Steven McClean v. Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC, et al.

Anbro Engineering, Inc. (1970) Cal.3d 493, 496.)

II.

Discussion

Section 871.21 provides as follows:

(a) An action covered by Section 871.20 shall be commenced within one year after the expiration of the applicable express warranty. (b) Notwithstanding subdivision (a), an action covered by Section 871.20 shall not be brought later than six years after the date of original delivery of the motor vehicle.

(c) The time periods prescribed in subdivisions (a) and (b) shall be tolled as follows: (1) As provided by tolling requirements prescribed in subdivision (c) of Section 1793.22 of the Civil Code, as applicable. (2) For the time the motor vehicle is out of service by reason of repair for any nonconformity. (3) For the time period after a pre-suit notice is provided to the manufacturer in accordance with Section 871.24, which time period shall not exceed 60 days.

The effective date of section 871.21 was January 1, 2025. Plaintiff filed this lawsuit February 5, 2025.

“Legislation that shortens a limitations period is considered procedural and is applied retroactively to preexisting causes of action, so long as parties are given a reasonable time in which to sue. When necessary to provide a reasonable time to sue, a shortened limitations period may be applied prospectively so that it commences on the effective date of the statute, rather than on the date the cause of action accrued.” (Coachella Valley Mosquito & Vector Control Dist. v. California Pub. Emp. Rels. Bd. (2005) 35 Cal. 4th 1072, 1091–92 [citations omitted].)

In Krusesky v. Baugh (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 562, the appellate court presumed that the Legislature intended a statute shortening the limitations period for a legal malpractice claim to operate prospectively because the statute contained no expression of legislative intent on retroactivity. The court held that the new four-years from occurrence limitations period started on the effective date of the statute. The plaintiff’s claim, filed more than four years after occurrence but less than three years after the effective date of the statute, was timely. (See, also, Baright v. Willis (1984) 151 Cal. App. 3d 303, 308 (Baright); Galdamez v. FCA US, LLC (C.D.Cal. 2026) --- F.Supp.3d ---; 2026 WL 1047004 [retroactive application of section 871.21 denied where plaintiff purchased vehicle on June 10, 2018 but did not file action until April 23, 2025]. 1)

Plaintiff alleges his warranty started on or about December 13, 2017. (FAC, ¶ 7.) Defendants argue that the warranty expired after four years but point to no allegation in the FAC or judicially noticeable fact showing a four-year warranty period. The FAC merely alleges the “warranty contract contained various warranties, including but not limited to the bumper-bumper warranty, powertrain warranty, emission warranty, etc.” (Id.) The expiration of the warranty is not apparent from the face of the FAC. There is no basis for barring the causes of action pursuant to section 871.21, subdivision (a).

Defendants argue that the causes of action are barred by the six-year statute of repose of section 871.21, subdivision (b) as follows: “According to Plaintiff’s own allegations, Plaintiff received the vehicle on December 13, 2017, and therefore needed to initiate this action no later than December 13, 2023.” (Motion, p. 15, lns. 14-15.) No allegation of the FAC or judicially noticeable fact is cited stating the date of original delivery.

1 The California Rules of Court do not prohibit citation to unpublished federal cases, which may properly be cited as persuasive, although not binding, authority. (Landmark Screens, LLC v. Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 238.)

However, based on the warranty date and section 871.22, subdivision (a), Plaintiff appears to have filed this action more than six years after original delivery of the Vehicle. Because there is no evidence of the Legislature’s intent to retroactively apply the statute, the Court finds that the statute is applied prospectively. The shortened statute of limitations of section 871.21 commences on the effective date of the statute rather than on the date the cause of action accrued. Plaintiff filed the action within six years after section 871.21 was enacted so the action was timely filed.

Plaintiff argues that even if the six-year limitations period applies, the period was tolled as alleged in the FAC. Defendants argue that the three bases set forth in section 871.21, subdivision (c) are the only bases for tolling the limitations period and none of them apply.

The Court need not determine whether the bases of tolling enumerated in section 871.21 are exclusive because it finds that the statute may not be applied retroactively to defeat Plaintiff’s claims and because facts supporting tolling pursuant to section 871.21, subdivision (c)(2), i.e., “time the motor vehicle is out of service by reason of repair for any nonconformity,” are alleged in the FAC. (FAC, ¶¶ 9, 10, 11, 12.)

For purposes of demurrer, these facts must be accepted as true and “a demurrer on the ground of the bar of the statute of limitations does not lie where the complaint merely shows that the action may have been barred. It must appear affirmatively that, upon the facts stated, the right of action is necessarily barred.” (Baright, supra, 151 Cal.App.3d at p. 311 [citations omitted.) Defendants point to no allegations in the FAC showing that alleged repair periods were insufficient to toll the claims.

III. RULING

The demurrer is overruled. Defendants shall have ten days from service of notice of this ruling to file and serve an answer to the FAC. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1320, subd. (j)(1).) Plaintiff shall serve notice.

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