DOE vs RACHANDEEP SINGH, M.D., et al.

23CV007225: DOE vs RACHANDEEP SINGH, M.D., et al. 02/03/2026 Hearing on Motion to Quash Subpoena as to Capital Post Acute in Department 54

Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff Jane Doe’s (“Plaintiff”) motion to quash deposition subpoena directed to Capital Post- Acute (“CPA”) issued by defendants Access Physician, Inc. (“API”) and Rachandeep Singh, M.D. (“Dr. Singh”) (collectively, “Defendants”) is ruled upon as follows.

This action arises out of an alleged sexual assault that occurred on April 26, 2023, by Dr. Singh against Plaintiff. Plaintiff filed her complaint on August 22, 2023, against Dr. Singh, his company API, and the facility he directed, Danube River Holdings, LLC dba RiverPointe Post- Acute (“RiverPointe”), alleging causes of action for: (1) assault, (2) sexual battery, (3) battery, (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (5) sexual harassment, (6) negligent hiring and supervision, and (7) sex discrimination.

Plaintiff, who was employed by RiverPointe, alleges that on the date of the assault she had just returned to work from vacation in Mexico and was experiencing abdominal pain and nausea. Plaintiff further alleges that Dr. Singh offered to prescribe her an antibiotic, but stated that he needed to physically examine her first. During the examination, Dr. Singh allegedly began to grope Plaintiff’s breasts and attempted to have sexual intercourse with Plaintiff. Plaintiff pushed Dr. Singh away and escaped to a nearby closet.

Plaintiff alleges that she has suffered “pain and suffering, emotional distress, shock, humiliation, loss of enjoyment of life, and other losses and damages.” In Plaintiff’s discovery responses, she stated that she suffers:

Emotional distress and mental anguish. Humiliation. Anxiety. Depression. Post- Traumatic Stress Disorder. Self-worth taken away. Flashbacks and nightmares of the assault and sexual battery. Defendant Singh’s face haunts Plaintiff. Insomnia and difficulty sleeping. Relationships were broken and harmed, and it is difficult to speak to people. Some people have stopped talking to Plaintiff. Plaintiff is under so much stress that it is impacting her body and health. Plaintiff was making good progress in her life and was graduating with her nursing degree. The assault and sexual battery has turned Plaintiff’s world upside down.

(Declaration of Faith Wolinsky (“Wolinsky Decl.”), Ex. B, Plaintiff’s Response to FROG 6.2.)

Plaintiff also stated that “[t]he symptoms of emotional distress and mental harm remain the same and happen very often. Plaintiff has had to find ways to distract herself, calm herself, and practice mindfulness to deal with the constant stress and anxiety.” (Id., FROG 6.3.)

Trial is currently scheduled for October 20, 2026.

23CV007225: DOE vs RACHANDEEP SINGH, M.D., et al. 02/03/2026 Hearing on Motion to Quash Subpoena as to Capital Post Acute in Department 54

On August 8, 2025, Defendants issued a subpoena (“Subpoena”) to CPA which seeks:

(1) ALL PAPER OR ELECTRONICALLY STORED DOCUMENTS AND MATERIALS reflecting dates and terms of employment, position, job description, work histories, including all assignments, dates, hours, shifts and locations worked, excluding materials related to earnings or wages or tax identification numbers which are to be redacted.

(2) ALL PAPER OR ELECTRONICALLY STORED DOCUMENTS AND MATERIALS reflecting any claims or actions made by the employee related to personal injury, physical or sexual assaults or other grievances.

(3) ALL PAPER OR ELECTRONICALLING STORED DOCUMENTS AND MATERIALS reflecting job performance, including but not limited to materials reflecting complaints, incident reports, performance reviews, couching, counseling, written reprimands, disciplinary measures, termination notices, feedback, performance reviews, star ratings or reliability scores and similar materials.

(4) ALL PAPER OR ELECTRONICALLY STORED DOCUMENTS AND MATERIALS reflecting any training provided related to infection control or prevention measures and employee sick policies.

(Declaration of Eliezer Cohen (“Cohen Decl.”), Ex. H.)

Plaintiff is a travelling nurse. She has worked at CPA from January 2024 to present. (Cohen Decl., Ex. B, Response to FROG 2.6.)[1] Plaintiff moves to quash the subpoena on the grounds that it is “harassing, overbroad, seeks documents not relevant to this matter and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence in this matter, and directs the witness to produce documents that are protected by plaintiff’s privacy rights.” (Motion, 2:9-12.)

Plaintiff insists that the Subpoena is incredibly overbroad, not limited in scope, harassing, seeks irrelevant documents and violates her right to privacy. She indicates that in her discovery responses she stated that she is not making a wage loss claim, which her counsel has reiterated to defense counsel numerous times. (Cohen Decl., Ex. B, FROG 8.1.) Plaintiff has also provided her detailed work history, and has produced her work history records from the Clipboard and Medley apps which includes the list of all facilities at which she had shifts. (Cohen Decl., ¶ 5.)

Plaintiff also testified at her deposition that at CPA, a supervisor talked to her about how to handle her stress, that she was never reprimanded or disciplined at CPA, and she did not have any concerns raised with regard to her work performance for any of the shifts she did using the Clipboard app. (Cohen Decl., Ex. F, at 80:4-16; 81:1-2; 83:11-16.) Plaintiff contends that since

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV007225: DOE vs RACHANDEEP SINGH, M.D., et al. 02/03/2026 Hearing on Motion to Quash Subpoena as to Capital Post Acute in Department 54

she is not making a wage loss claim and did not work any shifts until January 2024, there is “no apparent connection between post-assault records and the assault.” (Motion, 6:20-21.) She adds that request no. 2, which requests “all materials” relating to claims of sexual assault, is improper pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2017.220, and that request no. 3 violates the thirdparty patient privacy rights completely unrelated to the case. With respect to request no. 4, Plaintiff emphasizes that “[i]t is unclear what this relates to, and the training and sick policies of other medical facilities Plaintiff worked at after the assault are certainly irrelevant to this case.” (Motion, 8:2-3.)

Plaintiff further explains that the Subpoena invades her privacy rights, especially requests nos. 2 and 3, and that the request for “all materials” relating to claims of sexual assault is improper and require a noticed motion showing good cause. Plaintiff continues that since her employment records are clearly private, Defendants must show that the records are directly relevant, and they cannot do so because “[t]here is no compelling need for Defendants to obtain virtually Plaintiff’s employment file, from a third-party facility she worked at after the assault, when there are no claims of wage loss.” (Motion, 9:7-9.)

Plaintiff lastly advances that the Subpoena is harassing because it:

serves no legitimate discovery purpose and instead operates as a tool of harassment. As explained above, Plaintiff’s employment at Capital post-dates the sexual assault, Plaintiff does not claim wage loss, and Plaintiff has testified that she has never received written discipline or performance write-ups. Nonetheless, Defendants have served subpoenas on Plaintiff’s current employers in an attempt to expose Plaintiff’s sexual harassment claims against her former employer. This not only has the potential for causing stigma and shame; it could potentially jeopardize Plaintiff’s professional standing.

(Motion, 9:21-27.)

Defendants contend that the Subpoena is narrowly tailored and limited to information relevant to Plaintiff’s allegations regarding her emotional distress damages and her credibility. Defendants note that Plaintiff’s discovery responses and deposition testimony show that Plaintiff claims that she continues to suffer emotional distress, which has caused some issues at her subsequent jobs. Defendants also observe that Plaintiff has not unequivocally stated that she is not seeking damages for loss of earning capacity. Rather, in her response to FROG 8.1 she stated “[n]ot at this time. Plaintiff missed several scheduled days of work following the assault and sexual battery, but Riverpointe paid Plaintiff for those days and Plaintiff has not lost income for those days as a result.” (Wolinsky Decl., Ex. B, Plaintiff’s Response to FROG 8.1.)

Defendants further argue that Plaintiff has not satisfied her burden under Hill v. National

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV007225: DOE vs RACHANDEEP SINGH, M.D., et al. 02/03/2026 Hearing on Motion to Quash Subpoena as to Capital Post Acute in Department 54

Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal. 4th 1 to show that, she had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances, and that Defendants’ conduct constituted a serious invasion of privacy. Defendants explain that Plaintiff does not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy given the circumstances because she has alleged symptoms of emotional distress which affect her ability to function at work and believes that she lost a job as a result of the alleged assault. Defendants add that there is no serious intrusion into Plaintiff’s privacy because any concerns can easily be alleviated by a stipulated confidentiality protective order.

Defendants continue that even if Plaintiff satisfied the Hill analysis, that the “interests of fairness outweigh Plaintiff’s privacy interests.” (Opposition, 8:22-23.) Defendants insist that the information is relevant to Plaintiff’s emotional distress damages because:

[t]he primary issue in this case is whether a sexual assault occurred on April 26, 2023 and Plaintiff’s claim for damages for severe emotional distress caused by the alleged assault; the probative value of the information sought regarding Plaintiff’s mental health as exhibited by her ability to perform at work prior to the alleged incident, and the alleged incident’s impact on Plaintiff’s emotional distress after the incident based on changes in her work performance is substantial.

(Opposition, 9:15-20.)

Defendants submit the declaration of AmyAnne C. Freeburg, Psy.D, MDCP, ABPP, a licensed psychologist board certified in Forensic Psychology, in support of their opposition. Dr. Freeburg avers, in part:

11. In order to assess if the Plaintiff suffered from a pre-existing mental health condition or disorder, as well as the nature and extent of any alleged emotional impact from the claimed incident, it is imperative for an evaluator to determine the examinee’s psychological baseline functioning, post-incident functioning, and any potential alternative causes for the same. Review of Plaintiff’s employment records pertaining to her job performance prior and subsequent to the incident alleged are relevant to her emotional distress claim as they would contain evidence of her baseline socio-occupational functioning and any impact on the same as a result of the incident.

12. To assess the potential impact of the alleged incident and damages, it will be important to obtain information from a broad number of sources, including records related to Plaintiff’s pre-incident and post-incident employment performance.

13. For the reasons stated herein, evidence as to the details of Plaintiff’s

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV007225: DOE vs RACHANDEEP SINGH, M.D., et al. 02/03/2026 Hearing on Motion to Quash Subpoena as to Capital Post Acute in Department 54

employment performance prior to or subsequent to her interaction with Dr. Singh on April 26, 2023, is directly relevant to any evaluation of the extreme emotional distress claimed by Plaintiff in this case and is directly relevant to an assessment of her psychological condition as it pertains to causation and damages.

(Declaration AmyAnne C. Freeburg, Psy.D. at ¶¶ 11-13 attached to the Wolinsky Decl., as Exhibit I.)

Analysis

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.1, the “court, upon motion reasonably made, by the party...may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon such terms or conditions as the court shall declare including protective orders. In addition, the court may make any other order as may be appropriate to protect the parties, the witness, the consumer, or the employee from unreasonable demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the witness, consumer, or employee.”

The right to privacy provided for in Cal. Const., art. I, § 1 may be invoked by a litigant as justification for refusal to answer questions or respond to requests for information that unreasonably intrude on that right. A plaintiff asserting a privacy claim has the burden of establishing each element, specifically: 1. A legally protected privacy interest; 2. A reasonable expectation of privacy; and 3. A serious invasion of the privacy interest. (See, e.g. Hill, supra, 7 Cal. 4th at 36-37.)

The Court disagrees with Defendants that Plaintiff fails to show that her employment files are protected by the right to privacy. There can be no dispute that Plaintiff’s employment records are protected by the right to privacy. “It is clear ... personnel records and employment history are within the [privacy] protection provided by the state and federal Constitutions.” (San Diego Trolley, Inc. v. Superior Court (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1083, 1097 [disapproved by Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 557, fn. 8 only to the extent that the case assumed without conducting the Hill analysis that a compelling need is automatically required when a party seeks discovery of private information].)

As the California Supreme Court stated in Williams, not every invasion of privacy requires the party seeking discovery of private information to establish a compelling need. Rather, “[o]nly obvious invasions of interests fundamental to personal autonomy must be supported by a compelling interest.” (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at 557.) The invasion here is obvious given the privacy right set forth above and the breadth of the invasion of that right as seen from the language of the subpoena set forth above.

Under the Hill framework, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has established her privacy interest

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV007225: DOE vs RACHANDEEP SINGH, M.D., et al. 02/03/2026 Hearing on Motion to Quash Subpoena as to Capital Post Acute in Department 54

and that Defendants was therefore required to demonstrate a compelling need for all of the records. That is, Defendants were required to show that the information is directly relevant. The Court finds that Defendants have done so, but only with respect to request nos. 1 and 3.

Given Plaintiff’s broad claim for emotional distress damages which she states “turned her life upside down,” and “remain[s] the same and happen[s] very often,” (Wolinsky Decl., Ex. B, Plaintiff’s Response to FROGS 6.2-6.3), the Court finds that Defendants have demonstrated that the information requested in request nos. 1 and 3 are directly relevant to Plaintiff’s claim of emotional distress damages. Specifically, the requests are directly relevant to the impact of the alleged assault on Plaintiff’s emotional distress, and her ability to function at work.

The Court is not persuaded by Plaintiff’s argument that the Subpoena is only relevant to wage claims, which she is not asserting. Additionally, request no. 1 expressly stated that materials related to earnings or wages or tax identification numbers are to be redacted. Nor is the Court persuaded by Plaintiff’s argument that less intrusive means exist to obtain the discovery. Any concerns about third-party patient privacy can be addressed by redacting the patient identities, patient numbers, or any potentially identifying patient information.

A stipulated protective order will also lessen Plaintiff’s privacy concerns.

Accordingly, the motion to quash request nos. 1 and 3 is DENIED.

Defendants, however, make no showing that request nos. 2 and 4 are directly relevant to Plaintiff’s claims. “Mere speculation as to the possibility that some portion of the records might be relevant to some substantive issue does not suffice.” (Davis v. Superior Court (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1008, 1017.)

Accordingly, the motion to quash request nos. 2 and 4 is GRANTED.

Both parties’ request for monetary sanctions is DENIED.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc. §1019.5; CRC Rule 3.1312.)

[1] There is a discrepancy regarding when Plaintiff worked at CPA. Her counsel’s declaration

states that Plaintiff worked approximately nine shifts at CPA between September 2, 2023 and January 24, 2024. (Cohen Decl., ¶ 5.) Defendant has also submitted Plaintiff’s deposition testimony wherein she affirmed that her interrogatory response indicated that she began working at CPA in January 2024. (Wolinsky Decl., Ex. C, 79:4-6.)

NOTICE:

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV007225: DOE vs RACHANDEEP SINGH, M.D., et al. 02/03/2026 Hearing on Motion to Quash Subpoena as to Capital Post Acute in Department 54

Consistent with Local Rule 1.06(B), any party requesting oral argument on any matter on this calendar must comply with the following procedure:

To request limited oral argument, on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Law and Motion Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-2615 by 4:00 p.m. the Court day before the hearing and advise opposing counsel. At the time of requesting oral argument, the requesting party shall leave a voice mail message: a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and that opposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below. If no request for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court.

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A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV007225: DOE vs RACHANDEEP SINGH, M.D., et al. 02/03/2026 Hearing on Motion to Quash Subpoena as to Capital Post Acute in Department 54

or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will be forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.