KARLA IVETTE CARRILLO v. SOLAMONTE OWNER, LLC

deceptive and unfair business practices throughout Plaintiff’s tenancy. Defendants knowingly

misrepresented the condition of the property by concealing these issues. Defendants further acted

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unfairly by ignoring Plaintiff’s repeated complaints and refusing to remedy these hazardous

conditions. Plaintiff was subjected to dangerous living conditions through deceptive and unethical

means. Plaintiff was harmed, suffering physical damages, emotional turmoil, and economic

damages. (Complaint, ¶¶182-196.)

The CLRA is codified at Civil Code section 1750 et seq. Civil Code section 1770 describes

24 “unfair methods of competition and unfair acts or practices” that are deemed unlawful if

undertaken by “any person in a transaction intended to result or which results in the sale or lease

of goods or services to any consumer.” A plaintiff may recover under the CLRA when it is

established that they are a consumer who suffers any damage as a result of the use or employment

by any person of a method, act, or practice declared unlawful in section 1770. (Civ. Code, § 1780.)

To state a claim under the CLRA, the consumer must have suffered damages because of

the use or employment by the person of any method, act or practice declared unlawful. (Civ. Code

§ 1780; Meyer v. Sprint Spectrum L.P. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 634, 641 [“[A] consumer must experience

some damage, some type of increased costs, as a result of the [unlawful act] in order to have

standing pursuant to section 1780(a)”].) Civil Code section 1780, subdivision (a), states, “Any

consumer who suffers any damage as a result of the use or employment by any person of a method,

act, or practice declared to be unlawful by Section 1770 may bring an action against that person

...” Civil Code section 1770, subdivision (a)(7) provides representing goods or services are of a

particular standard, quality, or grade if they are not is another unlawful method of

competition/unfair or deceptive practice. Subdivision (a)(16) representing the subject of a

transaction has been supplied in accordance with a previous representation when it has not is

another unlawful method of competition/unfair or deceptive practice. Subdivision (a)(19) provides

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inserting an unconscionable provision in the contract is similarly an unlawful method of

competition/unfair or deceptive practice.

Causes of action pled under the CLRA must be stated with reasonable particularity, a more

lenient pleading standard than applied to common law fraud claims. (Gutierrez v. Carmax Auto

Superstores California (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1234, 1261.)

Defendant argues the complaint fails to allege any specific facts demonstrating how

Defendant’s conduct violated the CLRA and caused Plaintiff harm. Defendant contends the

allegations are overly conclusory and lack sufficient context.

Plaintiff alleges Defendant held out the property as fit for human habitation when it clearly

was not given the list of alleged conditions at the property. Sufficient particularity (less than the

specificity required for fraud-based claims) is pled. The Court overrules the demurrer to the ninth

cause of action.

Tenth cause of action for intentional influence to vacate. Plaintiff alleges Defendants

used force, willful threats, and menacing conduct that interfered with Plaintiff’s quiet enjoyment

of the premises and created an apprehension of harm. Plaintiff is informed and believes

Defendants engaged in a pattern and practice of harassing Plaintiff with intention of influencing

her to vacate the property. (Complaint, ¶201.) “Plaintiff alleges the Defendants have harassed

the Plaintiff by refusing to provide repairs, making threatening responses from the Defendants’

attorney.” (Ibid.) This conduct was undertaken with the intention of interfering with Plaintiff’s

quiet enjoyment and of leaving Plaintiff afraid of eviction and further retaliation. As a result,

Plaintiff has suffered general and special damages. Defendants by and through their respective

managing agents acted intentionally and maliciously for purpose of forcing Plaintiff to vacate.

(Complaint, ¶¶202-205.)

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This cause of action is brought under Civil Code section 1940.2, subdivision (a)(3), which

provides:

It is unlawful for a landlord to do any of the following for the purpose of influencing a tenant to vacate a dwelling...(3) Use, or threaten to use, force, willful threats, or menacing conduct constituting a course of conduct that interferes with the tenant’s quiet enjoyment of the premises in violation of Section 1927 that would create an apprehension of harm in a reasonable person. Nothing in this paragraph requires a tenant to be actually or constructively evicted in order to obtain relief.1

Defendant argues Plaintiff failed to cite any specific examples of threats, harassment, or

prohibited actions, instead cutting and pasting allegations from the sixth cause of action for the

breach of quiet enjoyment. In opposition, Plaintiff argues the alleged failures to repair support a

reasonable inference that Defendant intended to pressure Plaintiff to vacate or relinquish her rights.

The allegations here are simply too vague to support this claim. Failure to repair is not the

same thing as threatening or menacing conduct. The Court sustains the demurrer to the tenth cause

of action, but allows 15 days leave to amend as this defect is potentially curable.

Eleventh cause of action for retaliatory eviction. Plaintiff alleges she has not been in

default of the rent at all material times. Plaintiff suffered and continues to suffer mental stress,

severe emotional distress, property damage, anxiety, annoyance and discomfort, and fear of safety

and/or physical pain and injury. (Complaint, ¶¶209, 211.)

In connection with this cause of action, Plaintiff also cites several subdivisions of Civil

Code section 1942.5. These provisions prohibit eviction, rent increases, and more within 180 days

after certain triggering events, such as complaints about tenantability and more.

As with the prior claim, the allegations here are too vague as to demonstrate Plaintiff

suffered any “retaliatory eviction.” This is especially confusing because paragraph 1 of the

1 Civil Code section 1927, in turn, provides: “An agreement to let upon hire binds the letter to secure to the hirer the quiet possession of the thing hired during the term of the hiring, against all persons lawfully claiming the same.”

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complaint alleges Plaintiff remains a tenant at the unit. If Plaintiff has not been evicted then it is

difficult to see how she can bring a retaliatory eviction claim, but I reluctantly sustain the demurrer

to this claim with 15 days leave to amend in case Plaintiff is trying to plead one of the other

violations found in section 1942.5 rather than retaliatory eviction.

Twelfth cause of action for unjust enrichment. Plaintiff alleges Defendants collected rent

for the subject property despite knowingly failing to address numerous severe habitability issues

as described. Despite repeated complaints, Defendants took no adequate measures to remedy these

conditions, forcing Plaintiff to endure unsanitary and unsafe living conditions for an extended

period. Plaintiff contacted a former tenant of the unit and learned the defective conditions,

specifically the ongoing pest infestation, had been present for several years prior to Plaintiff’s

tenancy. It would be unjust and inequitable for Defendants to retain the benefits of the rent

payment without providing appropriate restitution. Plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer

actual and consequential damages, including but not limited to diminution in value of the leasehold

interest, emotional distress, physical injuries, and out of pocket expenses. (Complaint, ¶¶218-

224.)

“Although some California courts have suggested the existence of a separate cause of

action for unjust enrichment, this court has recently held that ‘[t]here is no cause of action in

California for unjust enrichment.’ Unjust enrichment is synonymous with restitution.” (Levine v.

Blue Shield of California (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1117, 1138, citations omitted; See Peterson v.

Cellco Partnership (2010) 164 Cal.App.4th 1583—a 4th Dist., Div. 3 case suggesting there is a

separate cause of action for unjust enrichment based on the Court’s outlining of the elements of

such a claim.) Under Peterson, the elements of an unjust enrichment claim are the “receipt of a

benefit and [the] unjust retention of the benefit at the expense of another.” (Peterson, supra, 164

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Cal.App.4th at p. 1593; See also Hirsch v. Bank of America, N.A. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 708,

721-22, [Based on equitable principles of restitution, the claim for unjust enrichment survived

demurrer because banks collected and retained excessive fees passed through to them by title

companies at the expense of the plaintiffs].) “A plaintiff may not, however, pursue or recover on

a quasi-contract claim if the parties have an enforceable agreement regarding a particular subject

matter.” (Klein v. Chevron U.S.A. (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1342, 1388.) “[I]f a plaintiff was

uncertain as to whether the parties had entered into an enforceable agreement, the plaintiff would

be entitled to plead inconsistent claims predicated on both the existence and absence of such an

agreement.” (Ibid.)

Defendant argues the unjust enrichment claim fails because it is not a proper cause of action

and because Plaintiff has not properly pled a restitution claim. However, Plaintiff adequately

alleges Defendant received and retained rent payment (a benefit) and unjustly retained it while

failing to provide habitable living quarters. Plaintiff may allege this as an alternative to a

contractual claim. The Court overrules the demurrer to the twelfth cause of action.

Thirteenth cause of action for fraud and deceit. Plaintiff alleges Defendants engaged in

fraud and deceit by misrepresenting and concealing material facts regarding the condition of the

subject property, including numerous habitability defects as described. They knowingly leased

the property to Plaintiff under false pretenses. Plaintiff repeats her allegations that a former tenant

indicated some issues had been present several years before Plaintiff’s tenancy. Defendants further

misled Plaintiff by willfully failing to remedy the habitability issues, despite receiving multiple

complaints, government-issued citations, and formal notices identifying urgent and hazardous

infestations requiring immediate pest control. Through these intentional omissions and

representations, Defendants induced Plaintiff to enter into and remain in a tenancy she would not

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have accepted had the true condition been disclosed. As a direct and proximate result of Plaintiff’s

reasonable reliance on Defendants’ misrepresentations, Plaintiff was subjected to hazardous and

inadequate band-aid repairs, knowingly performed by Defendants as part of a deliberate scheme

to defraud and deceive. As a result, Plaintiff has suffered damages as described. (Complaint,

¶¶226-230.)

“The elements of fraud that will give rise to a tort action for deceit are: ‘“(a)

misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity

(or ‘scienter’); (c) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting

damage.”’ [Citation.]” (Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 974;

see Civ. Code, § 1710.)

Each element for causes of action that sound in fraud “must be pleaded with specificity.

[Citation.] ‘The specificity requirements means a plaintiff must allege facts showing how, when,

where, to whom, and by what means the representations were made, and, in the case of a corporate

defendant, the plaintiff must allege the names of the persons who made the representations, their

authority to speak on behalf of the corporation, to whom they spoke, what they said or wrote, and

when the representation was made.’ [Citation.] However, ‘the requirement of specificity is relaxed

when the allegations indicate that “the defendant must necessarily possess full information

concerning the facts of the controversy” [citations] or “when the facts lie more in the knowledge

of the”’ defendant. [Citation.] The specificity requirement serves two purposes: ‘to apprise the

defendant of the specific grounds for the charge and enable the court to determine whether there

is any basis for the cause of action.’ [Citation.]” (Daniels v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (2016)

246 Cal.App.4th 1150, 1166-1167, disapproved on another ground in Sheen v. Wells Fargo Bank,

N.A. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 905; see Small v. Fritz Companies Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 167, 184 [policy

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of liberal construction of pleadings inapplicable to fraud causes of action].) The purpose of the

requirement that fraud be pled specifically is to “provide [] enough information for respondents to

know what purported falsehoods they must defend against. [Citation.]” (Murphy v. BDO Seidman,

LLP (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 687, 693.)

Defendant argues no facts are pled as to how Defendant allegedly knew of the purported

issues, and the allegations are therefore vague and conclusory. Defendant further argues Plaintiff

does not identify anyone who worked for or at Defendant’s direction who allegedly made the false

misrepresentation or concealed information.

In opposition, Plaintiff concedes specificity is required but argues the rules are relaxed

where relevant facts are within Defendant’s knowledge. Plaintiff argues she has adequately pled

her fraud claim.

Plaintiff needs more details to plead a fraud claim. Although Plaintiff alleges

misrepresentations were made, he never identifies who made them, when, by what means, etc.

Similarly, Plaintiff does not explain with any level of specificity who specifically concealed the

material facts, when they should have been disclosed, etc. The Court sustains the demurrer to the

thirteenth cause of action with leave to amend. Again, more specificity could potentially save this

claim.

Motions to Strike

A party may obtain punitive damages where he proves by clear and convincing evidence

that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice:

(1) “Malice” means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct2 which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.

2 “Despicable conduct” is essentially conduct that is so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched, or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decedent people. (Tomaselli v. Transamerica Ins. Co. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1287.)

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(2) “Oppression” means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights. (3) “Fraud” means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.

(Civ. Code, §3294, subd. (a) and (c).)

In a motion to strike punitive damage allegations, the ultimate facts showing entitlement

to such relief must be pled by the plaintiff that when read in context with the other facts alleged

sufficiently plead the evil motive required to recover punitive damages. (Clauson v. Superior

Court, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at p. 1255; Monge v. Superior Court (Crown Gibralter Graphic

Center, Inc.) (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 503, 510.) Facts of oppression, fraud, or malice must be

alleged. (Grieves v. Superior Court (Fox) (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166.)

To impose punitive damages against a corporate employer, the plaintiff must establish one

of the following: (i) the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and

employed him with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others; (ii) the employer

authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct; or (iii) was personally guilty of oppression, fraud or

malice. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (b).) In actions against the corporate employer, these employer’s

actions must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent.3 (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd.

(b).)

Defendant argues the claims for punitive damage are insufficiently pled because (a) there

are no allegations to warrant punitive damages against a corporation; and (b) a landlord’s failure

to remedy a defect or condition is insufficient to establish malice for the purpose of punitive

damages.

3 Managing agent is more than a mere supervisory employee; he is “someone who exercise[s] substantial discretionary authority over decisions that ultimately determine corporate policy.” (White v. Ultramar (1999) 21 Cal.4th 563, 573; Cruz v. Homebase (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 160, 167-68.)

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In opposition, Plaintiff contends the complaint alleges the misconduct was authorized,

ratified, or carried out by Defendant’s officers, directors, and managing agents. Indeed, Plaintiff

makes general allegations in this respect throughout the complaint. For example, in paragraph 47

Plaintiff alleges Defendants, individually and/or by and through an officer, director, or managing

agent, authorized or ratified the conduct for which punitive damages are sought and/or are

personally guilty of oppression and malice.

Defendant argues these allegations are insufficient at the pleading stage because no specific

individual is identified, and no facts are pled to demonstrate Defendant as an entity encouraged,

supported, or ratified the conduct of any particular individual. “When a defendant must produce

evidence in defense of an exemplary damage claim; fairness demands that he receive adequate

notice of the kind of conduct charged against him.” (G. D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court (1975)

49 Cal.App.3d 22, 29.) The allegations of corporate ratification/authorization are too vague under

the circumstances to put Defendant on notice of the specific conduct charged against him, as no

individual employee or agent is named in the complaint.

As for the sufficiency of allegations of malice, fraud, or oppression, Defendant cites to

McDonnell v. American Trust Co. (1955) 130 Cal.App.2d 296 for the proposition that a landlord’s

refusal to fix a despite knowledge of the potential consequences, absent other facts, is insufficient

to demonstrate malice. In McDonnell, the plaintiffs were tenants of a ground floor store in a multi-

storied building in which the landlord defendant maintained sole control of the roof and roof drains.

(Id. at p. 297.) The plaintiffs sought punitive damages after water entered their store, contending

the defendant was aware of the dangerous condition in advance and that it could cause damage but

failed to repair it. (Id. at pp. 298-299.)

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The Court held punitive damages were inadequately pled because the plaintiff only pled

“that defendant, aware of the defective condition and that such condition could cause damage,

refused to repair.” (Id. at p. 300.) “Calling this a ‘wilful’ failure to repair was not the same as

saying defendant acted with a wrongful personal intent to injure or in reckless disregard of the

rights of others. Nor did the words ‘reckless and wilful acts’ add anything of significance, limited

as they are by the words ‘as hereinabove particularly alleged.’” (Ibid.) The Court held at most,

the allegations sounded in negligence. (Ibid.)

Here, however, the copious allegations allege more than mere knowledge that failure to

remedy the conditions at the property could cause Plaintiff damage. Instead, Plaintiff alleges she

notified Defendants about the numerous violations, but Defendants failed to correct them, allowing

them to persist. (See, i.e., Complaint, ¶¶25-40.) The overall thrust of the complaint is that

Defendant allowed Plaintiff to live in squalor and failed to take action to abate the numerous issues

at the property. This is sufficient to allege oppressive conduct (“despicable conduct that subjects

a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights”) at the pleading

stage.

Nevertheless, the Court grants the motion to strike punitive damages with leave to amend

for failure to sufficiently allege corporate ratification.

Rulings

The Court rules as follows:

1. As for Defendant’s demurrer:

a. Note the demurrer is withdrawn as to the fourth cause of action;

b. Overrule the demurrer to the ninth and twelfth causes of action; and

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c. Sustain the demurrer to the tenth, eleventh, and thirteenth causes of action with

15 leave to amend.

2. Grant Defendant’s motion to strike punitive damage allegations with 15 daysleave to

amend.

Movant to give notice.

Dated-

____________________________ Judge

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