Courtyards East Homeowners’ Association v. Penoli

TENTATIVE RULINGS LAW & MOTION CALENDAR Friday, September 11, 2026, 3:00 p.m. Courtroom 16 – Hon. Randy Rhodes for Hon. Patrick M. Broderick 3035 Cleveland Avenue, Suite 200, Santa Rosa

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The following tentative rulings will become the ruling of the Court unless a party desires to be heard. If you desire to appear and present oral argument as to any motion, YOU MUST notify the Court by telephone at (707) 521-6725, and all other opposing parties of your intent to appear by 4:00 p.m. the court day immediately before the day of the hearing.

Parties in motions for claims of exemption are exempt from this requirement.

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1. 24CV01534, Courtyards East Homeowners’ Association v. Penoli

Defendant Heather Penoli (“Defendant”) moves pursuant to CCP sections 418.10, 473(d), and 473.5 to set aside the default judgment as void, vacate the entry of default, and quash Plaintiff Courtyards East Homeowners Association’s (“Plaintiff’s”) service of summons and complaint. I. Legal Standards “The return of a process server registered pursuant to Chapter 16 (commencing with Section 22350) of Division 8 of the Business and Professions Code upon process or notice establishes a presumption, affecting the burden of producing evidence, of the facts stated in the return.” (Evid.

Code, § 647.) The filing of proof of service creates a rebuttable presumption of proper service. (County of San Diego v. Gorham (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1230.) In Gorham, the defendant rebutted the facts stated in the proof of service because the evidence showed he had been incarcerated at the time he was alleged to have been personally served. (Ibid.) Improper service of summons and complaint renders a subsequent default judgment void. (County of San Diego v. Gorham (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1226.)

II. Service of Summons and Complaint Plaintiff filed this action on March 5, 2024. Proof of service of summons and complaint was filed on September 6, 2024. It states that Defendant was served on August 28, 2024, at 5:31 p.m., at 6321 35th Avenue, Sacramento, CA 95824, by registered process server Kayl J. Lagunas.

In her declaration, Defendant states that she was home at the Sacramento address on the date and time listed in the proof of service document but that she was not actually served with any documents. (Penoli decl., ¶6.) Defendant states that the service date of August 28 happens to be her birthday so she remembers the day well. (Id., ¶7.) She states she turned 33 that year and spent the whole day at home with her ex-girlfriend and her new service dog. (Ibid.) She states nobody came to her door that day except for a delivery driver bringing her lunch. (Id., ¶8.)

She states that her neighbor’s Ring camera captures her front door and captures footage whenever someone enters its frame, and that she spoke with her neighbors to see if the camera captured anyone at 5:31p.m, that day. (Id., ¶¶9, 10.) She states it did not. (Ibid.) Defendant also states that she has never received any court documents in the mail either to her Sacramento home or at 198 Courtyards East, Windsor, California (“Subject Property”), which is the property that is the subject of the dispute in this action. (Id., ¶13.)

Defendant states that on or around May 14, 2026, Defendant’s tenant living at the Subject Property found a note stating that Plaintiff was going to remove the fence based upon a court order. (Id., ¶14, Exhibit 7.) She states no court order was attached. (Ibid.) Defendant states she was contacted on May 19, 2025, by Plaintiff’s attorney who gave her a copy of this court’s February 6, 2025, judgment. (Id., ¶16.) She states this is the first time she became aware that a lawsuit had been filed against her. (Id., ¶17.)

III. Declaration of Process Server In his declaration, Kayl Lagunas states that he attempted service at 5:00 p.m. on August 28, 2024. He states there was no answer. There were several vehicles at the house. He noticed someone deliver a bag of food to the doorstep and saw a woman wearing a baseball cap open the door and take the food. He states he returned to the door and knocked again. This time a blonde woman in her mid-20s, about 5’6”, 130 lbs., answered the door. He states he told her: “I have a delivery for Heather Penoli.”

He states the woman said: “I don’t know,” to which he responded: “What do you mean by that?” She responded, “I don’t know.” He states he asked whether there was a normal time of day that she’s home to which she again responded, “I don’t know.” He asked for her name and she again said, “I don’t know,” and closed the door. Mr. Lagunas states he went back to the car and obtained a photo of Defendant which he recognized as the blonde woman who answered the door. He returned to knock again and “called out to Heather” to let her know he was aware that it was her who answered the door and that he was leaving the legal documents for her on the doorstep.

IV. Personal Service of Summons A summons may be served by personal delivery of a copy of the summons and complaint to the person to be served. Service of a summons in this manner is deemed complete at the time of such delivery. (CCP § 415.10.) Personal service requires leaving a copy of the summons and complaint with the person who is apparently in charge of the mailing address, or in the presence of a competent member of the household or person in charge. (CCP section 415.20.) Here, by Mr. Lagunas’ own admission, he did not leave the documents with anybody nor in anybody’s presence.

Nor does he state that he told Defendant that he was serving her with court documents. Rather, he only states he called out to her from outside the house sometime thereafter before he left the documents on the doorstep. Plaintiff cites Crescendo Corp. v. Shelted, Inc. (1968) 267 Cal.App.2d 209. In that case, the process server knocked on the door and heard a man’s voice say if it was for him, he wasn’t home. (Id., at p. 211.) Immediately thereafter, a woman opened the door, and he saw the defendant laying on the couch, who he recognized from an earlier meeting. (Ibid.)

The process server “stated loudly that he was serving [the defendant] with a copy of the unlawful detainer.” (Ibid.) The woman said the defendant was not at home and slammed the door on him. (Ibid.) The process server then left the 2

documents under the windshield wiper of a car registered to the defendant where defendant later found them. (Ibid.) Here, unlike in Crescendo, Mr. Lagunas did not announce his intention to serve court documents. He only informed Defendant that he had a “delivery.” This is insufficient. V.

Conclusion

The motion is GRANTED. Mr. Lagunas’ declaration establishes service of summons and complaint was not sufficient to effectuate personal service on Defendant. Therefore, this court did not acquire personal jurisdiction over the Defendant such that the default judgment against her is void. Defendant is directed to submit a written order to the court consistent with this ruling and in compliance with Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312.

2. 25CV04007, Pawlik v. Dupre

I. Motion to Compel Further Responses – Special Interrogatories Plaintiff Christopher Pawlik (“Plaintiff”) moves for an order compelling Defendant Ernesto Ongaro and Sons, Inc. (“Defendant”) to provide further responses to Plaintiff's Special Interrogatories, Set Two, Interrogatory Nos. 41 through 59, without objections, and for monetary sanctions against Defendant and its counsel of record in the amount of $4,260.00. A. Complaint This lawsuit arises from a motor vehicle collision on November 27, 2023.

Plaintiff alleges his car was T-boned by a vehicle driven by defendant Nathan Dupre (“Dupre”), while he was driving in the course and scope of employment for Defendant. B. Special Interrogatories In opposition, Defendant states that based upon this court’s ruling on May 29, 2026, on the issue of Plaintiff’s discovery of surveillance, Defendant agrees to produce code-complainant discovery responses. C. Sanctions Plaintiff seeks $4,260 in sanctions for having to bring this motion. CCP section 2030.300 requires sanctions unless this court finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (CCP section 2030.300(d).)

Defendant opposes Plaintiff’s request for monetary sanctions and attorney’s fees arguing that Defendant’s objections to Plaintiff’s discovery requests were objectively reasonable. This court disagrees. Defendant’s position was that the surveillance materials at issue in the discovery requests were subject to the work-product doctrine and attorney-client privilege. However, the surveillance video and photos are not privileged. This was the exact scenario discussed in Suezaki v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County (1962) 58 Cal.2d 166, in which the appellate court determined the attorney’s private investigator’s surveillance video was not privileged. (Id., at pp. 177-178.)

While Suezaki was decided prior to the current iteration of the statute outlying the work product privilege, the Suezaki court determined work product representing an attorney or the attorney’s agent’s impressions was not represented by surveillance video: “The films are not a graphic representation of the defendants, their activities, their mental impressions, anything within their knowledge, or of anything owned by them. The films are representations of the plaintiff, not of the defendants.” (Suezaki, supra, at p. 177.)

Only notes of the attorney or the attorney’s agent’s impressions of what is seen on the video or photos are privileged.

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