MATILDE IBARRA, ET AL VS. JOSE MANUEL PINON, ET AL

September 2, 2026, Law and Motion Calendar Judge Nicole S. Healy Department 28 ________________________________________________________________________ 2:00 PM LINE 11 25-CIV-09349 MATILDE IBARRA, ET AL VS. JOSE MANUEL PINON, ET AL

MATILDE IBARRA JAMESON ULLMAN JOSE MANUEL PINON JOSEPH A. LEPERA

DEFENDANTS JOSE MANUEL PINON AND JEIS PINON'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT, IF ENTERED

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendants Jose Manuel Pinon’s and Jeis Pinon’s motion for an order setting aside the default judgment entered on February 13, 2026, is GRANTED.

Defendants are ORDERED TO FILE THEIR ANSWER within ten (10) days of notice of entry of the formal order.

A.

Background

This is a landlord-tenant action arising from plaintiffs’ tenancy at property owned by defendants. Plaintiffs filed their complaint on November 21, 2025.

Defendants request the court vacate the entry of default because the delay was caused by their efforts to find and retain counsel. While doing so, they sought an extension of time in which to file their answer from plaintiffs’ counsel. Because the length of time requested plaintiffs’ counsel refused to stipulate and suggested defendants file a motion which plaintiffs would not oppose. Defendants did in fact file a motion for an extension of time but it was ultimately denied for their failure to serve the motion upon plaintiffs. They were unaware of the denial and its basis until after plaintiff moved for entry of default judgment for failing to file an answer.

Default judgment was entered February 13, 2026. Defendants retained counsel on or around March 13, 2026. On the date they were hired defense counsel requested plaintiffs stipulate to setting aside the default but plaintiffs refused. The instant motion to vacate the default was filed shortly thereafter, on March 27, 2026.

Defendants request the court vacate the default judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, section 473, subdivision (b) on the basis of surprise and excusable neglect. Plaintiffs oppose the motion, contending they will be prejudiced by enduring further tactical delays caused by defendants’ disregard for judicial deadlines.

B.

Legal Standard

Code of Civil Procedure, section 473, subdivision (b) provides in pertinent part that a court “may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party . . . from a judgment, dismissal, order,

September 2, 2026, Law and Motion Calendar Judge Nicole S. Healy Department 28 ________________________________________________________________________ or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Application for this relief shall be accompanied by a copy of the answer or other pleading proposed to be filed therein, otherwise the application shall not be granted, and shall be made within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months, after the judgment, dismissal, order, or proceeding was taken.” (Code Civ.

Proc., § 473, subd. (b).) Under this statute, “a court may relieve a party from a default or default judgment due to ‘mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect’ if the party files an application for relief within six months from the date of the default.” (Ibid; Kramer v. Traditional Escrow, Inc. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 13, 28.)

C.

Discussion

Defendants request the Court vacate the default judgment entered on February 13 because default judgment was entered due to their mistake and excusable neglect. To wit, they attempted to file a motion for an extension of time to answer the complaint while unrepresented and in so doing, made a fatal procedural error in failing to serve it upon plaintiffs.

Excusable neglect is “neglect that might have been the act or omission of a reasonably prudent person under the same or similar circumstances.” (Barragan v. County of Los Angeles (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1373, 1382-1383, citations omitted.) “It ‘is not shown by the mere failure to discover a fact until it is too late; the party seeking relief must establish that in the exercise of reasonable diligence, he failed to discover it.’” (Id., at p. 1383, citations omitted.) Based upon a review of the declarations submitted by both parties and their counsel, it appears that defendants made reasonable efforts to respond.

Plaintiffs contend they will be prejudiced if the court grants the motion but do not state how. Furthermore, the complaint was filed late November 2025 and the instant motion was filed only four months later, in the end of March 2026. Accordingly, defendants’ error in not timely answering was excusable and the motion is GRANTED.

If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the court. Thereafter, defendant’s counsel shall prepare a written order consistent with the court’s ruling for the court’s signature, providing written notice of the ruling to all parties who have appeared in this action, pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312 and Local Rule 3.403(b)(iv), which states in part that the “prevailing party on a tentative ruling is required to prepare a proposed order repeating verbatim the tentative ruling” (emphasis added). The order should be e-filed only, do not email or mail a hard copy to the court.