Jaime Morgan vs. Jaclyn Hobbs

Defendants oppose the motion on numerous procedural and substantive grounds. As explained below, while the Court declines to find that the motion should be denied for procedural reasons, the Court must agree with Defendants that Plaintiff has failed to

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identify any grounds on which the quash the subpoenas.

To the extent that Defendants argue that the motion is not timely because Plaintiff failed to serve the deposition officer with notice of a motion to quash at least five days prior to the date for production as required by CCP § 1985.3(g), that argument is rejected. The time limits in CCP § 1985.3(g) are not jurisdictional and do not prevent the Court from entertaining a motion brought after the production date. (Slagle v. Superior Court (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1309, 1312.)

Defendants also argue that service of the motion was improper because Plaintiff served the motion by email despite the fact that they have not consented to electronic service and because the proof of service fails to specify the exact title of the documents served as required by CCP § 1013b. However, the Court finds that Defendants have waived any service defect by opposing the motion on the merits. The Court therefore properly addresses the motion on the merits. (Carlton v. Quint (2000) 77 Cal. App. 4th 690; Reedy v. Bussell (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1272, 1288.)

Defendants also argue that Plaintiff failed to serve the motion on the various other defendants in this action. However, while this is true, the subject subpoenas were issue by Defendants and thus any failure to provide notice to other parties to this action who did not issue the challenged subpoenas is not a basis to deny the motion.

However, as it relates to the merits of the motion, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to set forth any basis on which the Court could quash any of the subject subpoenas.

John Muir Health

Plaintiff argues that Defendants have requested medical and psychiatric records from January 1, 2014, to September 1, 2023 in violation of her right to privacy and the psychotherapist-patient privilege.

The right to privacy in medical records has long been recognized. The right to privacy provided for in Cal. Const., art. I, § 1 may be invoked by a litigant as justification for refusal to answer questions or respond to requests for information that unreasonably intrude on that right. A plaintiff asserting a privacy claim has the burden of establishing each element, specifically: 1. A legally protected privacy interest; 2. A reasonable expectation of privacy; and 3. A serious invasion of the privacy interest. (See, e.g.

Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal. 4th 1) There can be no dispute that the right to privacy encompassed a person’s medical information. “A person’s medical profile is an area of privacy infinitely more intimate, more personal in quality and nature than many areas already judicially recognized and protected.” (Board of Medical Quality Assurance v. Gherardini (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 669, 678.) [disapproved by

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

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Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 557, fn. 8 only to the extent that the case assumed without conducting the Hill analysis that a compelling need is automatically required when a party seeks discovery of private information].) Rather, “[o]nly obvious invasions of interests fundamental to personal autonomy must be supported by a compelling interest.” (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at 557.)

“Although in seeking recovery for physical and mental injuries plaintiffs have unquestionably waived their physician-patient and psychotherapist-patient privileges as to all information concerning the medical conditions which they have put in issue such waiver extends only to information relating to the medical conditions in question, and does not automatically open all of a patient’s past medical history to scrutiny.” (Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 849, emphasis in original; see also In re Lifschutz (1970) 2 Cal. 3d 415, 435 [The scope of the inquiry permitted depends upon the nature of the injuries which the patient-litigant herself has brought before the court].)

Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff has entirely failed to demonstrate that the subject subpoena violates her right to privacy or the psychotherapist-patient privilege. This is so because Plaintiff does not address the specific requests contained in the John Muir Health subpoena. According to Plaintiff, Defendant has requested her medical and psychiatric records from January 1, 2014, to September 1, 2023. Plaintiff’s assertion in this regard is demonstrably false. Rather, that wide date range was contained in the subpoena directed to Organic Psychiatry which the Court indeed quashed in November 2023. However, that language is not contained in the John Muir Health subpoena. Plaintiff’s counsel goes so far as to refer to a subpoena directed to “Organic Psychiatry” in his declaration provided in support of this motion. (Borkowski Decl. ¶ 3.) That subpoena is not at issue here.

Rather, the John Muir Health subpoena request records from specific and narrow timeframe of June 18, 2015, to September 1, 2015. Plaintiff has not addressed these requests at all. According to Defendants, Plaintiff was placed on a medical of mental hold at John Muir during this limited time frame. They argue that these records will prove that their alleged statements regarding Plaintiff were true. To that end, Plaintiff’s seventh cause of action for slander, alleges that Defendants falsely stated that Plaintiff “was not mentally stable and was a drug abuser.” (FAC ¶ 79.)

Plaintiff also alleged Defendants stated Plaintiff “was bipolar and had mental health issues” and “had drug and mental health problems that endangered the children.” (FAC ¶¶ 12, 16.) There are also exhibits attached to the FAC stating “[t]he doctor’s evidence and the drug tests directly refuted the Rounseville’s accusation of drug abuse and mental instability” and that “[t]his information from the treating psychiatrist directly contradicts everything the Rounsevilles tell Ms. Hobbs.” (Id. Exh. C pp. 6, 9.)

By failing to address the actual subpoena at issue, much less the content of the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

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requests in the subpoena, Plaintiff has failed to establish that the subpoena violates her right to privacy. Plaintiff failed to establish that the subject subpoena constitutes an obvious invasion of her privacy such that Defendants were required to show a compelling interest in seeking the records. In the discovery context, information is relevant “if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement. [Citations omitted.] Admissibility is not the test and information, unless privileged, is discoverable if it might reasonably lead to admissible evidence.” (Lipton v.

Superior Court (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1599, 1611-1612 [emphasis in original].) “Any doubts regarding relevance are generally resolved in favor of allowing the discovery.” (Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 98.) Under this standard, the subject records meet the broad test of relevance for discovery given the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint described above.

In addition, Plaintiff failed to show that the subpoena violates the psychotherapistpatient privilege because she has failed again to address the subject subpoena much less show that the requests seek information regarding her medical/mental condition which she has not placed at issue in this action. Rather, Plaintiff merely states some law pertaining to privilege, followed by an assertion that Plaintiff’s confidential communications with her psychotherapist are privileged. Plaintiff fails to supply any evidence that demonstrates that the requested documents do, in fact, include privileged communications.

Plaintiff’s attempt to address certain of the requests in the John Muir Hospital subpoena for the first time in reply is rejected. Nor could Plaintiff supply the required evidence to support any arguments of privilege made for the first time in reply. (San Diego Watercrafts, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 308.) The time to address the correct subpoena and the specific requests in that subpoena was in the moving papers.

The motion is denied as to the John Muir Health subpoena.

Stanislaus and Contra Costa County Sheriff’s Office

Plaintiff devotes approximately three paragraphs arguing that these subpoenas should be quashed. As to the Stanislaus subpoena, Plaintiff argues that Defendants seek all documents related to her for a 24 year period, communications between the parties, and communications with Child Protective Services workers from 2015 to present. Plaintiff asserts that the documents are privileged and would violate her right to privacy and are not relevant.

Plaintiff fails to identify any basis to quash the entire subpoena. First, Plaintiff fails to identify any privilege which would apply to any of the subject requests. Further, she

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fails to discuss in any manner how the documents are protected by her right to privacy. Indeed, Plaintiff does not address the specific requests in the context of any unidentified privilege or a privacy right. Thus, no privilege or privacy right support quashing the entire subpoena. Again, to the extent Plaintiff attempted to address the specific content of any requests, attempted to identify some privilege or articulate a privacy right for the first time in reply, the time to do so was in the moving papers.

As set forth in the opposition, Defendants indicate that they have sought records from the Stanislaus County Sheriff because the records could show that Plaintiff’s minor children were removed form her custody for reasons other than the statements Defendants allegedly made to law enforcement. These records meet the broad relevance definition articulated above. Even assuming that there was a potential issue with respect to the temporal scope of some of the requests, and Plaintiff has not shown one, Plaintiff sought to quash the entire subpoena.

With respect to the Contra Costa subpoena Plaintiff simply states that the same reasons for quashing the Stanislaus subpoena support quashing the Contra Costa subpoena. However, those reasons have been rejected.

The motion is denied as to the Stanislaus County and Contra Costa County Sheriff’s Office subpoenas.

In summary, the motion is denied in its entirety.

Defendants’ request for sanctions pursuant to CCP §§ 128.5, 1987.2, or any of the various discovery statutes cited in the opposition is denied. Although the motion was unsuccessful, and even though the motion cited to an inapplicable subpoena, the Court does not find that the motion was without substantial justification or that is was made in bad faith as argued by Defendants. Alternatively, the Court finds that sanctions under the circumstances would be unjust.

Finally, while Defendants request an order in their opposition that the entities subject to the subpoenas be ordered to produce the requested records within 15 days, that request cannot be granted. Essentially Defendants are requesting an order compelling compliance with the subpoenas. First, affirmative relief cannot be requested in opposition papers. Further, the entities subject to the subpoena were not even served with Defendants’ opposition papers. The Court cannot enter an order compelling one to comply with a subpoena when they have not been served with the papers requesting that order. To the extent that there are issues with respect to the third parties’ compliance with the subpoenas, those issues must be addressed through a motion to compel compliance.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

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The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1312 or further notice is required.