Jaime Morgan vs. Jaclyn Hobbs

CCP § 1987.2(a) states that “[e]xcept as specified in subdivision (c), in making an order pursuant to motion made under subdivision (c) of Section 1987 or under Section 1987.1, the court may in its discretion award the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in making or opposing the motion, including reasonable attorney’s fees, if the court finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification or that one or more of the requirements of the subpoena was oppressive.” (CCP § 1987.2(a).)

Before even addressing the merits of the sanctions request, the Court finds that the motion must be denied because it is untimely. “[A] timely motion for sanctions is required to make these sanctions effective.” (Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd. (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1768, 1788 [motion for sanctions made after trial untimely].) Whether a motion for sanctions is untimely is a matter within the trial court’s discretion. (London v. Dri-Honing Corp. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 999, 1008-1009.) The Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to quash on November 29, 2023. Plaintiff filed the first motion for sanctions over three months later on March 4, 2024. After that motion was dropped for defective service on March 27, 2024, Plaintiff waited until January 16, 2025 to refile the motion, which was 414 days after the underlying motion was

34-2020-00285924-CU-CR-GDS: Jaime Morgan vs. Jaclyn Hobbs 03/11/2025 Hearing on Motion for Sanctions in Department 53

granted. Plaintiff provides no explanation for the extensive delay. The Court therefore exercises its discretion to find that the instant motion is untimely. On that basis alone, the motion is denied.

In addition, the motion fails on the merits. In Plaintiff’s approximately two-page memorandum of points and authorities, Plaintiff contends that she is entitled to monetary sanctions in the amount of $5,910 because the Court granted her motion to quash. Plaintiff asserts that in granting the motion, “the Court found there was no substantial justification for such discovery.” (Mot. 4:23.) The Court’s November 29, 2023, order made no such finding. In fact, the Court concluded that as phrased the subpoena was overbroad because it was not tailored to any specific medical or medical condition or injury. “While a more narrowly tailored subpoena may be appropriate, the instant one which seeks medical and psychiatric records potentially related to any medical and/or mental health condition or treatment is not and the Court will not undertake the task of defining what is appropriate.

As a result, the motion to quash is granted, without prejudice to the Rounsevilles issuing an appropriate subpoena.” (November 29, 2023 Minute Order) Not only did the Court not rule that the discovery was without substantial justification, but the Court recognized that Defendants could still be entitled to request a more limited set of documents. The entire basis for Plaintiff’s motion is contradicted by the Court’s November 29, 2023, order.

As noted above, the Court may award sanctions in connection with a motion to quash if it finds the “motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification or that one or more of the requirements of the subpoena was oppressive.” (CCP § 1987.2(a).) Even if the instant motion was timely, which it is not, Defendants’ opposition to the underlying motion to quash was not opposed in bad faith or without substantial recognition. Again, the Court simply found the subpoena at issue to be overbroad as written and violated Plaintiff’s right to privacy as a result.

But, the Court recognized that Defendants may well be entitled to issue a more narrowly tailored subpoena. Under such circumstances, the Court declines to find that Defendants opposed the motion to quash in bad faith or without substantial justification. Further, Plaintiff makes no argument that the subpoena was oppressive. Thus, even if the Court reached the merits of the sanctions request it would be denied.

Defendants’ request for sanctions pursuant to CCP §§ 128.5, 1987.2, or any of the statutes cited in the opposition is denied. Although the motion was unsuccessful, and even though the motion was untimely, the Court does not find that the motion was without substantial justification or that it was made in bad faith as argued by Defendants. The Court recognizes Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff engaged in bad faith by scheduling the instant hearing during a time when Defendants’ counsel was unavailable as reflected by the notice of unavailability served by counsel.

Defendants cites to Tenderloin Housing Clinic v. Sparks (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 299 for the proposition that purposefully scheduling a matter during that time is sanctionable conduct. “Tenderloin, of course, merely holds that a trial court may impose sanctions against an attorney who conducts litigation in bad faith and solely for the purpose of harassment. There, among other things, the sanctioned attorney purposefully set discovery for times when he knew

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2020-00285924-CU-CR-GDS: Jaime Morgan vs. Jaclyn Hobbs 03/11/2025 Hearing on Motion for Sanctions in Department 53

opposing counsel was on vacation and unavailable in order to gain an unfair tactical advantage in the litigation. Nothing in Tenderloin, however, expressly condones the practice that has grown up around its name. It has simply been made up." (Carl v. Superior Court (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 73, 76.) Defendants’ counsel did not request a continuance of the hearing until February 3, 2025, and then filed the opposition on February 5, 2025. (Halligan Decl. ¶ 25 Exh. D.) Defendants were able to file the opposition, and Defendant’s counsel concedes that there are other attorneys at her firm.

Other than stating that she indicates the most knowledge of the case, there is no showing that another attorney could not appear at any hearing on this matter. (Id. ¶ 26.) In any event. the Court granted Defendants' ex parte application to continue the motion to today's calendar. The Court will not impose sanctions against Plaintiff’s counsel pursuant to Tenderloin.

The motion is denied in its entirety.

The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1312 or further notice is required.