SHANNON VS DHSE, INC.

such as ‘revocation of the agreement.” (Duffens v. Valenti (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 434, 453.) “ . . . in the absence of indication of contrary intent, and where the arbitration clause is reasonably susceptible of such an interpretation, claims of fraud in the inducement of the contract (as distinguished from claims of fraud directed to the arbitration clause itself) will be deemed subject to arbitration.” (Ericksen, Arbuthnot, McCarthy, Kearney & Walsh, Inc. v. 100 Oak Street (1983) 35 Cal.3d 312, 323.

As noted by Defendants, here, there is not a single allegation in the Complaint that the arbitration provision in ¶31 is invalid because Plaintiff was allegedly fraudulently induced into initialing the arbitration provision. The Complaint instead alleges that Plaintiff’s “believed the property was being purchased for the full asking price of $515,000.00 by an investor”, despite the express language of the PSA/Addendum to the contrary, but “Plaintiff in fact has only received the total sum of $328,900.00 for the sale of the property and is still owed $186,100.00. (Complaint, ¶¶ 14 & 19).

Thus, Plaintiff is seeking monetary damages for the misrepresentations by his broker that he claims he relied upon. The Complaint does not have a single allegation that Plaintiff contends that the Arbitration provision in the PSA is in and of itself invalid. Thus, Plaintiff’s fraud claims do nothing to invalidate the binding Arbitration provision or the fact that under the controlling law cited above the cases must be ordered to Arbitration.

Plaintiff further contends that “Plaintiffs failure to read the documents may be excusable in light of evidence of some physical or other impairment, or of a fiduciary relationship and defendant’s misrepresentations.” (Opp., pg. 5, ln. 2-4). Failing to read or understand a contract under which one binds himself or herself to is no basis upon which relief may be had. “[A] party is bound by provisions in an agreement which he signs, even though he has not read them and signs unaware of their existence.” (N.A.M.E.S. v. Singer (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 653, 656; see also George v. Bekins Van & Storage Co. (1949) 33 Cal.2d 834, 848–849.) “The failure of a [party] to carefully read the agreement and the amendment is not a reason to refuse to enforce the arbitration provisions.” (Powers v. Dickson, Carlson & Campillo (1998) 54 Cal. App. 4th 1102, 1115.)

Since all of the claims asserted in Plaintiff’s Complaint are subject to the arbitration provision contained in paragraph 31 of the PSA, this Court must issue an order pursuant to 9 USC § 3 staying this action pending the completion of the arbitration.

6. CASE # CASE NAME HEARING NAME MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANT DHSE, INC. TO PROVIDE FURTHER RESPONSES, WITHOUT OBJECTION CVPS2507128 SHANNON VS DHSE, INC. TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION SET ONE (C.C.P. SEC. 2030.300) BY JENNIFER SHANNON Tentative Ruling: Granted.

Responding Defendants to provide further responses to request for production of documents no. 8, 9, 10, 12-28, and 30 within 30 days of this order.

Moving party to provide notice pursuant to CCP 1019.5.

Jennifer Shannon (“Plaintiff”) was employed by DHSE, Inc. (“Defendant”) as a General Manager. Defendant owns and operates a hotel and resort. Plaintiff alleges that she was subjected to unwanted sexual harassment by Defendant’s Vice President. She asserts that she complained multiple times about his conduct, but the conduct continued. She contends that she was

eventually demoted due to her continued complaints and was eventually constructively terminated.

The complaint alleges the following causes of action: (1) sexual harassment, (2) failure to investigate and prevent discrimination and harassment, (3) retaliation in violation of Government Code § 12940(h), (4) retaliation in violation of Labor Code § 1102.5, (5) wrongful constructive termination of employment in violation of public policy, (6) violation of Labor Code § 226, and (7) violation of Labor Code § 1198.5.

Plaintiff brings these motions seeking to compel further responses to requests for production of documents nos. 8, 9, 10, 12-28, and 30 and special interrogatories nos. 16 and 17. She contends that Defendant’s responses to these requests improperly contain boilerplate objections and the responses to requests for production are inconsistent. She asserts that the requests seek information relevant to this lawsuit. She seeks sanctions in the amount of $3,860 in connection with the motion pertaining to the requests for production and $2,435 in connection with the motion pertaining to the special interrogatories.

In opposition, Defendant contends that Plaintiff has obtained all documents responsive to her requests for production of documents. As such, there is nothing to compel. It asserts code compliant responses have been provided to the special interrogatories.

Motion to Compel Further Response(s)

Meet and Confer: A party seeking to compel further response to special interrogatories and requests for production of documents must meet and confer prior to filing a motion to compel further responses. (CCP §§ 2030.300(b)(1) and 2031.310(b).) A meet and confer requires a “reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion.” (CCP § 2016.040.) A good faith meet and confer attempt requires more than just an attempt to persuade the objector of the error of his or her ways. It requires counsel to talk the matter over, compare their views, consult, and deliberate. (Clemente v. Alegre (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1294.) It requires a serious attempt by the moving party to informally resolve each issue with the responses. (Id. at 1293.)

Here, counsel exchanged multiple emails, which quickly became combative. Not the best look for either counsel. They also engaged in a meet and confer telephone call. (Declaration of Sara Salinas, ¶ 4.) These efforts appear to meet the statutory requirements.

In motions seeking to compel further responses to requests for production of documents, the moving party must establish good cause for the document sought. (CCP § 2031.310(b)(1).) To establish good cause, the moving party must demonstrate relevance and specific facts justifying discovery. (Kirkland v. Superior Court (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98.) The burden to show good cause for production “is met simply by a fact-specific showing of relevance.” (Tbg Ins. Servs. Corp. v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443, 448.) A matter is relevant, “if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement.” (Glenfed Dev. Corp. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117.) Once this requirement has been met, the burden then shifts to the objecting party to substantiate their objections. (Kirkland, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98.)

Requests for Production of Documents Nos. 8, 9, 10, 12-28, and 30

Here, the requests pertain to communications regarding Plaintiff, employment manuals/handbooks, communications regarding negative work performance by Plaintiff, personnel policies, communications between Plaintiff and the alleged harasser, communications

between Plaintiff and other employees, communications between Plaintiff and the human resources department, documents regarding Plaintiff’s complaints, investigations relating to Plaintiff, harassment complaints, documents regarding Plaintiff’s removal as general manager, documents related to Plaintiff’s separation from employment, Plaintiff’s personnel file, documents concerning discipline imposed against Plaintiff, and statements from witnesses regarding Plaintiff’s claims. These documents all appear relevant to Plaintiff’s claims. As such, there is good cause for the documents sought.

Since good cause has been established, Defendant has the burden of substantiating its objections. (Kirkland, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98.) It fails to meet this burden. It does not discuss its objections and appears to argue that no objections have been asserted, which is incorrect. Defendant does contend that this motion should be denied because code compliant responses have been provided. However, the responses appear flawed. Defendant’s responses to all the requests at issue are contradictory.

They all state that Defendant has conducted a diligent search and made a reasonable inquiry to comply with the demand but is unable to do so because the requested documents have never existed. They also all state that without waiver, Defendant has produced all relevant responsive documents in its possession and control and identifies Bases PSTPS 1-102 and Bates DHSE 1-118. If documents have never existed, Defendant should not be able to identify responsive documents. Due to this, the motion is granted to all the requests at issue.

If documents never existed this is fine, Defendant should simply state this. If documents do exist, Defendant needs to eliminate the language regarding the documents never existing. It should identify specifically which documents are responsive to each request. As such, the motion is granted as to all the requests for production at issue in this motion.

Sanctions

Plaintiff seeks sanctions. Under CCP §§ 2030.300(d) and 2031.310(h), sanctions must be awarded against the losing party, unless the court finds that doing so would be unjust or the losing party acted with substantial justification.

While it is clear that Defendant does not believe it is a proper party to this lawsuit, a plaintiff is not required to prove her claims in order to be entitled to discovery. (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 550.) A party is allowed to obtain discovery regarding any matter that is not privileged and relevant to the lawsuit. (CCP § 2017.010.) As such, Plaintiff was entitled to the discovery sought. Defendant’s responses were insufficient. It fails to identify any reason that would make imposing sanctions unjust and its actions do not appear to be substantially justified. As such, sanctions are awarded. The amount of sanctions sought by Plaintiff appears excessive. Sanctions are granted in the amount of $1,260.00 (3 hours x $400 + $60) payable to Plaintiff within 30 days of this order becoming final.

7. CASE # CASE NAME HEARING NAME MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANT DHSE, INC. TO PROVIDE FURTHER RESPONSES, WITHOUT OBJECTION, CVPS2507128 SHANNON VS DHSE, INC. SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES SET TWO (C,C.P. SEC. 2030.300) BY JENNIFER SHANNON Tentative Ruling: Granted.

Responding Defendants to provide further responses to request for production of documents no. 8, 9, 10, 12-28, and 30 within 30 days of this order.

Moving party to provide notice pursuant to CCP 1019.5.

Jennfier Shannon (“Plaintiff”) was employed by DHSE, Inc. (“Defendant”) as a General Manager. Defendant owns and operates a hotel and resort. Plaintiff alleges that she was subjected to unwanted sexual harassment by Defendant’s Vice President. She asserts that she complained multiple times about his conduct, but the conduct continued. She contends that she was eventually demoted due to her continued complaints and was eventually constructively terminated.

The complaint alleges the following causes of action: (1) sexual harassment, (2) failure to investigate and prevent discrimination and harassment, (3) retaliation in violation of Government Code § 12940(h), (4) retaliation in violation of Labor Code § 1102.5, (5) wrongful constructive termination of employment in violation of public policy, (6) violation of Labor Code § 226, and (7) violation of Labor Code § 1198.5.

Plaintiff brings these motions seeking to compel further responses to requests for production of documents nos. 8, 9, 10, 12-28, and 30 and special interrogatories nos. 16 and 17. She contends that Defendant’s responses to these requests improperly contain boilerplate objections and the responses to requests for production are inconsistent. She asserts that the requests seek information relevant to this lawsuit. She seeks sanctions in the amount of $3,860 in connection with the motion pertaining to the requests for production and $2,435 in connection with the motion pertaining to the special interrogatories.

In opposition, Defendant contends that Plaintiff has obtained all documents responsive to her requests for production of documents. As such, there is nothing to compel. It asserts code compliant responses have been provided to the special interrogatories.

Motion to Compel Further Response(s)

Meet and Confer: A party seeking to compel further response to special interrogatories and requests for production of documents must meet and confer prior to filing a motion to compel further responses. (CCP §§ 2030.300(b)(1) and 2031.310(b).) A meet and confer requires a “reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion.” (CCP § 2016.040.) A good faith meet and confer attempt requires more than just an attempt to persuade the objector of the error of his or her ways. It requires counsel to talk the matter over, compare their views, consult, and deliberate. (Clemente v. Alegre (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1294.) It requires a serious attempt by the moving party to informally resolve each issue with the responses. (Id. at 1293.)

Here, counsel exchanged multiple emails, which quickly became combative. Not the best look for either counsel. They also engaged in a meet and confer telephone call. (Declaration of Sara Salinas, ¶ 4.) These efforts appear to meet the statutory requirements.

In motions seeking to compel further responses to requests for production of documents, the moving party must establish good cause for the document sought. (CCP § 2031.310(b)(1).) To establish good cause, the moving party must demonstrate relevance and specific facts justifying discovery. (Kirkland v. Superior Court (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98.) The burden to show good cause for production “is met simply by a fact-specific showing of relevance.” (Tbg Ins. Servs. Corp. v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443, 448.) A matter is relevant, “if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement.” (Glenfed Dev. Corp. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117.) Once this requirement has been met, the burden then shifts to the objecting party to substantiate their objections. (Kirkland, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98.)

Special interrogatories nos. 16 and 17 seek the last known address of Rene Liebling and all addresses Rene Liebling had while employed with Defendant. In response to both special interrogatories, Defendant objects on the grounds of privacy. It responds by stating “Rene Liebling is not employed by responding party and is not a party. Her employment files are privileged as described.” Ms. Liebling is alleged to be Defendant’s human resources manager. Plaintiff correctly argues that Ms. Liebling’s address, as a percipient witness, is discoverable. (Puerto v.

Superior Court (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1249-1259.) “[I]t is only under unusual circumstances that the courts restrict discovery of nonparty witnesses’ residential contact information. (Id. at 1254.) No pressing need as to why this information should be withheld has been provided. As such, the objections on the grounds of privacy lack merit. Defendant’s statement in response to special interrogatory 16 that Ms. Liebling is not employed by Defendant is not responsive to the request. This request simply asks Defendant to identify Ms.

Liebling’s last known address. Unlike special interrogatory no. 17, special interrogatory no. 16 is not tied to Ms. Liebling’s employment with Defendant. As such, even if Defendant contends that it did not employ Ms. Liebling, it is required to answer the special interrogatory, if it has said information.

Special interrogatory 17 is tied to Ms. Liebling’s employment with Defendant. However, Defendant’s response appears to be contradictory. It indicates Ms. Liebling is not employed by Defendant and then goes on to assert that her employment files are privilege. It is unclear based on this response whether she was employed or not. Due to this confusion, the motion is granted as to both interrogatories. If Ms. Liebling is not an employee, Defendant can indicate that it does not have said information because she has never been employed. However, if she has been employed, it needs to provide a response to said request.

Sanctions

Plaintiff seeks sanctions. Under CCP §§ 2030.300(d) and 2031.310(h), sanctions must be awarded against the losing party, unless the court finds that doing so would be unjust or the losing party acted with substantial justification.

While it is clear that Defendant does not believe it is a proper party to this lawsuit, a plaintiff is not required to prove her claims in order to be entitled to discovery. (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 550.) A party is allowed to obtain discovery regarding any matter that is not privileged and relevant to the lawsuit. (CCP § 2017.010.) As such, Plaintiff was entitled to the discovery sought. Defendant’s responses were insufficient. It fails to identify any reason that would make imposing sanctions unjust and its actions do not appear to be substantially justified. As such, sanctions are awarded. The amount of sanctions sought by Plaintiff appears excessive. Sanctions are granted in the amount of $1,260.00 (3 hours x $400 + $60) (SEPARATE AND APART FROM SANCTIONS ON PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS) payable to Plaintiff within 30 days of this order becoming final.

8. CASE # CASE NAME HEARING NAME MOTION TO COMPEL BY WELSH VS VOLKSWAGEN CVPS2507164 VOLKSWAGEN GROUP OF AMERICA, GROUP OF AMERICA, INC. INC. Tentative Ruling: Granted.

No opposition filed.

Request for Admissions Set One, Nos. 1-27 are deemed admitted, unless verified responses are served prior to the hearing date of June 2, 2026. However, in either instance, sanctions are