Motion to compel deposition
GRANTED and the court sets aside the dismissal entered on August 27, 2025.
The court sets a Case Management Conference for August 13, 2026 at 1:30 p.m.
Plaintiff to give notice.
103 Doe vs. City of Santa Ana, 24-01405644 Rosie Zilifyan (“Moving Attorney”) moves to be relieved as counsel of record for plaintiff Jane Doe.
The Court notes that no proof of service has been filed with the moving papers. Therefore, it is unclear whether all parties have been properly served. The Court further notes that the moving papers do not have the correct address where the hearing on the motion to be relieved as counsel will be held. Thus, even if the moving papers have been properly and timely served on the client and all parties who have appeared, the notice of motion would be deficient.
In light of the above, the motion to be relieved as counsel is DENIED without prejudice.
Moving Attorney to give notice. 104 Montoya vs. FCA US, LLC., 24-01445674 Defendants, FCA US LLC and Tuttle-Click, Inc. (collectively “Defendants”), move to compel Plaintiff Maria Montoya’s deposition and production of documents pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.450.
In opposition, Plaintiff represents that the parties resolved the issues raised in the motion through further meet and confer efforts, and that Plaintiff has provided deposition availability and agreed to appear for deposition. (Washington Decl., ¶¶ 3-4, Ex. 1.) Plaintiff therefore contends the motion is moot, but does not oppose an order setting a deposition date.
Although the parties appear to have resolved the discovery dispute through further meet and confer efforts, Plaintiff has not yet appeared for deposition. Accordingly, an order compelling Plaintiff’s deposition is appropriate to ensure completion of discovery and avoid further scheduling disputes.
Thus, the motion is GRANTED. Plaintiff is ordered to appear for deposition on a mutually agreed-upon date within 30 days.
Defendants to give notice. 105 Doe vs. Doe 1, 25-01495743 Defendant Nancy Williams moves for a protective order staying all merits discovery pending adjudication of defendant’s Demurrer to plaintiff John WA Doe’s First Amended Complaint (FAC) and permitting only narrowly tailored discovery regarding statute of limitations issues.
Defendant argues that a protective order staying any discovery not related to the statute of limitations on plaintiff’s claims should be stayed pending resolution of the pleadings because allowing discovery into sensitive and private issues when plaintiff’s claims may be time-barred would expose her to unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, undue burden, and undue expense. Defendant argues that it is highly likely that plaintiff discovered the link between his claimed injuries and the alleged abuse years ago when he began therapy in 2000, such that his claims are likely timebarred.
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Defendant cites no authority in support of the request for a stay pending resolution of a demurrer. Indeed, unlike the anti-SLAPP statute, which imposes a stay on discovery after a special motion to strike is filed, the demurrer statutes impose no such stay. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 425.16(g), 430.10, et seq.) Further, a plaintiff is entitled to reasonable discovery even if a demurrer to his or her pleading has been sustained with leave to amend. (See Budget Finance Plan v. Superior Court (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 794, 796-798.) It follows that a plaintiff must be entitled to conduct discovery, within the time limits set forth in Code of Civil Procedure sections 2025.210, 2030.020, and 2031.020, after a demurrer has been filed and before it has been heard.
Moreover, defendant has not supported any claim of unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, undue burden, or expense. While defendant’s counsel asserts