Peterson v. RL Liquidators, LLC, et al.

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with

24CV011057: PETERSON vs RL LIQUIDATORS, LLC, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, et al. 09/25/2025 Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Responses to Request for Production of Docs in Department 53

a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

Background

Plaintiff Samuel Peterson’s (“Plaintiff”) motion to compel Defendant RL Liquidators, LLC. (“Defendant”) to provide further responses to form interrogatories, set one, under Code of Civil Procedure sections 2031.310 and 2023.010 and request for monetary sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure § 2031.310(h) are ruled on as follows.

This is an action for claims of wrongful constructive termination, discrimination based on sex/gender and disability, sexual harassment, failure to accommodate, retaliation for engaging in protected activities, and other violations of California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act, the California Labor Code, and public policy by Defendant while Plaintiff was an employee of Defendant.

Plaintiff propounded the subject discovery on September 4, 2024. (Declaration of Rene Potter, (“Potter Decl.”), ¶ 2.) Defendant responded on October 22, 2024, after an extension was granted. (Id., ¶ 3.) Between December 6, 2024 and January 28, 2025, the parties exchanged various meetand-confer correspondence but were unable to resolve the dispute. (Id., ¶¶ 5-6, Exhibit 2.)

Plaintiff now moves to compel further responses to his requests for production nos. 1-79. Plaintiff also seeks to strike Defendant’s general objections from Defendant’s initial responses and an order directing Defendant to refrain from making general objections in its amended/supplemental responses. (Plaintiff’s Separate Statement, 2:19-21.)

Defendant objects to nearly every request for production on the grounds that the requests are overly broad and unduly burdensome, vague, ambiguous, irrelevant, and that they seek documents protected by third-party privacy rights, attorney-client privilege, or the attorney work product doctrine.

Defendant argues the motion should be denied as moot in light of supplemental responses. Inexplicably, Defendant further argues that Defendant is entitled to discovery sanctions “should Plaintiff continue pursuing this moot motion.” (Opposition, 3:8-17.) The Court rejects Defendant’s suggestion that this motion has been rendered “moot” by virtue of their service of “supplemental” responses or that sanctions are warranted. Code of Civil Procedure § 1005.5 specifically provides that a motion is deemed made at the time it is filed and served and here, Plaintiff filed the present motion back on 5/8/2025 while the “supplemental” responses were not actually served until just a few weeks ago on 8/19/2025, over three months after this motion was

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV011057: PETERSON vs RL LIQUIDATORS, LLC, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, et al. 09/25/2025 Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Responses to Request for Production of Docs in Department 53

filed. Thus, this motion cannot be considered “moot” within the meaning of § 1005.5.

Legal Standard

As applied to a motion to compel a further response to requests for production, “[o]n receipt of a response to a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling, the demanding party may move for an order compelling a further response if the demanding party deems that any of the following apply: [¶] (1) A statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete. [¶] (2) A representation of inability to comply is inadequate. [¶] (3) An objection in the response is without merit or too general.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.310(a).)

“[A]ny party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2017.010.) “In the absence of contrary court order, a civil litigant’s right to discovery is broad...[and] statutes governing discovery ‘must be construed liberally in favor of disclosure unless the request is clearly improper by virtue of well-established causes for denial.’ [Citation.]” (Williams v.

Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 541; see also Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 355, 378 [“disclosure is a matter of right unless statutory or public policy considerations clearly prohibit it”].) Nevertheless, while civil discovery is broad, it is not limitless. (Board of Registered Nursing v. Superior Court (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 1011, 1039 [citing Calcor Space Facility v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 223].) It cannot be based on pure speculation. (Digital Music News LLC v.

Superior Court (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 216, 227.)

The party seeking to resist discovery based upon objections has the burden to justify its objections. (Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255 [citing Coy v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 220-221].) Indeed, in the discovery context, information is relevant “if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement. [Citations omitted.] Admissibility is not the test and information, unless privileged, is discoverable if it might reasonably lead to admissible evidence.” (Lipton v. Superior Court (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1599, 1611-1612 [emphasis in original].) “Any doubts regarding relevance are generally resolved in favor of allowing the discovery.” (Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 98.)

“If a party filing a response to a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling under Sections 2031.210, 2031.220, 2031.230, 2031.240, and 2031.280 thereafter fails to permit the inspection, copying, testing, or sampling in accordance with that party’s statement of compliance, the demanding party may move for an order compelling compliance.” (Code Civ. Proc. §2031.320, subd. (a).)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV011057: PETERSON vs RL LIQUIDATORS, LLC, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, et al. 09/25/2025 Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Responses to Request for Production of Docs in Department 53

In a motion to compel further responses to requests for production, the burden is on the moving party to show both relevance to the subject matter and specific facts justifying discovery. (Glenfed Develop. Corp. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117; Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.310 [requiring a showing of good cause for production of documents].) Once good cause is established by the moving party, the burden then shifts to the responding party to justify any objections made to document disclosure. (See Hartbrodt v. Burke (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 168, 172-174.)

Discussion

As noted above and importantly for purposes of ruling on this motion, in a motion to compel further responses to requests for production, the initial burden is on the moving party to show both relevance to the subject matter and specific facts justifying discovery. (See Glenfed Develop. Corp. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117; Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.310 [requiring a showing of good cause for production of documents].) “Declarations are generally used to show the requisite ‘good cause’ for an order to compel inspection.” (Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (2024) ¶8:1495.7.) The Fourth District addressed the requirements of establishing good cause in Calcor Space Facility v. Superior Court directly. (53 Cal.App.4th 216.) The Calcor court explained:

Section 2031, subdivision (l), which applies to document production requests served on a party, requires a party seeking to compel such production to “set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the inspection demand.” (Italics added.)

In law and motion practice, factual evidence is supplied to the court by way of declarations. Thiem provided argument but no evidence at all to permit the court to conclude the material sought was “admissible in evidence or appear[ed] reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” The only justification for the request is contained in Thiem's “Statement Pursuant to Rule 335(a)” and in a document entitled “Combined Opposition to Calcor Space Facility, Inc.’s Motion for Protective Order and Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Compel Calcor Space Facility, Inc. to Comply with Deposition Subpoena for Production of Business Documents.” Neither document is verified, and thus they do not constitute evidence.

(Id. at 223-224 [italics in original; emphasis added in bold].)

Here, Plaintiff provides solely the declaration of Rene Potter in support of the instant motion. The Potter Declaration fails to provide any “factual basis,” much less an adequate factual basis, for the requests for production of documents so as to satisfy Plaintiff’s initial burden on its motion. Instead, it appears the Potter Declaration addresses the propounding of the subject

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV011057: PETERSON vs RL LIQUIDATORS, LLC, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, et al. 09/25/2025 Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Responses to Request for Production of Docs in Department 53

requests for production, the various meet-and-confer communications that took place, and Plaintiff’s counsel’s hourly rate and time spent on the motion. (See generally, Potter Decl.) But fatal to this motion, the declaration includes no specific facts which justify the requests for production of any documents. (Compare to Grannis v. Board of Medical Examiners (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 551, 564 [motion to quash subpoena still granted despite a declaration upon information and belief detailing possession of documents for a specific period of time and actions taken by board regarding convictions]; Chalco-California Corp. v.

Superior Court (1963) 59 Cal.2d 883, 889-890 [writ denied despite multiple affidavits filed to show good cause, including from an attorney attesting to when he learned of specific facts about various quotes and when defendant entered into a letter contract based on those quotes, because trial court determined that the documents were not relevant to the cause of action].)

While the absence of the required factual showring by declaration (or other admissible evidence)_is enough to deny this motion, the Court also notes that Plaintiff’s memorandum of points and authorities fails to adequately address its burden of showing good cause. The moving papers make no mention of the good cause requirement, only asserting Defendant failed to provide any substantive responses or produce documents requested. (MPA 5:7-8.) “The motion shall set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand.” (Code Civ.

Proc. § 2031. 310, subd. (b)(1) [emphasis added].) Good cause is shown by specific facts justifying the requests for production irrespective of whether Defendant provided Codecomplaint responses. As noted in Calcor, statements in a memorandum of points and authorities do not constitute evidence of specific facts to establish good cause. (53 Cal.App.4th at 224; see also Cole v. Town of Los Gatos (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 749, 767, fn.8 [“It goes without saying that statements in a memorandum of points and authorities are not evidence”].)

Only if good cause is shown by the moving party does the burden then shift to the responding party to justify any objections made to document disclosure. (Kirkland v. Superior Court (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98.) Due to Plaintiff’s failure to satisfy its initial burden, the burden does not shift to Defendant to justify any objections.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses to its requests for production is DENIED in its entirety for failure to establish good cause.

While the Court need not proceed further, it would note that to the extent that Plaintiff may have also intended to seek to compel the production of documents, the motion is not noticed as a motion to compel compliance with responses to requests for production, and thus, no such relief is available through this motion. (Compare Code Civ. Proc. §§2031.320, subd. (a) [demanding party may move for an order compelling compliance if the responding party fails to permit the inspection, copying, testing, or sampling in accordance with that party’s statement of compliance] & 2031.310, subd. (a) [demanding party may move for an order compelling further

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV011057: PETERSON vs RL LIQUIDATORS, LLC, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, et al. 09/25/2025 Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Responses to Request for Production of Docs in Department 53

responses to the demand if the demanding party finds the responses inadequate according to Code].) Furthermore, a motion seeking production of documents is only ripe after the responding party has agreed to produce documents and yet has not done so. Thus, where a dispute exists (as is the case here) as to whether further responses are necessary, a motion to compel compliance with an agreement to produce is premature. Accordingly, even if Plaintiff had intended its present motion to also seek to compel compliance with an agreement to produce documents, the motion would still be denied.

The Parties’ competing requests for sanctions are DENIED. The Court does not find that pursuing the motion was without substantial justification.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc. §1019.5; CRC, Rule 3.1312.)