RICHARD MARTINEZ vs VAG TNRCA, LLC, A CALIFORNI...

William E. Weinberger Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court

HEARING DATE: 08/26/2026 CASE NUMBER: 26STCV13716 CASE NAME: RICHARD MARTINEZ vs VAG TNRCA, LLC, A CALIFORNI... MOVING PARTY: Defendant VAG TNRCA, LLC OPPOSING PARTY: Plaintiff Richard Martinez PROCEEDING: Motion to compel arbitration RULING SUMMARY: Defendant VAG TNRCA, LLC DBA Northridge Toyota 's Motion to Compel Arbitration is granted.

Background

On April 29, 2026, plaintiff Richard Martinez ("Plaintiff") filed a Complaint against defendants VAG TNRCA, LLC; VAG TNRCA INV, INC.; VAG TNRCA RE, LLC (collectively "Defendants"); and Does 1 through 50, inclusive, alleging causes of action for (1) Whistleblower Retaliation in Violation of Lab. Code Sec. 1102.5; (2) Whistleblower Retaliation in Violation of Lab. Code Sec. 232.5; (3) Whistleblower Retaliation in Violation of Lab. Code Sec. 98.6; (4) Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy; (5) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress ("IIED"); (6) Violation of Lab.

Code Sec.Sec. 226 and 512; (7) Unpaid Commission Wages; and (8) Violation of Lab Code Sec. 226. On June 15, 2026, Defendant VAG TNRCA, LLC DBA Northridge Toyota ("Northridge Toyota") filed this Motion to Compel Arbitration. On August 13, 2026, Plaintiff filed his Opposition. On August 19, 2026, Northridge Toyota filed its Reply. motion to compel arbitration LEGAL STANDARD California law incorporates many basic policy objectives contained in the Federal Arbitration Act, including a presumption in favor of arbitrability. (E ngalla v.

Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 971-72.) Section 1281.2 of the Code of Civil Procedure authorizes a party to file a motion for an order compelling the parties to arbitrate a controversy. Under section 1281.2, the Court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines: (a) The right to compel arbitration has been waived by the petitioner; or¿ (b) Grounds exist for the revocation of the agreement.

(c) A party to the arbitration agreement is also a party to a pending court action or special proceeding with a third party, arising out of the same transaction or series of related transactions and there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact. For purposes of this section, a pending court action or special proceeding includes an action or proceeding initiated by the party refusing to arbitrate after the petition to compel arbitration has been filed, but on or before the date of the hearing on the petition.

This subdivision shall not be applicable to an agreement to arbitrate disputes as to the professional negligence of a health care provider made pursuant to Section 1295. (Code¿Civ.¿Proc.¿Sec. 1281.2.) Doubts as to whether an arbitration clause applies to a particular dispute are to be resolved in favor of sending the parties to arbitration.¿(California Correctional Peace Officers Assn. v. State (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 198, 205.)¿The Court should order them to arbitrate unless it is clear that the arbitration clause cannot be interpreted to cover the dispute.¿(Ibid., Code Civ.

Proc. Sec. 1281.2 [". . .unless it determines that: (a) The right to compel arbitration has been waived by the petitioner; or (b) Grounds exist for the revocation of the agreement"].)¿Unless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise, the question of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate is to be decided by the court, not the arbitrator.¿(AT&T Technologies v. Communications Workers (1986) 475 U.S. 643, 649.) The right to arbitration depends upon contract; a petition to compel arbitration is simply a suit in equity seeking specific performance of that contract.¿(Engineers & Architects Association v.

Community Development Department (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 644, 653.)¿There is no public policy favoring arbitration of disputes which the parties have not agreed to arbitrate.¿(Ibid.) The party seeking to enforce the arbitration agreement bears the burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement.¿(Giuliano v. Inland Empire Personnel, Inc. ¿(2007) 149 Cal. App.4th 1276, 1284; Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 1281.2.) "With respect to the moving party's burden to provide evidence of the existence of an agreement to arbitrate, it is generally sufficient for that party to present a copy of the contract to the court. (Condee v.

Longwood Mgt. Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 218; Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1330 ["A petition to compel arbitration or to stay proceedings pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 1281.2 and 1281.4 must state, in addition to other required allegations, the provisions of the written agreement and the paragraph that provides for arbitration. The provisions must be stated verbatim or a copy must be physically or electronically attached to the petition and incorporated by reference"].) The trial court first decides whether an enforceable arbitration agreement exists between the parties and then¿determine whether the plaintiff's claims are covered by the agreement.¿(Omar v.

Ralphs Grocery Co. ¿(2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 955, 961.) In determining whether the parties actually agreed to arbitrate the dispute, general principles of California contract law help guide

the court in making this determination. (Mendez v. Mid-Wilshire Health Care Center (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 534, 541.) Once petitioners allege that an arbitration agreement exists, the burden shifts to respondents to prove the falsity of the purported agreement. (See Condee, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at 219.) If the existence of the agreement is challenged, "petitioner bears the burden of proving [the arbitration agreement's] existence by a preponderance of the evidence" (Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin.

Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413; see Espejo v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1058-1060.) The party opposing the motion to compel may present any challenges to the enforcement of the agreement and evidence in support of those challenges. [Citation]" (Baker v. Italian Maple Holdings, LLC (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1152, 1160.) The party opposing the petition to compel arbitration bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence any fact necessary to its defense.¿(Giuliano v.

Inland Empire Personnel, Inc.,¿ supra,¿at¿1284.) ¿In these summary proceedings, the trial court sits as a trier of fact, weighing all the affidavits, declarations, and other documentary evidence, as well as oral testimony received at the court's discretion, to reach a final determination.¿(Id.) DISCUSSION A. Northridge Toyota has shown the existence of an arbitration agreement. Under both the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") and California law, arbitration agreements are valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, except on such grounds that exist at law or equity for voiding a contract. (Winter v.

Window Fashions Professions, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 943, 947.) The party moving to compel arbitration must establish the existence of a written arbitration agreement between the parties. (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 1281.2.) In ruling on a motion to compel arbitration, the court must first determine whether the parties actually agreed to arbitrate the dispute, and general principles of California contract law help guide the court in making this determination. (Mendez v. Mid-Wilshire Health Care Center (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 534, 541.)

Northridge Toyota asserts that a valid written arbitration agreement exists as Plaintiff signed the Binding Arbitration Agreement ("BAA") on November 13, 2025. The BAA reads, in relevant part: By signing my name below and/or by accepting and/or continuing employment with the Company, I agree to pursue any claims I might have against the Company that currently exist or that may arise in the future exclusively through binding arbitration; similarly, the Company agrees to pursue any claims it might have against me that currently exist or that may arise in the future exclusively through binding arbitration.

The only exceptions to this requirement are identified in Paragraph 3, below. Our agreement to submit all claims to binding arbitration includes any claims that either of us may have against any third-patty beneficiaries as mentioned below.

By agreeing to binding arbitration, we waive our rights to have any and all claims decided in an administrative hearing, in a judge/benchtrial, and/or in a jury trial. I understand that our only recourse for pursuing claims is through binding arbitration according to the rules set f011h herein and/or those rules inc01porated by reference in this agreement. I understand I have the right to a1Tange for an attorney to represent me or to represent myself during the arbitration proceedings. I understand that neither I nor the Company may later decide that one of us does not want to arbitrate all such claims.

I understand that this agreement requires me to pursue all claims I bring against the Company (and any third-party beneficiaries) through binding arbitration and requires that the Company submit any claims it has against me to binding arbitration (except for those claims specifically excluded by this agreement). Our agreement to arbitrate includes any and all claims which arise out of the employment context or any other interaction/relationship we had, have or may have in the future. Those claims include, but a1e not limited to, any claim, dispute, and/or controversy that either party brings against the other (including, but not limited to, any claims of discrimination and harassment, whether they be based on the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, the Americans With Disabilities Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, claims pursuant to the California Private Attorneys General Act (''PAGA") unless prohibited by controlling law, as well as all other applicable state or federal laws or regulations) which would otherwise require or allow resort to any court or other governmental dispute resolution forum between myself and the Company, as well as any third-party beneficiaries of the Company.

Third-patty beneficiaries include the Company's owners, directors, officers, managers, employees, agents, partne1s, attorneys, sister-companies, subsidiaries, parent companies, joint-venturers, affiliated persons/entities, independent contractors, and parties affiliated with its employee benefit and health plans. These claims also include any claims arising from, related to, or having any relationship or connection whatsoever with my seeking employment with, employment by, or other association with the Company or third-party beneficiaries, whether based on tort, contract, statute, equity or otherwise. [. . .]

I acknowledge that the Company's business and the nature of my employment in that business affect interstate commerce. Thus, I agree that this agreement and my employment are governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) (9 United States Code sec. 1, et seq). The binding arbitration proceedings shall be governed by the rules listed herein or as supplemented by the Federal Arbitration Act and/or the procedures of the California Arbitration Act (California Code of Civil Procedure sec. 1280 et seq." including sec. 1283.05 and all of the California Arbitration Act's other mandatory and permissive rights to discovery).

The arbitrator shall have the same authority as a state or federal court would have to issue subpoenas to third parties for production of documents and for depositions, in addition to subpoenas to appear at any arbitration hearing. The California Arbitration Act shall only control the arbitration proceedings to the extent it is consistent with this agreement and/or the Federal Arbitration Act. (Decl. of Cristina Anderson ("Anderson Decl."), Exh. 1.)

Plaintiff's signature on the BAA is dated November 13, 2025. (Ibid.) Northridge Toyota meets its initial burden to show that an arbitration agreement between the parties exists; therefore, the burden shifts to Plaintiff. B. The arbitration agreement is subject to the FAA. As a threshold matter, the Court must¿determine¿which body of law - the FAA or the California Arbitration Act (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 1280 et seq.) ("CAA") - applies to the issues presented here as the two statutory schemes apply different standards and presumptions.

The FAA embodies a strong federal policy favoring arbitration. To assure uniform results as to arbitrability of disputes subject to the FAA, conflicting state law is preempted under the Supremacy Clause: "Federal law¿in the terms of the Arbitration Act governs . . . [arbitrability] in either state or federal court." (Southland Corp v. Keating ¿(1984) 465 U.S. 1, 12;¿ Preston v. Ferrer ¿(2008) 552 U.S. 346, 353. See also Muller v. Roy Miller Freight¿Lines, LLC (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 1056, 1062 [FAA preempts any state law rule that '"stand[s] as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA's¿objectives"].)

The BAA states clearly that it is governed by the FAA. (Anderson Decl., Exh. 1.) Though there is a statement regarding the CAA, the BAA states that the CAA shall only control the arbitration proceedings to the extent it is consistent with this agreement and/or the FAA. The parties have expressly incorporated the substantive and procedural provisions of the FAA. C. Unconscionability analysis of the arbitration agreement reveals one severable substantively unconscionable term. The doctrine of unconscionability refers to¿"an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party."¿ (Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v.

Moreno¿ (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1109, 1133.) It consists of both procedural and substantive components - "the former focusing on oppression or surprise due to unequal bargaining power, the latter on overly harsh or one-sided results."¿ (Ibid.)¿¿¿ ¿ Both substantial and procedural unconscionability must be present to invalidate an arbitration agreement; however, they do not need to be present in the same degree. (Armendariz v. Found Health¿Psychcare¿Services, Inc. ¿(2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 114;¿ Parada v.

Superior Court ¿(2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1554, 1570.)¿¿"Essentially a sliding¿scale is invoked which disregards the regularity of the procedural process of the contract formation, that creates the terms, in proportion to the greater harshness or unreasonableness of the substantive terms themselves. In other words, the more substantively unconscionable the contract term, the less evidence of procedural

unconscionability is¿required¿to¿come to the conclusion¿that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa."¿ (Armendariz,¿ supra, (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83 at 114.)¿ ¿ "The party resisting arbitration bears the burden of proving unconscionability."¿ (Pinnacle Museum Tower¿Association. v. Pinnacle Market Development ¿ (US), LLC¿ (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 247.) Plaintiff first argues that the BAA is a contract of adhesion and concedes that it establishes some degree of procedural unconscionability. A contract of adhesion is only sufficient to establish some degree of procedural unconscionability. (See Sanchez v.

Valencia Holding Co., LLC (2015) 61 Cal.4th 899, 915.) "By itself, an adhesion contract may present a low or modest degree of procedural unconscionability, but that can 'rise[] to a moderate level' when the party drafting the agreement fails to provide a copy of the applicable arbitration rules." (Nelson v. Dual Diagnosis Treatment Center, Inc. (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 643, 660 [internal citations omitted].) Plaintiff next argues that the BAA is substantively unconscionable in the following ways: (1) Paragraph 7 of the BAA requires Plaintiff to waive the right to bring a class, collective, representative or PAGA claim (unless prohibited by controlling law) seeking any relief on behalf of others which is unenforceable under California law and this issue cannot be rectified due to Paragraph 10 of the BAA ("Notwithstanding the same, the prohibition on the arbitrator hearing class claims and/or collective claims shall not be severable"); (2) the 60-day fee payment delay is substantively unconscionable in violation of Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.97's 30-day payment; and (3) Paragraph 5 of the BAA requires any arbitrator to be a retired judge, which is limiting.

Substantive unconscionability pertains to the fairness of an agreement's actual terms and to assessments of whether they are overly harsh." (Carmona v. Lincoln Millennium Car Wash, lnc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 74, 85 [citations omitted].) A contract term is not substantively unconscionable when it merely gives one side a greater benefit; rather, the term must be so one-sided as to 'shock the conscience.'" (Id.) The "paramount consideration" is the mutuality of the obligation to arbitrate. (Nyulassy v.

Lockheed Martin Corp. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1267, 1287.) Regarding the PAGA exemption, Adolph v. Uber Techs., Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104 (" Adolph ") is controlling. In Adolph, the Supreme Court held that, "[w]here a plaintiff has brought a PAGA action comprising individual and non-individual claims, an order compelling arbitration of the individual claims does not strip the plaintiff of standing as an aggrieved employee to litigate claims on behalf of other employees under PAGA" (Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at 1114.)

The waiver section of the BAA reads in full: . . .Those claims include, but are not limited to, any claim, dispute, and/or controversy that either party brings against the other (including, but not limited to, any claims of discrimination and harassment,

whether they be based on the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, the Americans With Disabilities Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, claims pursuant to the California Private Attorneys General Act (''PAGA") unless prohibited by controlling law, as well as all other applicable state or federal laws or regulations) which would otherwise require or allow resort to any court or other governmental dispute resolution forum between myself and the Company, as well as any third-party beneficiaries of the Company. . . [. . .]

I agree that the arbitrator only has the authority to hear and adjudicate my individual claims and that the does not have the authority to make the arbitration proceeding a class, representative or collective action, or to award relief to a group of employees in one proceeding, including claims brought pursuant to PAGA. This arbitration agreement shall not be construed to permit the consolidation or joinder of claims of other claimants, or to permit such claims to proceed as a class, representative or collective action (collectively "class claims").

I and the Company both agree that any challenge to the prohibition against consolidating the claims of others into a single proceeding, whether as a class, a collective action or otherwise, is a gateway issue and shall be determined by the trial court; and any substantive claims shall not be decided by the arbitrator until after the gateway determination is made by the court. By signing below, you expressly waive the right to bring a class, collective, representative or PAGA claim (unless prohibited by controlling law) seeking any relief on behalf of others.

Both the Company and I agree that any arbitration proceeding must move forward under the FAA (9 U.S.C. sections 3-4) even though the claims brought in court or otherwise may name, involve and/or relate to persons/entities who are not parties to the arbitration agreement and/or claims that are not subject to arbitration (such as PAGA). Thus, the court may not refuse to enforce this arbitration agreement and may not stay the arbitration proceeding despite the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure sec. 1281.2(c) and shall instead sever and stay the non-arbitrable claims pending the final adjudication of the arbitrable claims.

If any term or provision, or portion of this agreement, is declared void or unenforceable, it shall be severed and the remainder of this agreement shall be enforceable. Notwithstanding the same, the prohibition on the arbitrator hearing class claims and/or collective claims shall not be severable. (Anderson Decl., Exh. 1.) The class action waiver states that it applies "unless prohibited by controlling law." Thus, to the extent Adolph prevents Plaintiff's waiver of any representative PAGA claims, Adolph trumps the arbitration agreement.

Plaintiff next challenges the provision, "It is further agreed that the Company shall not be responsible for paying the arbitrator's fees and costs for the arbitration hearing sooner than 60 days before the commencement of the arbitration hearing." (Id. P. 6.) This challenge stems from the CAA. But, as discussed above, the FAA applies.

Plaintiff notes that the California Supreme Court has held that section 1281.97 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not preempted by the FAA, explaining that the California Legislature adopted this law to keep parties to arbitration agreements moving forward in arbitration by requiring the timely payment of arbitration fees. (Hohenshelt v. Superior Court (2025) 18 Cal.5th 310, 348-49 (" Hohenshelt ".) But Plaintiff ignores that the Court in Hohenshelt also held: To begin, we note that section 1281.98 does not mandate that arbitration fees invariably be paid within 30 days of the arbitrator's invoice regardless of the parties' preferences. (Cf. dis. opn., post, at p. 359 [doubting that "a statute may amend arbitration contracts by inserting a material term to which the parties did not agree"].)

The statute provides a default rule that invoices are "due upon receipt" and must be "paid within 30 days." (Sec. 1281.98, subd. (a)(1), (2).) But parties are free to contract for any due date they want by adopting their own "provision in the arbitration agreement stating the number of days in which the parties to the arbitration must pay any required fees or costs." (Id., subd. (a)(2).) Even after a dispute has arisen, they may mutually agree to "[a]ny extension of time for the due date" (ibid.); indeed, nothing in the statute appears to prohibit parties from agreeing on an extension even within the 30-day period after a due date has passed.

Under the statute, parties retain flexibility to establish and revise their own payment agreements to be "'enforced according to their terms.'" (Concepcion, supra, 563 U.S. at p. 344.) (Id. at 342.) The parties here have contracted to payment "no sooner than 60 days before the commencement of the arbitration hearing." (Anderson Decl., Exh. 1, P. 6.) Plaintiff does not discuss the difference between the "commencement of the arbitration hearing" and "due date." This is highlighted in Northridge Toyota's Reply.

However, the Court need not address the wording issue or Northridge Toyota's hypothetical injury argument, as Hohenshelt allows the parties to contract for the due date. Therefore, the 60-day payment provision is not substantively unconscionable. Plaintiff cites no authority that the provision requiring the arbitrator to be a retired judge is substantively unconscionable. Thus, there is only one possibly substantively unconscionable term. Under the BAA, the prohibition on the arbitrator hearing class claims is not severable.

A separate provision states that waiver of collective or class claims by the Plaintiff applies unless it is prohibited by controlling law. (See Anderson Decl., Exh. 1.) The Court in Securitas Security Services USA, Inc. v. Superior Court (2015) 234 Cal. App.4th 1109, 1125-26 (" Securitas "), held: Here, the relevant contract language, which the superior court did not address, is the nonseverability clause within paragraph No.

4. Immediately after the class action waiver, this clause provides: "Notwithstanding any other clause in this Agreement, the preceding sentence shall not be severable from this Agreement in any case in which the dispute to be arbitrated is brought as a class, collective or representative action."

(Italics added.) " 'The fundamental rule is that interpretation of ... any contract ... is governed by the mutual intent of the parties at the time they form the contract. [Citation.] The parties' intent is found, if possible, solely in the contract's written provisions. [Citation.] "The 'clear and explicit' meaning of these provisions, interpreted in their 'ordinary and popular sense,' unless 'used by the parties in a technical sense or a special meaning is given to them by usage' [citation], controls judicial interpretation." [Citation.]

If a layperson would give the contract language an unambiguous meaning, we apply that meaning.'" (Nelsen v. Legacy Partners Residential, Inc. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1115, 1129 [144 Cal. Rptr. 3d 198].) The parties' expressed objective intent, not their unexpressed subjective intent, governs. (In re Tobacco Cases I (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 42, 47 [111 Cal. Rptr. 3d 313].) Likewise, "'[w]hether a contract is entire or separable depends upon its language and subject matter, and this question is one of construction to be determined by the court according to the intention of the parties.

If the contract is divisible, the first part may stand, although the latter is illegal. [Citation.]' [Citations.] It has long been the rule in this state that '"When the transaction is of such a nature that the good part of the consideration can be separated from that which is bad, the Courts will make the distinction, for the ... law ... [divides] according to common reason; and having made that void that is against law, lets the rest stand. ..."' [Citation.] Thus, the rule relating to severability of partially illegal contracts is that a contract is severable if the court can, consistent with the intent of the parties, reasonably relate the illegal consideration on one side to some specified or determinable portion of the consideration on the other side." (Keene v.

Harling (1964) 61 Cal.2d 318, 320-321 [38 Cal. Rptr. 513, 392 P.2d 273], fn. omitted, italics added; see Lewis v. Shell Oil Co. (1934) 220 Cal. 80 [29 P.2d 413].) Thus, a contract is not divisible "where there is a showing that it was the intention of the parties to treat [their] agreement as an entire contract, and where it appears that their engagements would not have been entered into except upon the clear understanding that the full object of the contract should be performed ... ." (Yeng Sue Chow v.

Levi Strauss & Co. (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 315, 326 [122 Cal. Rptr. 816]; see Stern v. Sunset Road Oil Co. (1920) 47 Cal.App. 334, 340 [190 P. 651].) From the contracting language, the parties did not intend that class or collective action waivers would be enforceable if against California law. Accordingly, the BAA shows only a slight level of procedural unconscionability. D. The co-defendants named in Plaintiff's Complaint as "Northridge Toyota" Plaintiff argues that under Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2(c), the motion to compel arbitration must be denied as two other defendants are named and non-signatories to the BAA.

The other two defendants are served only and have not appeared. Plaintiff has alleged that they are the same entity: "Defendants VAG TNRCA, LLC, VAG TNRCA INV, INC., and VAG TNRCA RE, LLC operate as a car dealership that is doing business as Northridge Toyota." (Complaint P. 5.) The signature on the BAA for the employer of Plaintiff is listed as "Northridge Toyota." Plaintiff does not address that the entities he claims as operating as one business have signed the BAA under the business name.

Section 1281.2(c) provides that the Court shall order arbitration unless it determines that: A party to the arbitration agreement is also a party to a pending arbitration or special proceeding with a third party, arising out of the same transaction or series of related transactions and there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact. Under California law, when a party to an arbitration agreement is also a party to a pending court action with a third party, and there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact, the court has several options - (1) it may refuse to compel arbitration, (2) it may order intervention or joinder as to all or certain issues, (3) may order arbitration among the parties who have agreed to arbitrate and stay the pending court action or proceeding pending the outcome of the arbitration proceeding, or (4) it may stay the arbitration pending completion of the proceedings in the other forum. (Code Civ.

Proc. Sec. 1281.2.) The Court will order arbitration as "Northridge Toyota" has signed the BAA and, as alleged by Plaintiff in the Complaint and contended by Northridge Toyota in Reply, there is no separate employment conduct alleged by the other defendant entities that are not currently present in this action.

Conclusion

Defendant VAG TNRCA, LLC DBA Northridge Toyota 's Motion to Compel Arbitration is granted. Date: 08/26/2026 _______________________________ William E. Weinberger Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court | Home -->)" -->