KRAMER vs FCA US, LLC, et al.

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver

25CV011403: KRAMER vs FCA US, LLC, et al. 05/26/2026 Hearing on Demurrer (Lemon Law) to Plaintiff's Complaint in Department 16D

and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

TENTATIVE RULING:

*** NOTICE: EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G STREET IN SACRAMENTO, CA. ALL MOTIONS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 53 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 16D OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. ALL PAPERS FOR THIS DEPARTMENT MUST BE FILED AT THIS NEW LOCATION AND WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED AT THE HALL OF JUSTICE. ALL HEARINGS WILL TAKE PLACE AT THIS NEW LOCATION. PARTIES MAY CONTINUE TO APPEAR REMOTELY IN DEPARTMENT 16D UNLESS SPECIFICALLY ORDERED OTHERWISE. ***

*** The Court finds in its file no proof of service demonstrating moving defendant’s service of the Notice of Disclosure issued on 8/11/2025, despite being directed to serve all other parties with the Notice of Disclosure “forthwith.” Moving defendant is directed to serve the Notice of Disclosure on all other parties forthwith and to file proof of service within five (5) court days. ***

The notice of demurrer does not provide notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system, as required by Local Rule 1.06. Moving counsel is directed to contact opposing counsel and advise him/her of Local Rule 1.06 and the Court’s tentative ruling procedure and the manner to request a hearing. If moving counsel is unable to contact opposing counsel prior to the hearing, moving counsel is ordered to appear at the hearing in person, by Zoom or by telephone.

Defendant FCA US, LLC’s (“FCA”) demurrer to plaintiff Kramer’s Complaint is ruled upon as follows.

*** If oral argument is requested, the parties must at the time oral argument is requested notify the clerk and opposing counsel which of the two causes of action challenged by this demurrer and which of the various grounds for this demurrer that will be addressed at the hearing. Counsel are also reminded that pursuant to local rules, only limited oral argument is permitted on law and motion matters. ***

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25CV011403: KRAMER vs FCA US, LLC, et al. 05/26/2026 Hearing on Demurrer (Lemon Law) to Plaintiff's Complaint in Department 16D

Factual Background

In this “lemon law” action filed on 5/9/2025, plaintiff alleges he purchased a 2021 Dodge Charger in August 2021 with various defects including but not limited to the engine, transmission, and electrical systems.

Defendant FCA now demurs to plaintiff’s fourth cause of action for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability on the grounds it is barred by the statute of limitations and by the lack of privity. (Dem., p.2:8-12.) Defendant FCA also demurs the sixth cause of action for fraudulent inducement-concealment on the grounds it is barred by the statute of limitations; is inadequately pled; fails to establish a duty to disclose, materiality and justifiable reliance; and is barred by the Economic Loss Doctrine (“ELD”). (Id., at p.2:8- 18.)

Plaintiff has filed no opposition or other written objection to the present demurrer.

Legal Standards for Demurrer

A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the pleadings, raising issues of law, not fact, regarding the form or content of the opposing party’s pleading. (Code Civ. Proc. §§422.10, 589.) A demurrer may only challenge defects on the face of the complaint or from matters that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) However, the face of the complaint includes facts contained in exhibits attached to the complaint. (Frantz v. Blackwell (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 91, 94.) A demurrer can be utilized where a complaint itself is incomplete or discloses some defense that would bar recovery. (Guardian North Bay, Inc. v. Superior Court (Myers) (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 963, 971-972.)

In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint against a general demurrer, courts treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. Matters which may be judicially noticed may also be considered. The complaint is to be given a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context. (Farmers v. Zerin (1997) 53 CaI.App.4th 445, 451.) Consideration of extrinsic evidence or facts asserted in the memorandum supporting or opposing the demurrer is improper. (Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.)

A demurrer may be sustained only if the complaint lacks any sufficient allegations to entitle the plaintiff to relief. (Financial Corp. of America v. Wilburn (1987) 189 Cal. App. 3d 764, 778.) “Plaintiff need only plead facts showing that he may be entitled to some relief, we are not concerned with plaintiff’s possible inability or difficulty in proving the

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allegations of the complaint.” (Highlanders, Inc. v. Olsan (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 690, 696-697.) “[Courts] are required to construe the complaint liberally to determine whether a cause of action has been stated, given the assumed truth of the facts pleaded.” (Picton v. Anderson Union High School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726, 733.) Still, the plaintiff has the burden of showing that the facts pleaded are sufficient to establish every element of the cause of action. (See, e.g. Martin v. Bridgeport Community Assn., Inc. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1024, 1031; Sui v. Price (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 933, 938.) The allegations must be factual and specific, not vague or conclusionary. (Rakestraw v. California Physicians’ Service (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 39, 43–44.)

A demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pled and the sole issue raised by a general demurrer is whether the facts pled state a valid cause of action - not whether they are true. (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591.) Finally, a demurrer may only be sustained where it disposes of an entire cause of action. (See, e.g., Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119.)

Discussion

At the outset, the Court acknowledges that plaintiff did not filed any opposition or other written objection to the present demurrer but this demurrer will nevertheless be overruled because defendant FCA has for the reasons explained below failed to satisfy its initial burden regardless of the lack of opposition on file. However, plaintiff and his counsel are admonished that the failure to file an opposition to any demurrer/motion in the future may result in the Court summarily granting the relief sought as unopposed.

Fourth Cause of Action. As noted above, defendant FCA demurs to this cause of action for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability on the grounds it is barred by the statute of limitations and by the lack of privity. (Dem., p.2:8-12.)

A. Statute of Limitations. According to defendant FCA, the Song-Beverly Act limits a claim based on implied warranties to no more than one year from the purchase date (citing inter alia Civil Code §1791.1(c) and Mexia v. Rinker Boat Co., Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1297) and since the complaint alleges plaintiff purchased the subject vehicle on 8/28/2021, the one-year period expired on 8/28/2022, long before this action was commenced on 5/9/2025. Defendant further asserts that plaintiff must also allege specific facts demonstrating the claimed defects not only existed but also caused harm during the one-year implied warranty period but the complaint does not do so.

Defendant FCA’s demurrer based on a one-year statute of limitations is overruled. Contrary to defendant’s suggestion, the Mexia decision explains that Civil Code

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25CV011403: KRAMER vs FCA US, LLC, et al. 05/26/2026 Hearing on Demurrer (Lemon Law) to Plaintiff's Complaint in Department 16D

§1791.1(c) merely established the “duration of the implied warranty of merchantability” but then clarifies that the Song-Beverly Act does not include its own statute of limitations. (Mexia, at 1304-1305.) The Fourth District Court of Appeal then stated in pertinent part:

California courts have held that the statute of limitations for an action for breach of warranty under the Song-Beverly Act is governed by the same statute that governs the statute of limitations for warranties arising under the California Uniform Commercial Code: section 2725 of the California Uniform Commercial Code. [Citations.] Under this statute, “(1) An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within four years after the cause of action has accrued. [¶] (2) A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party’s lack of knowledge of the breach.

A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered.” [Citations.]

C. Rinker and Miller’s Statute of Limitations Argument

In support of its demurrer before the trial court, Rinker and Miller argued that the duration provision of the Song-Beverly Act constitutes a one-year statute of limitations for breach of implied warranty claims. Because Mexia commenced this action more than one year after purchasing the boat, defendants asserted, his action is barred. The trial court apparently accepted this argument and sustained the demurrer.

Rinker and Miller do not repeat the same argument on appeal. They now concede that the statute of limitations for an action for breach of warranty under the Song-Beverly Act is four years pursuant to section 2725 of the California Uniform Commercial Code. [Citations.] Under that statute, a cause of action for breach of warranty accrues, at the earliest, upon tender of delivery. [Citation.] Thus, the earliest date the implied warranty of merchantability regarding Mexia’s boat could have accrued was the date Mexia purchased it -- April 12, 2003. Because he filed this action three years seven months after that date, he did so within the four-year limitations period. Therefore, Mexia’s action is not barred by a statute of limitations. (Mexia, at 1305-1306 (underline added for emphasis).)

In light of the foregoing, this Court rejects FCA’s assertion that this fourth cause of action is subject to a one-year limitations period and instead holds that it is governed by

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25CV011403: KRAMER vs FCA US, LLC, et al. 05/26/2026 Hearing on Demurrer (Lemon Law) to Plaintiff's Complaint in Department 16D

a four-year limitations period which commences upon discovery of the alleged breach. Because this action was commenced within four years of the subject vehicle’s purchase on 8/28/2021, the present demurrer based on the statute of limitations must be overruled and the Court need not address defendant FCA’s remaining argument that plaintiff failed to allege that the claimed vehicle defects caused any harm during the one-year period following the vehicle’s 8/28/2021 purchase.

B. Lack of Privity. Defendant FCA challenges plaintiff’s cause of action for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability on the ground that there is no contractual privity between plaintiff and defendant FCA. (Dem., p.2:12.) More specifically, according to defendant FCA, “Plaintiff does not and cannot allege that FCA was a party to the sales contract or had any involvement in negotiating or completing the transaction” and “This lack of a direct transactional relationship bars Plaintiff’s implied warranty claim,” citing Clemens v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (9th Cir. 2008) 534 F.3d 1017, 1023. (Mov. MPA, p.11:28-p.12:9.)

Defendant FCA’s demurrer based on the lack of contractual privity between plaintiff and FCA must be overruled insofar as Paragraph 7 of the complaint expressly alleges that plaintiff “entered into a warranty contract with Defendant FCA regarding a 2021 Dodge Charger which was manufactured and or distributed by Defendant FCA.” This allegation must be accepted as true for purposes of this demurrer and is on its face sufficient to establish the existence of a direct contractual relationship between plaintiff and FCA itself. Consequently, the demurrer on the second ground of lack of contractual privity is overruled.

Sixth Cause of Action. Defendant FCA demurs this cause of action for fraudulent inducement-concealment on several grounds. ”). (Dem., p.2:8-18.) Each of these will be addressed in turn.

A. Statute of Limitations. Defendant FCA first argues that this fraud cause of action is barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations found in Code of Civil Procedure §338(d) because (1) plaintiff alleges in Paragraphs 65-71 that FCA concealed material facts about the vehicle’s alleged defects, intending to induce him into purchasing it and (2) all elements of the concealment claim were complete and actionable at the time of the sale, thereby triggering the commencement of the threeyear statute of limitations on the date plaintiff took delivery of the vehicle. (Mov. MPA, p.12:13-19.) In short, in the absence of specific allegations to support tolling, the statute of limitations began to run on 8/28/2021 and expired on 8/28/2024, well before this action was filed on 5/9/2025, making this fraudulent concealment claim facially timebarred. (Id., at p.12:20-23.)

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25CV011403: KRAMER vs FCA US, LLC, et al. 05/26/2026 Hearing on Demurrer (Lemon Law) to Plaintiff's Complaint in Department 16D

Defendant FCA’s demurrer based on the three-year statute of limitations is overruled because the allegations in Paragraphs 65-71 that the vehicle was defective in various respects; defendant FCA had a duty to disclose such defects; plaintiff could have reasonably have discovered such defects prior to purchase of the vehicle; the concealed information is material to a reasonable person deciding whether to purchase a vehicle; plaintiff would not have purchased the vehicle if the concealed information had been known; and plaintiff suffered harm by purchasing the defective vehicle does not, without more, necessarily or affirmatively establish when this cause of action for fraud accrued.

When and how a plaintiff should have reasonably become aware that FCA concealed facts and/or defects at the time of purchase is a question of fact which ordinarily cannot be determined at the pleading stage and resolution of a statute of limitations issue is typically a question of fact. (See, e.g., Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 810.) Further, “[a] demurrer based on a statute of limitations will not lie where the action may be, but is not necessarily, barred. In order for the bar of the statute of limitations to be raised by demurrer, the defect must clearly and affirmatively appear on the face of the complaint; it is not enough that the complaint shows that the action may be barred.” (Guardian North Bay, Inc. v.

Superior Court (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 963, 971-972 [citation omitted].) Because the defect of the statute of limitations does not appear on the face of the complaint, FCA’s demurrer on this basis fails and thus, this Court need not address defendant’s additional arguments about why plaintiff failed to allege facts sufficient to invoke tolling of the statute of limitations under the discovery rule, the repair doctrine, class action tolling, equitable estoppel, etc.

B. Heightened Specificity for Fraud. Defendant FCA’s demurrer on this ground appears to consist of three separate components. First, FCA contends fraud must be pleaded with particularity and include allegations the “who, what, when, where, and how” of the alleged misconduct (citing Stansfield v. Starkey (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 59, 73) and that when the fraud is alleged against a corporation, plaintiff must also identify “the names of the persons who made the allegedly fraudulent representations, their authority to speak, to whom they spoke, what they said or wrote, and when it was said or written” (citing Tarmann v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 153, 157) but the complaint at issue here provides none of this requisite detail. (Mov. Memo. P&A, p.14:14-24.)

Separate and distinct different from a claim for misrepresentation, a claim based on fraudulent concealment requires the plaintiff to show (1) the defendant concealed or suppressed a material fact, (2) the defendant had a duty to disclose the fact, (3) the defendant intentionally concealed or suppressed the fact with the intent to defraud, (4) the plaintiff was unaware of the fact and would not have acted as s/he did if he had known of the concealed or suppressed fact, and (5) as a result of the concealment or

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25CV011403: KRAMER vs FCA US, LLC, et al. 05/26/2026 Hearing on Demurrer (Lemon Law) to Plaintiff's Complaint in Department 16D

suppression of the fact, the plaintiff sustained damage. (See, e.g., Prakashpalan v. Engstrom, Lipscomb & Lack (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1130.)

Although in California fraud must generally be pleaded with factual particularity, this general rule requiring a heightened degree of specificity is less applicable to cases which involve nondisclosure. After all, how does a plaintiff describe “how” and “by what means” something did not happen, or “when” it never happened, or “where” it never happened? (See, e.g., Alfaro v. Community Housing Improvement System & Planning Assn., (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1384.) Moreover, “[e]ven under the strict rules of common law pleading, one of the canons was that less particularity is required when the facts lie more in the knowledge of the opposite party than of the party pleading.” (Turner v.

Milstein (1951) 103 Cal.App.2d 651, 658.) In short, a plaintiff asserting a concealment theory will “not be able to specify the time, place, and specific content of an omission as precisely as would a plaintiff in a false representation claim” and thus, such a claim “can succeed without the same level of specificity required by a normal fraud claim.” (See, e.g., Falk v. GMC (N.D. Cal. 2007) 496 F.Supp.2d 1088, 1098- 1099.) The specificity rule is relaxed in actions premised on concealment or nondisclosure, as they are inherently different from those based on affirmative misrepresentations. (See, e.g., Jones v.

ConocoPhillips Co. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1187, 1199-1200.)

Here, given that plaintiff is alleging fraud not based on any affirmative misrepresentations but rather only concealment of defects claimed to exist, a relaxed pleading standard is appropriate here. (Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 214; Turner, supra, 103 Cal.App.2d 651, 658 [“If, in truth, Milstein concealed from plaintiff the fact that the property was to be sold, he knows it and he knows the time and place of concealment, if there was a time and place.

It would seem that concealment is negative and that it would occur without any time or place. Milstein knows the facts.”].) Thus, FCA’s contention that plaintiff failed to adequately allege the “who, what, when, where, and how” simply miss the mark and notably, neither of the two authorities on which defendant FCA relies (i.e., Stansfield and Tarmann) involved a fraudulent concealment claim such as the one alleged in the case at bar addressed. Instead, both of these decisions addressed claims for affirmative misrepresentations of facts, which claims are subject to pleading requirements different from claims for fraudulent concealment.

Defendant FCA next argues that plaintiff’s allegations based on “information and belief” are insufficient because this form of pleading “suggests speculation rather than factual allegations.” (Mov. Memo. P&A, p.14:25-p.15:5.) The moving papers indicate that the allegations in Paragraphs 16, 18-20 and 67(a) are all premised on “information and belief.” (Id., at p.14:28; p.15:1.) The Court is not persuaded the use of “information and

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25CV011403: KRAMER vs FCA US, LLC, et al. 05/26/2026 Hearing on Demurrer (Lemon Law) to Plaintiff's Complaint in Department 16D

belief” allegations in Paragraphs 16, 18-20 and 67(a) render this fraud cause of action vulnerable to demurrer here. Notably, Paragraphs 16, 18-20 and 67(a) each relate to plaintiff’s claim that defendant FCA knew before plaintiff’s 8/28/2021 purchase the subject vehicle had one or more defects, the sources of such knowledge, and the failure to disclose or otherwise conceal such defects. While such allegations could certainly have been made without the “information and belief” language, the inclusion of this language does not in this Court’s view “suggest[s] speculation rather than factual allegations,” but instead merely an acknowledgement that further investigation and/or discovery will be needed to prove such allegations.

This, of course, is true in most cases as a plaintiff is required to plead his/her claims before being permitted to conduct investigation and discovery necessary to prove the claims alleged. Finally, although the moving papers cite a variety of court decisions claimed to show the insufficiency of the fraud allegations in the case at bar (see generally, Mov. Memo. P&A, p.15:6-p.16:11), none of these authorities is binding on this Court (with most being authored by courts sitting outside the State of California).

Defendant FCA’s final contention is that plaintiff failed to allege facts showing the former either “ignored unambiguous data or intentionally concealed material defects” from him. (Mov. Memo. P&A, p.16:20-21.) This contention, however, ignores the express allegations in several paragraphs including the following:

18. Plaintiff is informed, believes, and thereon alleges that prior to Plaintiff acquiring the Vehicle, FCA was well aware and knew that the Vehicle was defective but failed to disclose this fact to Plaintiff at the time of sale and thereafter.

20. Plaintiff is informed, believes, and thereon alleges that while FCA knew about the Engine Defect, and its safety risks since prior to Plaintiff purchasing the Subject Vehicle, FCA nevertheless concealed and failed to disclose the defective nature of the Vehicle and its Engine Defect to its sales representatives and Plaintiff at the time of sale and thereafter. FCA omitted mention of the Engine Defect to its consumers.

68. In failing to disclose the defects in the Vehicle's Engine, FCA has knowingly and intentionally concealed material facts and breached its duty to do so. (Compl., ¶¶18, 20, 68 (underline added for emphasis).)

These allegations must be accepted as true for purposes of this demurrer and accordingly, defendant FCA’s suggestion that plaintiff failed to allege FCA either “ignored unambiguous data or intentionally concealed material defects” lacks merit.

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25CV011403: KRAMER vs FCA US, LLC, et al. 05/26/2026 Hearing on Demurrer (Lemon Law) to Plaintiff's Complaint in Department 16D

Finding no merit to any of defendant’s three challenges to the sufficiency of the complaint’s fraud allegations, defendant FCA’s demurrer to the fraud cause of action on such grounds is overruled.

C. Duty to Disclose. Relying largely on Bigler-Engler v. Breg, Inc. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 276 and LiMandri v. Judkins (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 326, defendant FCA next demurs to the fraud cause of action on the ground the complaint fails to establish any “direct dealings” giving rise to a duty on the part of FCA to disclose the alleged defects. (Mov. Memo. P&A, p.17:2-18.)

First, while it may be true that plaintiff did not purchase the subject vehicle directly from FCA, Paragraph 7 of the complaint explicitly alleges that on or about 8/28/2021 he “entered into a warranty contract with Defendant FCA regarding a 2021 Dodge Charger which was manufactured and[/]or distributed by Defendant FCA.” This allegation must be accepted as true for purposes of this demurrer and the existence of a “warranty contract” between plaintiff and FCA is sufficient, in this Court’s view, to establish “direct dealings” between these two parties. Accordingly, FCA’s suggestion that the complaint fails to establish the existence of any “direct dealings” between plaintiff and FCA is meritless.

Second, as this Court has repeatedly explained in connection with demurrers in other “lemon law” cases, no “transactional relationship” between a vendor and subsequent purchasers is necessary to bring a fraudulent concealment-inducement claim because a vendor has a duty to disclose material facts not only to immediate purchasers, but to subsequent purchasers when the vendor has reason to know that the subject product will be resold. (See, e.g., OCM Principal Opportunities Fund v. CIBC World Markets Corp. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 835, 859-860.)

This is also alleged in the present complaint and thus, FCA’s demurrer misses the mark for this reason as well. Moreover, the Bigler-Engler opinion on which FCA primarily relies is factually distinguishable insofar as it arose from the use of an allegedly defective medical device which was prescribed for a patient by a doctor and the issues on appeal were limited to the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial, without any question bearing on the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s allegations. (Bigler-Engler, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at 284-285, 312-313.)

For this reason as well, the Court finds FCA’s demurrer based on the absence of “direct dealings” to be without merit.

Moreover, the requirement of “direct dealings” between plaintiff and FCA must be rejected because the Song-Beverly Act treats a manufacturer and its representatives in “this state” or “agents” as a single entity. (See, e.g., Ibrahim v. Ford Motor Co. (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 878, 889.) Thus, the current allegations are sufficient to show that defendant FCA was aware the subject vehicle would be sold on the open market and

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25CV011403: KRAMER vs FCA US, LLC, et al. 05/26/2026 Hearing on Demurrer (Lemon Law) to Plaintiff's Complaint in Department 16D

also that defendant FCA had a contractual warranty relationship with plaintiff, thereby defeating FCA’s claim that no “direct dealings” giving rise to a duty to disclose has been alleged.

In light of the preceding paragraphs and the complaint’s allegations confirming the existence of “direct dealings” between plaintiff and defendant FCA, the latter’s demurrer to the sixth cause of action is overruled and the Court need not address FCA’s additional arguments relating to (1) FCA not having “exclusive knowledge” of the alleged defects; (2) FCA’s “data collection and warranty provision;” and/or (3) “dealership employees” not being agents of defendant FCA. (Mov. Memo. P&A, p.17:19-p.20:3.)

D. Economic Loss Doctrine. Defendant FCA’s final assertion is that plaintiff’s fraud cause of action is barred by the ELD insofar as he “seeks purely economic damages arising from the purchase of the Subject Vehicle,” which is alleged to have “only de minimis value” and for which he requests restitution.” (Mov. Memo. P&A, p.20:5-7.) Defendant cites Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. v. Dana Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 979 for the proposition that where a purchaser’s expectations are frustrated because the product bought is not working properly, the remedy is in contract alone since only ‘economic’ losses have been suffered and in such cases, the ELD operates to bar tort claims including for fraudulent concealment. (Id., at p.20:7-14.)

FCA also cites Rattagan v. Uber Techs., Inc. (2024) 17 Cal.5th 1 for the proposition that fraudulent concealment claims are permitted only where the concealed information exposes the plaintiff to risks or harms beyond the reasonable contemplation of the contractual relationship but in the case at bar, there is no allegation of any “independent harm” which operates “to bypass the ELD.” (Id., at p.20:15-22.)

This Court is not persuaded by defendant FCA’s arguments premised on the ELD and thus, the demurrer on this ground is overruled as well. First, according to longstanding California Supreme Court precedent, the ELD does not apply to a claim where, as here, the underlying contract is alleged to have been fraudulently induced. (See, e.g., Robinson Helicopter Co., supra, 34 Cal.4th at 989-900; Erlich v. Menzes (1999) 21 Cal.4th 543, 551-552 [citing Las Palmas Associates v. Las Palmas Center Associates (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1220, 1238-1239.) In Robinson Helicopter, the California Supreme Court stated in pertinent part:

We went on to describe several instances where tort damages were permitted in contract cases. Tort damages have been permitted in contract cases where a breach of duty directly causes physical injury [citation]; for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in insurance contracts [citation]; for wrongful discharge in violation of fundamental public policy [citation]; or where the

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25CV011403: KRAMER vs FCA US, LLC, et al. 05/26/2026 Hearing on Demurrer (Lemon Law) to Plaintiff's Complaint in Department 16D

contract was fraudulently induced. [Citation.]” (Erlich v. Menzes, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 551-552.) “[I]n each of these cases, the duty that gives rise to tort liability is either completely independent of the contract or arises from conduct which is both intentional and intended to harm. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 552; see also Harris v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 70, 78 [“when one party commits a fraud during the contract formation or performance, the injured party may recover in contract and tort”].) (Robinson Helicopter Co., supra, 34 Cal.4th at 989-900 (underline added for emphasis).)

Thus, the Supreme Court expressly recognized the existing exception to the ELD where a contract is fraudulently induced and did nothing to abridge that existing rule. In the case at bar, plaintiff expressly alleged defendant FCA fraudulently induced him to purchase the subject vehicle and concurrently enter into a warranty contract by failing to disclose and/or concealing material facts concerning various vehicle defects which defendant FCA had a duty to disclose. Accordingly, the ELD does not bar plaintiff’s cause of action for fraudulent inducement-concealment.

Defendant FCA’s reliance on the more recent decision of Rattagan fares no better. In Rattagan, the California Supreme Court concluded that a plaintiff may assert a cause of action for fraudulent concealment based on conduct occurring in the course of a contractual relationship provided that (1) the elements of the claim can be established independently of the parties’ contractual rights and obligations and (2) the defendant’s tortious conduct exposes the plaintiff to a risk of harm beyond the reasonable contemplation of the parties when they entered into the contract. (Rattagan v.

Uber Techs., Inc., supra, 17 Cal.5th at 13. Notably, the moving papers nowhere appear to argue that plaintiff did not and/or cannot plead each element of a claim for fraudulent concealment independent of the contractual relationship (i.e., the warranty contract) explicitly alleged in Paragraph 7 and thus, plaintiff has satisfied the first of Rattagan’s two prerequisites. This Court finds that the second prerequisite is likewise satisfied insofar as Paragraph 17 alleges the subject vehicle’s “Engine Defect is a safety concern because it can suddenly affect the driver’s ability to control the vehicle or cause a noncollision vehicle fire” and further, that “the Engine Defect can cause the vehicle to fail without warning, while the Vehicle is moving at highway speeds.” This allegation, which must be accepted as true for purposes of this demurrer, is sufficient to establish that defendant FCA’s allegedly tortious conduct exposes plaintiff to a serious risk of physical harm, and possibly death, which is fairly construed as being “beyond the reasonable contemplation of the parties when they entered into the contract.” Accordingly, Rattagan does not advance defendant FCA’s assertion that plaintiff’s fraudulent concealment claim is barred by the ELD.

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25CV011403: KRAMER vs FCA US, LLC, et al. 05/26/2026 Hearing on Demurrer (Lemon Law) to Plaintiff's Complaint in Department 16D

In light of the foregoing and coupled with the fact that none of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decisions cited on Page 21 is binding on this Court, defendant FCA’s demurrer to the fraudulent concealment claim based on the ELD is overruled.

Disposition

For the reasons explained above, defendant FCA’s demurrer to the complaint is OVERRULED in its entirety.

If not already done, Defendant FCA shall file and serve an answer to the complaint no later than 6/9/2026.

Moving defendant to provide notice of this ruling and file proof of service of same within five (5) court days.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc. §1019.5; CRC Rule 3.1312.)