Michael De Leon vs. J.M Equipment Company, Inc

Plaintiff alleges that in or around 1999 he began to develop knee and hip pain which caused him

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to walk slowly with a limp and hunched back. (Id., at 4:21-23.) Plaintiff contends that the he developed this pain “due to the strenuous demands of his job.” (Ibid.) Plaintiff further contends that he attended doctor’s appointments every two months (approximately) related to his “deteriorating hip and knee” and that he provided his supervisors with advance notice of these doctor’s appointments. (Id., at 4:24-26.)

Plaintiff contends that in or around 2014, his supervisors at JME began to make age-based derogatory remarks direct at Plaintiff. (Id., at 4:27-28.)

Plaintiff alleges that in or around 2015, he was demoted from road mechanic to shop mechanic. (Id., at 5:2-3). Plaintiff further contends that JME hired a 26-year-old to replace Plaintiff in his former role. (Ibid.)

Plaintiff states that he informed his supervisor, Taylor, that he was looking to undergo surgery for his hip. (Id., at 5:4-5.) Thereafter, in or around 2019, Plaintiff informed Taylor of his physical constraints due to his knee and requested an accommodation in the form of light duty. (Id., at 5:6-10). Plaintiff contends that Taylor denied this request, responding: “Light duty isn’t an option. You can either work, or you can’t.” (Ibid.) Plaintiff contends that in or around August 2021, he notified his supervisors Koop and Taylor that he would need to take temporary medical leave of absence to undergo hip replacement surgery. (Id., at 5:10-13.)

Plaintiff alleges that on or around October 1, 2021, just days before Plaintiff intended to begin medical leave for his scheduled hip replacement surgery, JME terminated his employment. (Id., at 5:14-18.) Plaintiff contends that the given reason for his termination was a downturn in business and lack of work available for him to perform. (Ibid.) Plaintiff contends that the only other employee terminated at the same time as him was Randy Yoshida, who was approximately 62 years old at the time of termination. (Id., 5:19-20.) Finally, Plaintiff contends that shortly after his termination, JME requested existing employees to work overtime and hired additional employees. (Id., at 5:21-23.)

Plaintiff filed his Complaint on February 15, 2023, naming Koop, Taylor and JME as defendants. The Complaint brings eleven causes of action, including FEHA actions for disability discrimination, and age discrimination as well as causes of action for wrongful termination and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Defendants now move for summary judgment on the ground that “Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants have no merit, there is not triable issue of material fact as to the legal issues raised therein, and Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Notice of Motion at 3:12- 14.)

In the alternative, Defendants present twelve issues for summary adjudication. The first eleven issues for summary adjudication assert that each of Plaintiff’s respective eleven causes of action

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“fails as at least one of the elements of this cause of action, cannot be established, and Defendants have a complete defense to this cause of action.” (Id., at 2:3-3:9.) The twelfth, and final issue asserts that “Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages has no merit.” (Id., at 3:11.)

Plaintiff opposes. Trial is currently set for June 1, 2026.

II. Objections

The Court need not address Plaintiff’s objections to the declaration of Rosario De Lopez nor Defendants’ objections to the declarations of Michael De Leon, Bill Steen, and Jared Tracy as they are not relevant to the disposition of this motion.

To the extent that Plaintiff has asserted objections in Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’ Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, and to the extent Defendants have asserted objections in Defendants’ Response to Plaintiff’s Separate Statement of Additional Material Facts, such objections are overruled because California Rules of Court, rule 3.1354 expressly requires written objections be set forth in a separate document and also quote the objectionable material. Moreover, to the extent these asserted objections are directed to the Defendants’ undisputed material facts and/or Plaintiff’s additional material facts, themselves, such objections are also overruled because objections are properly directed at evidence only. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rules 3.1352, 3.1354.)

III.

Legal Standard

In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the Court engages in a three-step process.

First, the Court identifies the issues framed by the pleadings. The pleadings define the scope of the issues on a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication. (FPI Dev. Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382.) Because a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication is limited to the issues raised by the pleadings (Lewis v. Chevron (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 690, 694), all evidence submitted in support of or in opposition to the motion must be addressed to the claims and defenses raised in the pleadings.

The Court cannot consider an unpled issue in ruling on a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication. (Roth v. Rhodes (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 530, 541.) The papers filed in response to a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not create issues outside the pleadings and are not a substitute for an amendment to the pleadings. (Tsemetzin v. Coast Federal Savings & Loan Assn. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1342.) Indeed, it has often been noted that “[i]t would be patently unfair to allow plaintiffs to defeat [defendant’s] summary judgment motion by allowing them to present a “moving target” unbounded by the pleadings.” (Melican v.

Regents of University of California, (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 168, 176-177.)

Next, the Court must determine whether the moving party has met its burden. A defendant

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moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication bears the burden of persuasion that one or more elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 [quoting Code Civ. Proc. §437c(p)(2)].) A defendant is not required to conclusively negate one or more elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action. (Saelzer v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 780-781).

Rather, to meet its burden, the defendant is required to show only that the plaintiff cannot prove an element of its cause of action, i.e., that the plaintiff does not possess and cannot reasonably obtain evidence necessary to show this element. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 853-855.) Further, the initial burden requires a showing that the plaintiff “could not prevail on any theory raised by the pleadings.” (Hawkins v. Wilton (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 936, 939-940.)

At the same time, a defendant cannot shift the burden to the plaintiff simply by suggesting the possibility that the plaintiff cannot prove its case; a moving defendant must still make “an affirmative showing” in support of its motion. (See Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 854-855, n.23; Addy v. Bliss & Glennon (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 205, 214.) Once the moving party has met its burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to show that a material factual issue exists as to the cause of action alleged or a defense to it. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (p); see generally Bush v. Parents Without Partners (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 322, 326- 327.)

Finally, in ruling on the motion, the Court must consider the evidence and inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 843.)

IV.

Discussion

As a preliminary matter, the Court observes that on May 4, 2026, Plaintiff filed a “Notice of Intent to Rely on Supplemental Evidence Re: Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, Summary Adjunction.” Plaintiff explains that he intends to rely on the following “new” evidence in support of his opposition to this motion: (1) declaration of Israel Chapa, (2) declaration of Adam Cline, and (3) relevant excerpt from the transcript of the Deposition of Randy Yoshida, taken on Tuesday, April 21, 2026.

As Plaintiff acknowledges, this new evidence was not submitted until after the Plaintiff’s opposition deadline has passed. Indeed, at the time Plaintiff submitted this evidence, Defendants’ reply deadline had already passed thus depriving Defendants of the opportunity to respond to such evidence. Moreover, Plaintiff did not receive leave from Court to make this additional filing. Accordingly, the Court does not consider this new evidence.[1]

A. Defendants’ Initial Burden

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The threshold question here is whether the moving papers are sufficient to satisfy Defendants’ initial burden of production under Code of Civil Procedure section 437c(p)(2) with respect to the ground(s) advanced for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication. As indicated earlier, on summary judgment or summary adjudication, a moving party must meet their initial burden regardless of whether the opposing party disputes any issues of material fact. (See Thatcher v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1087 [moving party on summary judgment must meet his initial burden even if the motion is unopposed].) Here, Defendants’ have failed to meet their initial burden by failing to sufficiently establish multiple purported undisputed material facts (“UMF”) as follows.

In this regard, UMF 12 asserts: “While Road Mechanics have the flexibility to come and perform repairs in the shop, it is not possible for Shop Mechanics to go out in the field.” Defendants rely on UMF 12 to support their request for summary judgment, and to support its request for summary adjudication of Issues 1-12. To support UMF 12, Defendants cites only to the following excerpt from Koop’s deposition:

Q. Do you ever have road mechanics come perform work in the shop occasionally?

A. Yes.

(Defendants’ Compendium of Exhibits [“Defendants’ COE”], Exhibit 2 at 218:23-25.)

While this testimony supports UMF 12’s assertions that “road mechanics have the flexibility to come and perform repairs in the shop”, it fails to provide any support whatsoever to the contention that “it is not possible for shop mechanics to go out in the field.” Defendants do not cite to any additional evidence to UMF 12. Thus, the Court finds that Defendants fail to support UMF 12 with adequate evidence and, consequently did not satisfy their initial burden with respect to this UMF.

UMF 39 asserts that “Bruce Helm was older than Plaintiff and Mr. Yoshida, approximately in his late 60s, while Devin Nord-Ziegenfuss was approximately in his 40s.” Defendants rely on UMF 39 to support their motion for summary judgment as well as its request for summary adjudication of Issues 3-12. To substantiate UMF 39, Defendants cite to excerpts from the deposition transcripts of Rosario De Lopez and Scott Andersen. Specifically, the evidence reveals that Rosario De Lopez testified that:

A. If I remember correctly, first it was “Why are we furloughing” Because JM Equipment had never ever laid off any employees prior to 2020. So I asked him if we were following the CBA, if we were following the skills and ability because he was keeping younger employees with more skills and ability than Mr. Yoshida and Mr. De Leon. But they were also keeping an older employee, older

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than Mr. Yoshida and Mr. De Leon.

(Defendants’ COE, Exhibit 6 at 82:3-8.)

Further Andersen testified that:

A. We did that because they were in the shop, their skill set was low. We had Bruce Helm, who repairs and works on all of our electric forklift batteries. And Bruce is quite a few years older than the other two and we kept him because of his skill set. He's able to fix electric forklifts, to repair batteries. We actually tear batteries apart and fix them. So we kept him. We had to keep Devon, because he's our go-to guy for teaching and training technicians. If we have a problem out in the field, he would have to go out and help. So, you know, it all came down to skill set, you know, who can we do without?

(Defendants’ COE, Exhibit 5 at 103:5-16.)

While this cited evidence (primarily by way of Ms. De Lopez’s deposition transcript) appears to support the UMF’s contention that Mr. Helm was older than Plaintiff and Mr. Yoshida, and Mr. Nord-Ziegenfuss was younger, there is no support for the assertion that Mr. Helm was “approximately in his late 60s” and Mr. Nord-Ziegenfuss was “approximately in his 40s.” The Court notes that it is unclear why Defendants have purposefully injected this approximate age of Mr. Helm and Mr. Nord-Ziegenfuss as constituting a material fact upon which Defendants’ motion is based.

Indeed, if Defendants believed that this level of specificity as to their ages was not required, Defendants should not have included it in their asserted UMFs. (See California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(d)(2) [separate statement to include “only material facts and not any facts that are not pertinent to the disposition of the motion”]; Beltran v. Hard Rock Hotel Licensing, Inc. (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 865, 875-876 [paragraphs in separate statement should be limited to facts that address elements of cause of action or affirmative defense].)

But in any event, because Defendants have purposefully included such asserted material facts, Defendants cannot now be heard to assert that their failure to establish such facts is somehow inconsequential to granting their motion. As previously explained, under Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 252, a moving party’s inclusion of facts in its separate statement effectively concedes each fact’s “materiality,” whether intended or not. (See also, Insalaco v. Hope Lutheran Church of West Contra Costa County (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 506.)

Thus, the Court finds that Defendants fail to support UMF 39 with adequate evidence and, consequently did not satisfy their initial burden with respect to this UMF.

UMF 45, on which Defendants rely to support their motion for summary judgment as well as issues 1-3 and 5-12 for summary adjudication, provides: “Only two witnesses, Mr. Koop, a coworker, Betsy McFarland, testified they were aware of his general hip pain.” In support, Defendants cite to certain excerpts of the deposition transcripts of Mr. Koop and Ms. McFarland.

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While these transcripts demonstrate Mr. Koop’s and Ms. McFarland’s testimony that they were aware of Plaintiff’s hip pain, these excerpts do not demonstrate by themselves, that these are the only two witnesses who testified that they were aware of Plaintiff’s hip pain. (Defendants’ COE, Exhibit 2 at 152:11-16, Exhibit 7 at 25:17-23.) Again, Defendants fail to cite to any additional evidence to support UMF 45 and as a result, the Court finds that Defendants failed to satisfy their initial burden with respect to UMF 45.

UMF 67 provides: “Mike Koop testified that if “shop mechanic” was on Mr. Jarvis’s offer letter, this would be incorrect, reiterating that he hired Mr. Jarvis as a Road Technician.” Defendants rely on UMF 67 to support its request for summary judgment, and to support its request for summary adjudication of Issues 1-12. To support UMF 67, Defendants cite to lines 3-12 on page 238 of Mr. Koop’s deposition transcript. However, Defendants did not include this page of Mr. Koop’s deposition transcript in its Compendium of Exhibits. Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendants failed to satisfy their initial burden with respect to UMF 67.

In sum, Defendants have failed to meet their initial burden with respect to UMFs 12, 39, 45 and 67. Any one of these failures requires denial of Defendants motion for summary judgment as Defendants rely on each of the aforementioned UMFs in its request for summary judgment. Moreover, failure to meet their initial burden with respect to the UMFs also requires denial of any issues for summary adjudication which rely upon these UMFs. Here, Issues 1 and 2 must be denied as these Issues rely upon UMFs 12, 45, and 67. Issues 4 must be denied as this Issue relies upon UMFs 12, 39, and 67. Finally, Issues 3 and 5-12 must be denied as these Issues rely upon UMFs 12, 39, 45, and 67. Consequently, Defendants motion for summary judgment is DENIED. Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication is also DENIED as to all of the Issues set forth in Defendants’ notice of motion and separate statement.

B. Triable Issue of Material Fact

Although the Court need not proceed further, it finds that even if Defendants had satisfied their initial burden, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and alternative motion for summary adjudication, would still be denied because Plaintiff has raised at least two issues of material fact that preclude judgment and/or adjudication in favor of Defendants.

Specifically, UMF 64 (which supports Defendants motion for summary judgment as well as Issues 1-2 and 5-12) asserts: “Jeffrey Jarvis was hired October 4, 2021, as a Road Mechanic.” Plaintiff disputes this UMF in opposition and presents evidence that Mr. Jarvis’ offer letter indicates he was hired as a shop mechanic. (Plaintiff’s Compendium of Exhibits [“Plaintiff’s COE”] Exhibit 34 [Employment Offer Letter from JME to Mr. Jarvis stating “We would therefore like to offer you the position as a Shop Mechanic”].) Plaintiff also cites to Mr. Jarvis’ deposition transcript which reveals that Mr. Jarvis testified as follows:

Q. Have you ever worked on the road for J.M.”

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A. No.

Q. Not even a single job?

A. I was sent out to one job location to replace a brake master cylinder.

Q. So in four years you've only done one job on the road; is that correct?

A. I believe so.

(Plaintiff’s COE, Exhibit 86 at 38:6-13.)

Finally, Plaintiff further points to Koop’s deposition testimony to dispute UMF 64’s assertion that Mr. Jarvis was hired as a Road Mechanic. Specifically, Plaintiff emphasizes that Koop testified as follows:

Q. Did you hire Jeffrey Jarvis as a shop mechanic?

A. No.

Q. What did you hire him as?

A. As a road tech.

Q. Why is he in the shop now?

A. Because he doesn't have the skills to be out on the road yet.

(Plaintiff’s COE, Exhibit 82 at 100:4-7.)

And further that:

Q. So he's a road technician who has never worked on the road; is that accurate?

A. He has not yet worked on the road.

Q. In three years.

A. '21, '22, '23, '24. Yes. Three and a half years.

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(Plaintiff’s COE, Exhibit 82 at 101:16-21.)

In ruling on this motion, the Court must consider the evidence and inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. (Aguilar, v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 25 Cal.4th at 843.) The Court concludes that this evidence raises a triable issue of fact as to whether or not Mr. Jarvis was hired as a Road Mechanic.

The Court further finds that Plaintiff has similarly raised a triable issue of material fact as to UMF 67. Again, UMF 67 (which Defendants’ rely on to support its request for summary judgment, and to support its request for summary adjudication of Issues 1-12) asserts that “Mike Koop testified that if “shop mechanic” was on Mr. Jarvis’s offer letter, this would be incorrect, reiterating that he hired Mr. Jarvis as a Road Technician.” Plaintiff disputes UMF 67 by arguing, inter alia, that Mr. Jarvis has never worked on the road and has worked exclusively in the shop since his hire date.

In support of this argument, Plaintiff again cites to portions of Mr. Jarvis’ and Koop’s deposition testimony which are also discussed in relation to UMF 64. The Court finds that this evidence is sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether or not the reference to “shop mechanic” on Mr. Jarvis’ offer letter was “incorrect” as asserted by UMF 67. Again, the evidence presented by Plaintiff indicates that since his hiring, Mr. Jarvis has yet to work on the road as a “road mechanic” and has instead been working in the shop.

Such evidence calls into question UMF 67’s assertion that any reference to “shop mechanic” on the offer letter was an error.

While Defendants may have raised additional triable issues of material facts, the Court need not continue. In sum, even if Defendants have satisfied their initial burden (which they did not do), the Court concludes that Plaintiff has met his burden of producing evidence sufficient to demonstrate the existence of triable issues of material fact, which precludes summary judgment as well as summary adjudication as to Issues 1-12. This is yet another alternative and independent ground requiring denial of Defendants’ motion for summary judgment or in the alternative summary adjudication.

V.

Disposition

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative summary adjudication, is DENIED in its entirety.

This minute order is effective immediately. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312, Plaintiff shall prepare an appropriate order which conforms to Code of Civil Procedure section 437c(g).

[1] The Court also notes that it does not find a continuance to allow Defendants to respond to the

newly submitted evidence would be appropriate under the circumstances before it. Specifically, trial in this matter is set for June 1, 2026. Moreover, based on the analysis set forth below, the

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Court does not find that consideration of the newly submitted evidence by Plaintiff would likely change the disposition of this motion.