DOE vs CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, et al.

24CV025817: DOE vs CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, et al. 08/18/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint in Department 16D

Tentative Ruling

NOTICE:

Consistent with Local Rule 1.06(B), any party requesting oral argument on any matter on this calendar must comply with the following procedure:

To request limited oral argument, on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Department 16D Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-3056 by 4:00 p.m. the Court day before the hearing and advise opposing counsel. At the time of requesting oral argument, the requesting party shall leave a voice mail message: a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and that opposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below. If no request for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court.

Unless ordered to appear in person by the Court, parties may appear remotely either telephonically or by video conference via the Zoom video/audio conference platform with notice to the Court and all other parties in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure §367.75. Although remote participation is not required, the Court will presume all parties are appearing remotely for non-evidentiary civil hearings.

The Department 16D Zoom Link is https://saccourt-cagov.zoomgov.com/j/16146506749 and the Zoom Meeting ID is 161 4650 6749. To appear on Zoom telephonically, call (833) 568-8864 and enter the Zoom Meeting ID referenced above. NO COURTCALL APPEARANCES WILL BE ACCEPTED.

Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporter services at their own expense, pursuant to Government code §68086 and California Rules of Court, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed on the Court Reporter Services webpage available on the Sacramento Superior Court website at https://saccourt.ca.gov/general-information/court-reporter-servicestranscripts. Parties may contact Court- Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore available at https://saccourt.ca.gov/home/showpublisheddocument/227/639084034465370000.

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required

24CV025817: DOE vs CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, et al. 08/18/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint in Department 16D

to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

*** EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G STREET IN SACRAMENTO, CA 95814. ALL HEARINGS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 53 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 16D OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. ***

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendant California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s (“CDCR” or “Defendant”)[1] demurrer to Plaintiff John Doe’s (“Doe”) first amended complaint (“FAC”) is ruled upon as follows.

This case arises out of the alleged childhood sexual assault of Plaintiff by an employee of Defendant, denominated “Doe 1,” when Plaintiff was incarcerated. Plaintiff alleges that DOE 1 manipulated, coerced, and otherwise forced Plaintiff to submit to acts of sex, including pre-abuse grooming, forced kissing, forced touching, and forced sexual intercourse over a period from early 2002 through April 2003. (FAC ¶ 27.) As alleged, Defendant’s employees failed to provide or summon medical care for Plaintiff, including denying Plaintiff’s request for medical care after being sodomized by DOE 1 and when Plaintiff confided in his mental health counselor that he was being abused.[2] (FAC ¶ 56.)

Plaintiff alleges physical and emotional injuries as a result. (FAC ¶¶ 117–118.) The FAC includes six causes of action against Defendant for (1) negligence; (2) negligent supervision, training, hiring, and retention; (3) sexual battery; (4) assault; (5) violation of civil rights (Civil Code Sections 51.7, 51.9, 52, 52.1, 52.3 & 52.4); and (6) failure to summon medical care.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV025817: DOE vs CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, et al. 08/18/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint in Department 16D

Plaintiff commenced this action on December 17, 2024, and filed the FAC on November 25, 2025. As of the time of this hearing according to the Court’s Register of Actions in this matter, Plaintiff has served only Defendant despite naming several co-defendants. The Court notes that while Defendant filed a demurrer to Plaintiff’s original complaint, such demurrer was dropped on December 11, 2025, as a result of Plaintiff’s filing of the FAC. Thus, this is the first demurrer that the Court addresses and rules upon this action.

Defendant demurs to all causes of action on the grounds of statutory immunity pursuant to Government Code section 844.6. Plaintiff opposes.

Legal Standard

The function of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of the pleading it challenges by raising questions of law. (Salimi v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 216, 219; Nordlinger v. Lynch (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1259, 1271.) “A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters.” (SKF Farms v. Super. Ct. (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) Extrinsic evidence may not properly be considered on demurrer. (Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal. App. 3d 868, 881; Hibernia Savings & Loan Soc. v. Thornton (1897) 117 Cal. 481, 482.)

For the purpose of determining the effect of a complaint, its allegations are liberally construed, with a view towards substantial justice. (Code Civ. Proc. § 452; Amarel v. Connell (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 137, 140–141; Quelimane Co., Inc. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 43, fn. 7.) In this respect, the Court treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law, and considers matters which may be judicially noticed. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Poseidon Development, Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1111–1112.)

A demurrer may be sustained only if the complaint lacks any sufficient allegations to entitle the plaintiff to relief. (Financial Corp. of America v. Wilburn (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 764, 778.) “[P]laintiff need only plead facts showing that he may be entitled to some relief . . . [W]e are not concerned with plaintiff’s possible inability or difficulty in proving the allegations of the complaint.” (Highlanders, Inc. v. Olsan (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 690, 697.) A demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pled and the sole issue raised by a general demurrer is whether the facts pled state a valid cause of action, not whether they are true. (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591.) The Court draws all reasonable implications and inferences in favor of upholding the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV025817: DOE vs CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, et al. 08/18/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint in Department 16D

complaint. (Poseidon Development, Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 1112.)

Analysis

Unaddressed Causes of Action in Plaintiff’s Opposition

Defendant’s demurrer is directed to all causes of action in the FAC. Plaintiff does not specifically argue in opposition that Defendant can be liable based on the FAC’s first through fifth causes of action. (See Opp. at p. 8:2–4.) Rather, on at least two occasions Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s immunity arguments under Government Code section 844.6 “are therefore beside the point as to the Sixth Cause of Action” and the holding in Bitner “does not reach the Sixth Cause of Action.” (Opp. at 3:27–28; 6:27–7:1.)

The Court construes Plaintiff’s lack of direct argument regarding first through fifth causes of action as a concession on the merits of Defendant’s demurrer. (See D.I. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Super. Ct. (1964) 60 Cal.2d 723, 728, fn. 4.) Accordingly, Defendant’s demurrer as to the first, second, third, fourth, and fifth causes of action is SUSTAINED.

While the Court finds no opposition specifically directed to the first through fifth causes of action, the Court will grant leave to amend as to these claims in an abundance of caution. The Court grants leave to amend given that the first through fifth causes of action appear to rely upon many of the same general allegations as does the sixth cause of action. (See e.g., FAC at ¶¶ 41–52.) However, by granting leave to amend, the Court does not presently rule whether any of these causes of action may in fact be amended so as to survive a future pleading challenge.

Rather, the Court grants leave to amend given that this is the first pleading challenge that the Court has ruled upon and that the labels of causes of action do not in themselves determine whether leave to amend a cause of action may or may not result in a viably pled claim. (See generally, City of Stockton v. Super. Ct. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 730, 747.) Nonetheless, if Plaintiff does not intend to pursue its first through fifth causes of action, the Court expects that no future amended complaint will be filed in response to this order.

Sixth Cause of Action: Failure to Summon Medical Care

A public entity is immune from liability for injury to a prisoner. (Gov. Code, § 844.6, subd. (a).) An incarcerated juvenile is a “prisoner” within the meaning of Section 844.6.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV025817: DOE vs CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, et al. 08/18/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint in Department 16D

(May v. County of Monterey (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 717, 719.) As an exception to the rule of immunity, Government Code section 845.6 imposes liability on a public entity for injuries proximately caused by the failure to furnish or obtain medical care when (1) a public employee knows or has reason to know (2) that the prisoner is in need of immediate medical care and (3) the employee fails to take reasonable action to summon such medical care. (Castaneda v. Dept. of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1051, 1070.)

Plaintiff alleges that he was sexually assaulted by Defendant’s employee, that he requested medical care after an assault, and that he confided in his mental health counselor that he was being sexually abused. (FAC ¶ 56.) This alleges actual knowledge of the sexual assault and abuse by Defendant’s employees and a failure to summon medical care, the first and third elements of the claim.

Defendant focuses on the second element, whether Plaintiff was in need of immediate medical care, and also argues that the FAC fails to allege causation. Defendant contends that the FAC alleges injury only in general terms, far from the statutory standard to show a need for immediate medical care.

Section 845.6 creates in public employees a limited duty to summon care for prisoners. (Hart v. Orange County (1967) 254 Cal.App.2d 302, 306–307.) The statutory duty does not require public employees to be medical diagnosticians. (Watson v. State (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 836, 843.) Instead, “liability is limited to serious and obvious medical conditions requiring immediate care.” (Id. at p. 841.) In stating this rule, the Watson Court cited a case in which a person in jail complained of a bad headache and a case in which an arrestee, believed to be under the influence of a drug, hung himself. (Ibid. [citing Kinney v.

County of Contra Costa (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 761 and Lucas v. City of Long Beach (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 341].) Watson itself dealt with a torn ankle tendon that went undetected after x-rays and medical examination. Defendant also cites Castaneda, supra, which restates Watson’s “serious and obvious medical condition” standard.

On this caselaw and for the purposes of demurrer, the Court does not find Plaintiff’s injuries as alleged are categorically not “serious and obvious medical conditions” within the meaning of Section 845.6. Defendant’s cases are distinguishable. Castaneda and Watson were decided based on the actual provision of medical care, not on the failure to summon medical care. (Castaneda, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 1072; Watson, supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at p. 842.) Their statements of the rule are arguably dicta. Lucas

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV025817: DOE vs CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, et al. 08/18/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint in Department 16D

held that apparent drug intoxication did not require medical intervention. (Lucas, supra, 60 Cal.App.3d at pp. 349–350.) And Kinney held that a prisoner’s request “for something for a headache” cannot reasonably be deemed notice of a need for immediate medical care. (Kinney, supra, 8 Cal.App.3d at p. 770.) These cases do not require sustaining the present demurrer under the facts alleged in the FAC.

Section 845.6 requires that a public employee “take reasonable action” in the circumstances. (Gov. Code, § 845.6.) Plaintiff alleges repeated sexual assault and abuse. (FAC ¶ 27.) Sexual assault allegations cannot simply be equated as a matter of law to allegations of a bad headache or drug intoxication. Plaintiff alleges physical injuries. (FAC ¶ 114.) Taken as true, a juvenile’s report of sexual assault to a mental health counselor or his request for medical aid after being sodomized (FAC ¶ 56) may trigger the “modest standard of care” in Section 845.6, “the moral obligation of common decency and common humanity” to summon medical care for a person in need. (Hart v.

Orange County (1967) 254 Cal.App.2d 302, 307.) Taking the allegations as true, it may be unreasonable not to summon medical care for these alleged injuries. Although the FAC states physical injuries generally rather than specifically, the Court does not find on demurrer that the FAC fails to include allegations of a need for immediate medical care.

As to the issue of causation, tort liability is premised on the harmful conduct being a legally recognized cause of injury. (Lucas v. City of Long Beach (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 341, 350.) Section 845.6 “envisions liability for injury resulting from the failure to treat the physical condition requiring treatment and not for some other incidental injury that might have been prevented by the mere presence of medical personnel.” (Ibid. [emphasis added].) As applied here, Plaintiff alleges that Plaintiff suffered physical injury and pain, along with emotional trauma, after the assaults and as a direct result of the failure to summon care. (FAC ¶¶ 117, 118.) This is a sufficient alleged causal link for purposes of demurrer.

Defendant’s demurrer to the sixth cause of action is OVERRULED.

Disposition

Defendant’s demurrer is SUSTAINED as to the first, second, third, fourth, and fifth causes of action with leave to amend. If Plaintiff elects to file and serve an amended complaint, it shall do so no later than September 1, 2026.

Defendant’s demurrer is OVERRULED as to the sixth cause of action.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV025817: DOE vs CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, et al. 08/18/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint in Department 16D

Assuming Plaintiff does not file any amended complaint in response to this order, Defendant shall file and serve its Answer to the First Amended Complaint no later than September 8, 2026. If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, Defendant shall respond within the time provided for by the Code of Civil Procedure.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1019.5; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.)

[1] The FAC also names the California Division of Juvenile Justice as a defendant. The

Division of Juvenile Justice was a division of CDCR that the legislature closed effective June 30, 2023. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 736.5.) [2] In reply, Defendant contends that the sodomy allegations are a cut-and-paste error

from a complaint filed in a separate lawsuit in this Court. Defendant has not requested that the Court judicially notice this other pleading. By filing a pleading, an attorney certifies to the court on penalty of sanctions that to the best of the person’s knowledge and belief the facts alleged have evidentiary support. (Code Civ. Proc., § 128.7.) The Court accepts the allegations in the FAC as true on the record now before the Court.