Doe K.N. vs. Orangewood Academy

Defendants require the action to be tried in Defendants’ county of residence, the court GRANTS the motion to transfer to Los Angeles County.

Case Management Conference is continued to December 03, 2026, at 09:00 am in Department C10, if all applicable fees have been paid and case transferred – hearing will be vacated.

Defendants shall give notice.

6 Doe K.N. vs. The demurrers by Defendants Cristina Alba, Charidan Jackson, Orangewood and Southeastern California Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists dba Academy Orangewood Academy (“SCC”) are OVERRULED as to the third cause of action for intentional infliction of emotion distress of the second amended complaint by Plaintiff Jane Doe K.N.

The demurrer by SCC to the fifth cause of action for negligent hiring, retention, and supervision of the second amended complaint is SUSTAINED with 20 days leave to amend.

DEMURRER

The elements of a cause of action for IIED are: “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress; and (3) the defendant’s extreme and outrageous conduct was the actual and proximate cause of the severe emotional distress. [Citation.] [¶] A defendant’s conduct is considered to be outrageous if it is so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community. [Citations.]” (Crouch v. Trinity Christian Center of Santa Ana, Inc. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 995, 1007.)

Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently plead severe emotional distress. Plaintiff details the alleged conduct that caused Plaintiff IIED by each moving defendant:

• “32. DEFENDANT CRISTINA M. ALBA’s choice to give plaintiff a failing grade despite plaintiff acing her final examination, refusing to change the grade despite plaintiff and her parents raising such concerns to Defendant ALBA, interfering with Plaintiff’s college scholarship eligibility were all retaliatory acts taken against plaintiff for reporting DEFENDANT MORGAN, calling minor plaintiff a liar to third parties after disclosing the sexual assault and battery done by school principal DEFENDANT MORGAN, and stating ORANGEWOOD ACADEMY would not do anything about her reports of sexual assault and battery was extreme and outrageous conduct. It is the totality of this defendant’s actions that arise to extreme and outrageous conduct, to protect Defendant Morgan by using their limited power in the classroom to retaliate against plaintiff.” (SAC, ¶ 32). 17

• “33. DEFENDANT CHARIDAN JACKSON’s choice to give plaintiff a failing grade despite plaintiff acing her final examination, refusing to change the grade despite plaintiff and her parents raising such concerns to Defendant JACKSON, interfering with Plaintiff’s college scholarship eligibility were all retaliatory acts taken against plaintiff for reporting DEFENDANT MORGAN, calling minor plaintiff a liar to third parties after disclosing the sexual assault and battery done by school principal DEFENDANT MORGAN, shaking her head in disagreement and rolling her eyes during Jane Doe’s statement at the board meeting, in addition to not submitting the final grade that Jane Doe earned, was extreme and outrageous conduct.

It is the totality of this defendant’s actions that arise to extreme and outrageous conduct, to protect Defendant Morgan by using their limited power in the classroom to retaliate against plaintiff.” (SAC, ¶ 33).

• “36. Defendant DOE 1’s refusal to intervene and take action after Plaintiff reported Defendant MORGAN’s conduct constitutes as extreme and outrageous conduct, including but not limited to failing to comply with its mandatory reporter obligations and reporting Defendant MORGAN to law enforcement.” (SAC, ¶ 36).

• “37. Defendant DOE 1’s to intervene and take action after Plaintiff reported Defendant ALBA and JACKSON’s conduct constitutes as extreme and outrageous conduct.” (SAC, ¶ 37).

As to the conduct of the Individual Defendants, the court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to allege a cause of action for IIED. “Behavior may be considered outrageous if a defendant (1) abuses a relation or position which gives him power to damage the plaintiff's interest; (2) knows the plaintiff is susceptible to injuries through mental distress; or (3) acts intentionally or unreasonably with the recognition that the acts are likely to result in illness through mental distress.” (McDaniel v.

Gile (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 363, 372). Here, Plaintiff alleges that Plaintiff reported that the school's principal had sexually assaulted her, Alba and Jackson retaliated by falsifying Plaintiff's grade despite Plaintiff having earned an A on her final exam but entering a zero, refused to correct the false grade even after Plaintiff and her parents raised the discrepancy directly with her. Plaintiff also alleges that this action deliberately interfered with Plaintiff's merit-based college scholarship eligibility.

Defendant Jackson then told other faculty members Plaintiff was a liar and created social isolation for Plaintiff at school. A trier of fact could reasonably infer that such conduct was an abuse of Alba and Jackson’s position, used to damage Plaintiff’s interest, that Plaintiff was susceptible to mental distress and that social isolation and the loss of a merit-based college scholarship would cause mental distress to a teenager.

As to defendant SCC, as the court previously found, Plaintiff’s allegations against Morgan were sufficient to constitute sexual assault, sexual battery, and/or battery. What constitutes reasonable suspicion and whether or not SCC breached its duty to investigate, take Plaintiff’s allegations seriously, and/or reprimand/terminate Morgan is a question of fact that cannot be decided on demurrer. “Those allegations and facts reasonably inferred from them are sufficient to impose vicarious liability against [SCC] for [Morgan’s] conduct.

Under the respondeat superior doctrine, an employer is liable for the torts of its employees committed within the scope of employment.” (Crouch v. Trinity Christian Center of Santa Ana, Inc. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 995, 1011). Further, where an entity acts recklessly with the intent to harm a minor so that the minor would not report to the police or news media, that raises sufficient questions of fact to constitute IIED. (Id. at 1011). Here, Plaintiff reported an incident that, if proven true, would foreseeably cause Plaintiff, a teenage minor, mental distress.

SCC’s conduct, which favored the interest of Morgan and abandoned Plaintiff’s could be inferred by a jury to be outrageous conduct.

Defendants’ reliance on Janken v. GM Hughes Electronics (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 55 is misplaced. In Janken, the court first discussed the difference between harassment claims under FEHA and age discrimination claims under FEHA. (Id. at 64). Harassment claims are based on a type of conduct that is avoidable and unnecessary to job performance. (Id.) Discrimination claims, by contrast, arise out of the performance of necessary personnel management duties. (Id. at 63.) As such, “[m]aking a personnel decision is conduct of a type fundamentally different from the type of conduct that constitutes harassment.

Harassment claims are based on a type of conduct that is avoidable and unnecessary to job performance.” (Id. at 64). “[C]ommonly necessary personnel management actions such as hiring and firing, job or project assignments, office or work station assignments, promotion or demotion, performance evaluations, the provision of support, the assignment or nonassignment of supervisory functions, deciding who will and who will not attend meetings, deciding who will be laid off, and the like, do not come within the meaning of harassment.” (Id. at 64-65).

Based on this reasoning, the court held that managing personnel that may result in age discrimination “is not outrageous conduct beyond the bounds of human decency, but rather conduct essential to the welfare and prosperity of society.” (Id. at 80).

The narrow reasoning in Janken does not apply here. The conduct alleged is not purely managerial personnel decisions that my result in discrimination. Rather, here, the conduct alleged involved falsifying grades, preventing Plaintiff from obtaining a merit-scholarship, mocking Plaintiff, and being a participant creating social isolation for Plaintiff go beyond mere personnel decisions.

The demurrers to the third cause of action are OVERRULED.

Fifth Cause of Action for Negligent Hiring, Retention, or Supervision— SCC Only 19

The theory of negligent supervision may be applied to impose liability on a religious organization for childhood sexual abuse, assuming that the general requirements for this cause of action are met. (Mark K. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 603.) Negligence liability will be imposed on an employer if it knew or should have known that hiring the employee created a particular risk or hazard and that particular harm materializes. (Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2019) 40 Cal. App. 5th 1077.)

Defendant SCC argues that the SAC is silent as to the notice and timeline of the allegations that defendants Morgan, Alba, and/or Jackson were unfit or incompetent prior to being hired by SCC. Defendant further argues that the SAC does not allege that SCC had any prior knowledge of the employee’s unfitness. (See Z.V. v. County of Riverside (2015) 238 Cal. App. 4th 889, 902 ("To establish negligent supervision, a plaintiff must show that a person in a supervisorial position over the actor had prior knowledge of the actor's propensity to do the bad act."))

The court agrees that the SAC does not cure these defects. It is unclear when the complaints were made and whether or not the cause of action is based on negligent retention only (i.e., retaining Morgan, Alba, and Jackson after complaints were made) and/or whether or not the cause of action encompasses negligent hiring (to which extent, the allegations are unclear that Defendant had knowledge of any complaints prior to hiring.

As such, Plaintiff fails to allege, at what time Defendant Morgan, Alba, and Jackson allegedly became incompetent/unfit, whether or not that time period occurred before or after Plaintiff’s claimed harm, and when/what particular risk or hazard and/or particular harm materialized.

For this reason, the demurrer is SUSTAINED with 20 days leave to amend as to the fifth cause of action as against SCC.

Moving Defendants to give notice.

7 Corey vs. The Defendants Regents of the University of California and Angela Myer, M.D. Regents of the demur and move to strike portions of the First Amended Complaint filed by University of Plaintiff Jacie Ruelas Corey. For the following reasons, the demurrer California is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

Plaintiff shall file her Second Amended Complaint by September 10, 2026.

In light of this ruling, Defendants’ motion to strike is rendered moot.

On February 2, 2026, Plaintiff filed a document entitled “Amended Complaint [¶] My First Amended Complaint.” However, this First Amended Complaint does not assert any causes of action.

CRC Rule 2.112 requires:

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