Cristina Araujo, et al. v. Salinas Valley Memorial Healthcare System

vaccination order. [Defense Fact 1.] In its Amended Answer, SVH asserted Section 855.4 immunity as its 21st Affirmative Defense. [Answer, filed 10/17/25, at 6:15-17.]

On August 5, 2021, the California Department of Public Health (“CDPH”) issued an order requiring all healthcare workers in California to be fully vaccinated by September 30, 2021, as an important and necessary step in preventing the spread of COVID-19. [Defense Fact 5.] Based on its comprehensive review of relevant factors, including an examination of medical literature and studies, SVH implemented a vaccine mandate requiring all employees to be vaccinated. [Defense Fact 6.]

Employees who refused the vaccine were terminated as of October 1, 2021, and those who obtained religious and/or medical exemptions were placed on leave and continued to receive health insurance. [Defense Fact 7.] The employees could not remain on leave of absence indefinitely, and, through negotiations with the two unions, employees with medical and/or religious exemptions were ultimately released from employment if they continued to refuse the vaccine. [Defense Fact 8.]

SVH’s decision to enforce the vaccine requirement and release Plaintiffs from their employment promoted public health by preventing disease and limiting its spread within the community. [Defense Fact 9.]

Legal Standard.

Summary judgment or adjudication is warranted where there are no triable issues of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. [Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subds. (c), (f); see Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.]

Courts follow a three-step process when reviewing a motion for summary judgment or adjudication: (1) identify the issues outlined by the pleadings; (2) evaluate whether the moving party has disproved the opponent’s claims; and (3) assess if the opposition has shown there is a triable factual issue. [Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.]

A motion for summary adjudication proceeds “in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment.” [Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (f)(2).] The initial burden always rests on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that no material factual issues are in dispute. [Choochagi v. Barracuda Networks, Inc. (2020) 60 Cal.App.5th 444, 453.] When a defendant files for summary judgment or adjudication, they satisfy their initial burden if they prove that at least one element of the cause of action cannot be established or that a complete defense exists. [Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (p)(2).] Failure to meet this burden results in denial of the motion, ending the inquiry. [Id.]

To meet the burden of proving that a cause of action cannot be established, a defendant must demonstrate that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, the needed evidence. [Aguilar, 25 Cal.4th at 854.] Merely pointing out the lack of evidence is not enough. [Gaggero v. Yura (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 884, 891.] This supporting evidence may include

affidavits, declarations, admissions, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and matters subject to judicial notice. [Aguilar, 25 Cal.4th at 855.]

Even if the moving defendant meets its burden, the opposing plaintiff can still defeat a summary judgment or summary adjudication motion by presenting evidence that raises a triable issue of fact. [Aguilar, 25 Cal. 4th at 849-850.] The plaintiff cannot rely solely on allegations or denials in its pleadings; instead, it must present specific facts indicating the existence of a triable issue of material fact concerning the cause of action. [Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Choochagi, 60 Cal.App.5th at 453.] If the plaintiff fails to do so, summary judgment or summary adjudication should be granted. [See Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.]

The court must liberally construe the evidence presented by the party opposing summary judgment or adjudication, resolving all doubts and making all reasonable inferences in favor of that party. [Aguilar, 25 Cal.4th at 844-845.] When reviewing such a motion, the court must consider what inferences a factfinder could reasonably draw that favor the opposing party. [Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 839.] The main role of the court is to identify issues, not to decide them; only clear and indisputable inferences can lead to a legal resolution. [Ibid.] If evidence conflicts, factual disputes must be resolved during trial. [Ibid.] Furthermore, the trial court cannot weigh evidence as a factfinder would to determine credibility, nor can it grant summary judgment based on credibility assessments. [Id. at 840.]

Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”).

SVH’s request to judicially notice the documents marked as Exhibits A (Supreme Court’s Order Regarding Depublication of Allos v. Poway Unified School Dist., No. S292190) and B (Order Granting Summary Judgment in Broadstreet v. Salinas Valley Memorial Healthcare System, Monterey County Superior Court, Case No. 24CV004109) is GRANTED. [Evid Code § 452, subd. (d).]

Plaintiffs’ request to judicially notice the documents marked as Exhibits 1 (California Department of Public Health Order), 3 (Law Revision Commission memorandum), 4 (Law Revision Commission recommendation), 6 (Legislative history of Assembly Bill 1194), and 7 (Legislative history of Assembly Bill 1194) is GRANTED. [Evid. Code § 452, subd. (c).] Plaintiffs’ remaining requests are DENIED. The document marked as Exhibit 2 (a demurrer ruling in an unrelated case) is irrelevant. [See Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1057, 1063 (“[a]lthough a court may judicially notice a variety of matters, only relevant material may be noticed.”) (original italics; internal citation omitted).] The exhibit marked as Exhibit 5 (California Government Tort Liability) is not official legislative history.

SVH’s second request to judicially notice the demurrer papers (Exhibit A) and the resulting order (Exhibit B) from an unrelated case filed in the Los Angeles County Superior Court is DENIED as irrelevant. [Mangini, 7 Cal.4th at 1063.]

Evidentiary Objections.

The Court rules on each party’s evidentiary objections as follows:

PLAINTIFFS’ OBJECTIONS No(s). Cite Ruling 1 Childs Decl. at ¶¶ 4, 23-24 OVERRULED. 2 3 4 Childs Decl. at ¶¶ 25, 27 SUSTAINED because it is a legal conclusion 6 as to “undue hardship.” 5 Childs Decl. at ¶ 26 SUSTAINED because it lacks foundation. 7 Dr. Reingold Decl. at ¶¶ 11, 13 OVERRULED. 8 9 Dr. Radner Decl. at ¶¶ 8, 9, 12, 16, OVERRULED. 10 17, 18, 20, 21, 25, 26, 29, 31 11 12 13 14 15 16 18 19 21 23 11 Dr. Radner Decl. at ¶ 13 SUSTAINED because he lacks foundation as (sic) to the intent behind the CDPH’s August 5, 2021, order. 17 Dr. Radner Decl. at ¶¶ 22, 27, 30, 32 SUSTAINED because it is a legal conclusion 20 as to “undue hardship.” 22 24

SVH’S OBJECTIONS No(s). Cite Ruling 1 Exh. 2 to Plaintiffs’ RJN and SUSTAINED as irrelevant. Compendium of Evidence (“CE”) 2 Exh. 3 to Plaintiffs’ RJN and CE OVERRULED. 3 Exh. 5 to Plaintiffs’ RJN and CE SUSTAINED because it is a legal conclusion as to “reasonableness” accommodation. 4 Exhs. 6-7 to Plaintiffs’ RJN and CE OVERRULED. 5 6 Exh. 8 to Plaintiffs’ CE SUSTAINED because the rough transcript of Dr. Radner’s deposition testimony is unreliable.

Discussion.

SVH argues that summary judgment should be granted because it has Section 855.4 immunity from FEHA liability, citing the holding in Allos v. Poway Unified School Dist. (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 822 as support. [Motion at 11-12.] Plaintiffs strongly disagree and offer various arguments, including that “Section 855.4 does not provide blanket immunity for all actions taken during a public health response” and that Allos is not determinative. [Opp. at 6:1-7:4.] Ultimately, as discussed below, SVH makes the stronger arguments, and therefore, its motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

Generally, the Government Claims Act (the “Act”) “affords a public employee personal immunity from suit when the act or omission for which recovery is sought resulted from the exercise of the discretion vested in him.” [Caldwell v. Montoya (1995) 10 Cal.4th 972, 976 (citing Gov. Code § 820.2; internal quotes omitted).] “This ‘discretionary act’ immunity extends to ‘basic’ governmental policy decisions entrusted to broad official judgment.” [Ibid.] The Act’s “purpose is assuring judicial abstention in areas in which the responsibility for basic policy decisions has been committed to coordinate branches of government, because any wider judicial review would place the court in the unseemly position of determining the propriety of decisions expressly entrusted to a coordinate branch of government.” [Allos, 112 Cal.App.5th at 833 (internal quotes, brackets, and ellipses omitted).]

Section 855.4 is part of the Act. Subdivision (a) of Section 855.4 provides that “Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for an injury resulting from the decision to perform or not to perform any act to promote the public health of the community by preventing disease or controlling the communication of disease within the community if the decision whether the act was or was not to be performed was the result of the exercise of discretion vested in the public entity or the public employee, whether or not such discretion be abused.”

Further, subdivision (b) states that a public entity or its employee is not liable for any injury “caused by an act or omission in carrying out with due care” such a decision. “Neither the statutory language nor case law interpreting it suggests a defendant must qualify for immunity under both section 855.4 subdivision (a) and section 855.4 subdivision (b) in order to be immune.” [Greenwood v. City of Los Angeles (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 851, 865.]

It is undisputed that SVH is a public entity and therefore falls within the class of entities Section 855.4 aims to protect. [Defense Fact 2.] Consequently, by seeking summary judgment based on the affirmative defense of Section 855.4 immunity, SVH must demonstrate there is no genuine issue of material fact because any injury resulting from its failure to accommodate Plaintiffs’ religious beliefs was due to a discretionary decision made to promote public health during the COVID-19 pandemic. [Aguilar, 25 Cal.4th at 850; Gov. Code § 855.4.]

SVH contends that Allos is controlling and confirms that Section 855.4 immunizes it from Plaintiffs’ Third Cause of Action under FEHA. [Motion at 11-13.] In that case, the plaintiff was a school district employee who filed claims after the district refused to let her work only from home following the COVID-19 stay-at-home order. [Allos, 112 Cal.App.5th at 826-827, 829-830.] She wanted to work remotely full-time because of several health problems that made her more vulnerable to COVID-19. [Id. at 827-829.] The plaintiff claimed she could not get

vaccinated due to a “prior serious reaction/allergy” to the vaccine, which she stated was a disability the school district had to accommodate. [Id. at 828, 831.] Plaintiff argued that the district’s various accommodations were inadequate. [Id. at 829.] The trial court granted, and the appellate court affirmed, summary judgment in favor of the district because the plaintiff’s “claims were barred by section 855.4.” [Id. at 831-832, 834-836.] In doing so, the court in Allos reasoned that Section 855.4 bars the plaintiff’s claims because they are rooted in the school district’s decisions about remote work and returning to the office. [Ibid.] Additionally, the appellate court found that the plaintiff did not clearly establish she had a disability, which weakened her FEHA disability discrimination and failure-to-accommodate claims. [Id. at 837.]

The Court agrees with SVH that Allos “confirms that [Section 855.4] immunity applies here.” [Motion at 11.] Like Allos, Plaintiffs seek to hold SVH responsible for harm caused by its decision to require them to be vaccinated. However, SVH made this decision “[b]ased upon a thorough evaluation of all relevant factors, including review of the relevant medical literature and conferring with all the major Monterey County hospitals . . .” [Defense Fact 6.] SVH’s reason for enforcing its vaccine mandate, placing Plaintiffs on leave, and ultimately releasing them from their employment was to “promote the public health of the community by preventing the COVID-19 disease and controlling the communication of disease within the community.” [Defense Fact 9.]

In other words, conduct contrary to SVH’s vaccine mandate would have been less protective of the public. Therefore, SVH’s decision not to accommodate Plaintiffs because of its vaccine mandate arises from its efforts to protect public health. Consequently, Section 855.4 applies to Plaintiffs’ FEHA claim.

Plaintiffs’ arguments fail to persuade the Court to rule otherwise.

First, Plaintiffs argue that there was no qualifying discretionary decision. Plaintiffs contend that SVH “merely copied” and “adopted” the CDPH’s preexisting public-health directives. [See Plaintiffs’ Undisputed Material Fact 15.] This argument overlooks and does not negate SVH’s evidence that its decision to implement its vaccine mandate was made more directly by its management team. [Defense Facts 4, 6, 9.] Therefore, SVH’s decision was independent of the CDPH’s mandate requiring health care workers to be vaccinated, while also allowing for medical and religious exemptions.

Second, Plaintiffs argue that SVH’s evidence confirms that the challenged conduct was based on operational and staffing concerns, not on the type of disease-control measures contemplated by Section 855.4. [Opp. at 13:19-14:10.] Not so. Dr. Radner stated in paragraph 21 of his declaration that allowing unvaccinated employees to work in the hospital would have significantly increased the risk of severe disease, hospitalization, or death to SVH’s staff, patients, and visitors. Thus, Dr. Radner made it clear that the focus was on the community’s public health – the patients – rather than “operational and staffing concerns.” Plaintiffs’ reliance on Sava v. Fuller (1967) 249 Cal.App.2d 281 is misplaced because it did not involve Section 855.4. [Id. at 292 (“Respondents contend they are also immune under section 855.4. That section is inapplicable.”).]

Third, Plaintiffs are mistaken in believing that Section 855.4 only applies when the plaintiff’s injury results from exposure to a communicable disease in a physical environment.

[Opp. at 16-17.] Such an interpretation contradicts the plain language of Section 855.4, which states that neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for an “injury” caused by a public health decision. [Gov. Code § 855.4, subd. (a).] The term “injury” is defined as “death, injury to a person, reputation, character, feelings or estate, of such nature that it would be actionable if inflicted by a private person.” [Gov. Code § 810.8.] Nothing in the statute supports Plaintiffs’ argument.

Fourth, Plaintiffs argue that Allos is distinguishable and point out that their “claims arise from subsequent employment decisions governed by FEHA, not from any qualifying decision under section 855.4, subsections (a) or (b).” [Opp. at 6 (bold in original).] The Court is not persuaded that Section 855.4 immunity does not apply to FEHA-related claims, including Plaintiffs’ Third Cause of Action. California law generally recognizes that “a statutory governmental immunity overrides a statute imposing liability,” and that “absent a clear indication of legislative intent that statutory immunity is withheld or withdrawn, a specific statutory immunity applies to shield a public employee from liability imposed by a particular statute.” [Bitner v.

Dept. of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1048, 1059 (internal quotes and ellipsis omitted).] A public entity, such as SVH, is subject to any immunity provided by statute. [Gov. Code § 815, subd. (b).] SVH’s cited authorities in its motion demonstrate that FEHA’s mandatory duty to accommodate religious beliefs does not override statutory immunity for discretionary acts. [Motion at 16-17; Esparza v. County of Los Angeles (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 452, 462 (FEHA did not abrogate Government Code section 818.2 immunity conferred by section 818.2); Bitner, 87 Cal.App.5th at 1063 (“[E]ven if we were to accept that FEHA creates a mandatory duty within the meaning of [Government Code] section 815.6, section 815 provides that the immunity provision of section 844.6 takes precedence over any liability imposed by section 815.6, and plaintiffs’ argument to the contrary is without merit.”).]

Thus, like other statutory immunities, and as recognized in Allos, 112 Cal.App.5th at 835, FEHA liability does not supersede Section 855.4 immunity. The Court notes that Plaintiffs’ argument that no immunity applies when FEHA is the more specific statute was rejected in Bitner, 87 Cal.App.5th at 1060-1062, because the distinction between “general” and “specific” is based on subject matter. FEHA is an extensive statutory scheme designed to support a broad public policy of protecting against employment discrimination; thus, the later enactment of FEHA was not decisive.

Fifth, the Court disagrees with Plaintiffs’ argument that SVH proposes an interpretation of Section 855.4 that does violence to “the very purpose of the immunity provision.” [Opp at 21.] The Court disagrees, and the statute’s legislative history does not support Plaintiffs’ limited view of the statute. As noted by the 1963 Law Revision Commission recommendation:

4. Public health officials and public entities should not be liable for determining whether to impose quarantines or otherwise take action to prevent or control the spread of disease, where they have been given the legal power to determine whether or not such action should be taken. Where the law gives a public employee discretion to determine a course of conduct, liability should not be based upon the exercise of that discretion in a particular manner; for this would permit the trier of fact to substitute its judgment as to how the discretion should

have been exercised for the judgment of the person to whom such discretion was lawfully committed...

5. Public entities and public employees should not be liable for failure to make arrests or otherwise to enforce any law. They should not be liable for failing to inspect persons or property adequately to determine compliance with health and safety regulations, Nor should they be liable for negligent or wrongful issuance or revocation of licenses and permits. The government has undertaken these activities to insure public health and safety. To provide the utmost public protection, governmental entities should not be dissuaded from engaging in such activitles by the fear that liability may be imposed if an employee performs his duties inadequately.

[Exh. 4 to Plaintiffs’ RJN at 830-831 (¶¶ 4, 5).]

Accordingly, SVH’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED because it has met its burden of showing that Section 855.4 immunity overrides the FEHA liability alleged in the Third Cause of Action. Plaintiffs have not provided any material facts raising triable factual issues to the contrary.

Conclusion.

SVH’s motion is GRANTED, and SVH is entitled to summary judgment of Plaintiffs’ claim against it. As detailed above, the parties’ evidentiary objections are SUSTAINED IN PART AND OVERRULED IN PART, and their request for judicial notice is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

SVH shall prepare the Proposed Order consistent with this Tentative Ruling. If this Tentative Ruling is affirmed, all future dates are VACATED.

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