Doe 1 vs. Falck Mobile Health, Corp

Superior Court of the State of California County of Orange TENTATIVE RULINGS FOR DEPARTMENT N16

HON. Donald F. Gaffney

Counsel and Parties Please Note: Law and Motion in Department N16 is heard on Wednesdays at 9:00 a.m.

Date: September 9, 2026

Tentative Rulings will be posted on the Internet on the day before the hearing by 5:00 p.m. [or earlier] whenever possible. To submit on the tentative ruling, please contact the clerk at (657) 622-5616, after contacting opposing party/counsel. Prevailing party shall give notice of the Ruling and prepare the Order/Judgment for the Court’s signature if required.

NOTE: After posting of tentative rulings, the Court will not take the motion off calendar and will grant a continuance of the motion only upon stipulation of all affected parties.

If no appearances are made on the calendared motion date, then oral argument will be deemed to have been waived and the tentative ruling will become the Court’s final ruling.

# Case Name Tentative 1 Doe 1 vs. TENTATIVE RULING: Falck Mobile Health, Corp Defendant Falck Mobile Health Corp.’s demurrer to the Second Amended Complaint is SUSTAINED without leave to amend as to the Second, Fourth, and Fifth Causes of Action, and OVERRULED as to the First and Third Causes of Action. The demurrer based on uncertainty is OVERRULED.

Defendant Falck Mobile Health Corp.’s motion to strike is GRANTED without leave to amend as to the punitive-damages allegations in paragraphs 43 and 46 as against Falck and Prayer for Relief Nos. 3, 5, and 6. The motion is MOOT as to paragraphs 53, 75, 77, 78, 81, and 82 in light of the ruling sustaining the demurrer to the Second, Fourth, and Fifth Causes of Action without leave to amend.

1. Demurrer

Defendant Falck Mobile Health Corp. (“Falck”) demurs to each of the five causes of action asserted in the Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) on the grounds that they fail to state a cause of action and are uncertain.

First Cause of Action for Sexual Abuse of a Minor

California Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 (“§ 340.1”) governs actions for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault. Under subdivision (c), “childhood sexual assault” includes specified sexual acts committed against a plaintiff while under the age of 18. (§ 340.1, subd. (c).)

As relevant here, subdivision (a)(2) applies to an action against any person or entity that “owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, if a wrongful or negligent act by that person or entity was a legal cause of the childhood sexual assault that resulted in the injury to the plaintiff.” (§ 340.1, subd. (a)(2).) Thus, as against Falck, Plaintiff must sufficiently allege that (1) Falck owed Plaintiff a duty of care; (2) Falck committed a wrongful or negligent act; (3) Falck’s conduct was a legal cause of the childhood sexual assault; and (4) the assault resulted in injury to Plaintiff. (Ibid.)

To state a negligence claim, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant owed a duty of care, breached that duty, and that the breach proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury. (Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204, 213 (“Brown”).) Whether a duty exists is a question of law, while breach and causation are generally questions of fact. (Ibid.; Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 764, 769, 772–774.)

Although each person has a duty to act with reasonable care (Civ. Code, § 1714), “ ‘one owes no duty to control the conduct of another, nor to warn those endangered by such conduct.’ [Citation.] ‘A person who has not created a peril is not liable in tort merely for failure to take affirmative action to assist or protect another unless there is some relationship between them which gives rise to a duty to act.’ ” (Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 619.) Such a duty may arise where the defendant has a special relationship with either the person whose conduct must be controlled or the foreseeable victim. (Ibid.)

A special relationship with the victim exists where the relationship gives the victim a right to expect protection from the defendant. (Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 215–216.) Examples include relationships between parents and children, colleges and students, employers and employees, common carriers and passengers, and innkeepers and guests. (Id. at p. 216.) The existence of such a special relationship places the defendant in a unique position to protect the plaintiff from injury, and the law requires the defendant to use that position accordingly. (Ibid.)

Here, the SAC alleges, in pertinent part as follows:

Plaintiff was 14 years old when Falck employees transported her injured brother to UCI Medical Center. (SAC ¶ 9.) Plaintiff’s mother entrusted Plaintiff to Defendants’ care, custody, and supervision because Plaintiff was a minor and could not travel independently. (SAC ¶ 12.) Defendants affirmatively accepted responsibility for Plaintiff’s safety and supervision, directed where she was to sit and stand, and exercised authority over her movements. (SAC ¶¶ 13–17.) Plaintiff remained dependent on Defendants for supervision and safe placement, and Defendants retained custody and control over her after arriving at UCI because her mother had not yet arrived. (SAC ¶¶ 15–21.)

While Plaintiff remained under this supervision, the Aggressor directed Plaintiff to stand next to him and, while other medical staff were distracted, pulled Plaintiff toward him and reached under her shirt and bra to grope her breasts. (SAC ¶¶ 22–24.) Falck, through its employees, took custody and control of her and thereby owed her a duty of reasonable care; Falck failed to supervise and protect her while she was under its custody and control; and this failure was a legal and proximate cause of the childhood sexual assault. (SAC ¶¶ 40–42.)

The court finds that the SAC adequately alleges the existence of a special relationship. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that her mother entrusted her to Defendants’ care and supervision; Defendants accepted responsibility for her safety; Plaintiff was dependent upon Defendants and subject to their direction; and Defendants’ custody and control continued after arriving at UCI until Plaintiff’s mother arrived. (SAC ¶¶ 12–21.) These factual allegations, accepted as true on demurrer, support a reasonable inference that Plaintiff was sufficiently vulnerable and dependent upon Falck and that Falck exercised sufficient control over her to give rise to an affirmative duty of reasonable care.

The court also finds that the SAC sufficiently alleges breach and causation. Plaintiff alleges Falck failed to supervise and protect her while she was under its custody and control and allowed the Aggressor to exercise authority over her without adequate supervision or safeguards, thereby placing her in the circumstances in which the assault occurred. (SAC ¶¶ 41–42, 55–64.) At the pleading stage, these allegations are sufficient to plead that Falck breached its asserted duty and that the breach was a legal cause of Plaintiff’s injury.

Falck argues that the alleged sexual assault was a personal criminal act outside the course and scope of the Aggressor’s employment and therefore cannot be imputed to Falck under respondeat superior. However, § 340.1 expressly encompasses liability based on an entity’s own wrongful or negligent conduct where the entity owed the plaintiff a duty of care and its conduct was a legal cause of the childhood sexual assault. (§ 340.1, subd. (a)(2).) Accordingly, Plaintiff need not establish that the Aggressor’s sexual assault itself occurred within the course and scope of his employment to pursue the negligence-based theory alleged under this section. Falck’s respondeat superior argument therefore does not dispose of this claim.

Falck also argues that, even assuming a special relationship existed, the SAC alleges no facts showing Falck knew or should have known that the Aggressor posed a risk of sexual misconduct. That argument does not defeat the claim at the pleading stage. Plaintiff’s claim is not limited to negligent hiring, retention, or supervision based on Falck’s prior knowledge of the Aggressor’s propensity for misconduct. Rather, the SAC alleges that Falck itself assumed custody and supervision of a 14-year-old minor, exercised control over her movements, and failed to reasonably protect and supervise her during that period. Whether Falck exercised reasonable care under those circumstances, including whether additional safeguards were required, presents factual issues concerning breach and causation.

The SAC adequately alleges facts supporting a claim under § 340.1, subdivision (a)(2), and is sufficiently certain to permit Falck to respond. Accordingly, the demurrer to the first cause of action is OVERRULED.

Second Cause of Action for Sexual Battery

To state a claim for sexual battery, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) the defendant intended to cause harmful or offensive contact with an intimate part of the plaintiff, and sexually offensive contact directly or indirectly resulted; (2) the plaintiff did not consent to the touching; and (3) the plaintiff was harmed or offended by the defendant’s conduct. (Civ. Code, § 1708.5; CACI No. 1306.)

An employer may be held vicariously liable for an employee’s tort committed within the scope of employment. (Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital (1995) 12 Cal.4th 291, 296 (“Lisa M.”.) For respondeat superior to apply, the employee’s tort must be engendered by or arise from the employment; the risk must be

“typical of or broadly incidental to” the employer’s enterprise or a generally foreseeable consequence of the employment. (Id. at pp. 298–299.) Although scope of employment is ordinarily a question of fact, it becomes a question of law where the facts are undisputed and no conflicting inferences are possible. (Id. at p. 299.) In Lisa M., the Supreme Court held that a hospital was not vicariously liable for an ultrasound technician’s sexual assault of a patient because the employment merely provided the employee with the opportunity, access, and proximity to commit the assault; the assault arose from the employee’s personal motives rather than the performance of his employment duties. (Id. at pp. 301–302.)

Alternatively, an employer may be liable for an employee’s intentional tort where the employer subsequently ratifies the unauthorized conduct. (C.R. v. Tenet Healthcare Corp. (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1110–1111.) Failure to investigate or respond to allegations of an intentional tort, or failure to discharge the employee, may constitute evidence of ratification, and ratification is generally a question of fact. (Ibid.) However, ratification requires conduct from which the employer’s intention to approve or adopt the employee’s wrongful act may reasonably be inferred. (Ibid.)

Here, the SAC alleges that the Aggressor intentionally engaged in sexual contact with Plaintiff by pulling her toward him and placing his hand under her shirt and bra to grope her breasts, and that Plaintiff suffered damages as a result. (SAC ¶¶ 22, 48–50.) As to Falck, the SAC alleges that Defendants were agents and employees of one another and acted within the authority granted to them while Plaintiff was under Defendants’ custody and control. (SAC ¶ 52.) It further alleges that, after learning of the assault, Falck failed to take appropriate corrective action, including failing to promptly terminate the Aggressor and failing to implement safeguards to prevent similar misconduct, “thereby ratifying the conduct.” (SAC ¶ 53.)

The SAC sufficiently alleges a sexual battery by the Aggressor, but not a basis for holding Falck liable for that intentional tort. Falck did not allegedly make the offensive contact, and its alleged negligence in failing to protect or supervise Plaintiff does not itself constitute sexual battery. Thus, liability against Falck must rest on respondeat superior or ratification.

The respondeat superior allegations are insufficient. As in Lisa M., the Aggressor’s employment placed him in proximity to Plaintiff and gave him some authority over her movements, but the alleged touching was unrelated to his EMT duties. The SAC itself alleges that he “used [the] opportunity” created when others were distracted

and Plaintiff’s guardian was absent to grope her. (SAC ¶ 22.) This suggests the employment merely provided the opportunity for the assault, which is insufficient under Lisa M.

Plaintiff’s reliance on Samantha B. v. Aurora Vista Del Mar, LLC (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 85 is unpersuasive. There, the employee had prolonged custodial interaction with vulnerable psychiatric patients under circumstances that increased the foreseeable risk of sexual exploitation. (Id. at pp. 107–108.) Here, Plaintiff was not being treated by the Aggressor, and the alleged interaction was brief and incidental to her brother’s emergency transport. The circumstances are therefore more analogous to Lisa M.

Nor do Falck’s alleged special relationship and independent duty to protect Plaintiff establish sexual battery liability. Those allegations may support a negligence claim, but they do not show that the Aggressor acted within the scope of employment.

The ratification allegations are also insufficient. The SAC alleges only that Falck did not “promptly” terminate the Aggressor and failed to implement safeguards after the assault. (SAC ¶ 53.) It does not allege facts showing that Falck, through an authorized decisionmaker, approved or adopted the misconduct. The SAC’s conclusory allegation that Falck “ratif[ied] the conduct” is insufficient.

Accordingly, the demurrer to the Second Cause of Action is SUSTAINED without leave to amend. This is Plaintiff’s third attempt to plead a viable sexual battery claim against Falck, and Plaintiff has not identified additional facts that could cure the deficiencies concerning respondeat superior or ratification.

Third Cause of Action for Negligence

The basic elements of a negligence claim are: (1) a duty on the part of defendant toward plaintiff, (2) breach of that duty, and (3) harm caused by the breach. (Kesner v. Sup.Ct. (Pneumo Abex, LLC) (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1142.)

Generally, one who has not created a peril has no duty to affirmatively act so as to prevent harm to third persons. Absent an applicable statute, the law does not require one to act as a “Good Samaritan.” (Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204, 213.) However, the law does impose a legal duty to affirmatively act (to protect someone else from danger or to control the conduct of a third person) if there is a “special relationship” between defendant and the

person in danger or the third person creating the danger. (Id., at p. 215.)

Here, the SAC alleges that Falck, through its employees, assumed custody, supervision, and control over Plaintiff, a 14-year-old minor, during the ambulance transport and hospital transfer. Plaintiff alleges she was dependent on Defendants, subject to their authority and direction, and not free to act independently. (SAC ¶¶ 55–60.) The SAC further alleges this relationship created a duty to protect Plaintiff from foreseeable harm, that Falck breached that duty by failing to supervise and protect her and by placing her in a position where she was vulnerable to the Aggressor, and that this failure was a substantial factor in causing her harm. (SAC ¶¶ 60–65.)

As discussed above, the SAC adequately alleges a special relationship giving rise to an affirmative duty of reasonable care. Falck’s alleged acceptance of responsibility for Plaintiff’s supervision, control over her movement and placement, and continued custody while she was separated from her mother are sufficient, at the pleading stage, to support such a duty.

Falck argues the assault was unforeseeable because the SAC does not allege prior notice of the Aggressor’s propensity for sexual misconduct. However, the negligence claim is based on Falck’s alleged failure to reasonably protect Plaintiff while she was under its custody and supervision. Whether Falck exercised reasonable care, including whether additional supervision or safeguards were required, presents factual questions not properly resolved on demurrer.

Accordingly, the demurrer to the Third Cause of Action is OVERRULED.

Fourth Cause of Action for Negligent Supervision

Generally, an employer may be directly liable for negligently hiring, retaining, or supervising an employee who is incompetent or unfit. (Phillips v. TLC Plumbing, Inc. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1133, 1139– 1140.) Such liability arises where the employer knew or should have known that the employee presented a particular risk of harm and that risk materialized. (Id. at p. 1139.) A duty to third parties therefore arises only where the employee’s misconduct was reasonably foreseeable; i.e., where the employer knew or should have known facts that would warn a reasonable person that the employee posed an undue risk of harm in light of the work to be performed. (Federico v. Superior Court (Jenry G.) (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1207, 1214; see

also Doe v. Capital Cities (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1038, 1055 [“cornerstone of a negligent hiring theory is the risk that the employee will act in a certain way and the employee does act in that way”].)

Here, the SAC alleges Falck employed the Aggressor and placed him in a position of authority over Plaintiff, a minor. It further alleges Falck failed to adequately supervise him, implement safeguards to prevent employees from isolating or exploiting minors, and prevent him from exercising unchecked authority over Plaintiff. (SAC ¶¶ 69– 74.)

The SAC does not, however, allege facts showing Falck knew or should have known the Aggressor posed a risk of sexual misconduct. There are no allegations of prior complaints, similar misconduct, boundary violations, disciplinary history, or other warning signs that would have placed Falck on actual or constructive notice of such a risk. Absent such facts, the allegations that Falck should have provided greater supervision or additional safeguards are insufficient to state a negligent supervision claim.

Accordingly, the demurrer to the Fourth Cause of Action is SUSTAINED without leave to amend. Plaintiff previously received leave to cure this deficiency, but the SAC still does not allege facts showing Falck knew or should have known the Aggressor posed a relevant risk, and Plaintiff identifies no additional facts that could cure the defect.

Fifth Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (“IIED”)

The elements of IIED are (1) the defendant’s conduct was outrageous, (2) the defendant intended to cause the plaintiff emotional distress or acted with reckless disregard of the probability that the plaintiff would suffer emotional distress, (3) the plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress, and (4) the defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s severe emotional distress. (CACI No. 1600.) “A defendant's conduct is outrageous when it is so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community...[and] intended to inflict injury or engaged in with the realization that injury will result.” (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050–1051.)

Here, the SAC alleges Defendants’ conduct was extreme and outrageous because they assumed a custodial role over Plaintiff and failed to protect her. (SAC ¶ 77.) It further alleges Defendants

intended to cause, or recklessly disregarded the probability of causing, severe emotional distress, and that Falck ratified the Aggressor’s conduct by failing to promptly terminate him or implement safeguards. (SAC ¶¶ 78–82.)

These allegations are insufficient as to Falck. Its alleged failure to supervise or protect Plaintiff may support negligence, but the SAC does not allege facts showing Falck itself engaged in outrageous conduct or acted with the requisite intent or reckless disregard. The ratification allegations are likewise conclusory and do not show that Falck approved or ratified the assault.

Accordingly, the demurrer to the Fifth Cause of Action is SUSTAINED without leave to amend. Plaintiff has had multiple opportunities to amend and identifies no additional facts showing Falck’s own outrageous conduct, the requisite intent or reckless disregard, or sufficient ratification.

Uncertainty

Although certain causes of action fail to state sufficient facts, the SAC adequately apprises Falck of the claims and factual allegations asserted against it. Accordingly, the demurrer based on uncertainty is OVERRULED.

2. Motion To Strike

Falck moves to strike SAC paragraphs 43, 46, 53, 75, 77, 78, 81, and 82, which contain punitive-damages, ratification, and IIED allegations, as well as the prayers for punitive/exemplary damages (Prayer No. 6), attorney’s fees (Prayer No. 3), and wages, civil penalties, and statutory penalties (Prayer No. 5).

Punitive Damages

Plaintiff may recover exemplary damages in an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract if Plaintiff proves by clear and convincing evidence that defendant is “guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.” (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (a).) Malice is defined as “conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (c)(1).) Oppression is defined as “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (c)(2).) Fraud is defined as “an intentional

misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (c)(3).)

Punitive damages cannot be pled in conclusory terms, instead the facts supporting a claim for punitive damages must be set out clearly, concisely, and with particularity. (Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1041-1042.) However, “it has long been recognized that ‘(t)he distinction between conclusions of law and ultimate facts is not at all clear and involves at most a matter of degree.’” (Perkins v. Superior Court (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 1, 6.) “What is important is that the complaint as a whole contain sufficient facts to apprise the defendant of the basis upon which the plaintiff is seeking relief.” (Id.)

In ruling on a motion to strike, the Court should “read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth.” (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255; See Perkins, 117 Cal.App.3d at 6 [“stricken language must be read not in isolation, but in the context of the facts alleged in the rest of petitioner’s complaint.”].)

“When the defendant is a corporation, ‘[a]n award of punitive damages against a corporation...must rest on the malice of the corporation’s employees.’” (Wilson v. Southern California Edison Co. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 123, 164 [citing Cruz v. HomeBase (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 160, 167].)

Here, the SAC does not sufficiently allege punitive damages against Falck. Although Falck’s alleged failure to supervise and protect Plaintiff may support negligence, the SAC does not allege facts showing malice, oppression, or conscious disregard of a known danger. Nor does it allege that any Falck officer, director, or managing agent authorized or ratified the Aggressor’s conduct or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.

Accordingly, Falck’s motion to strike the punitive-damages allegations is GRANTED without leave to amend as to the punitivedamages allegations in paragraphs 43 and 46 as against Falck and Prayer for Relief No.

6. The motion is MOOT as to paragraphs 53, 75, 77, 78, 81, and 82 in light of the ruling sustaining the demurrer to the Second, Fourth, and Fifth Causes of Action without leave to amend.

Attorney’s Fees and Penalties

Plaintiff does not oppose striking Prayer No. 5 for wages, civil penalties, and statutory penalties. Plaintiff also does not oppose striking Prayer No. 3 for attorney’s fees as presently pleaded, but requests leave to amend to allege a statutory basis for fees. Plaintiff does not identify any applicable statute or explain how amendment would cure the defect. Accordingly, the motion to strike Prayer Nos. 3 and 5 is GRANTED without leave to amend.

Defendant shall file and serve its answer to the remaining causes of action within 30 days of this ruling.

Defendant to give notice.

2 Herrera vs. OFF CALENDAR Bodda-Herrera 3 Mosqueda vs. TENTATIVE RULING: Ford Motor Company For the reasons set forth below, Defendants Ford Motor Company and Joe Macpherson Ford dba AutoNation Ford Tustin’s demurrer to Plaintiffs Giselle Mosqueda and Martha Andrade Lugardo’s Complaint is OVERRULED.

Statement of Law

A demurrer only tests the sufficiency of the pleadings. (See Satyadi v. West Contra Costa Healthcare District (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 1022, 1028 [in analyzing a demurrer, the court looks only to the face of the pleadings and to matters judicially noticeable and not to the evidence or other extrinsic matters]).

In reviewing the propriety of the sustaining of a demurrer, the “court gives the complaint a reasonable interpretation, and treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded. [Citations.] The court does not, however, assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law. [Citation.] The judgment must be affirmed ‘if any one of the several grounds of demurrer is well taken. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] However, it is error for a trial court to sustain a demurrer when the plaintiff has stated a cause of action under any possible legal theory. [Citation.]

And it is an abuse of discretion to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if the plaintiff shows there is a reasonable possibility any defect identified by the defendant can be cured by amendment.” (Hale v. Sharp Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1373, 1379 [citing Aubry v. Tri–City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967].). A court will not consider facts that have not been alleged in the complaint unless they may be reasonably