Radelfinger v. Ivaldi

TENTATIVE RULINGS LAW & MOTION CALENDAR Wednesday, September 2, 2026, 3:00 p.m. Courtroom 16 – Hon. Randy Rhodes for Hon. Patrick M. Broderick 3035 Cleveland Avenue, Suite 200, Santa Rosa

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Parties in motions for claims of exemption are exempt from this requirement.

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1. 24CV00168, Radelfinger v. Ivaldi

This matter is on calendar for the motion of Partition Referee, Amy Harrington (“Referee”), for Final Distribution of Proceeds of Sale, For Authority to Make Distribution, For Referee Fees and Costs, Request for Authority to Maintain a Closing Reserve, and Request to Be Discharged as Referee. I. Complaint, Defendant’s Default, Appointment of Referee, Sale of Property On January 8, 2024, Plaintiff Catherine K. Radelfinger, as Trustee of the Catherine K. Radelfinger Revocable Trust, dated December 20, 2016 (“Plaintiff”) filed her complaint for partition of property located at 9760 Willow Avenue, Cotati, California (“Subject Property”).

On January 30, 2024, Defendant Tanya Ivaldi (“Defendant”) was served with summons and complaint. On March 5, 2024, Plaintiff requested Defendant’s default, which was entered as requested. On April 7, 2025, an Interlocutory Judgment for Partition of Real Property and Appointment of Referee was entered. That order confirmed that the Subject Property was owned 50/50 by Plaintiff and Defendant. It appointed Referee for the partition. Sale of the Subject Property was confirmed on December 3, 2025, for $1,518,000 to Lynette C.

Rose, as Trustee of the Phillip H. Rose and Lynette C. Rose 2000 Revocable Trust dated 4/20/2000, and Ashlynn Rose, as joint tenants. The order was entered December 5, 2025. Referee fees were approved in the amount of $21,280 and costs in the amount of $2,335.65. Distribution of $100,000 was approved to each party.

The Subject Property now having been sold, the Referee has filed this motion for final distribution of the proceeds of sale, fees and costs, and for discharge. II. Distribution and Allocation of Costs The Referee lays out the costs and proposed 50/50 distribution of the proceeds of the sale. She recommends denying the request of Plaintiff for a 60/40 division of the proceeds due to alleged waste of the property by Defendant. The Referee determined that CCP sections 874.040 and 872.140 authorize the court to apportion costs and make compensatory adjustments according to principles of equity, but it does not support an arbitrary or punitive reallocation of ownership interests.

The Referee determined that any claim of waste is more appropriately addressed through compensatory adjustments or allocation of specific costs tied to the “waste.” Therefore, she recommends allocating specific costs to Defendant incurred to vacate Defendant from the Subject Property and preparing Defendant’s unit for sale, including cleaning and junk removal. The Referee recommends $568,255.54 be distributed to Plaintiff and $459,863.49 to Defendant. III. Referee Fees and Costs Referee requests $14,867.50 in fees.

She states she spent more than 31.30 hours in connection with the sale of the subject property and that her hourly rate is $475. She incurred $2,393.83 in costs. IV. Opposition- Division of Proceeds When it comes to the partition of real property, “The court may, in all cases, order allowance, accounting, contribution, or other compensatory adjustment among the parties according to the principles of equity.” (CCP section 872.140.) In opposition, Plaintiff objects to certain portions of the proposed distribution. a.

Condition of Property – Invoice 1212 In paragraph 12a of the Referee’s report, she recommends that all costs associated with preparing Defendant’s unit for sale be allocated to Defendant and 90 percent of the costs associated with preparing the barn. The referee allocated costs of $10,201.47 to Plaintiff and $13,414.18 to Defendant. The recommendations are based upon Invoice Numbers 1212 and 1213. These do not appear to be attached to either the motion or the opposition. In her declaration, Plaintiff states various charges listed in Invoice Number 1212 were for conversations between her and the Referee that pertained to the issue of removing Defendant’s personal property from the Subject Property, cleaning Defendant’s portion of the Subject Property, and related to Defendant’s Shellpoint mortgage. (Radelfinger decl., ¶2.)

As the subject invoice has not been provided, this court cannot assess whether the fees were actually allocated according to the Referee’s intent to allocate costs attributable to Defendant to her. b. Invoice 1335 Plaintiff objects to various charges appearing in Invoice 1335. Specifically, she argues that she is not responsible for the referee’s correspondence regarding Defendant’s storage charges, the Shellpoint Mortgage, and the Creams Towing charges. Plaintiff argues these were virtually all related to the removal of Defendant and her personal property from the Subject Property.

It is not clear from Plaintiff’s opposition which entries she is objecting to and how much she thinks should be allocated solely to Defendant. c. Concierge Capital Notable Loan Plaintiff argues that no more than $500 with respect to the proposed allocation of the reimbursement of funds towards the Concierge Capital Notable Loan should be charged to her. The Referee took out the Concierge Capital Notable Loan to pay for property expenses to prepare for and sell the Subject Property. It is not clear to this court which invoices pertain to these expenses.

However, a list of the expenses appears at subparagraph iii. under paragraph 12.a. The amounts paid for the loan origination fee, AllStarz Pumping and Engineering, well services, and building 2

inspection all appear appropriately allocated to both parties. And Plaintiff does not dispute any of these charges. These expenses alone are thousands of dollars, indicating that more than $500 should be charged to Plaintiff. With respect to the payment to Rodrigo Lopez to clean up the Subject Property, neither Plaintiff nor the Referee has explained what portion of the Subject Property Mr. Lopez cleaned up. Plaintiff argues she should not be charged any portion of the $2,750 listed as yard cleanup because she kept her gardener on payroll throughout the cleanup process to make the property more presentable for sale.

She also states she and her daughter spent hours cleaning up Defendant’s yard after the workers hired by the realtor, and paid for from the proceeds of the sale, left the property. Plaintiff should be reimbursed for expenses paid to her gardener which lessened the need for Mr. Lopez’s services. In addition, any amount of extra time required to clean up Defendant’s portion of the Subject Property over and above what it took him to clean up Plaintiff’s portion should be allocated to Defendant. However, Plaintiff’s and her daughter’s time spent cleaning the Subject Property must be viewed as voluntary. d.

Taxes Plaintiff argues that after Defendant’s parents died, Defendant continued to pay one-half of the tax bill until November 2023, when she stopped contributing to the account. Plaintiff states Defendant owes her $340.00 for the balance of the 2023 taxes; and, that Plaintiff paid all the property taxes for 2024 ($4,293.42) and for 2025 ($4,474.44), such that Defendant owes Plaintiff $4,723.93 for her share of the taxes. Plaintiff states that she paid for all of the repairs of the well tank and well such that Defendant owes her half of those amounts, totaling $1,526.

Plaintiff argues she should be repaid $3,023.00 for the cost of the required title search as a recoverable cost of litigation. It is not clear if the Referee took these requests for repayment into consideration. V.

Conclusion

Plaintiff’s arguments are valid. However, based upon the information provided by her and the Referee, this court cannot determine if the amounts she seeks to have allocated to the Defendant are reasonable. Nor is there any evidence before this court regarding tax payments or whether the Referee had this information. Accordingly, this court directs the Plaintiff to meet and confer with the Referee to allow the Referee to recalculate the proposed distribution to take into account Plaintiff’s objections. If the Referee determines Plaintiff should not be entitled to the requested amounts, she is directed to file an explanation with this court. This matter will be CONTINUED to September 16, 2026, at 3:00 p.m., in Department 16. Any brief filed by the Referee must be filed and served by Wednesday, September 9, 2026, and any opposition thereto must be filed by September 11, 2026.

2. 25CV00572, Jai Mundi Incorporated v. Vape Craft, LLC

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473, Defendant Benjamin Osmanson (“Defendant”) moves to set aside the default and default judgment entered against him on the grounds that the default judgment is void due to lack of service or, alternatively, Defendant’s default and default judgment resulted from his mistake, inadvertence, surprise, and/or excusable neglect. I. Legal Standards This motion is brought pursuant to CCP section 473, but the memorandum also cites CCP section 473.5. 3