Motion for Interlocutory Judgment of Partition by Sale, Appointment of Referee, Order for Immediate Sale and Request for Bifurcation
26CV166815: TAI vs TAI, et al. 07/07/2026 Hearing on Motion for Order Motion for Interlocutory Judgment of Partition by Sale, Appointment of Referee, Order for Immediate Sale and Request for Bifurcation; filed by Shahida Tai (Plaintiff) CRS# 425795966047 in Department 512
Tentative Ruling - 07/01/2026 Elizabeth Riles
The Hearing on Motion for Order Motion for Interlocutory Judgment of Partition by Sale, Appointment of Referee, Order for Immediate Sale and Request for Bifurcation; filed by Shahida Tai (Plaintiff) CRS# 425795966047 scheduled for 07/07/2026 is continued to 07/23/2026 at 02:30 PM in Department 512 at Hayward Hall of Justice.
On Plaintiff Shahida Tais (Plaintiff) Motion for Interlocutory Judgment of Partition by Sale, Appointment of Referee, Order of Immediate Sale, and Request for Bifurcation (the Motion for Partition), the Court CONTINUES THE HEARING TO THURSDAY, 7/23/2026 at 2:30 p.m. in Dept. 512 to allow for the resolution of the Motion to Consolidate pending in a related probate action in Dept. 201.
The Court attaches the previously published Tentative Ruling on Plaintiff's Motion.
RELEVANT FACTS, ALLEGATIONS AND CONTENTIONS
Plaintiff is age 78 and the defendants are her adult daughter Eman Tai (Eman) and son-in-law Ahson Ahmad (Ahmad) (Eman and Ahmad are collectively, Defendants). Plaintiff owned a home in Fremont (the Fremont Property) but around 2020 her husband was placed in a nursing home because he has dementia. Around October 2022, Plaintiff moved in with Defendants in Defendants' house in Dublin, at which time Defendants had two teenage sons. The parties dispute which of Plaintiff and Defendants wanted a bigger house for the five residents. Plaintiff has two other adult children, daughter Shabnam Tai (Shabnam) and son Khurram Tai (Khurram)
On or around July 10, 2023, Plaintiff and Defendants bought a $3 million house in Dublin, 3704 Penwood Place ("Penwood Property" or "Penwood"). The Penwood purchase was made possible by the sale of Plaintiff's Fremont Property and Defendants' Dublin property on Whitehorse Way ("Whitehorse Property" or Whitehorse), where Plaintiff and Defendants had previously been living.
Plaintiff alleges that the agreed-upon plan was that a less expensive new property would be purchased so that $400,000 could be retained from the sale of the Fremont property to pay the capital gains taxes from that sale. Plaintiff alleges that because Defendants effectively caused the purchase of a more expensive property and also Eman's filing of false 2023 tax returns on behalf of Plaintiff that did not list Plaintiff's capital gains from the Fremont property sale, Plaintiff now owes approximately $480,000 plus penalties and interest to the IRS and Cal.
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Franchise Tax Board, which she does not have capital to pay. Plaintiff declares she is concerned that the false tax return may impact her husband's health insurance that pays for his institutional care. 26CV166815: TAI vs TAI, et al. 07/07/2026 Hearing on Motion for Order Motion for Interlocutory Judgment of Partition by Sale, Appointment of Referee, Order for Immediate Sale and Request for Bifurcation; filed by Shahida Tai (Plaintiff) CRS# 425795966047 in Department 512
Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants embezzled $163,000 from her to pay off Defendants' mortgage on the White Horse property. Defendants allege that the $163,000 was a gift from Plaintiff so that Defendants would have better credit with which to get a better mortgage on the Penwood Property.
The deed on the Penwood Property provides that the parties are joint tenants, but that Plaintiff has 83.34% of Grantor's interest and Defendants have 16.66% of Grantor's interest. (See Exh. A to Plaintiff's moving Declaration.) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants have misappropriated funds from what is likely an inter vivos trust and/or Plaintiffs personal bank accounts.
Plaintiff alleges that on 6/22/2025 Eman struck her and knocked her down at the Penwood house, after which Plaintiff moved into Shabnam's home. Plaintiff now wishes to compel a partition sale of the Penwood Property so that Plaintiff can pay her back taxes and ensure that her husbands healthcare needs are provided for.
Defendant Eman in Opposition does not dispute the respective ownership interests set forth in the Grant Deed, but she declares that Defendants have invested more than $250,000 into the Penwood property, although they are still in the process of collecting documents to determine the sums spent. Plaintiff contends that she did not authorize Defendants to invest any moneys in the Penwood property for things apparently including a solar power system. Defendants apparently contend that these investments affect the relative ownership interests in the Penwood property, the Grant Deed's allocations notwithstanding.
LAW RE: PARTITION ACTIONS
Partition is the procedure for segregating and terminating common interests in the same parcel of property. It is a remedy much favored by law. (Summers v. Sup.Ct. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 138, 142.) A co-owner of property has an absolute right to partition unless barred by a valid waiver. (Orien v. Lutz (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 957, 962 citing CCP § 872.710(b).)
The manner of partition may be in kindi.e., physical division of the property according to the parties interests as determined in the interlocutory judgment. Alternatively, if the parties agree or the court concludes it would be more equitable, the court may order the property sold and the proceeds divided among the parties. (Summers, 24 Cal.App.5th at 143.)
[A]n interlocutory judgment in a partition action is to include two elements: a determination of the parties interests in the property and an order granting the partition. (§ 872.720, subd. (a).) Second, the manner of partitioni.e., a physical division or sale of the propertyis to be decided when or after the parties ownership interests are determined, but not before. (Ibid.) Court cannot order sale until the respective interests of the parties are resolved. (Ibid.)
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA
26CV166815: TAI vs TAI, et al. 07/07/2026 Hearing on Motion for Order Motion for Interlocutory Judgment of Partition by Sale, Appointment of Referee, Order for Immediate Sale and Request for Bifurcation; filed by Shahida Tai (Plaintiff) CRS# 425795966047 in Department 512 The law favors partition in kind rather than partition by sale, and a sale will be ordered only when it is necessary to prevent great prejudice to the owners, and a person will not be compelled to sell his property against his will except in cases of imperious necessity. (Formosa Corp. v. Rogers (1951) 108 Cal.App.2d 397, 409.) However, it is typically difficult or not reasonably possible to partition in kind a single-family residence.
ANALYSIS OF MOTION FOR PARTITION
Defendants in Opposition do not appear to contest that at some point in the future, partition may be appropriate. However, they argue that partition now is premature and procedurally defective, because there must be bench trial on the relative interests of the parties in the Penwood Property or at least a dispositive motion pursuant to CCP § 437c. This argument appears to have some merit. Plaintiff argues in reply that Defendants cite to no authority for the proposition that CCP Sec. 872.710 et seq. requires a trial or dispositive motion. However, CCP 872.610 provides:
"The interests of the parties, plaintiff as well as defendant, may be put in issue, tried, and determined in the action [for partition].
Moreover, Plaintiffs Reply argument appears frivolous and of dubious good faith where the last sentence of the Moving MPA states unambiguously:
[N]o partition can be made until the respective interests of all the parties have been ascertained and settled by a trial. Withington v. Collins (1943) 60 Cal.App.2d 110, 113.
Thus, and as alleged as Plaintiff's FAC's 8th cause of action for Partition by Sale, an interlocutory judgment for partition by sale is a cause of action that requires an evidentiary hearing or dispositive motion practice. Because partition by sale is an equitable remedy (Blodgett v. Haddock (1949) Cal.App.2d 17, 18; Cummings v. Dessel (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 589, 596- 597), the Court deems it appropriate to set a bench trial as soon as the Courts trial calendar will permit to determine the respective interests of the parties in the Penwood Property.
Once the respective interests in the party are determined, Plaintiff is entitled to partition as a matter of right unless Defendants can show waiver by Plaintiff. (Orien, supra.) Defendants Opposition arguments that the present time is bad time to sell the Penwood Property in terms of making a profit above the purchase price or preventing a loss appear to be of only minor relevance under the controlling legal authorities cited above.
The Court will then address appointing a receiver to manage any partition by sale and/or an accounting to determine any offsets due to either party. The Court is also inclined to bifurcate the trial of any tort claims to be heard, presumably by a jury, on a later date.
The parties should be prepared at the hearing to provide dates in the reasonably near future on which a bench trial may be conducted with respect to Plaintiffs Partition by Sale Cause of
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA
26CV166815: TAI vs TAI, et al. 07/07/2026 Hearing on Motion for Order Motion for Interlocutory Judgment of Partition by Sale, Appointment of Referee, Order for Immediate Sale and Request for Bifurcation; filed by Shahida Tai (Plaintiff) CRS# 425795966047 in Department 512 Action.