Motion to Compel Further Responses (Plaintiff); Motion to Compel Further Responses (Cross-Complainant)
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Case No.: 24CV445397 I. INTRODUCTION
This order addresses two discovery motions heard on July 31, 2026: (1) Plaintiff Terry Kwong's Motion to Compel Further Responses from Defendant Elaine Yang to Requests for Admissions, Set One, Nos. 5, 6, and 7 ("Motion 1"); and (2) Cross-
Complainant Elaine Yang's Omnibus Motion to Compel Further Responses from Cross- Defendants Joric Pang and Campbell Land Company, L.P. to Requests for Production of Documents, Set One, Nos. 23 and 35 ("Motion 2"). The Court has reviewed all moving, opposition, and reply papers, and considered the arguments of counsel.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 16, 2024, Plaintiffs Terry Kwong and Monica Suryoutomo filed their Complaint against Defendants Elaine Yang, Tiffany Wang, and ABC Consulting & Management, Inc. On June 2, 2025, Elaine Yang filed her Cross-Complaint against Cross-Defendants Terry Kwong, Monica Suryoutomo, Lily Pang, Joric Pang, and Campbell Land Company, L.P. On May 9, 2025, Plaintiff Kwong served Requests for Admissions, Set One, on Defendant Yang. Yang served verified responses on June 24, 2025. Following extensive meet-and-confer efforts, Kwong filed Motion 1 seeking further amended responses to RFAs Nos. 5, 6, and 7 regarding borrowed funds and credit card purchases.
Yang served her Requests for Production of Documents, Set One, on Cross- Defendants Joric Pang and Campbell Land Company on August 15, 2025. Pang and Campbell Land served verified responses on September 23, 2025. After meet-and-confer discussions, the parties stipulated to narrow the dispute to RFP Nos. 23 and 35 only, seeking tax returns and K-1s dating to 1993 and ownership interest documents dating to 2009, with Yang withdrawing her sanctions request. The parties have continued to engage in substantial good-faith efforts to narrow these disputes, as evidenced by the joint stipulation eliminating most issues and all sanctions requests.
On February 24, 2026, the Court held an Informal Discovery Conference at which it instructed the parties that seeking documents across decades prior to 2020 is inappropriate due to the four-year statute of limitations period. (Opp.Cross-Defendants Joric 3:16-25.) The Court indicated that documents pertaining to the Partnership's activities during specific periods prior to 2020 could potentially be relevant and, therefore, discoverable. (Decl. of Veena A. Bansal 4:1-4.) Following the IDC, Kwong agreed to limit his document requests to 2020 forward, resolving all Requests for Production originally at issue in his concurrent motion. (Opp.
Cross-Defendants Joric 5:1-2.) Yang's motion was originally broader, but following a joint stipulation filed July 20, 2026, Yang withdrew her motion against Lily Pang entirely and withdrew her sanctions request. III. MOTION 1: PLAINTIFF TERRY KWONG'S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS NOS. 5, 6, AND 7
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A. Summary of the Parties' Arguments
1. Plaintiff Kwong's Arguments Plaintiff Kwong seeks to compel Defendant Yang to provide further amended and verified responses to three Requests for Admissions concerning financial transactions involving the Milpitas Greens partnership.
RFA No. 5 requests Yang to "Admit that you have borrowed money from MILPITAS GREENS." RFA No. 6 requests Yang to "Admit that you have not repaid all money you borrowed from MILPITAS GREENS." RFA No. 7 requests Yang to "Admit that you have used MILPITAS GREENS's credit card to make purchases for yourself." Kwong contends that Yang's responses are evasive and non-committal, failing to comply with the statutory requirement to admit, deny, or state in detail why she cannot respond. Specifically, Kwong argues that Yang's response to RFA No. 5 improperly focuses on whether borrowed amounts are "currently due or payable" rather than directly admitting or denying whether she borrowed money.
Similarly, Yang's response to RFA No. 6 addresses whether amounts are presently due rather than whether she has repaid all borrowed funds. For RFA No. 7, Kwong asserts Yang's response is even more evasive, denying "improper" use of the credit card without directly admitting or denying personal purchases. Kwong emphasizes that Yang never requested clarification about ambiguous terms during multiple meet-and-confer efforts, despite being provided with relevant credit card statements. Kwong relies on the statutory framework requiring straightforward admissions or denials, arguing that qualified responses circumvent the purpose of requests for admissions.
2. Defendant Yang's Arguments Yang contends her responses are code-compliant and that she has acted in good faith by supplementing responses and producing extensive documentation. Yang argues the RFAs are vague, overbroad, compound, and call for legal conclusions. For RFA No. 5, Yang admits that Milpitas Greens extended funds to her but asserts these are not currently due or payable and no demand for repayment has been made. For RFA No. 6, Yang denies that any amounts are due and payable or that demand has been made.
For RFA No. 7, Yang denies using the credit card for any improper purpose and contends she reimbursed any accidental expenses. Yang argues the requests are compound in nature, requiring her to admit or deny several factual premises simultaneously, making them improper. Yang further contends that RFAs are intended to eliminate undisputed matters, not to force admissions to disputed facts, and that when a party objects but also provides complete responses, there is nothing left to compel. Yang emphasizes that discovery is ongoing and she reserves the right to supplement her responses.
She has produced 184 documents on May 13, 2026, 306 additional documents on June 16, 2026, and 206 more documents totaling approximately 6,416 pages on July 13, 2026.
B. Legal Standards
California Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.290 authorizes a motion to compel further responses when an answer to a request for admission is evasive or incomplete, or when an objection is without merit or too general. (Cal Code Civ Proc § 2033.290) The responding party must provide a direct answer or set forth in detail the reasons for inability to admit or deny. Each answer must be as complete and straightforward as the information reasonably available to the responding party permits. If a responding party does not
have sufficient information to admit the matter, the party must set forth the particularity the reasons why the party cannot reasonably obtain that information.
C.
Analysis
The Court finds that Yang's responses to RFAs Nos. 5, 6, and 7 are qualified and do not directly admit or deny the facts as phrased in the requests. RFA No. 5 asks a straightforward factual question: whether Yang has borrowed money from Milpitas Greens. Yang's response shifts the inquiry to whether borrowed amounts are "currently due or payable" or subject to demand. This reformulation evades the core question. The request does not ask about current obligations or repayment schedules; it asks whether Yang has borrowed money.
A party may borrow funds that are not currently due and still admit to having borrowed them. Yang's response thus provides an incomplete answer to the question actually posed. RFA No. 6 similarly asks whether Yang has repaid all borrowed money. Yang's response again redirects to whether amounts are "due and payable" or demanded. The question is historical and factual: has repayment occurred? Yang's response addressing the present obligation status rather than the repayment history is non-responsive.
RFA No. 7 requests Yang to admit she has used the partnership's credit card to make purchases for herself. Yang's response denies using the card for "any improper purpose" and claims reimbursement for "accidental expenses." This response adds qualifications not present in the request. The RFA asks about personal purchases, not improper ones. Whether a purchase was proper or improper, or whether it was later reimbursed, does not answer whether Yang used the credit card for personal purchases. Yang's reframing substitutes a different question for the one asked.
Yang's objections that the RFAs are vague, compound, or call for legal conclusions are not persuasive. The requests are direct inquiries about objective facts: borrowing money, repaying money, and using a credit card. These are not complex legal constructs requiring interpretation. While Yang argues the requests are compound, each RFA asks a single factual question. RFA No. 5 does not ask multiple questions; it asks whether Yang borrowed money. RFA No. 6 asks whether she has repaid all borrowed money, a single historical fact.
RFA No. 7 asks whether she used the credit card for personal purchases, again, a unitary factual inquiry. Yang's argument that she did not request clarification during meet-and-confer is significant. If the requests were truly ambiguous or vague, Yang had ample opportunity to seek clarification. Her failure to do so undermines the claim that the requests are deficient. Yang's extensive document production, while commendable for advancing discovery, does not cure inadequate responses to requests for admissions.
Document production and requests for admissions serve different purposes. The latter are designed to narrow issues for trial by establishing uncontroverted facts. Providing documents while simultaneously offering qualified, non-responsive answers to RFAs does not satisfy the statutory obligation. The Court recognizes Yang's argument that RFAs should not be used to force admissions to disputed facts. However, the requests here seek basic factual admissions about financial transactions. If Yang disputes that she borrowed money, she should deny it.
If she admits borrowing but disputes current liability, she should admit the
borrowing and, if necessary, explain why no current liability exists. The statute requires direct answers followed by necessary qualifications, not substitution of different questions. Plaintiff Terry Kwong's Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Admissions nos. 5, 6, and 7 is GRANTED. Defendant Elaine Yang shall serve further amended verified responses to Requests for Admissions, Set One, Nos. 5, 6, and 7 within ten (10) days of the date of this order. The responses shall directly admit or deny each request as phrased, or state in detail the reasons Yang cannot admit or deny after making reasonable inquiry. Any objections must be specific and supported by factual detail demonstrating why the request is objectionable.
IV. MOTION 2: CROSS-COMPLAINANT ELAINE YANG'S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION NOS. 23 AND 35
A. Summary of the Parties' Arguments
1. Yang's Arguments Yang seeks to compel Cross-Defendants Joric Pang and Campbell Land Company, L.P. to produce documents responsive to two requests: RFP No. 23, seeking all federal, state, and local income tax returns, including K-1s and Form 1099s; and RFP No. 35, seeking documents showing all entities in which Pang or Campbell Land have held any ownership or equity interest. Yang argues these documents are fundamental to partnership accounting and directly relevant to her claims of self-dealing, undisclosed distributions, and breach of fiduciary duty.
Yang contends that K-1s and 1099s are essential for tracing partnership funds, determining whether assets were diverted, and evaluating the partnership's ownership and voting structure. Yang emphasizes that the statute of limitations does not bar discovery of pre- 2020 documents, particularly in partnership cases involving continuing fiduciary duties and alleged concealed misconduct. Yang asserts her Cross-Complaint adequately alleges facts supporting delayed discovery, including concealment of transactions and lack of access to full partnership records.
Yang argues the tax return privilege is not absolute and is waived when the taxpayer's finances are directly at issue. Yang contends Pang's objections of overbreadth and burden are unsupported by any factual showing or declaration. Yang points to case law supporting broad discovery in partnership and fiduciary duty cases. Yang disputes Pang's characterization of the Court's February 24, 2026 IDC guidance, arguing the Court did not impose a categorical 2020 cutoff but indicated documents pertaining to specific partnership activities during periods prior to 2020 could be relevant and discoverable.
2. Pang and Campbell Land's Arguments Pang and Campbell Land object to the requests as overbroad, unduly burdensome, not reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence, and calculated to harass. They argue the Court's IDC guidance bars pre-2020 documents due to the four-year statute of limitations.
Pang and Campbell Land assert they have produced all responsive, non-privileged documents from 2020 through September 2025. They contend Yang, as a former general partner, had access to all relevant partnership records and financial documents during her tenure, undermining any claim of inability to obtain documents earlier. Pang and Campbell Land argue Yang cannot rely on the delayed discovery rule because she failed to allege facts sufficient to support this doctrine in her Cross- Complaint. They emphasize that Yang's claims alleging wrongful acts since approximately 1995 are barred by the statute of limitations, and documents must be limited accordingly.
Pang and Campbell Land cite legal standards requiring relevance, specificity, and limits on fishing expeditions. They note that Plaintiff Kwong agreed not to seek documents prior to 2020 in his concurrent motion, suggesting Yang should be held to the same temporal limitation.
B. Legal Standards
A party seeking to compel further responses to requests for production must set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought. (Cal Code Civ Proc § 2031.310.) The burden is on the moving party to show both relevance to the subject matter and specific facts justifying discovery. A party may discover any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action if the matter is either admissible in evidence or reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
While the scope of civil discovery is broad, it is not limitless. The court shall limit the scope of discovery if it determines that the burden, expense, or intrusiveness of that discovery clearly outweighs the likelihood that the information sought will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. (Cal Code Civ Proc § 2017.020.) The responding party bears the burden of demonstrating that discovery should be limited.
C.
Analysis
The Court finds that Yang has demonstrated the relevance and discoverability of the requested financial records. K-1s, Form 1099s, and entity ownership documents are fundamental categories of financial evidence in a partnership dispute involving allegations of self-dealing, breach of fiduciary duty, undisclosed distributions, and improper use of partnership funds. Yang's Cross-Complaint alleges that beginning in 1989 and continuing through the 1990s, Pang and others used partnership funds to purchase limited-partner interests without disclosure or reimbursement, while delaying the recording of partnership documents and obscuring the true ownership and voting structure of Milpitas Greens.
The Cross-Complaint alleges Yang contributed substantial funds in 1993 to prevent the partnership's bankruptcy, that Pang concealed transactions involving partnership assets affecting ownership interests and distributions, and that by approximately 1994 Pang participated in additional financial arrangements involving partnership funds. These allegations, if proven, would directly implicate the financial records Yang seeks. K-1s and 1099s reflect distributions and income allocations over time. Entity ownership documents would reveal whether Pang used partnership funds to acquire
interests in related entities or whether conflicts of interest existed. These are precisely the types of records essential to proving or defending against the claims at issue. Pang and Campbell Land have produced documents from 2020 through September 2025. The disputed issue is whether Yang is entitled to documents dating back to 1993 (for tax returns and K-1s) and 2009 (for entity ownership documents).
1. The Court's IDC Guidance The parties dispute the meaning of the Court's February 24, 2026 IDC guidance. Yang asserts the Court did not impose a categorical 2020 cutoff but indicated documents pertaining to specific partnership activities during periods prior to 2020 could be relevant and discoverable. Pang and Campbell Land argue the Court instructed that seeking documents across decades prior to 2020 is inappropriate due to the fouryear statute of limitations. The Court clarifies its IDC guidance.
The Court did not establish a bright-line rule that no documents prior to 2020 are discoverable. The Court indicated that the fouryear statute of limitations is a relevant consideration in evaluating temporal scope, and that requests spanning multiple decades require a correspondingly strong showing of need and relevance to specific claims or defenses. The Court emphasized that discovery should be proportional and that parties seeking historical records must demonstrate why those specific records are necessary to prosecution or defense of particular claims.
2. Temporal Scope and Proportionality Yang seeks 33 years of tax records (1993–present) and 17 years of entity ownership documents (2009–present). This is an extraordinarily broad temporal scope. While Yang has articulated general relevance to partnership accounting and fiduciary duty claims, the requests as framed are insufficiently tailored to specific claims, defenses, transactions, or time periods. Yang argues the statute of limitations does not limit discovery scope, citing authority that accrual of claims is distinct from temporal scope of relevant discovery.
This is correct as a general proposition. Evidence from outside the limitations period may be relevant to proving claims within the period or establishing patterns, knowledge, or intent. However, this principle does not eliminate the requirement that the requesting party demonstrate specific relevance and proportionality. Yang has not identified which specific alleged acts or transactions in her Cross- Complaint require tax returns and K-1s from 1993, or entity ownership documents from 2009. Yang has not explained what specific accounting questions remain unanswered by the 2020–2025 documents already produced.
Yang has not addressed proportionality— why the importance of the discovery justifies the burden of producing decades of historical records.
3. Access to Records and Delayed Discovery Pang and Campbell Land argue Yang, as a general partner from 1993 until her removal in 2024, had access to partnership books, records, and financial documents, including K-1s issued by Milpitas Greens. This access undermines Yang's ability to invoke delayed discovery for pre-2020 documents. Yang responds that access to some records does not equal knowledge of all misconduct, particularly where the responding party controls the accounting and is alleged to have deliberately concealed transactions. Yang alleges Pang and Kwong intentionally delayed recording partnership documents and used partnership funds to purchase additional limited-partner interests while concealing that fact from Yang.
The Court finds Yang's delayed discovery allegations insufficient as currently pleaded to support discovery of 33 years of tax records and 17 years of entity ownership documents. While the Cross-Complaint alleges concealment in general terms, it does not plead facts showing Yang could not, despite reasonable diligence, have discovered the specific information reflected in pre-2020 K-1s, 1099s, and entity ownership documents during her 31 years as general partner with access to partnership records.
4. Good Cause and Specificity Yang must demonstrate good cause for the requested discovery by setting forth specific facts showing why each category of documents for each time period is necessary. (Cal Code Civ Proc § 2031.310.) Yang's showing here is general rather than specific. Yang argues the documents are needed for "a complete partnership accounting" and to trace funds and evaluate ownership structure. These are valid purposes, but Yang has not connected them to specific time periods, specific transactions, or specific claims and defenses with the particularity required to justify decades of historical financial records.
For example, Yang's Cross-Complaint alleges misconduct beginning in 1989 and continuing through the 1990s involving use of partnership funds to purchase interests and concealment of transactions. If Yang seeks pre-2020 K-1s to establish a pattern of improper distributions or to trace specific transfers of partnership funds to acquire ownership interests, Yang must identify which years, which transactions, and why. If Yang seeks entity ownership documents from 2009 forward because a judgment was entered that year and Yang contends Pang used entities to circumvent the judgment, Yang must specify which entities, which transactions, and why documents for the entire 17-year period are necessary rather than a more focused temporal scope.
5. Less Intrusive Alternatives Pang and Campbell Land have produced all responsive documents from 2020 through September 2025, covering the limitations period. Yang has not adequately explained why these documents are insufficient to establish her claims. If Yang contends that specific historical transactions require corroboration or that patterns extending before 2020 are probative, Yang must explain what those transactions are, why they require pre-2020 documents, and why documents already in her possession or available from other sources do not suffice. Yang was a general partner with access to partnership records for decades. Yang presumably possesses some historical partnership documents, financial statements, and tax returns from her tenure. Yang has not explained why her own records, combined with the 2020–2025 production from Pang, are insufficient.
D. Ruling on Motion 2
Cross-Complainant Elaine Yang's Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production Nos. 23 And 35 is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Yang may file a narrowly tailored renewed motion supported by a specific factual showing of good cause. To succeed on any renewed motion, Yang must address the following with particularity:
a. Necessity of Specific Document Categories. Yang must identify the particular categories of documents sought and explain with specific facts why each category is necessary to the prosecution of her cross-claims or defense of claims against
her. General assertions that documents are needed for "a complete partnership accounting" are insufficient. Yang must explain what specific accounting questions remain unanswered by the documents already produced for the 2020–2025 period. b. Linkage to Claims or Defenses. Yang must demonstrate a direct nexus between the specific documents sought and particular claims or defenses in the operative pleadings. The Cross-Complaint alleges wrongful acts since approximately 1995. If Yang seeks pre-2020 documents, she must identify which specific alleged acts or transactions require those documents and why. c.
Proportionality and Importance. Yang must address the proportionality of the discovery sought. A request for 33 years of tax records or 17 years of ownership documents requires a correspondingly strong showing of need. Yang must demonstrate that the importance of the requested discovery to the resolution of the litigation justifies the burden and expense of producing decades of historical records. The scope of civil discovery, while broad, is not limitless. d. Why Less Intrusive Discovery Is Insufficient.
Yang must explain why documents within the limitations period (2020–2025), which have been fully produced, are insufficient to establish her claims. If specific historical transactions require corroboration, Yang must explain what those transactions are and why documents already in her possession or available from other sources (given her years of access to partnership records as a general partner) do not suffice. e. Temporal Specificity. Consistent with this Court's IDC guidance, any renewed motion must identify specific time periods for which documents are sought and explain why each period is relevant, rather than seeking blanket production across decades.
Yang may file a narrowly tailored renewed motion consistent with the guidance set forth above. V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court rules as follows: 1. Motion 1 (Kwong v. Yang—Requests for Admissions Nos. 5, 6, 7) is GRANTED. Defendant Yang shall serve further amended verified responses within ten (10) days.
2. Motion 2 (Yang v. Pang/Campbell Land—Requests for Production Nos. 23, 35) is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Cross Complainant Yang may file a renewed motion supported by a specific factual showing of good cause consistent with the guidance set forth in Section IV.D of this order and the court’s prior IDC guidance.
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