Douglas vs. Regents of the University of California

5 Douglas vs. Defendants The Regents of the University of California, Julius Edson, Regents of the Daniela Bota, Aimee Edinger, Ed Monuki, Elizabeth Head, Claudia University of Benavente, Young Jik Kwon, Elizabeth Rome, Shannon Kotter, Hillel California Adesnik, David Fruman, and Christopher Hughes demur to the Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) filed by Plaintiff Christopher Ryan Douglas. For the following reasons, the demurrer is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

Should Plaintiff wish to file a Third Amended Complaint, he shall do so by September 24, 2026.

In ruling on a demurrer, a court must accept as true all allegations of fact contained in the complaint. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) A demurrer challenges only the legal sufficiency of the affected pleading, not the truth of the factual allegations in the pleading or the pleader’s ability to prove those allegations. (Cundiff v. GTE Cal., Inc. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1404-05.)

Defendants’ request for judicial notice is GRANTED. (See Regents of Univ. of Calif. v. City of Santa Monica (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 130, 135; see Mendoza v. The Regents of the University of California (1978) Cal.App.3d 168, fn. 3 [judicial notice of the Regents’ policies is appropriate]; People v. Lofchie (2014) 229 Cal. App. 4th 240, 260.)

Dismissals

In his opposition, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed Defendants Hillel Adesnik, Shannon Kotter, Elizabeth Rome, Christopher Hughes and Young Jik Kwon from this action without prejudice. (Opp. at 6:2-4; 26:8-11.) Thus, these defendants are hereby dismissed with prejudice.

Plaintiff also agreed to dismiss the RICO claim. (Opp. at 16:3.) This claim is dismissed without prejudice.

Plaintiff agreed to withdraw the Bane Act claim. (Opp. at 15:27.) This claim is dismissed without prejudice.

Plaintiff agreed to dismiss the claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. (Opp. at 24:21.) This claim is dismissed without prejudice.

Plaintiff agreed to waive the cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (Opp. at 23:4-6.) Plaintiff also agreed to waive the claim under Labor Code 1102.5. (Opp. at 23:6-8; see also Opp. at 25:16-17 [“Plaintiff is willing to voluntarily dismiss the Claims for Whistleblower Retaliation and RICO, provided leave is granted to amend...”].) These claims are dismissed without prejudice.

First cause of action

The first cause of action is styled, “Attempted Civil Extortion, Extortion, Commercial Bribery, Civil Rights Interference, Witness Tampering, and Conspiracy (Including RICO Predicate Acts, California Unfair Competition Law, Proposition 64, and Bane Act Violations, and Prior Misconduct Creating a Hostile Environment.” (SAC at 50:17-21.) Plaintiff appears to assert numerous theories against Defendant into one cause of action, including extortion, bribery, violation of California unfair competition law, and violation of the Bane Act.

This is a proper basis upon which to sustain a special demurrer. (Campbell v. Rayburn (1954) 129 Cal.App.2d 232, 235 [“A further consideration is that the special demurrer was properly sustained because the complaint was defective in that two purported causes of action were not separately stated.”].) Plaintiff has also agreed to dismiss portions of this cause of action, including the Bane Act clam and the RICO claim.

Further, Defendants have shown that public entities, including Defendant Regents and its employees, are immune from liability for common law tort claims such as unless the legislature expressly provides for such liability. (Gov. Code, §§ 815(a) and 820.2; McCarty v. State of California Dept. of Transp. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 955, 977 [“a public entity cannot be held liable for common law negligence”]; Miklosy v. Regents of University of California (2008) 44 Cal.4th 876, 899 [Subject to certain exceptions, Government Code section 815 “abolishes common law tort liability for public entities.”].)

The demurrer to this cause of action is sustained.

Second cause of action

The second cause of action is styled, “Violation of California Government Code §§ 11135 et seq. and 12940 et seq., and California Code Regs., Title 2, § 14071 — Discrimination and Retaliation.” (SAC at 63:8-10.)

Plaintiff has agreed to dismiss this cause of action as to the individual Regents Defendants.

Under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), exhaustion of administrative remedies is “a jurisdictional prerequisite to resort to the court.” (Johnson v. City of Loma Linda (2000) 24 Cal.4th 61, 70 (internal quotes omitted); see Campbell v. Regents of Univ. of Calif. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 311, 321.) Therefore, failure to file an administrative charge before commencing suit is ground for dismissal of an action for violation of the FEHA. (Okoli v. Lockheed Technical Operations Co. (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1607, 1613; Martin v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., Inc. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1718, 1724.)

The SAC does not allege Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies. Plaintiff’s Opposition attaches a letter to address this issue, but that is

beyond the scope of a demurrer, which addresses only the operative pleading and material that is subject to judicial notice.

The demurrer to this cause of action is sustained with leave to amend.

Third cause of action

The third cause of action is styled, “defamation, civil conspiracy, and tortious interference.” As discussed previously in connection with the first cause of action, this cause of action is uncertain because it combines three causes of action into one.

Further, as discussed previously, Government Code Sections 815 and 820.2 establishes immunity against common law tort liability for public entities such as the Regents and its employees.

The demurrer to this cause of action is sustained with leave to amend.

Fourth cause of action

The fourth cause of action is for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. As noted previously, Plaintiff agreed to waive the cause of action.

“The covenant of good faith and fair dealing, implied by law in every contract, exists merely to prevent one contracting party from unfairly frustrating the other party's right to receive the benefits of the agreement actually made. It cannot impose substantive duties or limits on the contracting parties beyond those incorporated in the specific terms of their agreement.” (Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 349.) To succeed on a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair, a valid contract must exist between the parties. (Racine & Laramie, Ltd. v. Department of Parks & Recreation (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1026, 1031-1032.)

Plaintiff has not alleged a valid contract or breach thereof by moving Defendants.

The demurrer to this cause of action is sustained with leave to amend.

Fifth cause of action

The fifth cause of action is for whistleblower retaliation under California labor code § 1102.5. As noted previously, Plaintiff agreed to waive this claim. (Opp at 23:9.)

The demurrer to this cause of action is sustained with leave to amend.

Sixth cause of action

The sixth cause of action is for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff concedes that the claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress should be dismissed. (Opp. at 24:21.) Further, Defendants have shown that they are immune from tort liability and a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is a tort. Finally, Defendants have shown that the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule bars this claim. (Miklosy v. Regents of University of California (2008) 44 Cal.4th 876.)

The demurrer to this cause of action is sustained with leave to amend.

a. Seventh cause of action

The caption of the SAC refers to a seventh cause of action for declaratory, injunctive, and equitable relief. (SAC at 2:7.) However, the SAC does not actually contain a seventh cause of action. Instead, after the sixth cause of action, the SAC contains an “executive summary” and then a section entitled, “Nonmonetary; Declaratory or Injunctive Relief.” (SAC at pp. 82- 84.) Plaintiff’s Opposition seems to recognize that this is not a cause of action by identifying it as a “prayer for injunctive and declaratory relief” rather than a cause of action. (Opp. at 24:23.)

In this “nonmonetary” section, the SAC alleges: 260. Plaintiff requests an order declaring that Defendants, including the Regents of the University of California, violated the Public Records Act and engaged in a pattern of misconduct designed to obstruct justice, interfere with investigations, and spoil evidence. 261. Based on (260), the plaintiff requests an order permitting expanded discovery, including the imposition of appropriate sanctions, against Defendants for willful non compliance, concealment, or misattribution of records. 262.

Plaintiff requests a public injunction prohibiting the Regents of the University of California, and their agents, representatives, or affiliates, from engaging in discrimination, harassment, retaliation, or other adverse actions against students, employees, or former employees based on protected status, free expression, whistleblower activity, or protected disclosures. 263. Plaintiff requests any other declaratory, injunctive, or equitable relief the Court deems just and proper to prevent future harm and ensure compliance with applicable laws, including but not limited to remedies that safeguard access to institutional systems, academic opportunities, and procedural protections.

(SAC, ¶¶ 260-263.)

To qualify for declaratory relief, Plaintiff is required to show two essential elements: “(1) a proper subject of declaratory relief, and (2) an actual controversy involving justiciable questions relating to the rights or obligations of a party.” (Lee v. Silveira (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 527, 546.)

Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief in the form of a declaration that Defendants violated the Public Records Act. However, as discussed previously, the 15

demurrer to the remainder of Plaintiff’s SAC is sustained. Thus, there is currently no valid basis for declaratory relief. And Plaintiff’s Opposition states, “The plaintiff waives the request for injunctive relief.” (Opp. at 25:2.)

The demurrer to this cause of action is sustained with leave to amend.

On a demurrer, a court determines whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. If the court sustains the demurrer, it must decide whether to grant leave to amend. Leave to amend should be granted if there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment. Plaintiff has the burden of proving that there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)

This is the first pleadings challenge on which the Court has ruled. Thus, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to amend.

Moving Defendants shall file and serve notice of this ruling. 6

7 Doe K.N. vs. The motion to strike by Southeastern California Conference of Seventh-Day Orangewood Adventists dba Orangewood Academy (“SCC”) to the second amended Academy complaint (“SAC”) by Plaintiff Jane Doe K.N. is GRANTED without prejudice to Plaintiff’s requesting leave to amend in the future to allege punitive damages in compliance with Code of Civil Procedure section 425.14.

The court makes no substantive findings as to whether or not future leave will be granted and/or whether or not future leave is proper, but simply clarifies that this ruling has no bearing on Plaintiff’s ability to seek leave to amend to allege punitive damages in the future.

A motion to strike punitive damages is properly granted where a plaintiff does not state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, including allegations that defendant is guilty of oppression, fraud or malice. (Turman v. Turning Point of Cent. California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63; Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(a).)

Defendant SCC argues that Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege the requirements of section 425.14, which states:

“No claim for punitive or exemplary damages against a religious corporation or religious corporation sole shall be included in a complaint or other pleading unless the court enters an order allowing an amended pleading that includes such a claim to be filed.” The court may allow the filing of an amended pleading claiming punitive or exemplary damages on a motion by the party seeking the amended pleading and upon a finding, on the basis of the supporting and opposing affidavits presented, that the plaintiff has established 16