Manolelis vs. Staffpay, Inc

impossible because they share an identical unity of interest, and Plaintiff therefore requests the court grant the motion under the court’s “broad equitable discretion to find that all defendant litigations costs were completely intertwined”. (Repl. Br. at p. 2, lines 5-14.)

The court however disagrees that differentiating costs is impossible. For example, the first matter listed in the Cost Memorandum Worksheet is for $448.50 to answer the Second Amended Complaint. According to the court file, defendants separately answered the Second Amended Complaint. (See ROAs 129 and 136.) The amount requested does not represent fees that would be incurred by more than one defendant.

As Defendant Restoration notes in its opposing papers, “Plaintiff has not sought to contest or tax any of the specific items included in [the Cost Memorandum].” (Opp’n Br. at p. 3, lines 10-12.)

Accordingly, the court DENIES the motion.

Defendants to give notice.

10 Manolelis vs. P’s Motion to Compel Further Staffpay, Inc RFPs (Set One) D’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Form Interrogatories (Set One); and RFPs (Set One)

1. Plaintiff’s Motion (re RFPs)

The court DENIES Plaintiff COLLEEN RUGGIERO MANOLELIS moves to compel Defendant STAFFPAY, LLC to serve further responses to Plaintiff’s Requests for the Production of Documents (Set One) (“RFP”), Nos. 9-11.

RFPs 9-11 seek “All communications, including but not limited to emails, text messages, and written correspondence” between Defendant, on the one hand, and on the other hand, (1) Decedent Theo Manolelis

(“Theo”), (2) Paragon (Theo’s company), and (3) Plaintiff Colleen Manolelis.

To each of these RFPs, Defendant responded by incorporating its general objections and objecting on the basis that the RFPs 1) are overbroad as to time and scope, and 2) seek irrelevant information or information that is equally available to Plaintiff. Subject to those objections, Defendant stated it would meet and confer with Plaintiff about limitations on the temporal and substantive scope of this request. The parties apparently did not agree on any such limitations.

After this motion was filed, Defendant produced documents consisting of over 71,000 pages, some of which were identified to be produced in response to RFPs 9-11. (Supp. Korenaga Decl., ¶ 2, Exhs. B and C.)

Defendant primarily objects on the basis that the RFPs are overbroad and unduly burdensome as to time and scope. The court agrees. The requests provide no time period limitation or subject matter limitation and as such, appears to be a mere fishing expedition. Plaintiff fails to proffer a good cause showing for such broad discovery requests. Notably, Defendant employed Theo for nearly two decades.

Defendant also objects on relevance grounds. Again, the RFPs seek “all communications” between Defendant on the one hand and Theo, Paragon, and Plaintiff on the other hand. While the requests may capture materials that are inadmissible, a litigant’s right to discovery is broad. (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 551; see also Davies v. Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal.3d 291, 301 [“discovery is not limited to admissible evidence”].) The statutory phrase “‘subject matter’” is “‘broader than the issues’ and is not limited to admissible evidence.” (Jessen v. Hartford Casualty Ins. Co. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 698, 711.) At the same time, because the requests are so broadly stated, without a time or subject matter limitation, the requests would likely cover materials clearly irrelevant to this litigation.

Accordingly, the court DENIES the motion in its entirety.

Re sanctions: Defendant requests monetary sanctions against Plaintiff and her counsel in the total sum of $10,500. Plaintiff sought sanctions of $8,700 in connection with its motion.

Sanctions are available on a motion to compel a further response to inspection demands. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.310 [“The court shall impose a monetary sanction ... against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel ... unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.”].) And if the results are mixed, the court has the discretion to apportion sanctions or award no sanctions on any terms as may be just. (See Mattco Valley Forge v. Arthur Young & Co. (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1429, 1437.)

The court finds that under the circumstances, sanctions would be unjust. As such, the court DENIES the requests for sanctions.

Defendant Staffpay to give notice.

2. Defendant’s Motions (re Form Interrogs & RFPs)

The court GRANTS Defendant STAFFPAY, LLC’S motions to compel Plaintiff COLLEEN RUGGIERO MANOLELIS to serve further responses to (1) Defendant’s Form Interrogatories (Set One), No. 52, and (2) Requests for the Production of Documents (Set One)(“RFP), No.

33.

Form interrogatory No. 50.2 states, “Was there a breach of any agreement alleged in the pleadings? If so, for each breach describe and give the date of every act or omission that you claim is the breach of the agreement.”

Plaintiff responded, “Plaintiff has alleged causes of action for 1) Conversion, 2) Fraud and 3) Declaratory Relief in this action, not breach of agreement.”

Plaintiff’s response is insufficient. Form interrogatory 50.2 does not ask whether the pleadings allege a breach of contract. It asks whether there was a breach of any agreement alleged in the pleadings. Plaintiff is therefore ordered to provide a further response to Form Interrogatory No. 50.2.

RFP No. 33 requests, “All COMMUNICATIONS between THEO and his estate attorneys CONCERNING STAFFPAY since January 1, 2013.”

Plaintiff initially responded, “Responding Party objects to this Request on the grounds that it is overbroad in scope and time, unduly burdensome, compound, seeks communications between third parties in which Responding Party was not involved, seeks privileged attorney-client communications, and is vague and ambiguous as to the term “his estate attorneys.”

After the motion was filed, Plaintiff served a supplemental response that repeats the same objections and states that, without waiving those objections, Plaintiff “has conducted a further diligent search and reasonable inquiry” and “will comply with this Request and produce all responsive documents in its possession, custody or control.”

Based on the supplemental response, Defendant has withdrawn as moot its request for an order compelling Plaintiff to serve a statement of compliance but also argues that Plaintiff invokes the attorney-client privilege while not provided a privilege log.

While Plaintiff states in her opposing brief that Plaintiff “located just one email” responsive to RFP No. 33, Plaintiff also asserts she is not waiving her objections, including based on the attorney-client privilege. As such, it’s not clear whether Plaintiff is withholding any document based on attorney-client privilege.

If so, Plaintiff is ordered to provide within 20 days a privilege log pursuant to Section 2031.240(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The log must identify each document for which privilege is claimed, its author, recipients, date of preparation, and the specific privilege or work product

protection claimed. Alternatively, Plaintiff may serve a statement within 20 days explaining that no document is being withheld based on privilege. For clarity, Plaintiff’s non-privilege objections are OVERRULED.

Re sanctions: Defendant seeks monetary sanctions of $17,850.00, consisting of 17 hours at an hourly rate of $1,050.00. (Grant Cofer Decl., ¶ 8.) The request appears excessive in light of the issues raised.

The court finds the just and reasonable amount of fees to award here is $2,100.00. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.300, 2031.310.)

In sum:

Consistent with this ruling, Plaintiff SHALL within 20 days:

(A) serve a further response to Defendant’s Form Interrogatory (Set One), No. 52; (B) serve a privilege log/statement concerning Defendant’s RFP (Set One), No. 33; and (C) pay Defendant Staffpay a total of $1,200.00 in monetary sanctions.

Defendant Staffpay to give notice.

11 Keller vs. Etheridge Demurrer (re First Amended Complaint)

The court OVERRULES the general demurrer filed by Defendants KEVIN M. ETHERIDGE (individually) and KEVIN M. ETHERIDGE and CARALI S. ETHERIDGE, Trustees of the ETHERIDGE LIVING TRUST DATED September 1, 2020 to the third cause of action (nuisance) in the First Amended Complaint (FAC) filed by Plaintiffs ERIC KELLER and TRACY KELLER.

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have not cured the defects identified in the court’s prior ruling on Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings (MJOP) and instead, Plaintiffs continue to plead a time-barred permanent nuisance claim.

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