Bruno Silva v. Kyle Billingsley

Code of Civil Procedure section 436 permits a court to strike: (1) “any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading”; and (2) “all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” As with demurrers, the grounds for a motion to strike must “appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437.) “In ruling on a motion to strike, the allegations in the complaint are considered in context and presumed to be true.” (Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2025) ¶ 7:197.5.)

II. Res Judicata/Claim Preclusion

Billingsley submits evidence that Silva was evicted from the property for failure to pay rent. The Court grants Billingsley’s request for judicial notice of the court file in San Luis Obispo County Superior Court, Case No. 25LC-0641 (UD Action). In his answer in the UD Action, Silva asserted

as defenses that “[Billingsley] Failed to Provide Habitable Home Situation” and “No 24Hr Notice.” (UD Action Answer, ¶ 2.b.(1)(a).) Silva also asserted the following defenses in the UD Action:

Property in current code violations Landlord doesn’t care to maintain property Driveway unfinished for months Mailbox was verified (no mail) Crater problems creates mosquitos, rats, still water

(UD Action Answer, ¶ 3t.) Photographs submitted as attachments to Silva’s answer in the UD Action are also submitted in this action and depict the same conditions Silva raised in defense of the UD Action.

The UD Action was tried before the Court on July 8, 2025, and after trial the Court entered judgment for Billingsley and against Silva for possession and for $10,000 in past due rent and $4,560 in hold-over rent and costs. (UD Action, Amended Judgment dated 7/24/26.)

Code of Civil Procedure section 1908 codifies the res judicata doctrine and provides that “a judgment or final order in an action or special proceeding” is conclusive as to “the matter directly adjudged.” (Id., subd. (a)(2).) “Res judicata, or claim preclusion, prevents relitigation of the same cause of action in a second suit between the same parties or parties in privity with them.” (Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 888, 896–897.) The doctrine applies when (1) the issues decided in the prior adjudication are identical with those presented in the later action; (2) there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior action; and (3) the party against whom the plea is raised was a party or was in privity with a party to the prior adjudication. (Pollock v.

University of Southern California (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1416, 1427.) The party asserting issue preclusion bears the burden of establishing these requirements. (Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 341.)

Where a tenant asserts claims and defenses against his landlord in answer to an unlawful detainer complaint and the unlawful detainer action is tried and judgment entered, the tenant’s claims and defenses are fully determined. The tenant is precluded from raising those issues in a later action against the landlord. (Needelman v. DeWolf Realty Co. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 750, 757.)

Here, the issues underlying Silva’s complaint and FAC were raised in the UD Action and finally determined by the Court. Silva is precluded from asserting claims against Billingsley arising from lack of habitability or failing to give notice before entering the rental.

III. Causes of Action Alleged in FAC

A complaint must contain “[a] statement of the facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.10, subd. (a)(1).) “[T]he complaint ordinarily is sufficient if it alleges ultimate rather than evidentiary facts.” (Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007)

42 Cal.4th 531, 550.) This distinction is generally made by a determination of whether allegations set forth facts with “particularity sufficient to acquaint a defendant with the nature, source and extent of [the plaintiff’s] cause of action.” (Thomas v. Regents of Univ. of California (2023) 97 Cal. App. 5th 587, 610–11 [citations omitted].)

Courts do not, however, accept contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. Further, although courts permit some latitude in a pleading’s description of the defendant’s conduct, courts “are not bound to respect a pleader’s ‘legal characterization’ of events or transactions.” (O'Grady v. Merchant Exchange Productions, Inc. (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 771, 776–777.)

Although California courts take a liberal view of inartfully drawn complaints, “[i]t remains essential ... that a complaint set forth the actionable facts relied upon with sufficient precision to inform the defendant of what plaintiff is complaining, and what remedies are being sought.” (Signal Hill Aviation Co. v. Stroppe (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 627, 636.)

Silva’s FAC replaced his complaint, although it appears Silva believes the FAC simply added to the complaint. (FAC, p. 7 [“adding to complaint two more causes of action....”].) The FAC states the words “negligence, breach of contract and fraud” (FAC, p. 7), but includes only two causes of action for breach of contract and fraud. The form negligence cause of action attached to the original complaint is not part of the FAC.

The elements necessary to state a breach of contract cause of action are (1) the existence of the contract, (2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant’s breach, and (4) the resulting damage to the plaintiff. (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 821.) “If the action is based on alleged breach of a written contract, the terms must be set out verbatim in the body of the complaint or a copy of the written agreement must be attached and incorporated by reference.” (Harris v. Rudin, Richman & Appel (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 299, 307.)

Boxes are checked on the form Fraud Cause of Action stating the agreement is written and oral and the written agreement is attached as Exhibit 5B, but there are no attachments nor are the terms of a written or oral agreement alleged. (FAC, p. 4.) The allegations fail to state a breach of contract cause of action.

The box on the form Fraud Cause of Action in the FAC for promise without intent to perform is checked. Silva alleges Billingsley made two promises: (1) to verify the address of the rental property mailbox and (2) to fix the driveway. (FAC, p. 6.)

Civil Code section 1709 provides, “One who willfully deceives another with intent to induce him to alter his position to his injury or risk, is liable for any damage which he thereby suffers.” Deceit is “[a] promise, made without any intention of performing it.” (Civ. Code § 1710, subd. 4.)

To assert a promissory fraud cause of action a complaint must allege (1) the defendant made a representation of intent to perform some future action and (2) the defendant did not intend to perform the promise at the time it was made. (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631,

639.) Pleading the false promise requires allegations of “facts which ‘show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.’” (Id. at 645 [citations omitted].)

There are no allegations in the FAC as to how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the promises were tendered. In California, fraud must be pled specifically; general and conclusory allegations do not suffice. (Stansfield v. Starkey (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 59, 74. The FAC does not state a fraud cause of action.

IV. Motion to Strike

Billingsley seeks to strike punitive damages from the FAC. Punitive damages are governed by Civil Code section 3294, which permits such damages in actions for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract when there is clear and convincing evidence that the defendant engaged in oppression, fraud, or malice. Each of these terms carries distinct statutory definitions: “fraud” means an intentional misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact made with intent to injure or willful conscious disregard of others’ rights; “malice” includes conduct intended to cause injury or despicable conduct with willful disregard; and “oppression” involves despicable conduct causing cruel and unjust hardship.

The FAC does not allege facts stating a fraud cause of action and does not allege facts showing Billingsley acted with oppression or malice.

Billingsley also seeks to strike the claim for attorney fees. However, the box stating that the plaintiff is entitled to attorney fees is not checked on the FAC, although the box stating “according to proof” is checked. (FAC, p. 4.) The FAC does not seek recovery of attorney fees, but the check mark on the “according to proof” box should be stricken.

Finally, Billingsley seeks to strike the phrase “violation of civil rights” from the FAC. There are no allegations of a civil rights violation and the phrase should be stricken from the FAC.

V. Ruling

The demurrer to the FAC is sustained without leave to amend because the issues alleged in the FAC arise from facts Silva asserted as defenses in the UD Action which were fully litigated between these parties and adjudicated against Silva.

The motion to strike punitive damages, attorney fees, and the phrase “violation of civil rights” is granted without leave to amend.

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