Mangum vs. Defense International Corporation

sanctions precluding Defendants from supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses and/or introducing designated matters in evidence.

Despite proper service by mail and email, the motion is unopposed.

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.030, “the court, after notice to any affected party, person, or attorney, and after opportunity for hearing, may impose” certain “sanctions against anyone engaging in conduct that is a misuse of the discovery process.” Such misuses include but are not limited to “[f]ailing to respond or to submit to an authorized method of discovery” and “[d]isobeying a court order to provide discovery.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.010(d) and (g).)

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.030(a), the “court may impose a monetary sanction ordering that one engaging in the misuse of the discovery process, or any attorney advising that conduct, or both pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred by anyone as a result of that conduct.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030, subd. (a).)

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.030(d)(1), the court may also “impose a terminating sanction by . . . [a]n order striking out the pleadings or parts of the pleadings of any party engaging in the misuse of the discovery process” or “[a]n order dismissing the action, or any part of the action, of that party.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030, subd. (d)(1) and (d)(3).)

A party’s repeated failure to “participate in the discovery process” and “failure to pay the monetary sanctions the superior court ordered” constitute grounds for terminating sanctions. (Moofly Productions, LLC v. Favila (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1, 12; Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. LcL Administrators, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1106 [holding the party’s persistent “pattern of failure or refusal to give meaningful responses to discovery” constituted grounds for terminating sanction]; Mileikowsky v. Tenet Healthsystem (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 262, 280, as modified on denial of reh’g (May 4, 2005) [“Here the record is replete with evidence of Dr. Mileikowsky’s failures to answer discovery requests despite numerous extensions

sought and granted. Time and again, he refused to respond despite the issuance of court orders and monetary sanctions.”].)

Terminating sanctions are inappropriate if the “imposition of a lesser sanction will serve to protect the legitimate interests of the party harmed by the failure to provide discovery.” (Thomas v. Luong (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 76, 81.) Even so, “where a violation is willful, preceded by a history of abuse, and the evidence shows that less severe sanctions would not produce compliance with the discovery rules, the trial court is justified in imposing the ultimate sanction.” (Moofly Productions, LLC v. Favila (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1, 12.) Under such circumstances, the trial court has “broad authority to levy the ultimate sanction when prior efforts yielded no results.” (Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. LcL Administrators, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1105.)

Here, the Court finds that Defendants have repeatedly failed to participate in the discovery process and abide by the Court’s orders regarding the same. Plaintiff has been attempting to obtain discovery from Defendants since March of 2025, which is now well over a year ago. Defendants have yet to (1) provide the outstanding and court-ordered discovery responses, (2) pay court-ordered monetary sanctions, and (3) meaningful participate in the case.

Defendants’ counsel moved to be relieved as counsel and the Court granted this request on July 17, 2025. Now, over a year later, Defendants remain without counsel. Defendant Defense International is a corporation and must be represented by counsel. (CLD Constr., Inc. v. City of San Ramon (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1141, 1150 [“[T]he court retains authority to dismiss an action if an unrepresented corporation does not obtain counsel within reasonable time.”].)

Defendants have repeatedly failed to meaningful participate in this case for well over a year.

Defendants also did not oppose this motion and therefore proffered no evidence establishing otherwise. Based on the non-opposition, the Court may “deem [defendant] to have abandoned the issues” or “claims” addressed in the

moving papers. (Herzberg v. County of Plumas (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1, 20.) The non-opposition is considered an implied concession to the merit of Plaintiff’s arguments presented in the motion. (Herzberg v. County of Plumas (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1, 20; DuPont Merck Pharmaceutical Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 562, 566, as modified (Jan. 25, 2000) [“By failing to argue the contrary, plaintiffs concede this issue.”]; Glendale Redevelopment Agency v. Parks (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1409, 1424 [holding that “by failed to address” an issue, the issue is “impliedly concede[d].”]; and Westside Center Associates v. Safeway Stores 23, Inc. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 507, 529 [“Its failure to address the threshold question of intent effectively concedes that issue and renders its remaining arguments moot.”].)

Given the above, the Court finds that the requested terminating sanctions are appropriate under the circumstances.

The Motion is GRANTED. Defendants’ answer (ROA 19) is DEEMED STRICKEN.

Plaintiff may seek entry of default forthwith and may prepare an appropriate default judgment prove-up package.

Plaintiff to give notice. 107 Parker vs. Le, 24-01447835 Motion to Consolidate Defendants Nhi Xuan Le and Linda Nguyen (together, “Defendants”) move to consolidate the two related matters, Parker v. Le, et al., Case No. 2024-01447835 (the “7835 Action”), and Parker v. Le, et al., Case No. 2025-01463080 (the “3080 Action”).

For the following reasons, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED.

Defendants did not strictly comply with rule 3.350 because the notice of motion was not filed in the related 3080 Action, and the motion does not contain both captions. Although this constitutes a procedural defect, Plaintiff is the only party to both actions other than the moving parties, and Plaintiff filed an opposition (albeit, belatedly), in which she does not raise any objections to the procedural defects. Thus, no resulting prejudice has been

identified. The Court therefore addresses the merits notwithstanding the procedural defect.

The two actions concern disputes over the same two adjacent residential properties, and the parties are identical in both cases, except that in the 3080 Action, Plaintiff litigates in her capacity as “Successor Trustee and Sole Beneficiary of the Claudia Anne Parker Revocable Trust.” In the 7835 Action, Plaintiff appears in her individual capacity, although she alleges that the property is in a trust, and has filed a motion for leave to amend which, in part, seeks to change Plaintiff’s capacity to trustee. Both cases involve claims for negligence, private nuisance and property damage. However, the 3080 Action also includes allegations related to easement rights.

Plaintiff contends that the cases do not overlap, and therefore consolidation would not serve economy and convenience. She contends that the 3080 Action concerns issues with the front portion of the properties, while the 7835 Action concerns issues with the rear portion of the properties.

The Court finds that consolidation would conserve judicial resources, and reduce the risk of inconsistent rulings. Although the issues raised in the two cases are not identical, because they involve the same parties, same property, and similar causes of action, complete consolidation will streamline the litigation.

Defendants raise concern that Plaintiff is not able to prosecute these actions in pro per, as she apparently intends to pursue both actions in her capacity as trustee. Defendants urge the Court to set an OSC re: Dismissal regarding the matter. However, this issue is beyond the scope of a motion for consolidation. Further, citing Aulisio v. Bancroft, Defendants contend that a person who is "only the trustee and sole beneficiary of a revocable trust settled by someone else," and not the settlor, "could not purport to litigate trust matters in propria persona because the interests at stake in protecting the trust corpus would belong to the settlor." (Aulisio v. Bancroft (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1516, 1525.) Defendants have not provided any evidence that Plaintiff is not the settlor of the trust.