ATI RESTORATION, LLC, A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY vs HERNANDEZ, et al.

24CV008800: ATI RESTORATION, LLC, A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY vs HERNANDEZ, et al. 09/02/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication by Dry Creek Constr in Department 8D

Tentative Ruling

NOTICE:

Consistent with Local Rule 1.06(B), any party requesting oral argument on any matter on this calendar must comply with the following procedure:

To request limited oral argument, on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Department 8D Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-7719 by 4:00 p.m. the Court day before the hearing and advise opposing counsel. At the time of requesting oral argument, the requesting party shall leave a voice mail message: a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and that opposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below. If no request for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court.

Unless ordered to appear in person by the Court, parties may appear remotely either telephonically or by video conference via the Zoom video/audio conference platform with notice to the Court and all other parties in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure §367.75. Although remote participation is not required, the Court will presume all parties are appearing remotely for non-evidentiary civil hearings.

The Department 8D Zoom Link is https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/j/16113421868 and the Zoom Meeting ID is 161 1342 1868. To appear on Zoom telephonically, call (833) 568-8864 and enter the Zoom Meeting ID referenced above. NO COURTCALL APPEARANCES WILL BE ACCEPTED.

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24CV008800: ATI RESTORATION, LLC, A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY vs HERNANDEZ, et al. 09/02/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication by Dry Creek Constr in Department 8D

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

*** EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G STREET IN SACRAMENTO, CA 95814. ALL HEARINGS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 25 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 8D OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. ***

TENTATIVE RULING The motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication of moving defendant Dry Creek Construction, a California Corporation dba Dry Creek Construction Company (“Defendant” or “Dry Creek”) is ruled on herein.

The notice of motion does not provide notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system, as required by Local Rule 1.06. Moving counsel is directed to contact opposing counsel and advise of Local Rule 1.06 and the Court’s tentative ruling procedure and the manner to request a hearing. If moving counsel is unable to contact opposing counsel prior to the hearing, moving counsel is ordered to appear at the hearing by Zoom or in person.

Factual Background

This action arises out of a dispute between plaintiff ATI Restoration, LLC (“Plaintiff” or “ATI”) and its former employees.

Plaintiff alleges that, after it spent years and millions of dollars building its healthcare facility

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV008800: ATI RESTORATION, LLC, A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY vs HERNANDEZ, et al. 09/02/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication by Dry Creek Constr in Department 8D

remediation business, codefendant Kevin Ritchie (“Ritchie”) and Dry Creek, recruited ATI employees who ran ATI’s healthcare remediation business, codefendants Pedro Hernandez (“Hernandez”) and Radford Johnson (“Johnson”), to act as secrete business partners and covert advisers while still employed by ATI. (FAC, ¶¶ 1-5.) Plaintiff alleges that on February 5, 2024, Johnson and Hernandez asked the members of ATI’s field crew to meet them at Sky River Casino in Elk Grove, where a private conference room had been reserved for lunch. (Id. at ¶ 6.)

At that meeting, Johnson and Hernandez announced their plans to join Dry Creek and “primed” the ATI attendees to leave Plaintiff and join Dry Creek. (Id. at ¶ 7.) Ritchie and former ATI employee Hintze were waiting at a nearby bar, were texted by Johnson, and then joined the meeting. (Id. at ¶¶ 7-8.) At the meeting, crew members were given written offer letters from Dry Creek, which all the crew members accepted. (Id. at ¶¶ 8-9, 161.)

Plaintiff alleges that, in the days and weeks leading up to the February 5, 2024 meeting, Hernandez and Johnson “covertly served as Dry Creek’s inside consultants and business partners by meeting with Dry Creek several times” and by supplying it with detailed information of ATI’s operations, specialized equipment and supply needs, vehicle selection and set-up, and other information relevant to ATI’s operations. (FAC, ¶ 210.) Plaintiff further alleges Hernandez and Johnson orchestrated a surprise mass resignation of ATI’s hospital-remediation crew and actively and secretly gave improper assistance to prepare the Dry Creek offer letters and other documents, and to connect Dry Creek with ATI’s flagship client UC Davis Medical Center (“UCDMC”). (Ibid.)

Plaintiff also alleges that Hernandez and Johnson helped Dry Creek recruit other key employees from ATI, delivered to Dry Creek numerous ATI documents and files to accelerate Dry Creek’s newly formed healthcare division, and failed to bill ATI’s top client for numerous jobs and then deleted thousands of ATI documents needed to support such billing. (Ibid.)

Plaintiff’s FAC asserts causes of action for: (1) breach of duty of loyalty (against Johnson and Hernandez); (2) aiding and abetting breach of duty of loyalty (against Dry Creek and Ritchie); (3) tortious interference with prospective economic advantage (against all defendants); (4) violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200 (against Dry Creek and Ritchie); (5) violation of Penal Code section 502 (against all defendants); and (6) conspiracy (against all defendants).

Dry Creek now moves for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV008800: ATI RESTORATION, LLC, A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY vs HERNANDEZ, et al. 09/02/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication by Dry Creek Constr in Department 8D

Plaintiff opposes.

Legal Standard

In evaluating a motion for summary judgment or adjudication, the Court engages in a three-step process. First, the Court identifies the issues framed by the pleadings. The pleadings define the scope of the issues on a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication. (FPI Dev. Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382.) Because a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication is limited to the issues raised by the pleadings (Lewis v. Chevron (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 690, 694), all evidence submitted in support of or in opposition to the motion must be addressed to the claims and defenses raised in the pleadings; the Court cannot consider an unpled issue in ruling on a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication. (Roth v. Rhodes (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 530, 541.)

Next, the Court must determine whether the moving party has met its burden. A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication bears the burden of persuasion that one or more elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal. 4th 826, 850 [“Aguilar”].) A defendant is not required to conclusively negate one or more elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action. (Saelzer v.

Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 780- 781). Rather, to meet its burden, the defendant is required to show only that the plaintiff cannot prove an element of its cause of action, i.e., that the plaintiff does not possess and cannot reasonably obtain evidence necessary to show this element. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at 853- 855.) Further, the initial burden requires a showing that the plaintiff “could not prevail on any theory raised by the pleadings.” (Hawkins v. Wilton (2006) 144 Cal.

App. 4th 936, 939-940.)

At the same time, a defendant cannot shift the burden to the plaintiff simply by suggesting the possibility that the plaintiff cannot prove its case; a moving defendant must still make “an affirmative showing” in support of its motion. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 854-855 n.23; Addy v Bliss & Glennon (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 205, 214.)

Once the moving party has met its burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to show that a material factual issue exists as to the cause of action alleged or a defense to it. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p); see generally Bush v. Parents Without Partners (1993) 17 Cal. App. 4th 322, 326-327.) In ruling on the motion, the Court must consider the evidence and inferences

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV008800: ATI RESTORATION, LLC, A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY vs HERNANDEZ, et al. 09/02/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication by Dry Creek Constr in Department 8D

reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at 843.)

While a summary adjudication motion is treated largely the same as one for summary judgment, there are a few important differences. One of these differences is that California Rule of Court, Rule 3.1350(b) mandates that issues presented for summary adjudication be stated in the notice of motion and repeated verbatim in the separate statement. Another difference is that summary adjudication cannot be granted unless it “completely disposes” of a cause of action, affirmative defense, claim for punitive damages, or question of duty. Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (f)(1) provides in its entirety:

A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if that party contends that the cause of action has no merit or that there is no affirmative defense thereto, or that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, or both, or that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs. A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.

Finally, before turning to the specific issues raised by this motion and the oppositions, the Court reminds the parties of the “Golden Rule” of summary judgment/adjudication: “If it is not set forth in the separate statement, it does not exist.” (See, Zimmerman, Rosenfeld v. Larson (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1466, 1477 (italics in original).) Moreover, a moving party’s inclusion of facts in its separate statement effectively concedes each fact’s “materiality,” whether intended or not, and if there is a triable dispute relating to any one of these facts, the motion must be denied. (Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 252 (citing Weil & Brown, Civil Procedure Before Trial, Ch.10:95.1).)

Discussion

Dry Creek’s Alternative Motion for Summary Adjudication

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV008800: ATI RESTORATION, LLC, A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY vs HERNANDEZ, et al. 09/02/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication by Dry Creek Constr in Department 8D

“The language in Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (f) makes it clear that a motion for summary adjudication cannot be considered by the court unless the party bringing the motion duly gives notice that summary adjudication is being sought.” (Gonzales v. Superior Court (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1542, 1545-1546.) “If summary adjudication is sought, whether separately or as an alternative to the motion for summary judgment, the specific cause of action, affirmative defense, claims for damages, or issues of duty must be stated specifically in the notice of motion and be repeated, verbatim, in the separate statement of undisputed material facts.” (Cal.

Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(b).) A movant’s failure to comply with the requirements of a separate statement, in the Court’s discretion, may constitute a sufficient ground for denying the motion. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (b)(1).)

As a preliminary matter, the Court finds Dry Creek failed to comply with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(b). Dry Creek’s Notice of Motion requests summary adjudication of the following nine issues: 1. ISSUE 1 (Global) – FAC rhetoric vs. routine, non-secret conduct (van photos, equipment, uniform sizes, generic forms); 2. ISSUE 2 (Global) – Failure to identify specific trade secrets, documents, clients, or damages; 3. ISSUE 3 – First Cause of Action (Breach of Duty of Loyalty) as to Hernandez and Dry Creek; 4.

ISSUE 4 – Third Cause of Action (Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage) as to all moving Dry Creeks against whom it is pled; 5. ISSUE 5 – Fifth Cause of Action (Penal Code § 502) as to Hernandez and Dry Creek; 6. ISSUE 6 – Sixth Cause of Action (Civil Conspiracy) as to all moving Dry Creeks; 7. ISSUE 7 – Second Cause of Action (Aiding and Abetting Breach of Duty of Loyalty) as to Dry Creek; 8. ISSUE 8 – Fourth Cause of Action (Unfair Competition, Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200) as to Dry Creek; and 9.

ISSUE 9 (Global) – Damages as to all claims asserted against the moving Dry Creeks.

(Notice of Motion, pp. 2-3.) The Court notes that Dry Creek’s Issues 1, 2, and 9 as framed in its Notice of Motion do not refer to any particular cause of action. Furthermore, to the extent Dry Creek asserts that Issues 1, 2, and 9 are applicable to any specific cause of action, Dry Creek has presented no argument or authority showing how summary adjudication of Issue 1, Issue 2, or Issue 9 will “completely dispose” of any cause of action at issue in this action as required by

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV008800: ATI RESTORATION, LLC, A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY vs HERNANDEZ, et al. 09/02/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication by Dry Creek Constr in Department 8D

Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (f)(1). The Court further notes that Dry Creek’s Notice of Motion seeks summary adjudication of the first cause of action, which the FAC asserts exclusively against Hernandez and Johnson.

Lastly, Dry Creek’s Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“UMFs”) does not include verbatim repetition of the issues from the Notice of Motion.

Issue in Notice of Motion Issue in Separate Statement ISSUE 1 (Global) – FAC rhetoric vs. routine, Issue 1: Whether ATI’s generalized narrative non-secret conduct (van photos, equipment, that Defendants “stole” ATI’s entire uniform sizes, generic forms) Sacramento healthcare operation and “gutted” its healthcare division (FAC ¶¶ 1, 8–11, 55, 188 192, 248–254) can support any cause of action where the undisputed facts show that the alleged acts consist of ordinary, non-secret conduct: photographs of openly visible vans and equipment, generic industry forms and templates, off-the-shelf equipment lists, basic clothing sizes, and an after-hours meeting at Sky River—none of which are inherently wrongful, confidential, or proprietary.

ISSUE 2 (Global) – Failure to identify Issue 2: Whether ATI can proceed on any specific trade secrets, documents, clients, or cause of action where, after forensic imaging damages of Dry Creek’s servers and devices and production of roughly one million pages of ESI, ATI has (a) failed to identify any specific document from Dry Creek’s systems as a protectable trade secret or confidential document allegedly used by Defendants; (b) identified only UCD as a supposedly affected “healthcare” client despite pleading abstract “clients” in the plural; and (c) produced no client- or contract-specific damages evidence tied to any act by any particular Defendant.

ISSUE 3 – First Cause of Action (Breach of Issue 3: The First Cause of Action for Breach

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV008800: ATI RESTORATION, LLC, A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY vs HERNANDEZ, et al. 09/02/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication by Dry Creek Constr in Department 8D

Duty of Loyalty) as to Hernandez and Johnson of Duty of Loyalty has no merit because there is no triable issue that Hernandez or Johnson (1) operated or ran a competing business while employed by ATI; (2) diverted ATI employees, customers, or jobs; or (3) caused any damages to ATI—and ATI has failed and refused to produce damages evidence tied to either Hernandez or Johnson. ISSUE 4 – Third Cause of Action (Tortious Issue 4: The Third Cause of Action has no Interference with Prospective Economic merit because there is no triable issue that any Advantage) as to all moving Defendants Defendant committed an “independently against whom it is pled wrongful” act directed at ATI’s clients, intentionally disrupted any specific economic relationship, or caused recoverable economic harm; ATI has no client-specific damages evidence tied to any Defendant.

ISSUE 5 – Fifth Cause of Action (Penal Code Issue 5: The Fifth Cause of Action under § 502) as to Hernandez and Johnson Penal Code section 502 has no merit because there is no triable issue that Hernandez or Johnson accessed ATI’s computer systems “without permission,” circumvented any security, caused any “damage or loss,” or used ATI data for Dry Creek, and ATI has no evidence of any loss or expense caused by their computer use. ISSUE 6 – Sixth Cause of Action (Civil Issue 6: The Sixth Cause of Action for Conspiracy) as to all moving Defendants “Conspiracy” has no merit because civil conspiracy is not an independent cause of action, and to the extent it relates to vicarious liability, there is no triable issue that any Defendant entered into an agreement to commit a tort, performed a wrongful act in furtherance of a conspiracy, or caused any damages; ATI has no damages evidence tied to any alleged conspiratorial plan.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV008800: ATI RESTORATION, LLC, A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY vs HERNANDEZ, et al. 09/02/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication by Dry Creek Constr in Department 8D

ISSUE 7 – Second Cause of Action (Aiding Issue 7: The Second Cause of Action for and Abetting Breach of Duty of Loyalty) as to aiding and abetting breach of duty of loyalty Dry Creek has no merit because there is no triable issue that Dry Creek or Ritchie (1) knew of any actual breach of duty of loyalty by Hernandez or Johnson, (2) gave “substantial assistance” to any breach, or (3) caused ATI any damages separate from the ordinary effects of lawful employee mobility and competition. ISSUE 8 – Fourth Cause of Action (Unfair Issue 8: The Fourth Cause of Action under Competition, Bus. & Prof.

Code § 17200) as Business and Professions Code section 17200 to Dry Creek has no merit because (1) ATI cannot show any “unlawful,” “fraudulent,” or “unfair” conduct by Dry Creek or Ritchie beyond the same alleged conduct underlying the other failed claims; (2) ATI has not proven any restitutionary loss attributable to Dry Creek or Ritchie; and (3) ATI seeks to re-package ordinary competition and employee mobility as “unfair” without the required evidentiary support. ISSUE 9 (Global) – Damages as to all claims [No issue 9 is included in the Separate asserted against the moving Defendants Statement in Support of Defendant Dry Creek’s motion.]

(Compare Notice of Motion with Sep. Stmt., filed 1/13/2026.)

As shown by the above, Defendant Dry Creek includes additional grounds for summary adjudication for all causes of action in the Separate Statement, and none of these additional grounds are not set forth in the Notice of Motion. The failure to include a verbatim repetition of issues from the Notice of Motion in the Separate Statement is an issue of due process. (Schmidlin v. City of Palo Alto (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 728, 743-744 [citing Gonzales v. Superior Court (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1542, 1546 [summary adjudication must include proper notice of each issue to be adjudicated so that opposing party does not raise only one triable issue of fact in order to defeat the motion, without intending to concede the other issues].) Failure to comply with

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV008800: ATI RESTORATION, LLC, A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY vs HERNANDEZ, et al. 09/02/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication by Dry Creek Constr in Department 8D

California Rule of Court, rule 3.1350(b) is sufficient grounds to deny a motion for summary adjudication. (Schmidlin v. City of Palo Alto, supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 744.)

The Court thus finds that the deficiencies in Dry Creek’s Notice of Motion and Separate Statement warrant denial of Dry Creek’s motion for summary adjudication, and the motion is DENIED on such grounds.

Dry Creek’s Motion for Summary Judgment

In support of the motion for summary judgment, it appears that Defendant seeks for the Court to consider all 65 UMFs submitted I the Separate Statement. Indeed, Defendant asserts in the unauthorized preamble to the Separate Statement, Defendant provides:

Defendants Pedro Hernandez (“Hernandez”), Radford Johnson (“Johnson”), Kevin Ritchie (“Ritchie”), and DRY CREEK CONSTR, a California corporation, dba Dry Creek Construction Company (“Dry Creek”) (collectively, “Defendants”) submit the following Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in support of their Motions for Summary Judgment, or, in the alternative, Summary Adjudication, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 437c(b)(3) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(e), (f), (h), (i).

For each cause of action asserted in Plaintiff ATI Restoration, LLC’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”)—and for the global issues that cut across all causes of action, including ATI’s overarching “conspiracy” theory—this Separate Statement identifies the Issue to be adjudicated and the Undisputed Material Facts (“UMF”) demonstrating that the claims have no merit. Because ATI seeks to impose joint and overlapping liability on all Defendants, an adjudication resolving a given issue as to one Defendant will, by its nature, narrow and streamline the case as to the others: even where an issue pertains most directly to a single Defendant, its resolution will still benefit the remaining Defendants by eliminating or narrowing common theories and reducing the scope of triable issues, whether or not all Defendants are ultimately dismissed.

(Sep. Stmt., filed 1/13/2026, at p. 1:23-2:15, emphasis added.) Accordingly, the failure of Defendant to support a single UMF or the existence of a single triable issues of material fact in connection with any UMF will mandate denial of summary judgment. (See Code of Civil

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV008800: ATI RESTORATION, LLC, A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY vs HERNANDEZ, et al. 09/02/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication by Dry Creek Constr in Department 8D

Procedure section 437c(c), (g).)

For the second cause of action for aiding and abetting breach of duty of loyalty, Dry Creek sets forth UMFs 46-52:

(46) Ritchie formed Dry Creek in 2016 as an independent competitor in the disaster- recovery and restoration business. At all times relevant to the FAC, Ritchie and Dry Creek were not ATI employees and owed ATI no duty of loyalty; their role was that of a separate competitor in a competitive industry. (¶¶ 3-6, 19-25

(47) Ritchie understood that ATI employees, including Hernandez and Johnson, were at- will and free to consider and accept opportunities with competitors. Ritchie’s discussions with them were focused on prospective future employment and were held after hours or away from ATI job sites; he did not instruct them to sabotage ATI’s work, to walk off jobs, or to divert existing ATI projects.

(48) Ritchie did not ask Hernandez or Johnson to provide ATI trade-secret documents, proprietary “playbooks,” or confidential pricing data. To the extent he asked questions about equipment, supplies, or logistics, those inquiries concerned standard, off-the-shelf restoration equipment and widely known industry practices that Ritchie already understood from his own decades of experience.

(49) Ritchie did not instruct Hernandez or Johnson to access ATI’s computer systems “without permission,” did not request ATI login credentials, and did not direct them to copy or download ATI data for Dry Creek’s use. Any access to ATI systems by Hernandez or Johnson was done using their own ATI-issued credentials in the course of their ATI employment.

(50) Dry Creek’s hiring and compensation decisions were based on market conditions, perceived skill, and Ritchie’s assessment of fair pay, not on any ATI confidential compensation spreadsheets or HR data. When Ritchie and Johnson discussed potential wages, Johnson used a handwritten note and general market knowledge, not ATI documents.

(51) There is no evidence that Ritchie or Dry Creek provided “substantial assistance” to

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV008800: ATI RESTORATION, LLC, A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY vs HERNANDEZ, et al. 09/02/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication by Dry Creek Constr in Department 8D

any actual breach of duty of loyalty. Hernandez and Johnson continued to perform ATI work until their resignations; there is no evidence that they diverted live ATI projects, misrepresented ATI to clients, or stopped work in order to benefit Dry Creek at Ritchie’s direction.

(52) ATI has not produced damages analyses, financial records, or client-specific evidence tying any alleged loss to any supposed aiding and abetting by Ritchie or Dry Creek, as distinct from the general effects of employees leaving and clients deciding independently to award business to Dry Creek.

The Court finds the Separate Statement to be deficient. First, a separate statement must “set forth plainly and concisely all material facts that the moving party are undisputed.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)(1), italics added.) Several of Dry Creek’s UMFs consist of multiple alleged facts within a single UMF. For example, UMF 46 combines the alleged facts that Ritchie formed Dry Creek in 2016 as an independent competitor, that Ritchie and Dry Creek were not ATI employees and owed ATI no duty of loyalty, and that their role was that of a separate competitor in a competitive industry. (UMF 46.) UMFs 47-52 similarly set forth multiple alleged facts as a single UMF. In addition, the Court notes that UMF 46’s statement that Ritchie and Dry Creek owed no duty of loyalty to ATI is a conclusion of law rather than a material fact.

UMFs in the separate statement must also “be followed by a reference to supporting evidence. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)(1).) Dry Creek’s UMF 46 cites to the declarations of Ritche (¶¶ 3-6, 19-25) in support of the UMF, providing: “Ritchie formed Dry Creek in 2016 as an independent competitor in the disaster-recovery and restoration business. At all times relevant to the FAC, Ritchie and Dry Creek were not ATI employees and owed ATI no duty of loyalty; their role was that of a separate competitor in a competitive industry.” The Court has reviewed this evidence and does not find it relevant to the facts alleged.

As an initial matter, it is unclear what time periods are “relevant to the FAC.” Further, paragraphs 3-6 address when Ritchie was hired by ATR in or around 2006 and his background in the construction industry. Paragraphs 19-25 addresses ASHE certification and IICRC training and certifications. The Court finds that these paragraphs do not meet the initial burden for all the facts set forth in UMF 46. As such, Defendant has not met his initial burden with respect to this proffered “material fact.”

Similarly, Dry Creek’s UMF 47 cites to the declarations of Hernandez[1] (¶¶ 15–19, 40 52), Johnson (¶¶ 10–12, 24–28, 52–57, 65[2]–69), and Ritchie (¶¶ 19–25, 56–64, 102–110) to

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV008800: ATI RESTORATION, LLC, A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY vs HERNANDEZ, et al. 09/02/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication by Dry Creek Constr in Department 8D

support the following assertion: “Ritchie understood that ATI employees, including Hernandez and Johnson, were at-will and free to consider and accept opportunities with competitors. Ritchie’s discussions with them were focused on prospective future employment and were held after hours or away from ATI job sites; he did not instruct them to sabotage ATI’s work, to walk off jobs, or to divert existing ATI projects.” The Court has reviewed this evidence and finds that none of the cited paragraphs support the contents of the UMF. Dry Creek’s inclusion of evidence that is irrelevant and/or that does not support its UMFs is improper and requires the Court to waste its finite resources scouring the separate statements and opposing volumes of evidence in an attempt to find the relevant evidence. Further, Defendant has not met his initial burden with respect to this proffered “material fact.”

Noncompliance with the separate statement requirements under Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (b)(1) is sufficient grounds to deny the motion without considering its merits. “Separate statements are required not to satisfy a sadistic urge to torment lawyers, but rather to afford due process to opposing parties and to permit trial courts to expeditiously review complex motions for [summary adjudication] and summary judgment to determine quickly and efficiently whether material facts are dispute.Both the court and the opposing party are entitled to have all the facts upon which the moving party bases its motion plainly set forth in the separate statement.” (United Community Church v.

Garcin (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 327, 335-336; see also Department of General Services v. Superior Court (1978) 85 Cal. App.3d 273, 284 [“because of the drastic nature of the remedy” summary judgment and [summary adjudication], the moving party “is held to strict compliance with the procedural requisites.”].)

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that, at minimum, Defendant has failed to meet its initial burden with respect to UMFS 46 and 47.[3]

Even if the Court were to overlook the multiple deficiencies in Dry Creek’s Separate Statement, and even if the Court were to find that Dry Creek had met its initial burden, Plaintiff has met its own burden to demonstrate the existence of triable issues of material fact. For example, in response to Defendant’s UMF 51, which asserts: “There is no evidence that Ritchie or Dry Creek provided “substantial assistance” to any actual breach of duty of loyalty. Hernandez and Johnson continued to perform ATI work until their resignations; there is no evidence that they diverted live ATI projects, misrepresented ATI to clients, or stopped work in order to benefit Dry Creek at Ritchie’s direction.”

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV008800: ATI RESTORATION, LLC, A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY vs HERNANDEZ, et al. 09/02/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication by Dry Creek Constr in Department 8D

Plaintiff has submitted evidence showing that, while still employed with ATI, Hernandez and Johnson met with Ritchie multiple times to discuss Dry Creek’s plans to compete with ATI (Walton Decl., Exh. 19, 267:17-24; Exh. 15, 68:18-69:8), that Hernandez provided Ritchie and/or Dry Cree with ATI documents (id. at Exh. 15, 182:3-183:10), that Hernandez and Johnson discussed strategies with Ritchie for Dry Creek’s healthcare division (id. at Exh. 19, 267:25- 268:3; Exh. 15, 75:22-76:1), and that Hernandez and Johnson gave advice to Ritchie about the materials, equipment, and/or clothing used by ATI employees in furtherance of ATI’s remediation services (id. at Exh. 19, 268:4-12, 195:6-23, 200:4-202:6, 268:19-23; Exh. 15, 77:19-78:7).

Furthermore, to the extent UMF 51 alleges there is no evidence that neither Hernandez nor Johnson “diverted live ATI projects,” Plaintiff has submitted evidence showing that Johnson spoke with an ATI customer about the timing of Johnson’s resignation and the customer’s approval of Dry Creek as a vendor at the customer’s facility. (See id., Exh. 19, 183:10-184:11, 185:23-187:8, 188:21-189:3, 269:2-6, 206:2-207:18- 210:19, 211:6-211:18, 216:15-217:1.) Based on the evidence, the Court finds there are apparent disputes regarding whether Ritchie and/or Dry Creek provided “substantial assistance” to Johnson’s and Hernandez’s alleged breach of loyalty, and whether Johnson’s communications with future Dry Creek customers “diverted live ATI projects.” These disputes alone preclude summary judgment.

Summary shall be granted only if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (c); 24 Hour Fitness, Inc. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1199, 1208.) Here, Plaintiff has shown that there are at least two UMFs that are not supported by the cited evidence and at least one triable issue of material fact. Therefore, the motion for summary judgment is DENIED in its entirety.

Evidentiary Objections

The Court does not rule on the evidentiary objections filed by either party since they concern evidence deemed immaterial to the decision on the motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (q).)

Judicial Notice

Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice is UNOPPOSED and GRANTED for the limited purposes permitted for judicial notice. (See Evid. Code §§ 451, subd. (a), §452, sub. (b)-(d); see also Dry Creek & Dry Creek v. Superior Court (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 757, 768 [court may take judicial

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV008800: ATI RESTORATION, LLC, A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY vs HERNANDEZ, et al. 09/02/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication by Dry Creek Constr in Department 8D

notice of the existence of court documents but not to the truth of the statements contained therein]; Kilroy v. State of California (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 140, 145-148; Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1569-70.)

Disposition

Dry Creek’s motion for summary judgment or in the alternative summary adjudication is DENIED.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1019.5; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.)

[1] It appears that the declaration of Pedro Hernandez filed on January 13, 2026, presumably

submitted in support of this motion filed on the same date, is actually a “Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, or, in the alternative, Summary Adjudication.” (See Hernandez Decl., filed 1/13/2026.) However, even reviewing the Hernandez declaration filed on January 27, 2026, the Court finds that the cited paragraphs do not support Ritchie’s asserted understanding or instructions. [2] The Court notes that there does not appear to be a paragraph 65 in the Johnson Declaration

filed January 13, 2026. [3] As set forth in the concurrent ruling on Radford’s motion for summary judgment, Defendant

has also failed to meet its initial burden with respect to UMFs 21 and 22.