HALE vs REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

25CV031010: HALE vs REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 08/20/2026 Hearing on Demurrer in Department 16D

Tentative Ruling

NOTICE:

Consistent with Local Rule 1.06(B), any party requesting oral argument on any matter on this calendar must comply with the following procedure:

To request limited oral argument, on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Department 16D Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-3056 by 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing and advise opposing counsel. At the time of requesting oral argument, the requesting party shall leave a voice mail message (a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; (b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and (c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and that opposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below. If no request for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court.

Unless ordered to appear in person by the Court, parties may appear remotely either telephonically or by video conference via the Zoom video/audio conference platform with notice to the Court and all other parties in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure §367.75. Although remote participation is not required, the Court will presume all parties are appearing remotely for non-evidentiary civil hearings.

The Department 16D Zoom Link is https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/j/16146506749 and the Zoom Meeting ID is 161 4650 6749. To appear on Zoom telephonically, call (833) 568-8864 and enter the Zoom Meeting ID referenced above. NO COURTCALL APPEARANCES WILL BE ACCEPTED.

Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporter services at their own expense, pursuant to Government code §68086 and California Rules of Court, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed on the Court Reporter Services webpage available on the Sacramento Superior Court website at https://saccourt.ca.gov/general-information/court-reporter-services-transcripts. Parties may contact Court- Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore available at https://saccourt.ca.gov/home/showpublisheddocument/227/639084034465370000.

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with

25CV031010: HALE vs REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 08/20/2026 Hearing on Demurrer in Department 16D

a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

*** EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G STREET IN SACRAMENTO, CA 95814. ALL HEARINGS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 53 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 16D OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. ***

TENTATIVE RULING: Defendant The Regents of the University of California’s demurrer to Plaintiff Charity Hale’s complaint is ruled upon as follows.

Defendant’s unopposed request for judicial notice is granted for the limited purposes permitted for judicial notice. (Evid. Code §§ 451(a), 452(b)-(d); Johnson & Johnson v. Superior Court (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 757, 768 [court may take judicial notice of the existence of court documents but not to the truth of the statements contained therein]; Kilroy v. State of California (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 140, 145-148; Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1569-70.)

In this action, Plaintiff alleges numerous employment related causes of action. Plaintiff, a pharmacist, alleges that Defendant retaliated against her and ultimately terminated her employment for disclosures that she made related to patient safety.

Defendant demurs to the third cause of action for violation of Health & Safety Code § 1278.5 on the basis that it is barred by the statute of limitations.

A demurrer “tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) The purpose of a demurrer is to test the legal sufficiency of a claim. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal. App. 4th 968, 994.) For the purpose of determining the effect of a complaint, its allegations are liberally construed, with a view toward substantial justice. (CCP § 452; Amarel v. Connell (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 137, 140-141; Quelimane Co. v.

Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 43, fn. 7.) The Court treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law, and considers matters which may be judicially noticed. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d at 318; Poseidon Development, Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1111-1112.) A general demurrer does not admit contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the complaint; facts impossible in law; or allegations contrary to facts of which a court may take judicial notice. (Blank, supra, 39 Cal. 3d at 318, William S.

Hart Union High School Dist. v. Regional Planning Com. (1991) 226 Cal. App. 3d 1612, 1616 fn.2.) Extrinsic evidence may not properly be considered on demurrer or on a motion to strike. (Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV031010: HALE vs REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 08/20/2026 Hearing on Demurrer in Department 16D

Cal. App. 3d 868, 881; Hibernia Savings & Loan Soc. v. Thornton (1897) 117 Cal. 481, 482.)

A demurrer may be sustained only if the complaint lacks any sufficient allegations to entitle the plaintiff to relief. (Financial Corp. of America v. Wilburn (1987) 189 Cal. App. 3d 764, 778.) “Plaintiff need only plead facts showing that he may be entitled to some relief . . ., we are not concerned with plaintiff's possible inability or difficulty in proving the allegations of the complaint.” (Highlanders, Inc. v. Olsan (1978) 77 Cal. App. 3d 690, 696-697.) “[Courts] are required to construe the complaint liberally to determine whether a cause of action has been stated, given the assumed truth of the facts pleaded.” (Picton v.

Anderson Union High School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal. App. 4th 726.) A demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pled and the sole issue raised by a general demurrer is whether the facts pled state a valid cause of action - not whether they are true. (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal. 3d 584, 591.)

Third Cause of Action (Health & Safety Code § 1278.5)

Defendant’s demurrer is overruled.

As mentioned above, Defendant demurs to the instant cause of action on the basis that it is barred by the one-year statute of limitations in CCP § 340(a). Defendant points out that Plaintiff alleges her employment was terminated on January 5, 2024. According to Defendant, that act triggered the statute of limitations and the complaint filed on December 22, 2025, more than one year later, was untimely.

Defendant argues that the one-year statute of limitations in CCP § 340(a) applies because Health & Safety Code § 1278.5 (“§ 1278.5”) imposes a mandatory civil penalty.

CCP § 340(a) provides a one-year statute of limitations for “[a]n action upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture, if the action is given to an individual, or to an individual and the state, except if the statute imposing it prescribes a different limitation.”

Defendant cites various non-binding unpublished federal cases which, without much analysis, conclude that CCP § 340(a) applies to a § 1278.5 cause of action. Indeed, one of the cases involved a scenario where the plaintiff did not oppose the statute of limitations argument. (Rabara v. Heartland Employment Services, LLC (N.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2019) No. 17-cv-03770- LHK, 2019 WL 1877351.) Defendant also cites to De Picciotto v. Seneca Healthcare District, (E.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2021) No. 2:19-cv-01297, 2021 WL 3292583, where the plaintiff “broadly [sought] ‘all penalties owed’” and the “sole argument” in opposition to a statute of limitations argument was an analogy to Labor Code section 1102.5.” (Id. at *5.)

The Court declines to follow the non-binding federal cases as they engage in little analysis of the statutory scheme and are not consistent with the analysis discussed below where a statutory scheme allows for both damages and penalties.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV031010: HALE vs REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 08/20/2026 Hearing on Demurrer in Department 16D

Notably, § 1278.5 is a statute that provides both for a civil penalty and actual damages. The California Supreme Court has recognized that § 1278.5, besides providing for civil penalties also authorizes employees, health care workers and medical staff members to remedies in a civil judicial action. (Fahlen v. Sutter Central Valley Hospitals (2014) 58 Cal.4th 655, 667; Shaw v. Superior Court (2017) 2 Cal.5th 983, 996.) The civil penalties are to be assessed and recovered in the administrative process provided in Chapter 2.4 (commencing with Section 1417) for longterm health care facilities. (§ 1278.5(b)(3).)

As seen from the relevant statutes governing that administrative process, the State issues citations for violations, penalties are imposed by the State, and all money from civil penalties are deposited into an account in the State Treasury. (§§ 1417(a), 1423.) The penalty that Defendant refers to in § 1278.5 is not a penalty that can be sought or recovered by an individual plaintiff. Thus, a cause of action under § 1278.5 seeking only damages, even though the statute allows for penalties to be recovered by the State, is not “[a]n action upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture, if the action is given to an individual, or to an individual and the state.” (CCP § 340(a).)

In this cause of action Plaintiff seeks damages pursuant to Health & Safety Code § 1278.5(g). As noted above, Defendant cites to non-binding federal cases. The only California case cited by Defendant regarding § 1278.5 is Melamed v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1271, 1288, which expressly declined to address the issue because the parties had not briefed it and stated “we need not, and do not, decide which limitations period is appropriate here.” (Id. [emphasis added].) Defendant’s argument that Melamed held that a one-year statute of limitations applies is simply incorrect.

Melamed did not resolve the issue. Nor did Melamed engage in the analysis of the applicable statute of limitations when a statute provides for recovery of both penalties and actual damages. In this scenario, courts apply a “two-fold statute of limitations” analysis. (E.g. G.H.I.I. v. MTS, Inc. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 256, 278-279.) “Certain statutory schemes contain separate, independent statutory provisions for recovery of actual damages and treble damages. [citation omitted] In such a case, a claim for actual damages under one statute will be governed by a different statute of limitations than CCP section 340, subdivision (1) [now CCP § 340(a)], which will govern the claim for treble damages.” (Menefee v.

Ostawari (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 239, 243.) Indeed, in Hypertouch, Inc. v. ValueClick, Inc. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 805, 842, the “two-fold statute of limitations” was applied to Business & Professions Code § 17529.5 where one subdivision provided for liquidated damages which were penal in nature and also allowed for actual damages. CCP § 340(a) applied to the liquidated damages claim but the three-year statute of limitations in CCP § 338(a) applied to the claim for actual damages.

The authorities set forth above govern the Court’s instant analysis regarding the applicable statute of limitations given that Health & Safety Code § 1278.5 contains one subdivision which provides for recovery of civil penalties and contains a separate subdivision which allows for remedies including reinstatement, reimbursement for lost income (actual damages), etc. CCP § 340(a) could apply to claims for civil penalties under § 1278.5 but not to the claims for civil remedies such as reimbursement, lost income, etc. In no way can these remedies be classified as

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV031010: HALE vs REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 08/20/2026 Hearing on Demurrer in Department 16D

a penalty or forfeiture. Defendant also cited The TJX Cos., Inc. v. Superior Court (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 80 but that case is inapplicable because the plaintiff asserted that the defendant violated Civil Code § 1747.08 which only provided for recovery of a penalty in a civil action by a private party (it also allowed by the AG to seek injunctive relief.) A similar scenario was presented in Shamsian v. Atlantic Richfield Co., (2003) 107 Cal. App. 4th 967. These cases have no application here given § 1278.5 provides for not only a civil penalty but also allows an individual to seek reinstatement, reimbursement, etc.

Again, the cases have made clear that that § 1278.5, besides providing for civil penalties also authorizes employees, health care workers and medical staff members to remedies in a civil judicial action. (Fahlen, supra, 58 Cal.4th at 667; Shaw, supra, 2 Cal.5th 983, 996.) The penalty provision specifically contemplates recovery of any penalty through a separate administrative process than recovery of actual damages in a civil action provided for under § 1278.5. The statute thus specifically refers to an administrative process for the assessment and recovery of civil penalties which is in the words of Hypertouch and the other cases discussing the “two-fold” approach, “patently severable” from the provisions of § 1278.5(g) which provides that a member of the medical staff “shall be entitled to reinstatement, reimbursement for lost income.”

As a result, the Court finds that CCP § 338(a)’s three-year statute of limitations which applies to any “action upon a liability created by statute, other than a penalty or forfeiture” governs Plaintiff’s third cause of action here. The complaint was filed on December 22, 2025, less than three years after the alleged violation.

The Court declines to examine the purported legislative intent surrounding Health & Safety Code § 1278.5. It is not necessary to resort to legislative history where the words of a statute are clear. (E.g., Halbert's Lumber, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1238; Nolan v. City of Anaheim (2004) 33 Cal.4th 335, 340.) There is nothing unclear about the language of § 1278.5 and no need to resort to the legislative history. Indeed, “[i]f the words themselves are not ambiguous, we presume the Legislature meant what it said, and the statute's plain meaning governs.” (Wells v. One2One Learning Foundation (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1164, 1190.)

The demurrer on the basis that the third cause of action is untimely is overruled.

Defendant shall file and serve an answer to the Complaint no later than September 3, 2026.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1312 or other notice is required.