Padilla et al v. Bridge Management Inc., et al

Padilla et al v. Bridge Management Inc., et al Motion: Demurrer and Strike Movant: Bridge Management Inc. (Bridge) and SPSSM Investments-VI,LP (SPSSM), collectively, (Defendants) Respondent: Eric Padilla and Gladys Padilla (Defendants)

RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On February 10, 20205, Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendants asserting claims for (1) violation of Civil Code section 1942.4, (2) tortious breach of the warranty of habitability, (3) private nuisance, (4) violation of Business & Professions Code section 17200, et seq. (5) negligence, (6) breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, (7) intentional infliction of emotional distress or IIED, (8) negligence per se, (9) violation of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act or the CLRA, (10) premises liability, and (11) negligent hiring, retention, and supervision.

Defendants’ demurrer to the first, seventh eighth and ninth causes of action. Defendants’ also move to strike 33 total paragraphs from the Complaint in addition to the prayers for punitive damages, statutory damages, restitution, and reasonable attorney’s fees. Plaintiff opposes. ANALYSIS Meet and Confer Before filing a demurrer and motion to strike, the moving party shall meet and confer, at least 5 days before a responsive pleading is due, in person, by telephone, or by video conference, with the opposing party to see if a resolution can be reached on the objections to the pleading. (Code Civ.

Proc., §§430.41, subd. (a), 435.5, subd. (a)(1)-(2).) With the demurrer and strike motion, the moving party shall submit a declaration stating (a) how the parties met and conferred, and no resolution was reached, or (b) the opposing party failed to respond to the demurring party’s meet and confer requests or failed to meet and confer in good faith. (Code Civ. Proc., §§430.41, subd. (a)(3), 435.5, subd. (a)(3).) Attorney Branden D. Frankel (Frankel) filed a declaration only states a letter was sent to Plaintiff’s counsel concerning the alleged deficiencies in their pleadings.

There is no mention of

an in person, telephonic or virtual conference. To the extent there was no in person, telephonic, or video conference meet and confer, the efforts were not Code-compliant, and the Court can take the matters off calendar. (Local Rule 560) Counsel should be prepared to discuss the full extent of the meet and confer efforts. The court reserves the right to take both motions off calendar. General Demurrer A general demurrer challenges a complaint for failure to state a cause of action under Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (e).

It is granted only where the facts alleged on the fact of the complaint fail to state a valid claim under any possible legal theory entitling the plaintiff to relief against the demurring defendant. (Sheehan v. San Francisco 49ers, Ltd. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 992, 998.) The plaintiff may be mistaken as to the nature of the case or the legal theory on which he or she can prevail, but if the essential facts of some valid cause of action are alleged, the complaint is good against a general demurrer. (Weil & Brown, Cal.

Prac. Guide: Civ. Proc. Before Trial § 7:41 (hereafter Weil & Brown), citing Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Tile Guaranty Co. (1989) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38-39.) All that is necessary as against a general demurrer is to plead facts showing that the plaintiff may be entitled to some relief. In passing upon the sufficiency of a pleading, its allegations must be liberally construed with a view to substantial justice between the parties.” (Fundin v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co. (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 951, 955; Michaelian v.

State Compensation Insurance Fund (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1104-1105.) The complaint includes matters shown in attached exhibits and incorporated by reference. (Frantz v. Blackwell (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 91, 94.) No other extrinsic evidence can be considered. (Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.) A demurrer predicated on a complaint’s failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action (Code of Civ. Proc. §430.10, subd. (e)) should be granted only when the facts alleged on the face of the complaint fail to state any valid claim entitled to the plaintiff or disclose a complete defense to relief.

Even if a plaintiff is mistaken as to the nature of the case or the legal theory on which he/she could prevail, the complaint is good against a general demurrer if the essential facts allege some valid cause of action. (Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co. (1973) 9 Cal.3d 566, 572.) Leave to Amend Courts are very liberal in permitting amendments, not only where a complaint is defective in form, but also where substantive defects are apparent: “Liberality in permitting amendment is

the rule, if a fair opportunity to correct any defect has not been given.” (Angie M. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1227.) It is an abuse of discretion for the court to deny leave to amend where there is any reasonable possibility that plaintiff can state a good cause of action. (Bounds v. Superior Court (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 468, 484 [court should grant leave to amend if in all probability plaintiff will cure defect].) However, no abuse of discretion will be found unless a potentially effective amendment is “both apparent and consistent with the plaintiff’s theory of the case.” (Camsi IV v.

Hunter Technology Corp. (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1525, 1542.) “Leave to amend should be denied where the facts are not in dispute and the nature of the claim is clear, but no liability exists under substantive law.” (Lawrence v. Bank of America (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 431, 436 (emphasis added); Schonfeldt v. State of Calif. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1465 [if no liability as a matter of law, leave to amend should not be granted].) First Cause of Action California Civil Code Section 1942.4 states in pertinent part: A landlord of a dwelling may not demand rent, collect rent, issue a notice of a rent increase, or issue a three-day notice to pay rent or quit pursuant to subdivision (2) of Section 1161 of the Code of Civil Procedure, if all of the following conditions exist prior to the landlord’s demand or notice: The dwelling substantially lacks any of the affirmative standard characteristics listed in Section 1941.1 or violates Section 17920.10 of the Health and Safety Code, or is deemed and declared substandard as set forth in Section 17920.3 of the Health and Safety Code because conditions listed in that section exist to an extent that endangers the life, limb, health, property, safety, or welfare of the public or the occupants of the dwelling.

A public officer or employee who is responsible for the enforcement of any housing law, after inspecting the premises, has notified the landlord or the landlord’s agent in writing of his or her obligations to abate the nuisance or repair the substandard conditions. The conditions have existed and have not been abated 35 days beyond the date of service of the notice specified in paragraph (2) and the delay is without good cause. For purposes of this subdivision, service shall be complete at the time of deposit in the United States mail.

The conditions were not caused by an act or omission of the tenant or lessee in violation of Section 1929 or 1941.2. (CC§1942.4(a)(1)(2)(3)(4))

The Complaint indicates that, among other problems, the plumbing was constantly clogged, the windows were missing screens, and the flooring was damaged, detached, and mold infested. (Compl. at ¶ 105.) These conditions violate section 1941.1. Plaintiffs further contend

that the conditions were not caused by them. (Compl. at ¶ 106.) Finally, the Complaint indicates that a public housing officer and health inspector provided Defendants with written notice of their obligation to repair the “prohibited conditions” and that Defendants did not repair the conditions within 35 days. Furthermore, it is alleged that Defendants continued to demand and collect rent. (Compl. at ¶¶ 107-109.) These allegations are sufficient to support the cause of action. Seventh Cause of Action “The elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress are: ‘(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct....’” (Christensen v.

Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 868, 903; Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 965, 1001.) “Behavior may be considered outrageous if a defendant (1) abuses a relation or position which gives him power to damage the plaintiff’s interest; (2) knows the plaintiff is susceptible to injuries through mental distress; or (3) acts intentionally or unreasonably with the recognition that the acts are likely to result in illness through mental distress.” (Kiseskey v. Carpenters” Trust for So.

California (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 222, 230.) A landlord’s knowing, intentional, and willful failure to correct a defective condition may sufficiently state extreme and outrageous conduct. (Burnett v. Chimney Sweep (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1069.) The alleged conditions of Plaintiffs’ residence are severe. (See Compl. at ¶ 168.) The Complaint also indicates Defendants were aware of the conditions, and they had the means, opportunity, and ability to abate the conditions, but failed to do so despite knowing the impact and effect it was having on Plaintiffs and their family. (Compl. at ¶¶ 102, 106, 118, and 167.)

The allegations further indicate Defendants’ conduct was extreme and outrageous and that they acted with a reckless disregard as to the probability that Plaintiffs would suffer emotional distress—allegations which are not conclusory in light of the specific facts alleged. (Compl. at ¶¶ 171-172.) Finally, the Complaint indicates Plaintiffs suffered severe emotional distress that was caused by Defendants’ conduct. (Compl. at ¶ 173.) The claim is sufficiently pled to withstand a demurer. /// ///

Eighth Cause of Action “The elements of a cause of action for negligence are well established. They are ‘(a) a legal duty to use due care; (b) a breach of such legal duty; [and] (c) the breach as the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury.’” (Ladd v. County of San Mateo (1996) 12 Cal.4th 913, 917.) “The negligence per se doctrine is codified in Evidence Code section 669, subdivision (a), under which negligence is presumed if the plaintiff establishes four elements: (1) the defendant violated a statute, ordinance, or regulation; (2) the violation proximately caused death or injury to person or property; (3) the death or injury resulted from an occurrence the nature of which the statute, ordinance, or regulation was designed to prevent; and (4) the person suffering the death or the injury to his person or property was one of the class of persons for whose protection the statute, ordinance, or regulation was adopted.’ ‘The burden is on the proponent of a negligence per se instruction to demonstrate that these elements are met.’” (Taulbee v.

EJ Distribution Corp. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 590, 596.) In the demurrer, Defendants merely note that negligence per se “is not a separate cause of action but creates an evidentiary presumption that affects the standard of care in a cause of action for negligence.” (Johnson v. Honeywell Internat. Inc. (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 549, 555.) However, under the “duty to liberally construe pleadings,” multiple “causes of action” that are not truly distinct causes of action but which are alternative counts or theories of liability should be treated as such. (Landeros v.

Flood (1976) 17 Cal.3d 399, 413 [“common law negligence and statutory liability may be pleaded in a single count”]; Bay Cities Paving & Grading, Inc. v. Lawyers’ Mutual Ins. Co. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 854 [“Count” means a group of related paragraphs in the complaint setting forth a legal theory of recovery. Counts “are merely ways of stating the same cause of action differently”]; CACI 418 [providing a jury instruction for negligence per se].) Ninth Cause of Action The Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) makes it unlawful to represent that goods or services are of a particular standard, quality, or grade if they are of another. (Civ.

Code, § 1770.) However, the “unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices” must relate to “a transaction intended to result or that results in the sale or lease of goods or services to any consumer....” (Ibid.) The term “goods” means “tangible chattels bought or leased for use primarily for personal, family, or household purposes ... including goods that, at the time of the sale or subsequently, are to be so affixed to real property as to become a part of real property, whether or

not they are severable from the real property.” (Civ. Code, § 1761, subd. (a).) CLRA claims, like UCL claims “must be stated with reasonable particularity, which is a more lenient pleading standard than is applied to common law fraud claims.” (Gutierrez v. Carmax Auto Superstores California (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1234, 1261, as modified on denial of reh'g (Feb. 22, 2018).) Furthermore, 30 days before commencing an action for damages under the CLRA, the consumer must notify the person alleged to have employed the unlawful conduct in writing and demand correction. (Civ.

Code, § 1782, subd. (a).) Civil Code section 1782, subdivision (b), then provides that “no action for damages may be maintained under section 1780 if an appropriate correction, repair, replacement or other remedy is given or agreed to be given within a reasonable time, to the consumer within 30 days after receipt of the notice.” However, an action for injunctive relief may be commenced without compliance with the notice requirement and not less than 30 days after commencement of suit for injunctive relief and after compliance with the notice requirement, the consumer may amend the complaint without leave to include a request for damages. (Civ.

Code, § 1782, subd. (d).) In the case at hand, there is no indication that Plaintiffs complied with the prelawsuit notice requirement and injunctive relief is not sought specifically as to the CLRA claim, only damages. Furthermore, the allegations only generically indicate that in placing the property on the market, Defendants represented that it was fit for human occupation or that there was an advertisement that implied as much, but both allegations are conclusory and not sufficiently particularly pled. (See Compl. at ¶¶ 191-192.)

Motion to Strike Code of Civil Procedure section 436, subdivision (a) states that matters that are irrelevant, false, or improper are subject to a motion to strike. “Irrelevant” means any immaterial allegation, and “immaterial” means (1) an allegation that is not essential to the statement of a claim or defense, (2) an allegation that is neither pertinent to nor supported by a sufficient claim or defense, and (3) a demand for relief not supported by the allegations. (Code Civ. Proc., §431.10, subs. (b)-(c).)

Additionally, all or part of a pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or order of the court may be stricken. (Code Civ. Proc., §436, subd. (b).) The grounds to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from matters that are judicially noticed. (Code Civ. Proc., §437.) Additionally, the court reads the allegations as a whole, with

all parts in their context, and assumes their truth. (Spielholz v. Superior Court (Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Company) (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1371.) Moot Portion of Motion The instant motion to strike is in part directed at allegations within the ninth cause of action under the CLRA. Given the tentative ruling to sustain with leave to amend as to the ninth cause of action, the motion is moot as to paragraphs 191, 196, 198, 199, and the prayer for relief under the CLRA. Request for Punitive Damages and the Related Allegations In the case at hand, the alleged property conditions were significant.

Defendants were aware of the conditions and had the ability and opportunity to make repairs but refused to do so. Defendants also knew of the effects of the conditions upon Plaintiffs but still failed to act. These allegations give substance to the claims that Defendants acted intentionally, willfully, oppressively, despicably, maliciously, etc., and the averments therefore support the prayer for punitive damages. As for the allegations that Defendants acted through their officers, directors, or managing agents, or the other allegations of agency, at the pleading stage generally all that is necessary are ultimate facts.

Courts have permitted “allegations which obviously included conclusions of law and have termed them ‘ultimate facts” or ‘conclusions of fact.’” (Dino, Inc. v. Boreta Enterprises, Inc. (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 336, 340 [see Peninsula, etc. [Properties] Co. v. County of Santa Cruz, 34 Cal.2d 626, 629 [one is the ‘owner’ of property]; Rannard v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 26 Cal.2d 149, 154 [act was ‘negligently’ done]; May v. Farrell, 94 Cal.App. 703, 707 [employee was ‘acting within the scope of his employment’].)

As a result, the allegations regarding agency and authority to act in this case should similarly be seen as proper ultimate fact, especially when Defendants would have superior knowledge of such facts and, again, that superior knowledge lessens the pleading standard. (Ibid.) As for the alleged ratification, case law also instructs that the failure to act can support a ratification theory. (See, e.g., Thomas v. Regents of University of California (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 587, 619 [ratification is generally a question of fact, but, for instance, an employer’s failure to “investigate or respond to charges that an employee has committed an intentional tort” or the employer’s “failure to discharge the employee may be evidence of ratification” by the employer”].)

Such a failure to act is alleged in this case and to the extent Defendants continued to employ its agents that refused to act despite the known facts and complaints, Defendants’ continued employment of those individuals and the failure to act (e.g. correct the conditions) can be seen as ratification and the continued employment could also be seen as oppressive. (See, e.g., Compl. at ¶¶ 13 and 16.) Fraud Allegations As noted above, the allegations related to the CLRA are not sufficiently particularized.

That same analysis applies as to the claimed fraud asserted in paragraphs 58 and the generic references to fraud in the context of the allegations that Defendants acted with “oppression, fraud, or malice.” Request for Relief under Civil Code section 1942.4 As the claim premised upon Civil Code section 1942.4 is sufficiently stated, so too is the request for attorney’s fees and statutory damages. UCL Language Defendants take issue with allegations indicating they violated the UCL by engaging in unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent business practices.

Defendants also take issue with item no. 5 of the prayer, which requests restitution under Business & Professions Code section 17200. The Unfair Competition Law (UCL), as codified in Bus. & Prof. Code section 17200, et seq., prohibits any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business practice. The UCL is written in the disjunctive, which means a business act or practice can be alleged to be all or any of the three prongs. (Berryman v. Merit Property Management, Inc. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1544, 1554.)

The UCL was enacted “to protect both consumers and competitors by promoting fair competition in commercial markets for goods and services.” (Linear Technology Corp. v. Applied Materials, Inc. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 115, 135 [quoting Kasky v. Nike, Inc. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 939, 949].) To successfully state a claim for violation of Section 17200, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant engaged in unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practices. (Berryman, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 1554.) Moreover, a claim for violation of the UCL must plead with reasonable particularity the facts that support the statutory elements of the violation. (Khoury v.

Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 619.) In addition, a private plaintiff must be able to show economic injury caused by the unfair competition. (Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 310, 336.) By proscribing “any unlawful” business practice, the UCL essentially

borrows the provisions of other laws and makes violations of those provisions independently actionable. (Zhang v. Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 364, 370.) “Virtually any statute or regulation (federal or state) can serve as a predicate for a UCL unlawful practice cause of action.” (Gutierrez v. Carmax Auto Superstores California (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1234, 1265, as modified on denial of reh’g (Feb. 22, 2018).) Restitution is also available under a UCL claim. (Sepanossian v. National Ready Mixed Concrete Co. (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 192, 199.)

As a result, Plaintiffs could potentially recover the money paid to Defendants for rent as restitution. The motion shall therefore be denied as to paragraph 138 of the Complaint, except as to the generic reference to fraud. The motion shall also be denied as to item no. 5 of the prayer, which seeks restitution under section 17200. Request for Fees under Civil Code section 3304 Item 6 of the prayer Plaintiffs seek attorney’s fees under Civil Code section 3304, but that statute does not provide for attorney’s fees. “California follows what is commonly referred to as the American rule, which provides that each party to a lawsuit must ordinarily pay his own attorney fees” unless otherwise provided for by contract or statute. (In re FairWageLaw (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 279, 288.)

RULING (1) Demurrer is OVERRULED as to the 1st cause of action under Civil Code section 1942.4. (2) Demurrer is OVERRULED as to the 7th cause of action for IIED. (3) Demurrer is OVERRULED as to the 8th cause of action for negligence per se. (4) Demurrer is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND as to the 9th cause of action under the CLRA. The misrepresentation and fraud is not alleged with reasonable particularity, which is required. (Gutierrez v. Carmax Auto Superstores California (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1234, 1261, as modified on denial of reh'g (Feb. 22, 2018).)

There are also no allegations that Plaintiffs complied with the prelawsuit notice requirements. (See Civ. Code, § 1782.) (5) Motion to strike paragraphs 191, 196, 198, and 199 of the Complaint is MOOT (6) Motion to strike item no. 6 of the prayer for relief under the CLRA is GRANTED, since the claim is no longer viable. (7) Motion to strike paragraphs 13, 16, 55, 57, 59, 63, 64, 65, 67, 68, 93, 96, 101, 102, 123, 135, 121, 155, 168, 169, 170, 171, 174, and 175 in addition to item no.’s 4, 7, and 12 of the prayer,

is DENIED. Motion to strike is GRANTED in part as it relates to the references to fraud in paragraphs 13, 16, 55, 58, 59, 97, and 138. (8) Motion to strike as to paragraph 111 of the Complaint and item no.’s 1 and 6 of the prayer for relief is DENIED. (9) Motion to strike paragraph 138 of the Complaint is DENIED. Motion to strike is GRANTED as to the generic reference to fraud. The motion is also DENIED as to item no. 5 of the prayer, which seeks restitution under section 17200. (10) Motion to strike item no. 6 and the prayer for attorney’s fees under Civil Code section 3304 is GRANTED. (11) Plaintiff shall have 20 days to file and serve amended pleading. (12) Movant to give Notice.