THOMAS vs KUPPINGER, et al.

23CV006712: THOMAS vs KUPPINGER, et al. 01/28/2025 Hearing on Demurrer to First Amended Complaint in Department 53

defendants, and (5) the 1AC is also fatally uncertain. In support of this demurrer, Defendants filed a Request for Judicial Notice, asking the Court to take judicial notice of a declaration provided by Nick Wagner, Staff Services Manager of the Government Claims Program for the Department of General Service, which in part identifies the government claims presented by or on behalf of plaintiff Thomas in 2022, as well as an application he submitted in December 2022 for leave to present a late claim (which was not approved).

Opposition. In response to this demurrer, plaintiff filed a document entitled “Plaintiffs [sic] objection to Defendants [sic] Motion Requesting Judicial Notice in Support of Defendants [sic] Demurrer to [1AC] and Notice of Motion to Strike Said Pleadings Filed by Someone Other then [sic] Counsel of Record.” In this document, plaintiff first argues the present demurrer and supporting papers not only should be “vacated and stricken as moot” because plaintiff never received notice of Defendants having new counsel but also should be disregarded “as unsubstantiated,” while the 1AC’s allegations must be accepted as true.

Plaintiff adds that he has also submitted his “mail log records” and a declaration showing inter alia a government claim being mailed on 4/8/2022 and other mailings which are not referenced in the “bias[ed] and prejudiced” Wagner Declaration and that plaintiff’s application for leave to present a late claim “was denied without any reasoning.”

Plaintiff further asserts that statutory immunities do not apply because the 11th Amendment “does not forbid suing state officials in their individual capacities” and does not protect “local government and their agencies” and that the “intentional theftmisappropriation” was “done and resulted from a clearly established state procedure,” while qualified statutory immunity applies only where conduct does not violate “clearly established constitutional or statutory rights.” Finally, plaintiff insists that because of the Presiding Judge’s 2/28/2023 order requiring the former to “exhaust his administrative remedies before proceed[ing] with this civil action,” all “applicable time limits” were “legally stayed until the administrative remedies were resolved.”

Reply. Defendants concede plaintiff did submit a government claim but did so late, requiring him to obtain leave from the “Claims Board” to file a late claim and if needed, seek leave of court to be relieved of the claim filing requirement. However, plaintiff failed to do the latter after the “Claims Board” did not approve his application to file a late claim and thus, the current lawsuit is barred in its entirety. Defendants insist they are pursuant to Fowler v. Howell (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1746, 1752 permitted to request judicial notice of those records which fail to reflect plaintiff’s alleged compliance with the Government Claims Act and while the Wagner Declaration reflects two government claims by plaintiff in 2022, these were for “unrelated matters.” The reply adds that Defendants are immune from liability

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23CV006712: THOMAS vs KUPPINGER, et al. 01/28/2025 Hearing on Demurrer to First Amended Complaint in Department 53

“because they cannot be liable for acts or omissions of others,” but rather they are under Government Code §820.8 liable only their own wrongful acts or omissions. Finally, Defendants claim that plaintiff’s “opposition” does not address their demurrers based on uncertainty or the failure to plead facts sufficient to state a cause of action either for negligence or intentional tort.

Legal Standards for Demurrer

A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the pleadings, raising issues of law, not fact, regarding the form or content of the opposing party’s pleading. (Code of Civil Procedure §422.10 and §589.) A demurrer may only challenge defects on the face of the complaint or from matters that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) However, the face of the complaint includes facts contained in exhibits attached to the complaint. (Frantz v. Blackwell (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 91, 94.) A demurrer can be utilized where a complaint itself is incomplete or discloses some defense that would bar recovery. (Guardian North Bay, Inc. v. Superior Court (Myers) (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 963, 971-972.)

In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint against a general demurrer, courts treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. Matters which may be judicially noticed may also be considered. The complaint is to be given a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context. (Farmers v. Zerin (1997) 53 CaI.App.4th 445, 451.) Consideration of extrinsic evidence or facts asserted in the memorandum supporting or opposing the demurrer is improper. (Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.)

A demurrer may be sustained only if the complaint lacks any sufficient allegations to entitle the plaintiff to relief. (Financial Corp. of America v. Wilburn (1987) 189 Cal. App. 3d 764, 778.) “Plaintiff need only plead facts showing that he may be entitled to some relief, we are not concerned with plaintiff’s possible inability or difficulty in proving the allegations of the complaint.” (Highlanders, Inc. v. Olsan (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 690, 696-697.) “[Courts] are required to construe the complaint liberally to determine whether a cause of action has been stated, given the assumed truth of the facts pleaded.” (Picton v.

Anderson Union High School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726, 733.) Still, the plaintiff has the burden of showing that the facts pleaded are sufficient to establish every element of the cause of action. (See, e.g. Martin v. Bridgeport Community Assn., Inc. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1024, 1031; Sui v. Price (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 933, 938.) The allegations must be factual and specific, not vague or conclusionary. (Rakestraw v. California Physicians’ Service (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 39, 43–44.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV006712: THOMAS vs KUPPINGER, et al. 01/28/2025 Hearing on Demurrer to First Amended Complaint in Department 53

A demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pled and the sole issue raised by a general demurrer is whether the facts pled state a valid cause of action - not whether they are true. (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591.) Finally, a demurrer may only be sustained where it disposes of an entire cause of action. (See, e.g., Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119.)

Request for Judicial Notice

Defendants’ request for judicial notice of the Wagner Declaration (and the exhibits attached thereto) is granted. Although it is ordinarily true that the granting of judicial notice of certain records does not extend to the truth of the statements contained therein but is instead limited solely to the existence of such records (see, e.g., Johnson & Johnson v. Superior Court (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 757, 768; Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1569-70), Defendants have properly cited to Fowler v. Howell as expressly authorizing a public entity to request and a trial court to grant pursuant to Evidence Code §452(c) judicial notice of public records which are claimed to show noncompliance with the Government Claims Act (Fowler, supra, 42 Cal.App.4th at 1752- 1753.)

While the opposition papers assert that the aforementioned Wagner Declaration is “bias[ed] and prejudiced,” neither of these constitutes a ground which otherwise precludes the Court from taking judicial notice pursuant to Fowler or otherwise considering the Wagner Declaration in connection with this demurrer. Likewise, plaintiff’s suggestion that Mr. Wagner’s declaration is based on “a 2-day search” of records and thus improperly omits acknowledging plaintiff’s mailings on 4/19/2022, 7/6/2022 and 7/29/2022 reflects a misunderstanding of the declaration itself, which avers in Paragraph 4 that his search of records was for “all documents and records pertaining to any claims presented by or on behalf of Plaintiff Edward Thomas for incidents that occurred from between [sic] December 21, 2022, to December 23, 2021.” (Underline added for emphasis.)

The reason for this limitation is that plaintiff’s original and amended complaint specifically allege that the incidents giving rise to the current lawsuit actually occurred on 12/22/2021 and thus, submissions from plaintiff relating to events on dates outside the three-day period from 12/21-23/2022 would have no relevance to this disposition of this demurrer.

Discussion

At the outset, the Court acknowledges the present demurrer appears to have been prepared and filed by an attorney different from the one who had previously been representing Defendants in this action and plaintiff’s related contention that this demurrer should therefore be “vacated and stricken.” However, the Court declines

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV006712: THOMAS vs KUPPINGER, et al. 01/28/2025 Hearing on Demurrer to First Amended Complaint in Department 53

either to vacate or to strike the present demurrer on this ground since plaintiff has identified no legal authority which either authorizes or compels such relief under these circumstances. While plaintiff is certainly entitled to notice of Defendants’ filing of this demurrer, there is no law which requires plaintiff to receive advance notice that a different attorney from within the same firm or entity already representing Defendants in this action is now participating in their defense but in any event, the Court finds that Defendants filed and served on 10/16/2024 a “Notice of Change of Handling Attorney Within-Firm,” which indicates that Attorney Macfarlane has assumed handling of this matter on behalf of Defendants.

Because plaintiff has had a full and fair opportunity to respond to this demurrer and has failed to demonstrate that the alleged lack of notice of the change of attorney prejudiced his ability to fully respond to the merits of this demurrer and has indeed filed a comprehensive opposition addressing the merits of this demurrer, the Court shall reject plaintiff’s request to vacate and/or strike the present demurrer.

Compliance with Government Claims Act. As noted above, Defendants’ first ground for this demurrer is that plaintiff’s claims in this action are barred due to his failure to timely file a government claim.

California law generally provides that no suit for money or damages may be brought against a public entity or employee until a written claim has been presented to the public entity and has been either acted upon or deemed rejected. (Gov. Code §§945.4; 950.2.) Compliance with the government claims statute is mandatory and the failure to file a government claim is fatal to the cause of action against the public entity or employee. (See, e.g., Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Cnty. of Riverside (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 183, 188.) Indeed, compliance with the Government Claims Act is an element of a cause of action for damages against a public entity or employee. (See, e.g., State of California v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1244.)

Additionally, one bringing suit against a public entity or employee for money damages must present the government claim within six months of the date on which the cause of action accrues. (Gov. Code §§ 901, 911.2, 945.4.) Timely claim presentation is not merely a procedural requirement but actually a condition precedent to maintaining an action against a public defendant and thus, it is an element of the plaintiff's cause of action. (K.J. Arcadia Unified School Dist. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1238.)

The claims act requires the timely presentation of a written claim for money or damages directly to the public entity, and the rejection of such claim, as a condition precedent to an action against a public entity or a public employee acting in the scope of his/her employment. (Gov. Code §§ 911.2, 945.4, 950.2; State of California, supra, 32 Cal.4th at 1239.) Failure to plead facts showing compliance with the Act or an excuse for noncompliance subjects the complaint to demurrer. (Id., at 1245.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV006712: THOMAS vs KUPPINGER, et al. 01/28/2025 Hearing on Demurrer to First Amended Complaint in Department 53

In the case at bar, plaintiff’s original complaint not only alleged compliance with the applicable claims statute but also attached a copy of a government claim form dated 12/20/2022, a date just under one year from the date on which the subject incident is alleged to have occurred, 12/22/2021. Because this government claim dated 12/20/2022 was not filed within six months of the 12/22/2021 incident giving rise to this action and that plaintiff did not timely file any application to the public entity for leave to present a late claim pursuant to Government Code §911.4, Defendants’ demurrer to the original complaint was sustained.

The 1AC filed on 6/24/2024 similarly alleges plaintiff has complied with the applicable claims statute but does not include a copy of the 12/20/2022 government claim which had been attached to the original complaint. Curiously, the 1AC also asserts that plaintiff is “excused” from complying with the applicable claims statute for the reasons set forth on Pages 3-5, where plaintiff alleges in pertinent part that his prison mail had been obstructed and he has documents to prove he timely filed a government claim “in 2022 on several instances.”

Defendants now again assert that plaintiff has failed to plead facts sufficient to establish either his compliance with the claims statute or his being excused from complying with same as is permitted in Government Code §946.6. With respect to the former, Defendants cite to the Wagner Declaration to show that plaintiff submitted only two (2) government claims during 2022, one in April 2022 and the other in December 2022. By its own terms, the April 2022 claim relates to an incident occurring “between January 3rd, 2022 & January 18th, 2022,” several weeks after the 12/22/2021 incident giving rise to this action, and involving several correctional staff none of whom is named as a defendant in this suit.

The second claim in December 2022 does by its own terms relate to the subject incident on or about 12/22/2021 and recites facts similar to those alleged in this lawsuit but this claim is itself dated 12/20/2022, nearly one year later and well beyond the six-month deadline found in Government Code §911.2 for presenting a timely government claim. In fact, this 12/20/2022 claim actually includes a “late claim explanation” (i.e., why this 12/20/2022 claim was filed more than six months after the subject incident), so as to constitute an application to present a late claim as permitted by Government Code §911.4, but this application was not “approved.” To the extent plaintiff suggests he never received a response to his application to file a late claim, Government Code §911.6(c) states that such an application is automatically “deemed to have been denied on the 45th day” after its submission.

As such, whether his application to present a late claim was expressly denied or otherwise “deemed to have been denied” pursuant to §911.6(c), plaintiff was then obliged to file with this Court a petition pursuant to Government Code §946.6 to be excused from the requirement of presenting a government claim but he has not alleged he has done so.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV006712: THOMAS vs KUPPINGER, et al. 01/28/2025 Hearing on Demurrer to First Amended Complaint in Department 53

This Court finds that the foregoing facts, established by the Wagner Declaration for which judicial notice has been requested and granted, are sufficient to demonstrate plaintiff has failed to timely file a government claim within six months of the subject incident and has also failed to plead facts showing he has been excused from the requirement of filing a government claim pursuant to Government Code §946.6 or otherwise. The opposition’s argument about the Wagner Declaration failing to account for a government claim which plaintiff mailed on 4/8/2022 does not withstand scrutiny insofar as Paragraph 5 of the Wagner Declaration specifically discusses the April 2022 claim (attached as Ex. 1) which is itself dated 4/8/2022, bears a 4/8/2022 postmark, was received on 4/11/2022.

However, as explained above, this 4/8/2022 claim which plaintiff insists was not addressed by the Wagner Declaration is not pertinent to the current litigation as it expressly refers to events which neither occurred in December 2021 nor involved any of the individuals now named as defendants in this suit. As such, plaintiff’s reliance on the 4/8/2022 claim in an attempt to show timely compliance with the Government Claims Act is unavailing.

Additionally, while plaintiff further asserts his application for leave to present a late claim “was denied without any reasoning,” the opposition cites no legal authority which requires specific reasoning be provided for denial of such an application, nor is this Court aware of such legal authority. (See, e.g., Gov. Code §911.6.) However, even assuming arguendo that the application for leave to present a late claim was somehow ‘improperly’ denied, plaintiff was thereafter free to file with this Court a petition pursuant to Government Code §946.6 for relief from the claim filing requirement set forth in §945.4 but the 1AC does not allege this was done, nor do this Court’s records indicate he did so.

As noted above, the 1AC does purport to allege on Pages 3-5 a variety of reasons why plaintiff is “excused” from complying with the Government Claims Act but plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that any or all of the reasons set forth constitute a legally-recognized “excuse” from the general requirement for timely filing a government claim separate and apart from making a timely petition as permitted by §946.6.

Thus, in the end, Defendants have shown that plaintiff has failed to plead in the 1AC facts sufficient to establish either his compliance with the applicable claims statute or his being excused from complying with same pursuant to the provisions of Government Code §946.6 or other California law. Accordingly, Defendants’ demurrer to the 1AC based on the Government Claims Act and plaintiff’s non-compliance with same shall be sustained.

Failure to Plead Facts. Defendants further assert in this demurrer that the 1AC fails to plead facts sufficient to state a valid cause of action for either negligence or intentional tort. With respect to the former, Defendants contend that the 1AC fails to plead facts sufficient to establish any of the essential elements of negligence (i.e., duty, breach, causation, injury) but instead merely alleges on Pages 7-11 that his personal items were

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV006712: THOMAS vs KUPPINGER, et al. 01/28/2025 Hearing on Demurrer to First Amended Complaint in Department 53

stolen, certain defendants failed to document some of the items and others lied about the items. While a review of the first cause of action for negligence reveals some limited allegations beyond what Defendants have described, the Court finds that Defendants’ characterization is fundamentally accurate inasmuch as plaintiff has failed to plead facts sufficient to establish each of the prima facie elements for a valid negligence claim including the existence of a duty of care owed to plaintiff, any individual defendant’s breach of such duty, and any breach of duty proximately causing and specific injury to plaintiff.

Coupled with the opposition’s failure to offer any discernible argument about how the 1AC pleads facts sufficient to establish each of the requisite elements and this being construed as a concession on the merits of the demurrer to the negligence cause of action (see, e.g., D.I. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 60 Cal.2d 723, 728, n.4), the Court sustains the demurrer to the first cause of action.

As to the second cause of action for intentional tort, Defendants contend it is deficient since it fails to identify what intentional tort is being alleged and to allege facts which are claimed to establish each of its essential elements, including the elements necessary to show any or all of Defendants actually committed “theft” as defined in Penal Code §484. Moreover, although the second cause of action makes reference to unspecified “thefts” and “falsifications” as well as to the negligence cause of action, this does not enable Defendants to ascertain exactly what is being alleged and does not constitute facts sufficient to plead a valid claim for any intentional tort.

The Court agrees and will sustain the demurrer to the second cause of action. Rather than pleading specific facts claimed to establish that any of Defendants actually committed a particular intentional tort, the second cause of action merely alleges in its entirety:

Plaintiff asserts that the acts and deprivations, thefts, falsification of State Document and records substanciates [sic] the Intentional and Malicious actions of each of these defenda[]nts within the “General Negigence [sic]” and “Exemplary Damages Attachement [sic]” falls within the Intentional Tort Action herein referenced are liable to Plaintiff for the monetary damag[]es and compensation for said damages and injuries under the State Civil Tort Claims Act and as such[,] Plaintiff is entitled to recover for the lost [sic] he’s sustained.

Because the foregoing fails to adequately plead against any particular named defendant the facts necessary to state a valid intentional tort claim against any named defendant and because the opposition nowhere appears to explain how the above-cited allegations are sufficient to state an intentional tort claim against one or more of Defendants (which is construed as a concession on the merits of the present challenge to the intentional tort cause of action (see, e.g., D.I. Chadbourne, Inc., supra, 60 Cal.2d

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23CV006712: THOMAS vs KUPPINGER, et al. 01/28/2025 Hearing on Demurrer to First Amended Complaint in Department 53

at 728, n.4)), the demurrer to the second cause of action is sustained as well. Although the opposition does suggest Defendants “violated clearly established statutory and constitutional rights of plaintiff of which a reasonable person would have known,” the 1AC does not currently appear to allege a cause of action for violation of any specific, discernible constitutional or statutory right and thus, the opposition has failed to set forth any valid basis for overruling this demurrer to the intentional tort cause of action.

Statutory Immunities. Defendants maintain they are immune from liability here because Government Code §820.8 provides that public employees may only be liable for their own wrongful acts and omissions unless a statute states otherwise, effectively precluding a public employee’s vicarious liability for the conduct of another including a subordinate. Thus, while the 1AC appears to allege that defendants W. Porter, Ramirez and Kuppinger “stole” or “misappropriated” certain personal property and defendant Hogan “maliciously” transferred plaintiff, the 1AC fails to set forth any factual or legal basis for imposing liability for the aforementioned conduct as against any of the other Defendants including Anderson, Heinkel, Peterson, Beeby, K.

Porter, Stigelmayer, Hogan and Lynch, none of whom is alleged to have “stolen” or “misappropriated” anything of plaintiffs or engaged in any other conduct on which a valid cause of action may be premised.

The Court agrees and will sustain the demurrer based on statutory immunity asserted on behalf of defendants Anderson, Heinkel, Peterson, Beeby, K. Porter, Stigelmayer, Hogan and Lynch only. The opposition does argue that Defendants may not rely on statutory immunities because the 11th Amendment “does not forbid suing state officials in their individual capacities” and does not protect “local government and their agencies” and because qualified statutory immunities apply only where the conduct does not violate “clearly established constitutional or statutory rights” but none of these points has any bearing on the specific immunity on which this demurrer is based -- Government Code §820.8.

Instead, as explained above, Defendants merely assert that the 1AC fails to allege defendants Anderson, Heinkel, Peterson, Beeby, K. Porter, Stigelmayer, Hogan and Lynch themselves engaged in any wrongful conduct which might give rise to a valid cause of action and that §820.8 precludes them from being vicariously liable for any wrongful conduct by defendants W. Porter, Ramirez, Kuppinger and/or Hogan, including their alleged participation in the “intentional theft” or “misappropriation” of plaintiff’s personal property.

Since the opposition fails to provide any legal argument or authority which shows otherwise and since this is construed as a concession on the merits of this demurrer based on §820.8 (see, e.g., D.I. Chadbourne, Inc., supra, 60 Cal.2d at 728, n.4), the demurrer on this ground is also sustained.

Disposition

For the reasons explained above, Defendants’ demurrer to the 1AC is SUSTAINED.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV006712: THOMAS vs KUPPINGER, et al. 01/28/2025 Hearing on Demurrer to First Amended Complaint in Department 53

Since the Court is presently unable to conclude that plaintiff has no reasonable possibility of pleading a valid cause of action against any of Defendants, leave to amend is GRANTED.

Plaintiff may file and serve an amended complaint no later than 2/28/2025. Although not required by Court rule or statute, plaintiff is directed to present a copy of this order when the amended complaint is presented for filing.

Defendants to respond within 30 days if the amended complaint is personally served, 35 days if served by mail.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc. §1019.5; CRC Rule 3.1312.)

NOTICE: Consistent with Local Rule 1.06(B), any party requesting oral argument on any matter on this calendar must comply with the following procedure: To request limited oral argument, on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Law and Motion Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-2615 by 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing and advise opposing counsel. At the time of requesting oral argument, the requesting party shall leave a voice mail message: a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and that opposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below.

If no request for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court. Unless ordered to appear in person by the Court, parties may appear remotely either telephonically or by video conference via the Zoom video/audio conference platform with notice to the Court and all other parties in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure §367.75. Although remote participation is not required, the Court will presume all parties are appearing remotely for non-evidentiary civil hearings.

The Department 53/54 Zoom Link is https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/my/sscdept53.54 and the Zoom Meeting ID is 161 4650 6749. To appear on Zoom telephonically, call (833) 568-8864 and enter the Zoom Meeting ID referenced above. NO COURTCALL APPEARANCES WILL BE ACCEPTED. Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporter services at their own expense, pursuant to Government code §68086 and California Rules of Court, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed in the Policy for Official Reporter Pro Tempore available on the Sacramento Superior Court website at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/courtreporters/docs/crtrp-6a.pdf.

Parties may contact Court- Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore available at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-13.Pdf. A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list, Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk.

If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV006712: THOMAS vs KUPPINGER, et al. 01/28/2025 Hearing on Demurrer to First Amended Complaint in Department 53

away. Once approved, the clerk will be forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.