GLOBAL TEL*LINK CORPORATION vs CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, et al.

If a Court Reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list is not used, aStipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) must be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing. Once the form is signed, it must be filed with the Clerk of Department 3A.

Pursuant to Government Code Section 69959, Court Reporters are not permitted through the use of remote technology, and any Court Reporter designated for the hearing shall be physically present in the Courtroom.

If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a Court Reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the Clerk of Department 3A at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the Clerk of Department 3A will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official Court Reporter will be provided.

TENTATIVE RULING

Introduction

This action involves a challenge to a public contract award pursuant to Public Contract Code section 6611, subdivision (d) [authorizing petition for writ of traditional mandate as mechanism to challenge negotiated state contract award].) Petitioner Global Tel*Link Corporation, d/b/a ViaPath Technologies (Petitioner) challenges a large technology contract awarded by

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25WM000052: GLOBAL TEL*LINK CORPORATION vs CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, et al. 05/28/2026 Hearing on Motion - Other MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER in Department 3A

Respondents Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) and Department of Technology (DOT), collectively, “Respondents.” Petitioner alleges that Respondents erred in awarding the contract to Real Party in Interest Securus Technologies, LLC (“Securus”) and seeks a writ of mandate setting aside the contract award to Securus.

Petitioner has served Respondents with discovery, including requests for production of documents, special interrogatories, and has sought the deposition of several of Respondents’ employees. Respondents now move for a protective order prohibiting the deposition of three members of Respondents’ legal staff. For the reasons discussed herein, Respondents’ motion will be granted.

Background

In July of 2024, Respondents issued the Request for Proposals (RFP) for the contract at issue. The RFP sought proposals for a contract to provide CDCR with communications technology for use by incarcerated individuals. Two firms, Petitioners and Securus, submitted timely final proposals. Respondents invited both Petitioner and Securus to participate in the negotiation process under Public Contract Code section 6611. At the conclusion of the process, Respondents announced that they intended to award the contract to Securus.

Petitioner filed this action on April 1, 2025. Petitioner alleges that the contract award to Securus was improper. The principal basis for Petitioner’s challenge is its claim that Securus is financially distressed and therefore does not qualify as a “responsible bidder” for purposes of the Public Contract Code and the RFP. Petitioner also claims that Securus did not comply with certain of the RFP’s requirements, including submission of a complaint Letter of Bondability.

As noted, Petitioner has propounded discovery on the Respondents, the focus of which appears to be on Securus’s financial status and Respondents’ evaluation thereof during the negotiation and contract award process. (See generally Declaration of Anna Barsegyan [Barsegyan Decl.], Exhs. A, B [Respondents’ responses to Petitioner’s Special Interrogatories].) On March 9 and 10, 2026, Petitioner took the depositions of Stephanie Jones, CDCR’s Acting Chief of the Incarcerated Population and Community Solutions Section, and Amy Snow, CDT’s Branch Chief in the Office of Statewide Technology Procurement. (Barsegyan Decl., ¶¶ 6-7.)

Following the depositions of Ms. Jones and Ms. Snow, Petitioner noticed the depositions of Rami Mazher, Adam Crook, and Jennifer Neill. (Barsegyan Decl., ¶¶ 8-10.) Mr. Mazhar is an internal audit manager in CDT’s legal unit, Mr. Crook is employed as legal counsel for CDT, and Ms. Neill is the former Chief Counsel at CDCR but is no longer employed by CDCR. Barsegyan Decl. Exhs. I, K, L, & M.) Respondents served objections to the deposition notices of the three witnesses on March 25, 2026, and on March 27, 2026, filed the instant motion.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25WM000052: GLOBAL TEL*LINK CORPORATION vs CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, et al. 05/28/2026 Hearing on Motion - Other MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER in Department 3A

Respondents seek a protective order precluding the depositions of Mr. Mazhar, Mr. Crook, and Ms. Neill on the grounds that the noticed depositions exceed the scope of discovery permitted in this action, seek privileged information, and would compel the two attorney deponents to violate their professional and ethical duties. (Notice of Motion, 2:12-22.)

Relevant Standards of Review

Upon a showing of good cause, a protective order may issue “to protect any party, deponent, or other natural person or organization from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.420, subd. (b).)

In an action challenging the award of a public contract under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, as provided in Public Contract Code section 6611, subdivision (d), the court’s review is limited “to an examination of the proceedings before the agency to determine whether its actions and findings are supported by substantial evidence.” (MCM Const., Inc. v. City & County of San Francisco (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 359, 368.)

Discussion

Respondents first argue that a protective order precluding the depositions at issue is necessary because the discovery sought is outside the scope of the Court’s review in this action and is therefore inadmissible. Respondents contend that the Court’s review is limited to the administrative record, and materials other than those comprising the record cannot be considered. Accordingly, they argue, the depositions of the three members of Respondents’ legal staff are inappropriate because any deposition testimony would be inadmissible extra-record evidence.

Respondents are correct. Petitioner’s challenge to the contract award is a traditional mandate action brought pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1085. (MCM Construction, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at p. 368.) As such, judicial review “is limited to an examination of the proceedings to determine whether the public agency’s actions were arbitrary, capricious, entirely lacking in evidentiary support, or inconsistent with proper procedure.” (DeSilva Gates Construction, LP v.

Dept. of Transp. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1409, 1417-1418, cleaned up, quoting Ghillotti Construction Co. v. City of Richmond (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 897, 903.) Extra-record evidence is generally not admissible in traditional mandamus actions challenging an agency’s exercise of discretion. (San Joaquin County Local Agency Formation Comm. v. Superior Court (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 159, 167 (San Joaquin), citing Western States Petroleum Assn. v. Superior Court (1995) 9 Cal.4th 559, 576.) Accordingly, because review is limited to the administrative record, discovery in traditional mandamus actions “is usually not necessary.” (Ibid.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25WM000052: GLOBAL TEL*LINK CORPORATION vs CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, et al. 05/28/2026 Hearing on Motion - Other MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER in Department 3A

Moreover, it is well-established that “substantial evidence review is purely a question of law and is limited to the administrative record.” (San Joaquin, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 167.) In undertaking this review, the Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the agency:

There is a presumption that the [agency’s] actions were supported by substantial evidence, and [the petitioner] has the burden of proving otherwise. [A reviewing court] may not reweigh the evidence and must view it in the light most favorable to the [agency’s] actions, indulging all reasonable inferences in support of those actions.

(Ghilotti Construction Co. v. City of Richmond, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 903.)

Nor does the Court evaluate the subjective decision making of the agency: “In an ordinary mandamus review of a legislative or quasi-legislative decision, courts decline to inquire into thought processes or motives, but evaluate the decision on its face because legislative discretion is not subject to judicial control and supervision.” (San Joaquin, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 171.)

In light of the applicable standards governing review of the public contract award at issue here, Respondents contend that Petitioner is not entitled to depose the three members of Respondents’ legal staff.

In opposition, Petitioner first contends that the deposition testimony it seeks to compel is not actually extra-record evidence at all because “it is an account of the information before the agency and the agency’s reasons for its ultimate determination about that information as part of the State’s procurement decision.” (Pet. Opp. to Resp. Mot. for Prot. Order, 10:17-19, italics and bold omitted.) This argument proves the opposite. The procurement record itself is the information that was before the agency.

Any secondary “account” of that information is by definition extra-record evidence. Furthermore, any after-the-fact testimony about “the agency’s reasons for its ultimate determination” is not permissibly included in the administrative record because the wisdom of the agency’s decision making process is not relevant to this Court’s substantial evidence review: “[E]xtra-record evidence can never be admitted merely to contradict the evidence the administrative agency relied on in making a quasi-legislative decision or to raise a question regarding the wisdom of that decision.” (Western States Petroleum Assn. v.

Superior Court (1995) 9 Cal.4th 559, 579 [Western States]; see also San Joaquin, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 171 [in an ordinary mandamus action, “courts decline to inquire into thought processes or motives, but evaluate the decision on its face”].)

Petitioner next argues that extra-record evidence may be admitted under an exception to the general rule. Petitioner notes that extra-record evidence may be admitted “in traditional mandamus actions challenging ministerial or informal legislative actions if the facts are in

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25WM000052: GLOBAL TEL*LINK CORPORATION vs CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, et al. 05/28/2026 Hearing on Motion - Other MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER in Department 3A

dispute.” (Western States, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 576.) Petitioner contends that the contract award at issue here is an “informal” agency action because no public hearing took place in connection with the administrative decision. (Pet. Opp. to Resp. Mot. for Prot. Order, 12:21-22, citing California Oak Foundation v. Regents of University of California [California Oak Foundation] (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 227, 255 [“Administrative actions that do not involve public hearings are generally considered ‘informal’”].)

Courts may admit extra-record evidence when reviewing certain informal actions in traditional mandamus:

[B]ecause the record upon which a public agency's informal action is based is often inadequate to permit meaningful review, the court presiding over traditional mandamus proceedings challenging the agency's informal action is generally permitted to consider extra-record evidence if the facts are in dispute.

(California Oak Foundation, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 255.) Here, however, there is no indication that the record upon which the contract award was based will be inadequate to permit meaningful review or that there are any essential facts in dispute. The administrative record in this action consists of the materials contained in the procurement file, which constitutes the materials relied upon by Respondents in support of their decision to award the contract to Securus. (See Resp. Opp. to Pet.

Mot. to Compel, 6:28-7:3.) No party has suggested that these materials are unavailable or that there is any dispute about the contents of the procurement file. In the cases cited by Petitioner, by contrast, factual disputes or incomplete records permitted the admission of extra-record evidence. (See e.g. California Oak Foundation, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 256 [“given the conflicting evidence regarding the Athlete Center's design and its relationship to the Stadium, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering extrarecord evidence in the form of expert declarations from engineers and architects when deciding whether the Regents complied with the Alquist–Priolo Act”]; City of Oakland v.

Oakland Police & Fire Retirement System (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 210, 239 [extra-record evidence permitted where trial court requested additional evidence for “the development of essential facts”].)

Petitioner seeks to depose members of Respondents’ legal staff about their “communications and analyses” of the “business and factual evaluation of Securus’s financial responsibility.” (Pet. Opp. to Resp. Mot. for Prot. Order, 4:26-27.) Petitioner complains, “The State cannot make a key decision regarding a bidder, award a contract to that bidder, then keep its justification hidden in a black box hidden behind the claim of privilege.” (Id. at p. 8:7-8.) In framing the dispute in this way, Petitioner appears to misunderstand the nature of the Court’s review in traditional mandamus: “The question of whether there is substantial evidence to support the agency’s decision concerns the evidence in the record.

This is a question of law.” (Santa Teresa Citizen Action Group v. City of San Jose (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 689, 706, italics in original.) Unlike in a civil litigation matter, Petitioner need not conduct discovery in order generate or obtain new

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25WM000052: GLOBAL TEL*LINK CORPORATION vs CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, et al. 05/28/2026 Hearing on Motion - Other MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER in Department 3A

evidence in a post-hoc effort to learn about Respondents’ “justification” for the contract award. If, as Petitioner appears to contend, the administrative record contains insufficient evidence to support the decision to award the contract to Securus, then Petitioner will prevail. It is the record itself that provides the evidence, or establishes the lack thereof, to support Respondents’ decision. In the absence of any significant factual dispute that will be illuminated by the admission of extra-record evidence or indication that the existing record is incomplete, there is no basis for admitting extra-record evidence here.

To the degree Petitioner contends that extra-record evidence may be admitted because the agency decision at issue is ministerial, Petitioner is incorrect. “A public entity’s award of a contract, and all of the acts leading up to the award, are legislative in character.” (SN Sands Corp. v. City and County of San Francisco (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 185, 191, cleaned up; see also Mike Moore’s 24-Hour Towing v. City of San Diego (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1294, 1303 [“[T]he letting of contracts by a governmental entity necessarily requires an exercise of discretion guided by consideration of the public welfare”], quotation omitted; American Medical Response of Inland Empire v.

County of San Bernardino (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 856, 877-878 [rejecting argument that RFP imposed a ministerial duty on respondent].) Nor does the existence of a purely legal question in the evaluation of an agency’s exercise of its discretion render the underlying decision ministerial, as Petitioner appears to argue. (Pet. Opp. to Resp. Mot. for Prot. Order, p. 13, fn. 1.) Substantial evidence review of an agency’s discretionary act is itself “a question of law.” (Santa Teresa Citizen Action Group v.

City of San Jose, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at p. 706.)

In sum, the noticed depositions seek extra-record evidence that is not admissible in this traditional mandamus action. Respondents’ motion for a protective order will be granted on this basis.

Having so determined, the Court need not and does not reach Respondents’ separation of powers and privilege arguments.

Disposition

Respondents’ motion for a protective order is granted.

Respondents shall prepare a formal order consistent with this ruling, submit it to the opposing party for approval as to form, and thereafter submit it to the Court for signature in accordance with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.