Unknown v. Unknown

insisted on the application formula and that is how defendant was able to insist on and obtain the Satisfaction of Judgment. In other words, according to plaintiff, defendant did not pay the $15,000/month and an additional sum to satisfy the default judgment, but rather the $15,000/month and nothing more, and that was used to satisfy the judgment and therefore could not keep the rent current (even putting to one side the escalation clause).

The reply also notes that although the prior action did include an option that the lease be forfeited, that was because possession was being sought. When the parties agreed that defendant could remain in possession, that by definition ended the forfeiture option, and the lease remained. And plaintiff makes a compelling case on the math alone. These are strong points and the court wants to consider them.

The matter will be CONTINUED. Defendant will have an opportunity to file a sur-reply to address these issues. The court is concerned because the assertions in the reply are fundamentally inconsistent with the assertions made in the opposition under oath.

that this will have on the trial date, especially given the dismissals. The court's inclination is that it makes sense to try all of the case together, as all deal with what is apparently one road that traverses multiple properties. But if the trial date is jeopardized, the court might take a different view of whether consolidation is the best way to go. If plaintiff is claiming that the trial date will need to be vacated, plaintiff will need to be specific as to why in light of the common question of access to plaintiff's property and plaintiff's earlier position that consolidation is appropriate.

Case Number: 24SMCV04056 Hearing Date: August 26, 2026 Dept: I This case involves property.

Back in 2015, there was a fire at the property and the units became uninhabitable. The owner at the time, Leovy, allegedly told the tenants (cross complainants here) that he would rebuild the units and he would allow them to move back in when the construction was completed if they wanted to do so. Cross complainants then moved out of the property (which was necessary because of the fire) and lived elsewhere for a while.

In March 2024, cross defendant Fairfax purchased the property. Fairfax has stated that it would not honor Leovy's promise and seeks an order clarifying that there is no obligation on Fairfax to re-let the premises to the prior tenants. The prior tenants have sued to enforce the deal and claim that Fairfax's refusal to let them back is a violation. Fairfax has demurred to that cross complaint.

The parties agree that at the time of the fire (and now) the property was subject to certain rent control ordinances. The court notes that many of the cross complainants have different or slightly different facts--such as whether the agreement to re-lease the property made by Leovy is in writing or oral. But the gist is largely the same so the court discusses them together.

In a prior hearing, the court sustained Fairfax's demurrers with leave to amend. The court asked for certain clarifications and suggested that cross complainants try to avoid the kitchen sink approach. (The court notes