MARTIN vs HOLT OF CALIFORNIA, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION

“Under both federal and state law, the threshold question presented by a petition to compel arbitration is whether there is an agreement to arbitrate.” (Sparks v. Del Mar Child and Family Svcs. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1511, 1517.) “Absent a clear agreement to submit disputes to arbitration, courts will not infer that the right to a jury trial has been waived.” (Id. at 1518.)

The moving party “bears the burden of producing ‘prima facie evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate the controversy.’” (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 165.) The moving party may meet this burden by attaching a copy of the agreement purporting to bear the opposing party’s signature to the motion or petition. (Ibid.) “For this step, ‘it is not necessary to follow the normal procedures of document authentication.’” (Ibid.) Cal. Rules of Court Rule 3.1330 also provides that “[a] petition to compel arbitration or to stay proceedings pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 1281.2 and 1281.4 must state, in addition to other required allegations, the provisions of the written agreement and the paragraph that provides for arbitration.

The provisions must be stated verbatim or a copy must be physically or electronically attached to the petition and incorporated by reference.”

“If the moving party meets its initial prima facie burden and the opposing party disputes the agreement, then in the second step, the opposing party bears the burden of producing evidence to challenge the authentication of the agreement. [Citation.] The opposing party can do this in several ways. For example, the opposing party may testify under oath or declare under penalty of perjury that the party never saw or does not remember seeing the agreement, or that the party never signed or does not remember signing the agreement. [Citations.] If the opposing party meets its initial burden of producing evidence, then in the third step, the moving party must establish with admissible evidence a valid arbitration agreement between the parties.” (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.)

A written agreement to submit a controversy to arbitration is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable consistent with standard contract principles. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.2; Badie v. Bank of

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV008137: MARTIN vs HOLT OF CALIFORNIA, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION 07/16/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 16C

America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 787.) Included among these is the long-accepted rule that ambiguities in an arbitration agreement, as in any other type of contract, must be interpreted against the drafting party. (Victoria v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 734, 739, 745-747.)

Discussion

Existence of Arbitration Agreement

Defendant has attached a copy of the Agreement, which was purportedly electronically signed by Plaintiff on August 29, 2024. (See Waugh Decl., Exh. A.). Accordingly, Defendant has satisfied its initial burden showing that an agreement to arbitrate exists.

In opposition, Plaintiff first contends that no arbitration agreement exists between the parties because she does not recall ever receiving, reviewing, or signing the Agreement. (See Martin Decl., ¶¶ 6-8.) Plaintiff also raises several arguments regarding the authenticity of the copy of the Agreement, including the following: (1) Defendant fails to identify the software system used to execute the Agreement; (2) the signature evidence is inconsistent and unreliable; (3) the signature dates on the Agreement are inconsistent; and (4) Defendant has not countersigned the Agreement.

Having challenged the authenticity of the electronic signature, the burden now shifts to the Defendant to prove the Agreement’s existence by a preponderance of evidence.

Authenticity of Electronic Signatures

With respect to proving the authenticity of an electronic signature, Civil Code section 1633.9 “addresses how a proponent of an electronic signature may authenticate the signature - that is, show the signature is, in fact, the signature of the person the proponent claims it is.” (Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Grp., Inc. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836, 843.) The statute provides: “An . . . electronic signature is attributable to a person if it was the act of the person. The act of the person may be shown in any manner, including a showing of the efficacy of any security procedure applied to determine the person to which the electronic record or electronic signature was attributable.” (Civ. Code, § 1633.9, subd. (a).)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV008137: MARTIN vs HOLT OF CALIFORNIA, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION 07/16/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 16C

In Espejo v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1047, the court found sufficient the defendant’s declaration, which set forth specific details regarding the electronic review and signature process for employee agreements; the security precautions regarding transmission (including the use of applicant’s unique password); and the actual steps an applicant would have to take to place his or name on the signature line of the agreement. (Id. at 1061-1062.) The court explained that the declaration “offered the critical factual connection” and “provide[d] the necessary factual details to authenticate the document” properly. (Id. at 1062.)

On the other hand, the court in Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Group, Inc. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836 found the defendant’s declaration insufficient. In Ruiz, “the phrases ‘Ernesto Zamora Ruiz (Electronic Signature)’ and ‘9/21/2011 11:47:27 AM’ appear[ed] in print on the third page, under the signature and date lines.” (Id. at 840.) The defendant’s business manager “summarily asserted that Ruiz ‘electronically signed’ the [] agreement ‘on or about September 21, 2011,’ and that the same agreement was presented to ‘all persons who seek or seek to maintain employment’ with Moss Bros.,” but did not explain how such signatures were verified. (Id. at 839.)

In opposition, the plaintiff stated that he did not recall signing the arbitration agreement and “if he had been presented with an agreement that limited his ability to sue Moss Bros. he would not have signed it.” (Id. at 840.) Moss Bros. submitted a second declaration in reply. Its business manager stated that, as part of an update to its employee handbook, all employees were required to log into an electronic human resources system with their unique login IDs and passwords and agree to the arbitration agreement. (Id. at 840–41.)

The court held that the evidence was insufficient because it did not explain “how she ascertained that the electronic signature on the [] agreement was ‘the act of’ Ruiz,’” and failed to address whether some other employee could have written Ruiz’s name, and whether the date and time next to the purported electronic signature automatically recorded the actual date and time of signing. (Id. at 843–44.)

Defendant submits the Declaration of HR Manager Kelly Waugh, who attests to the following:

15. After hiring Ms. Martin on August 28, 2024, I sent her an offer letter and subsequent arbitration agreement electronically through our HR software, HRIS, which administered sending the document to Ms. Martin for review and signature. Within this HRIS system, employees can see their time cards and their personal information in this system, they make requests for time off in this system, and we send out forms and information to employees with this system, among other things. Anything an employee signs is retained and saved in the system so they can go back and look at the documents that have signed at any time they elect to do so. Each employee has unique, employee only access to their account on the system.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV008137: MARTIN vs HOLT OF CALIFORNIA, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION 07/16/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 16C

16. I uploaded the arbitration agreement into HRIS, then sent the agreement to Ms. Martin electronically for signature.

17. The electronic system allows the employee to elect to either hand draw their signature or they can type it, and it makes a date stamp of when the signature was made.

18. HRIS has a messaging system, as well as my contract [sic] information provided, so that employees can ask any questions during the review and signing of the arbitration agreement.

19. Ms. Martin took the day, and into the next to review the offer letter and separate employment and arbitration agreement, and she executed the arbitration agreement electronically on August 29, 2024.

20. The arbitration agreement it [sic] is not a policy within the employee handbook. It is a standalone agreement with its own separate signature requirement. So it may be provided at the same time and in the same group of documents as the handbook, but it is not part of or a policy within the handbook or within any other document.

21. In regards to our system for transmittal and signature of arbitration agreements with employees, the electronic signatures are made and maintained in the HRIS system. Only myself, Kim Lightfoot, Vice President of Strategic Services, and payroll manager, Heather Arevalo, have access to records in the system, as administrators

22. As far as employee access, employees must access all documents in HRIS through their individual account. The employee has to choose their own password, and nobody else knows it as a result. If an employee forgets their password, they are prompted to reset it by the system, and nobody would have access to their reset password. If an employee asks for help resetting their password, the company can prompt a reset, but this just means the employee specifically will be sent a generic temporary password, and then once they use that to log into the system they are prompted set a new, updated password, which administrators do not have access to.

23. When an employee signs documents in the system, it will show the date of the signature. Even the administrators, they cannot modify an employee’s signature without it reflecting they made a modification. If an administrator makes any modifications, it will reflect as an action of the administrator, not the employee.

(Waugh Decl., ¶¶ 15-23.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV008137: MARTIN vs HOLT OF CALIFORNIA, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION 07/16/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 16C

Plaintiff questions the validity of the Agreement’s signature because it is dated August 28, 2024, whereas the electronic signature agreement that follows is dated August 29, 2024. (See Waugh Decl., Exh. A, pp. 5-6.) Plaintiff argues that the electronic signature on the Agreement cannot be valid if it predates the parties’ agreement to use electronic signatures. The Court disagrees. Civil Code section 1633.5 states in relevant part, “[the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act] applies only to a transaction between parties each of which has agreed to conduct the transaction by electronic means.

Whether the parties agree to conduct a transaction by electronic means is determined from the context and surrounding circumstances, including the parties’ conduct.” Here, based on the evidence before the Court, the parties used software to execute the Agreement, which allowed Plaintiff to save her progress and return to sign the documents at a later time. (Id., ¶ 15.) Based on this context, the parties intended to conduct the transaction (i.e., sign and submit the Agreement) by electronic means.

Plaintiff has provided no facts indicating that the parties intended to conduct the transaction other than by electronic means. Thus, that Plaintiff may have affixed her electronic signature to the electronic signature agreement one day after she affixed her signature to the main body of the Agreement is inconsequential in this context.

Plaintiff also argues the Agreement is not valid because it lacks Defendant’s countersignature. The Court rejects this argument. “Evidence confirming the existence of an agreement to arbitrate, despite an unsigned agreement can be based, for example, on conduct from which one could imply either ratification or implied acceptance of such a provision.' (Serafin v. Balco Properties Ltd., LLC (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 165, 176 [internal quotations omitted].) An arbitration agreement can be specifically enforced against the signing party regardless of whether the party seeking enforcement has also signed, provided that the party seeking enforcement has performed or offered to do so. (Civ.

Code, § 3388.) Here, Defendant drafted the Agreement, presented it to Plaintiff, and invoked the Agreement in this motion. These acts demonstrate Defendant’s mutual agreement to be bound by the Agreement. The Court is not persuaded by Plaintiff's argument that Serafin is distinguishable because the Agreement here contains a signature block for Defendant's countersignature.

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Defendants have carried their burden to show that the electronic signature is attributable to Plaintiff.

Unconscionability

Both procedural and substantive unconscionability must be present in order for a contract provision to be unenforceable under the unconscionability doctrine. (Parada v. Superior Court (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1554, 1570.) “But they need not be present in the same degree. ‘Essentially a sliding scale is invoked which disregards the regularity of the procedural process

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV008137: MARTIN vs HOLT OF CALIFORNIA, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION 07/16/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 16C

of contract formation, that creates the terms, in proportion to the greater harshness or unreasonableness of the substantive terms themselves.’ In other words, the more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa.” (Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychare Service, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 114.)

Procedural Unconscionability

The procedural aspect of unconscionability “concerns the manner in which the contract was negotiated and the circumstances of the parties at that time. [citations omitted] It focuses on factors of oppression and surprise. [citations omitted] The oppression component arises from an inequality of bargaining power of the parties to the contract and an absence of real negotiation or a meaningful choice on the part of the weaker party.’ [citations omitted]” (Morris v Redwood Empire Bancorp (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th at 1305, 1319; Gatton v. T-Mobil USA, Inc. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 571, 595.)

“‘The circumstances relevant to establishing oppression include, but are not limited to (1) the amount of time the party is given to consider the proposed contract; (2) the amount and type of pressure exerted on the party to sign the proposed contract; (3) the length of the proposed contract and the length and complexity of the challenged provision; (4) the education and experience of the party; and (5) whether the party’s review of the proposed contract was aided by an attorney.’” (OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho (2019) 8 Cal.5th 111, 126-127.)

According to Plaintiff, procedural unconscionability exists because the Agreement is a contract of adhesion and was presented to her on a take-it-or-leave-it basis with no opportunity to negotiate any term, no opportunity to consult counsel, and was “buried” within a 16-section employment contract. Plaintiff further argues procedural unconscionability on the grounds that the Agreement fails to identify a specific arbitration provider, that the Agreement’s arbitrator selection provision is vague, and that the Agreement fails to designate the location of arbitration.

As an initial matter, the Court notes that Plaintiff has not provided any evidence that the Agreement was adhesive or that it was provided on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Nonetheless, the Court finds that the lack of any opt-out provision in the Agreement suggests it was mandatory, or that it was at least presented to Plaintiff with the implication that it was mandatory, particularly since Defendant does not argue that Plaintiff could opt out of the Agreement. The adhesive aspect of an agreement, however, is not dispositive. The Court must also look to whether there

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV008137: MARTIN vs HOLT OF CALIFORNIA, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION 07/16/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 16C

is any other indication of oppression or surprise. (Peng v. First Republic Bank (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1470.)

Having reviewed the evidence, the Court finds that there is a mild amount of procedural unconscionability. It is apparent that the Agreement is a preprinted form containing legalistic language, and the arbitration provision appears under Section 10 of a sixteen-section Agreement. Further, the evidence shows that Plaintiff was hired on August 28, 2024, signed the Agreement that same day, and signed the electronic signature provision on August 29, 2024. (See Waugh Decl., Exh. A, pp. 5-6.) It is unclear whether Plaintiff was able to take additional time to review the Agreement prior to signing it. However, the arbitration provision specifically includes the following bolded language:

THIS ARBITRATION AGREEMENT IS A WAIVER OF ALL YOUR RIGHTS TO A CIVIL JURY TRIAL OR TO ANY OTHER ADJUDICATORY, ADMINISTRATIVE, OR GOVERNMENTAL FORUM OR PROCEDDING NOT EXPRESSLY EXCLUDED ABOVE AND A WAIVER OF ALL YOUR RIGHTS TO PARTICIPATE IN CIVIL CLASS ACTION LAWSUITS INCLUDING CLASS ACTIONS BROUGHT IN ARBITRATION OR ANY OTHER FORUM OR PROCEEDING FOR ANY AND ALL CLAIMS OR CAUSES ARISING OUT OF OR RELATING TO YOUR EMPLOYMENT (PRE-HIRE THROUGH POST-TERMINATION). ONLY TO THE EXTENT REQUIRED BY APPLICABLE LAW, THIS WAIVER EXCLUDES CLAIMS MADE PURSUANT TO THE PRIVATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL ACT (PAGA).

(Waugh Decl., Exh. A, p. 4.) The evidence also shows that Defendant’s HR software allowed Plaintiff to ask questions about the Agreement before signing it. (Id., ¶ 18.) Moreover, the Agreement is only six pages in length, and its operative language of the document is not particularly opaque, hidden, or difficult to understand, even for a layperson.

As for the Agreement’s failure to specify an arbitration provider or location, this does not heighten the level of procedural unconscionability because the Agreement contemplates Plaintiff’s ability to propose an arbitrator: “If we are unable to agree upon a neutral arbitrator, we will obtain a list of arbitrators from a neutral dispute resolution service, and strike names alternatively until one arbitrator remains.” (Waugh Decl., Exh. A, p. 4.)

Having found a mild amount of procedural unconscionability, Plaintiff must demonstrate a high degree of substantive unconscionability.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV008137: MARTIN vs HOLT OF CALIFORNIA, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION 07/16/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 16C

Substantive Unconscionability

“A provision is substantively unconscionable if it ‘involves contract terms that are so one-sided as to ‘shock the conscience,’ or that impose harsh or oppressive terms.” (Parada v. Superior Court, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 1573.)

Plaintiff argues substantive unconscionability on the following grounds: (1) the Agreement gives Defendant a unilateral veto over the arbitration administrator and its fee obligations; (2) Section 7 of the Agreement is non-mutual and carves out claims that only Defendant can bring against Plaintiff regarding Defendant’s confidential information; (3) the mandatory internal exhaustion prerequisite gives Defendant a “free peek” at Plaintiff’s claims; and (4) the Agreement covers an infinite duration pre-hiring and post-termination.

The Court first addresses Plaintiff’s contention that the Agreement provides Defendant with a “unilateral veto” that renders inoperative Defendant’s obligation to pay costs associated with arbitration. Plaintiff bases this contention on the following language in the Agreement:

[Defendant] shall pay all the costs that are unique to the arbitration’s forum, including the arbitrator’s fee. However, no payment shall be rendered by [Defendant] unless and until [Defendant] has expressly consented to the selection of the arbitration administrator, if any.

(Waugh Decl., Exh. A, p. 3.) However, prior to the language cited by Plaintiff and as discussed above, the Agreement also states: “If we are unable to agree upon a neutral arbitrator, we will obtain a list of arbitrators from a neutral dispute resolution service, and strike names alternatively until one arbitrator remains.” (Id. at p. 4.) Thus, the Agreement lays out a procedure whereby an arbitrator will ultimately be selected. It follows that Defendant will “pay all the costs that are unique to the arbitration forum, including the arbitrator’s fee” in every scenario. Accordingly, the Court finds no substantive unconscionability on these grounds.

Regarding the asserted carve-out provisions of Section 7 of the Agreement, Plaintiff ignores that the arbitration provision expressly preserves “the ability of either party to seek injunctive relief in an appropriate court of law.” (Waugh Decl., Exh. A, p. 3.) Second, Plaintiff fails to account for the arbitration provision’s integration clause, which states that it “sets forth the entire agreement between the parties and supersedes any and all prior or contemporaneous agreements and

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV008137: MARTIN vs HOLT OF CALIFORNIA, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION 07/16/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 16C

understandings, whether written, oral or implied, pertaining to the subject matter of this agreement.” (Id. at p. 4.) The arbitration provision of the Agreement broadly covers any dispute arising out of or related to Plaintiff’s employment, including breach of contract; grants the arbitrator authority to order any legal or equitable remedy available in a civil or administrative action; and expressly preserves both parties’ right to seek injunctive relief. To the extent Section 7 also purports to govern resolution of disputes arising from Plaintiff’s employment, the arbitration provision controls. And, even if the Court were to conclude that Section 7 was not superseded by the arbitration provision, the Court is not persuaded that the offensive portions could not be severed.

The Court also disagrees with the view that the Agreement gives Defendant a “free peek” at her claims. First, the arbitration provision is mutual, applying to both Plaintiff and Defendant. Second, Plaintiff is not required to participate in Defendant’s internal procedures. The sentence referring to the internal procedures uses the term “should,” not “shall,” meaning Plaintiff’s or Defendant’s use of Defendant’s internal procedures is optional, not mandatory. Third, the Agreement does not enable Defendant to gain a free peek at Plaintiff’s claims.

All that is required to begin the arbitration process is a party’s delivery “of a written request for arbitration to the other party within the time limits that would apply to the filing of a civil complaint in court.” (Waugh Decl., Exh. A, p. 4.) There is no requirement that the request for arbitration contain any substantive information or a description of alleged claims that would constitute a free peek at any party’s claims before any formal complaint is filed. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not established any degree of substantive unconscionability on this ground.

Lastly, in arguing that the arbitration provision of the Agreement lacks reciprocity through its open-ended duration for pre-hire through post-termination claims, Plaintiff relies exclusively on Cook v. University of Southern California (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 312. In Cook, the arbitration agreement required the plaintiff to arbitrate all claims “‘whether or not arising out of Employee’s University employment, renumeration or termination, that Employee might have against the University of any of its related entities; and all claims that the University may have against Employee.” (Id. at p. 317.)

The arbitration agreement further stated that it: “‘shall survive the termination of Employee’s employment, and may only be revoked or modified in a written document that expressly refers to the ‘Agreement to Arbitrate Claims’ and is signed by the President of the University.’” (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal upheld the trial court’s finding of substantive unconscionability based on the arbitration agreement’s broad scope that required arbitration of claims unrelated to the employment, infinite duration, and lack of mutuality as to claims against third party beneficiaries.

In the case at bar, the arbitration provision applies explicitly to “all claims arising out of or related to [Plaintiff’s] employment (pre-hire through posttermination)” and does not implicate third parties. (See Waugh Decl., Exh. A, p. 3, italics added.) Therefore, Plaintiff has not established a level of substantive unconscionability

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV008137: MARTIN vs HOLT OF CALIFORNIA, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION 07/16/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 16C

that would compel the same result under Cook.

In sum, the Court finds no level of substantive unconscionability.

Disposition

Defendant’s motion to compel binding arbitration is GRANTED. The arbitration shall be conducted in accordance with the arbitration provision of the Agreement.

This case against the moving Defendant is STAYED pending completion of arbitration.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1019.5; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.)

NOTICE:

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To request limited oral argument, on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Department 16C Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-1475 by 4:00 p.m. the Court day before the hearing and advise opposing counsel. At the time of requesting oral argument, the requesting party shall leave a voice mail message: a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and that opposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below. If no request for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court. Unless ordered to appear in person by the Court, parties may appear remotely either

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV008137: MARTIN vs HOLT OF CALIFORNIA, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION 07/16/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration in Department 16C

telephonically or by video conference via the Zoom video/audio conference platform with notice to the Court and all other parties in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure §367.75. Although remote participation is not required, the Court will presume all parties are appearing remotely for non-evidentiary civil hearings.

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