EDWARD M. CHAN, AS TRUSTEE OF CHAN FAMILY LIVING TRUST DATED AUGUST 26, 1988 vs WING HOP FUNG A BUSINESS OF UNKNOWN FORM, et al.

(Alhambra Courthouse: Dept. X) September 2, 2026 DEPARTMENT X LAW AND MOTION RULINGS

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LA, A BUSINESS ENTITY FORM UNKNOWN The Ex Parte Application will be reviewed in chambers without oral argument. Any oppositions should be filed and served by 11:00 a.m. A ruling will be electronically or mail served to the parties. Case Number: 25NNCV01625 Hearing Date: September 2, 2026 Dept: X

STATE FARM GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY vs IDAN REUVEN FARHI, et al. The Ex Parte Application will be reviewed in chambers without oral argument. Any oppositions should be filed and served by 11:00 a.m. A ruling will be electronically or mail served to the parties. Case Number: 25NNCV07535 Hearing Date: September 2, 2026 Dept: X

RABBI RUSSELL (RUSLAN) RABICHEV vs YELENA IOFFE The Ex Parte Application will be reviewed in chambers without oral argument. Any oppositions should be filed and served by 11:00 a.m. A ruling will be electronically or mail served to the parties. Case Number: 25NNCV08033 Hearing Date: September 2, 2026 Dept: X

#20 - EDWARD M. CHAN, AS TRUSTEE OF CHAN FAMILY LIVING TRUST DATED AUGUST 26, 1988 vs WING HOP FUNG A BUSINESS OF UNKNOWN FORM, et al. DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT (6925, 2994)

The demurrer contends that the First Cause of Action fails to state sufficient facts and that rent installments due before November 12, 2021 are barred by the four-year limitations period governing written contracts. Defendants' demurrer to the First Cause of Action for breach of lease is OVERRULED. Defendants are to answer the complaint within 10 days.

A. The First Cause of Action sufficiently alleges breach of lease

To prevail on a cause of action for breach of contract, the plaintiff must prove (1) the contract, (2) the plaintiff's performance of the contract or excuse for nonperformance, (3) the defendant's breach, and (4) the resulting damage to the plaintiff. (Richmond v. Hartley (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1182, 1186.) The First Amended Complaint alleges a written lease, identifies the rent obligation, alleges plaintiff's performance or excuse, describes defendants' alleged failures to pay the full rent, and pleads resulting damages. Those allegations satisfy the elements of a contract claim at this stage.

Defendants' assertions concerning plaintiff's acceptance of reduced payments, defendants' pandemic-related business disruption, and alleged maintenance and repair disputes depend on facts outside the First Amended Complaint. Those matters may support defenses, but the Court cannot resolve them on demurrer. Accordingly, the general challenge to the sufficiency of the First Cause of Action is overruled.

B. The limitations argument does not dispose of the entire cause of action

For breach of a written contract, that period is four years from the time the claim accrues. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 337.) When a contract creates recurring payment obligations, each breach may accrue independently, and recovery ordinarily is limited to breaches occurring within the applicable limitations period. (Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1198.)

Here, defendants acknowledge that at least some alleged rent deficiencies arose within four years before commencement of the action, and argues that Plaintiff's claims accruing before November 12, 2021, must fail because they are time-barred. (Demurrer, p. 7.) The FAC also alleges deficiencies continuing through December 2025 and thereafter. Thus, even under defendants' accrual theory, the FAC includes timely alleged breaches and states a claim for relief.

Further, it is improper to sustain a "partial" demurrer. If any part of a cause of action is properly pleaded, the demurrer must be overruled. (See Campbell v. Genshlea (1919) 180 Cal. 213, 217; ¿ DeMonbrun v. Sheet Metal Workers (1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 546, 566.) Therefore, the Court cannot sustain the demurrer to the First Cause of Action merely to eliminate damages attributable to earlier installments. This ruling does not determine whether any particular rent installment ultimately is barred. Defendants may assert the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense and seek an appropriate determination through a procedurally proper motion or at trial.

C. The Court declines to strike allegations on its own motion

Defendants alternatively ask the Court to strike the allegedly time-barred portions of the pleading. Although the Court possesses discretion to strike improper matter, defendants did not file a motion to strike, nor assert arguments, identifying the precise allegations to be removed.

The parties also dispute whether the COVID-19 tenant protections affected accrual or tolling. Plaintiff alleges that the applicable repayment period postponed accrual until August 1, 2022, while defendants contend that the protections restricted remedies without tolling the limitations period. (FAC, P. 26; Demurrer, p. 9.) Resolution of this dispute is unnecessary because the First Cause of Action includes timely alleged breaches regardless of which limitations position ultimately prevails. The Court accordingly declines to exercise its authority to strike allegations on its own motion.

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