable, the Court finds that, based on the totality of the circumstances, they are severable. (See Ramirez v. Charter Communications, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 478, 516–517.)