DOE vs RACHANDEEP SINGH, M.D., et al.

23CV007225: DOE vs RACHANDEEP SINGH, M.D., et al. 04/28/2026 Hearing on Motion to Quash Deposition Subpoena for Production of Business Records to Elicia Health Centers in Department 16C

Tentative Ruling

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Hon. Christopher E. Krueger Department 16C 916-874-7848

TENTATIVE RULING:

Plaintiff Jane Doe’s (“Plaintiff”) motion to quash or modify the deposition subpoena directed to Elica Health Centers (“Elica”) by defendant Danube River Holdings, LLC dba RiverPointe Post-Acute (“Defendant”) is ruled upon as follows.

This action arises out of an alleged sexual assault that occurred on April 26, 2023, by Rachandeep Singh, M.D. (“Dr. Singh”) against Plaintiff. Plaintiff filed a Complaint on August 22, 2023, against Dr. Singh, his company Access Physician Inc. (“API”), and the facility he directed, RiverPointe (a skilled nursing facility), alleging causes of action for: (1) assault, (2) sexual battery, (3) battery, (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (5) sexual harassment, (6) negligent hiring and supervision, and (7) sex discrimination. Plaintiff alleges she was employed by Defendant and that on the date of the assault, she had just returned to work from vacation in Mexico and was experiencing abdominal pain and nausea. Plaintiff further alleges that Dr. Singh offered to prescribe her an antibiotic, but stated that he needed to physically examine her first. During the

23CV007225: DOE vs RACHANDEEP SINGH, M.D., et al. 04/28/2026 Hearing on Motion to Quash Deposition Subpoena for Production of Business Records to Elicia Health Centers in Department 16C

examination, Dr. Singh allegedly began to grope Plaintiff’s breasts and attempted to have sexual intercourse with Plaintiff. Plaintiff pushed Dr. Singh away and escaped to a nearby closet.

In August of 2025, Defendant issued a subpoena to Elica Health Centers with a production date of September 12th, which seeks:

“All medical, psychiatric, and/or psychological records pertaining to any examinations, treatments, and consultations of [Plaintiff] from January 1, 2018 to present, including, but not limited to: inpatient and outpatient records; medical histories; referrals; prescriptions; chart notes; x-ray reports, laboratory reports; tests; admissions and discharge reports; treatment records; diagnosis and prognosis records; notes by nurses, nurse practitioners, doctors and/or other healthcare professionals; and all medical, psychiatric, and/or psychological evaluations and/or reports.”

(Declaration of Alexandra Darling (“Darling Decl.”), ¶ 7, Ex. C.)

Plaintiff moves to quash this subpoena on the grounds it is overbroad, seeks irrelevant documents, and violates her privacy rights and the physician-patient privilege. Plaintiff argues the subpoena seeks all of her medical records for over an eight-year period and there is no conceivable connection between the requested documents and her claim of sexual assault that occurred on April 26, 2023.

In opposition, Defendant asserts this motion is untimely. Defendant notes that after the subpoena was issued, Plaintiff sent a letter objecting and the parties engaged in meet and confer efforts. Plaintiff’s proposed solution was a first look agreement, similar to the agreement Plaintiff entered into with Dr. Singh and API related to a subpoena Dr. Singh and API had issued to Elica back in May of 2024. Defendant explains that as part of that agreement (to which Defendant was not a party), Plaintiff received approximately 502 pages of documents from Elica, but produced only approximately 99 pages, much of which was redacted and the accompanying privilege log failed to adequately explain the redactions.

Thus, Defendant rejected Plaintiff’s proposed first look agreement, asserting that it would simply duplicate what Plaintiff had already done, which Defendant deemed insufficient. (Declaration of Peyton M. Turner (“Turner Decl.”), ¶¶ 2-7, Exs. 1-3.) After it was clear that the parties were at an impasse, Defendant issued a new subpoena to Elica, along with the notice to consumer, on October 1, 2025, with a production date of October 22, 2025.

Although not addressed by Defendant, this second subpoena is not discussed or presented anywhere in Plaintiff’s moving papers, which includes and refers only to the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV007225: DOE vs RACHANDEEP SINGH, M.D., et al. 04/28/2026 Hearing on Motion to Quash Deposition Subpoena for Production of Business Records to Elicia Health Centers in Department 16C

first subpoena issued in August of 2025. The second subpoena, however, is issued to the exact same party and seeks the exact same documents. As the subpoena is identical, albeit with different issuance and production dates, the Court will not find the motion defective on this basis.

Defendant does argue, however, that this motion is untimely because Plaintiff failed to comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 1985.3(g) and California Rules of Court, rules 3.1112 and 3.1113. Code of Civil Procedure section 1985.3 provides that a party “may, prior to the date for production, bring a motion under Section 1987.1 to quash or modify the subpoena duces tecum.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 1985.3(g).) Rule 3.112 requires that a motion include at least a notice of motion, the motion itself, and a memorandum in support of the motion. Rule 3.113 authorizes the court to deny a motion in the absence of a memorandum.

Defendant argues that the production date for the subpoena was October 22, 2025, but Plaintiff only filed a notice of motion and an objection on October 15, 2025, filed an amended notice of motion on November 13, 2025, and that it was not until April 2, 2026, that Plaintiff filed the supporting memorandum and declaration. Defendant contends Plaintiff had plenty of time to prepare and file a fully briefed motion that included a memorandum before October 22nd, but she failed to do so.

Based on the opening sentence of section 1985.3(g), and the corresponding rules of court, Plaintiff was required to present a fully briefed motion before October 22, 2025, but Plaintiff’s motion was not complete until April 2, 2026. However, no legal authority is presented by Defendant establishing that the foregoing deficiency warrants denial of the motion, and there is legal authority supporting that nothing in the procedure set forth in section 1985.3 suggests that a court lacks jurisdiction to consider a motion to quash if it is brought after the date set forth in the subpoena for production. (Slagle v. Superior Court (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1309, 1312.) Accordingly, the Court declines to deny the motion as untimely.

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.1, the “court, upon motion reasonably made, ... may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon such terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders. In addition, the court may make any other order as may be appropriate to protect the parties, the witness, the consumer, or the employee from unreasonable demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the witness, consumer, or employee.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 1987.1(a).)

The right of privacy is an “inalienable right” secured by Article I, Section 1 of the California Constitution. (Valley Bank of Nevada v. Super Ct. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 652,

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV007225: DOE vs RACHANDEEP SINGH, M.D., et al. 04/28/2026 Hearing on Motion to Quash Deposition Subpoena for Production of Business Records to Elicia Health Centers in Department 16C

656.) However, the right to privacy is not absolute - the right to privacy protects the individual’s reasonable expectation against a serious invasion. (See, e.g. Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 39-40.) In determining whether disclosure of private personal information is required, the court must engage in a balancing of the right of a civil litigant to discover relevant facts, on the one hand, and the right of the third parties to maintain reasonable privacy regarding their sensitive personal affairs, on the other. (Vinson v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 833, 842.)

The California Supreme Court has decided the analytical framework for assessing a privacy claim: (1) there must be a specific legally-protected privacy interest; (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy must exist; and (3) the invasion of the privacy interest must be serious. (Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn., supra, 7 Cal.4th at 39-40.)

As to items protected by the right to privacy, the threshold requirement is that such items must be “directly relevant” to the issue in the case. (Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844; Tylo v. Superior Court (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1379.) Yet, even when the discovery of private information is found directly relevant to the issues of ongoing litigation, it will not be automatically allowed; there must then be a “careful balancing” of the compelling public need for discovery against the fundamental right of privacy. (Board of Trustees v. Superior Court (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 516, 525.)

There is no dispute that the right to privacy exists in one’s medical records. (Binder vs. Superior Court (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 893, 901 (medical records are the type of information which is protected by the right of privacy.) Further, the invasion here is obvious given the privacy right and the breadth of the invasion of that right as seen from the language of the subpoena. Thus, under the Hill framework, the Court finds Plaintiff has established a reasonable expectation of privacy in her medical records, as well as the seriousness of the invasion. In turn, Defendant must demonstrate a compelling need for the requested medical records via a showing of direct relevance.

Where it is argued that a party waives protection by filing a lawsuit, the Court must construe the concept of waiver narrowly and the requisite “compelling public interest” is demonstrated only where the material sought is directly relevant to the litigation. Such waiver extends only to information relating to the issues in question. (See e.g., Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 858-859.) “Even when the balance does weigh in favor of disclosure, the scope of disclosure must be narrowly circumscribed.” (Life Technologies Corp. v.

Superior Court (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 640, 652-53 (citing Harding Lawson Associates v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 7, 10; Britt, supra, 20 Cal.3d at 855-864 (even party plaintiffs could not be compelled to provide information about all their political activities or their entire medical histories; party seeking discovery must show both compelling need for the information and that

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV007225: DOE vs RACHANDEEP SINGH, M.D., et al. 04/28/2026 Hearing on Motion to Quash Deposition Subpoena for Production of Business Records to Elicia Health Centers in Department 16C

discovery request is narrowly and specifically drawn to minimize intrusion into private matters).)

A plaintiff does not sacrifice all privacy rights in seeking redress for a specific medical condition. (Britt, supra, 20 Cal.3d at 863-864 [citations omitted].) “As Lifschutz explains, plaintiffs are ‘not obligated to sacrifice all privacy to seek redress for a specific [physical,] mental or emotional injury’; while they may not withhold information which relates to any physical or mental condition which they have put in issue by bringing this lawsuit, they are entitled to retain the confidentiality of all unrelated medical or psychotherapeutic treatment they may have undergone in the past.” (Id. at 864.)

Plaintiff asserts that although she may have waived her rights to certain medical information, such as information about her emotional distress, any records that are unrelated to her emotional distress are not relevant, must less directly relevant. In addition, Plaintiff contends she has already produced all records related to her claimed emotional distress.

In opposition, Defendant avers that Plaintiff alleges she has suffered emotional distress due to Defendant’s negligence and that she suffers from:

“Emotional distress and mental anguish. Humiliation. Anxiety. Depression. Post- Traumatic Stress Disorder. Self-worth taken away. Flashbacks and nightmares of the assault and sexual battery. Defendant Singh’s face haunts Plaintiff. Insomnia and difficulty sleeping. Relationships were broken and harmed, and it is difficult to speak to people. Some people have stopped talking to Plaintiff. Plaintiff is under so much stress that it is impacting her body and health. Plaintiff was making good progress in her life and was graduating with her nursing degree. The assault and sexual battery has turned Plaintiff’s world upside down.”

(Turner Decl. ¶ 10, quoting Plaintiff’s Response to Form Interrogatory No 6.2, & Ex. 6.)

Defendant argues by claiming such extensive and severe emotional distress damages, she has placed her mental and emotional condition at issue and waived her right to privacy over the requested records. In addition, Defendant contends Plaintiff has waived the physician-patient privilege via her allegations and testimony that she saw her provider for counseling prior to the alleged incident following a diagnosed miscarriage, thereby opening the door to Plaintiff’s broader mental health and physical history. Defendant asserts if other stressors in Plaintiff’s life impacted, or continue to impact, her mental health, Defendant is entitled to discovery to properly apportion any damages.

Defendant also cites to the Declaration of Dr. Amyanne C. Freeburg, a psychologist

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV007225: DOE vs RACHANDEEP SINGH, M.D., et al. 04/28/2026 Hearing on Motion to Quash Deposition Subpoena for Production of Business Records to Elicia Health Centers in Department 16C

who previously submitted a declaration in this case, asserting the relevance of such information:

“information related to Plaintiff’s prior mental health treatment and medical treatment both before and after the alleged incident must be explored. Prior psychiatric hospitalizations reveal an exceptional level of mental health crisis which can place a patient at risk for future relapse. Patients can also suffer from somatic preoccupation that can impact their mental health unrelated to any alleged sexual abuse claimed to have been encountered. In addition, medical conditions unrelated to the alleged assault can also be a source of unrelated emotional distress, such as unplanned pregnancies or the loss of a pregnancy.”

(Turner Decl. ¶ 12, Ex. 8.)

Defendant has also agreed to reduce the time period from January 1, 2018, to January 1, 2020, to the present. Defendant also proposed that the parties stipulate to a protective order to govern the use of documents from Elica, but Plaintiff refused.

The Court finds Plaintiff has placed records regarding her mental health treatment at issue given the extent of the emotional distress allegations that she has raised and her testimony that she has received counseling regarding other life stressors. Such records are relevant to evaluate whether there are alternative sources for Plaintiff’s alleged emotional distress. However, Defendant has not sufficiently established why Plaintiff’s medical records related to any physical condition would be directly relevant to her claims of emotional distress. Plaintiff is only alleging emotional distress damages. Accordingly, the Court elects to modify the subpoena to exclude from production any records that pertain to any physical medical conditions that Plaintiff suffered from or was treated for.

Elica shall produce the requested documents with the foregoing modification, no later than May 19, 2026.

The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312, or further notice is required.

NOTICE:

Consistent with Local Rule 1.06(B), any party requesting oral argument on any matter on this calendar must comply with the following procedure:

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV007225: DOE vs RACHANDEEP SINGH, M.D., et al. 04/28/2026 Hearing on Motion to Quash Deposition Subpoena for Production of Business Records to Elicia Health Centers in Department 16C

To request limited oral argument, on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Law and Motion Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-2615 by 4:00 p.m. the Court day before the hearing and advise opposing counsel. At the time of requesting oral argument, the requesting party shall leave a voice mail message: a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and that opposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below. If no request for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court.

Unless ordered to appear in person by the Court, parties may appear remotely either telephonically or by video conference via the Zoom video/audio conference platform with notice to the Court and all other parties in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure §367.75. Although remote participation is not required, the Court will presume all parties are appearing remotely for non-evidentiary civil hearings.

The Department 16C Zoom Link is https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/j/16030877014 To appear on Zoom telephonically, call (833) 568-8864 and enter the Zoom Meeting ID 16030877014. NO COURTCALL APPEARANCES WILL BE ACCEPTED.

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A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.