NEW GLOBAL PROPERTIES, LLC v. NAS NEGAHBAN, et al.

Clear Glass, which totals $281,514. In addition, Plaintiffs allocate 15% of the estimated $2.35 million in pool reconstruction costs to Clear Glass, totaling $352,689. Plaintiffs also allocate a small portion of demolition and other overhead costs associated with all repairs contemplated at the Subject Property. Plaintiffs' allocations to Clear Glass total $2 million.

Plaintiffs settled with Abbott, and Abbott assigned its Cross-Complaint against the subcontractor cross - defendants to Plaintiffs, which includes a claim for defense fees (the "Abbott Assigned Claims") . Clear Glass has also agreed to settle with Plaintiffs for $750,000, which includes Plaintiffs' claims and the Abbott Assigned Claims.

This hearing is on Clear Glass' application for a good faith determination pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Sec.877.6. Clear Glass argues that its settlement sum is "an approximation of [its] potential liability in this matter." There was no opposition filed as of the posting of this tentative ruling.

LEGAL STANDARD

Under Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 877.6, "[a] ny party to an action in which it is alleged that two or more parties are joint tortfeasors or co-obligors on a contract debt shall be entitled to a hearing on the issue of the good faith of a settlement entered into by the plaintiff or other claimant and one or more alleged tortfeasors or co-obligors." (Code Civ. Proc.Sec. 877.6(a)(1).)

"The issue of the good faith of a settlement may be determined by the court on the basis of affidavits served with the notice of hearing, and any counter-affidavits filed in response, or the court may, in its discretion, receive other evidence at the hearing." (Code Civ. Proc.Sec. 877.6(b).)

Section 877.6 requires "that the courts review [settlement] agreements made under its aegis to insure that the settlements appropriately balance the . . . statute's dual objectives" of (1) providing an "equitable sharing of costs among the parties at fault" and (2) encouraging parties to resolve their disputes by way of settlement.¿ (Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal.3d at 494.)

"A determination by the court that the settlement was made in good faith shall bar any other joint tortfeasor or co-obligor from any further claims against the settling tortfeasor or co-obligor for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault." (Code Civ. Proc.Sec. 877.6(c).)

The party asserting the lack of good faith shall have the burden of proof on that issue. (Code Civ. Proc.Sec. 877.6(d).)

In Tech-Bilt, the California Supreme Court set forth the following factors for evaluating whether a proposed settlement was made in good faith: (1) a rough approximation of plaintiffs' total recovery and the settler's proportionate liability; (2) the amount paid in settlement; (3) the allocation of settlement proceeds among plaintiffs; (4) discount for settlement before trial; (5) the financial conditions and insurance policy limits of settling defendants; and (6) the existence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of non-settling defendants. (38 Cal.3d at 499.)

DISCUSSION

Clear Glass' application does not comply with California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1382 which requires that " [t] he notice of motion or application for determination of good faith settlement must list each party and pleading or portion of pleading affected by the settlement and the date on which the affected pleading was filed. "

Here, Clear Glass' application seeks a dismissal of "pending claims and Cross-Complaints against [Clear Glass], specifically including the Cross-Complaint of RT ABBOTT CONSTRUCTION, INC. filed on December 27, 2024." It is unclear based on Clear Glass' application whether there are pending claims and Cross-Complaints against Clear Glass, besides the one filed by Abbott.

Accordingly, the Court denies Clear Glass' application without prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 10, 202 6 ___________________________ Edward B. Moreton, Jr. Judge of the Superior Case Number: 25SMCV06820 Hearing Date: September 10, 2026 Dept: 205 Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles - West District Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 20 5 NEW GLOBAL PROPERTIES, LLC, Plaintiff, v. NAS NEGAHBAN, et al., Defendants. | Case No.: 2 5 SMCV0 6820 Hearing Date: September 10, 2026 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO TAX COSTS |

BACKGROUND

This is a breach of lease case. Plaintiff New Global Properties, LLC is the owner and lessor of a commercial building located at 1301 5th Street, Santa Monica, California 90401 (the "Premises"). Defendant West End Pub, Inc. dba Zanzibar (Tenant) assumed a written commercial lease for the Premises. Defendant 1301 Fifth Street LLC dba Canary executed a written guaranty of Tenant's obligations under the Lease. There were also individual defendants who signed a joint and several, unconditional guaranty of Tenant's obligations under the Lease, including Defendant Nas Negahban.

Plaintiff filed a proof of service indicating that Negahban was served by substitute service. Negahban filed a motion to quash service of summons because the service address has no relation to him. The Court granted Negahban's motion. The Court's order did not reference the award of any costs to Negahban.

Negahban then filed a memorandum of costs seeking $3,420.45, which includes $435.00 in filing fees, $235.45 in electronic filing and service fees, and $2,750.00 in attorneys' fees. This hearing is on Plaintiff's motion to tax costs. Plaintiff argues that Negahban is not a prevailing party and is not entitled to costs. The Court's order on the motion to quash service of summons did not dismiss the action or result in a judgment in favor of Negahban. Plaintiff is free to re-serve Negahban. Plaintiff also argues that even if there was authority to award costs, Negahban would not be entitled to attorneys' fees because there is no contract or statute that authorizes an award of fees when a defendant prevails on a motion to quash service of summons.

LEGAL STANDARD

Generally, a "prevailing party" is entitled to costs. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 1032(b); Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th 599, 606.). "A prevailing party who claims costs must serve and file a memorandum of costs within 15 days after the date of mailing of the¿notice of entry of judgment... The memorandum of costs must be verified by a statement of the party, attorney, or agent that to the best of his or her knowledge the items of cost are correct and were necessarily incurred in the case." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1700.)

The losing party may contest the costs that a prevailing party seeks. (C ode C iv. P roc., Sec.1034(a).) The challenging party has the burden of demonstrating that those costs are unreasonable or unnecessary. (Adams v. Ford Motor Co., ¿(2011) 199 Cal. App. 4th 1475, 1486; 612¿South LLC v. Laconic Limited Partnership, (2010) 184 Cal. App. 4th 1270, 1285.)

Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 1033.5 sets forth the costs recoverable by the prevailing party. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 1033.5.) "Allowable costs shall be reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec.1033.5(c)(2); Perko's Enterprises, Inc. v.

RRNS Enterprises (l992) 4 Cal.App.4th 238, 244.) A "properly verified memorandum of costs is considered prima facie evidence that the costs listed in the memorandum were necessarily incurred." (Bach v. County of Butte (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 294, 308; see also Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 682.) This puts the burden on the party seeking to tax costs to show that they were not reasonable or necessary. (Ladas v. California State Automotive Assoc. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 773-74.) If items are properly objected to, they are put in issue, and the burden of proof is on the party claiming them as costs. (Id.)

The memorandum of costs need not contain invoices, billings, or statements. (Bach, 215 Cal.App.3d at 308; see also Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1700(a)(1) (only verification required).) "Documentation must be submitted only when a party dissatisfied with the costs claimed in the memorandum challenges them by filing a motion to tax costs." (Bach, 215 Cal.App.3d at 308.)

DISCUSSION

As a threshold matter, the Court considers Defendant's argument that he was not properly served with the motion to tax costs because service was effectuated at 2708 Wilshire Blvd, Suite 424, Santa Monica, California 90403, which Defendant maintains is a commercial mail receiving suite and not a valid address for service of process. However, 2708 Wilshire Blvd is the address Defendant provided to the Court, and is the same address the Clerk of the Court use s to mail documents to Defendant. Accordingly, the Court rejects Defendant's argument that service of the motion to tax costs was not proper.

Turning to the merits of the motion, Plaintiff argues that Defendant is not a prevailing party and is therefore not entitled to costs. The Court agrees. A party ' s right to recover costs is governed by statute. (Perko's Enterprises, Inc. v. RRNS Enterprises ¿(1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 238, 241.) Under¿ section 1032, subdivision (b), "[e] xcept as otherwise expressly provided by statute, a prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs in any action or proceeding."¿The term "prevailing party" includes "a defendant in whose favor a¿ dismissal is entered." (Sec. 1032, subd. (a)(4), italics added.) A dismissal is entered when it is entered in the clerk ' s register. (Sec. 581 d.)

Rule 870 of the California Rules of Court states that " [a] prevailing party who claims costs shall serve and file a memorandum of costs within 15 days after the date of mailing of the notice of¿ entry of judgment or dismissal ¿by the clerk under¿ Code of Civil Procedure section 664. 5 ¿or the date of service of written notice of¿ entry of judgment or dismissal, or within 180 days after¿ entry of judgment, whichever is first." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 870(a)(2), italics added.) Thus, rule 870 contemplates the entry of a dismissal or judgment as a predicate to a costs award. (See also Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2006) P. 11:38, p. 11- 22 [" Ordinarily, a judgment or order must be entered upon which a costs award must be based"] .)

Here, there was no dismissal or judgment entered. Rather, the Court granted a motion to quash service of summons. Th is order did not dismiss Plaintiff's complaint or enter judgment against Plaintiff. Accordingly, N e gahban is not a prevailing party, and its memorandum of costs is premature.

Negahban argues that the Court has equitable discretion to award him costs because Plaintiff's service of the summons and complaint was defective. Negahban, however, cites no authority to support his position. His memorandum of costs cited only Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 1028, Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 1032, and California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1700 as his legal basis for seeking costs. There was no reference to the Court's equitable discretion to award costs. As to the cited statutes, Section 1028 applies to an award of costs against the state and clearly does not apply as Plaintiff is not a state entity. As to Section 1032, as discussed above, it only allows a prevailing party to seek costs. And as to Rule 3.1700, it sets the deadline and procedures for a prevailing party to seek costs. Accordingly, none of the statutes cite d by Negahban support s the award of costs.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's motion to tax costs. IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 10, 2026 ___________________________ Edward B. Moreton, Jr. Judge of the Superior Court Case Number: 26SMCV02313 Hearing Date: September 10, 2026 Dept: 205 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles - West District Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 20 5 THE 44 GROUP, INC., Plaintiff, v. JOHN SALIDO, et al., Defendant s. | Case No.: 2 6 SMCV0 2313 Hearing Date: September 10, 2026 [TENTATIVE] order RE: defendan t SCORPION CLEANING SERVICE, INC.'S DEMURRER and motion to strike COMPLAINT |

BACKGROUND

This is a trade secret misappropriation case. Plaintiff Invictus Support Services is a commercial cleaning company. Invictus hired Defendant John Salido as its Director of Operations. Salido was responsible for overseeing and optimizing the company's operations, including driving sales and development. As part of his employment, Salido agreed to a Proprietary Information and Inventions Agreement ("PI I A"), which required him to " hold in confidence and not disclose, transfer, or (except within the scope of performing the Services) use any business, technical, or financial information of the Company [.]"

The PIIA also required that Salido not solicit any employee of the Company to leave the Company, induce any client to sever its relationship with the Company, or solicit or accept engagement with any organization that does business with the Company. Further, the PIIA required that a t the termination of his employment, Salido would return all proprietary information and not use the information to solicit any Company employee or any client.

In March 2025, Invictus bid on jobs to provide window cleaning and power washing services for the State of California. Salido was highly involved in the bidding and contracting process for the State jobs and had access to information relating to the bidding process. Invictus eventually contract ed with Defendant Scorpion Cleaning Service, Inc., to be the main contractor for the State jobs. Salido managed the relationship between Invictus and Scorpion.

Invictus and Scorpion negotiated in detail the terms of a services contract. The contract for Northern California, agreed upon in May 2025, provided that Invictus would provide window and building cleaning services to Scorpion at twenty-two locations, over the course of Scorpion's three-year contract and two-year renewal period with the State. Scorpion was only permitted to terminate its contract with Invictus if the State terminated its contract with Scorpion. Invictus incurred several hundred thousand dollars in expenses in reliance on its contract with Scorpion, including recruitment, onboarding and extensive training of window cleaners; full-time assignment of an employee to manage the contracts; engagement of an independent consultant to assist with the government